Some perceptive observations from “At the Convention in Chicago, Kamala Harris Can Seal the Deal” b y Jeet Heer at The Nation:

Writing in The Atlantic, the veteran political analyst Ronald Brownstein makes a powerful argument that this week’s Democratic National Convention could be one of the history-making ones, thanks to the fact that Kamala Harris, like Clinton before her, remains for much of the public an unknown quantity—a blank slate ready to be filled in. Brownstein contends that “no presidential nominee in decades has approached their convention with a greater opportunity to reshape their public image than Vice President Kamala Harris.”

Aside from the comparison with Bill Clinton, Brownstein also notes, “Harris is the first nonincumbent since Hubert Humphrey in 1968 to claim either party’s presidential nomination without first enduring months of grueling primary contests. Because Harris did not experience the setbacks and triumphs that come from waging such a fight, public impressions of her are uncommonly shallow for a nominee on the convention’s eve, strategists in both parties agree.”

While acknowledging that the current era of partisan polarization means candidates have only a narrow room to rise (or, conversely, to sink), Brownstein makes a convincing case for 2024 offering Harris the chance to solidify her standing in a way that is essential to her presidential bid.

Harris heads into the convention already riding a wave of enthusiasm. But if Brownstein is accurate in gauging the opportunity the convention presents, Harris has a chance to catch an even bigger wave—one that would ensure a solid electoral victory.

Heer notes further, “It seems America is hungry for a fresh face—a fact that has already allowed Harris to take a lead in polls and election models (notably that of Nate Silver, who was bullish on Trump but now sees Harris as the favorite). Political analyst Joshua A. Cohen estimates that more than 100 Electoral College votes that were previously leaning toward Trump have shifted toward Harris—an astonishing reversal that puts the Democrats in a far more favorable position.” Also,

Harris has the wind at her back precisely because many Americans who hate Trump had also been dispirited by Biden. So far, they seem willing to give Harris a chance. Harris’s challenge is to turn these feel-good vibes into a fully mobilized electorate ready to flood the polls on Election Day.

Harris will be helped by the fact that she is not just a fresh face in the campaign. She also has a gripping biographical story that speaks to the emerging America. Harris’s late mother was an immigrant from India, and her father is an immigrant from Jamaica. Donald Trump has tried to use Harris’s multiethnic family history as a wedge to divide Black voters by absurdly claiming that Harris is not really Black. But the meeting of Harris’s parents is a very American story, one that speaks to an optimistic vision of the country as a haven for all. It is also a story that serves as an eloquent rebuke to Trump’s xenophobia and racism.

So far, Harris has been chary of defining herself as anything more than a generic Democrat, a profile reinforced by her pick of Minnesota Governor Tim Walz. Harris has made a few policy pitches that are gratifyingly progressive, notably her promise to fight corporate price gouging on food and to provide financial support to low-income first-time homeowners. With the eyes of the nation watching the DNC, Harris would be well-advised to offer many more such policies to help economically struggling Americans. That would turn a feel-good event into durable political support.

Heer adds, “Barack Obama, the most skilled living orator in American politics, will take the stage on Tuesday. Former first lady Michelle Obama will speak the same evening, as will Harris’s husband, Doug Emhoff. Emhoff’s prominent role at the event stands in contrast to Melania Trump’s silent, sullen presence at the GOP convention. The following evening’s highlights include speeches from Bill Clinton and Tim Walz, Harris’s running mate. Harris herself will be the primary speaker on the final night of the convention on Thursday.”

Heer concludes, “The danger of a divided—and divisive—convention is real. Harris’s ability to navigate the Israel/Palestine divide is the first big test of her political acumen. Harris has a difficult task ahead of her, but if she can manage to secure the votes of wavering parts of the Democratic coalition, this convention will truly be historic.”

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

There’s been a lot of good news lately for the Harris campaign. Every national polling average has her ahead of Trump with margins ranging from 1 point in the New York Times average to 3.1 points in Nate Silver’s average (average lead = 2.1 points).

Silver’s state-level polling averages, which are relatively aggressive in incorporating new information, have Harris enjoying big improvements relative to Biden every swing state and now has her ahead in all these states except for Georgia and North Carolina. Moreover, his forecasting model makes her the favorite in Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin and tips her as a 57 percent overall favorite to take the Electoral College.

That’s the good news. The bad news is that Harris is still running significantly behind where Biden and Hillary Clinton were at this point in the 2020 and 2016 cycles. Using the RCP averages (538 does not provide 2016 averages but their 2020 average closely tracked the 2020 RCP averages), at this point Biden was ahead of Trump by 7.7 points and Clinton was ahead by 6.8 points. That compares to the current RCP average of 1.1 points.

Moreover, looking at the “Rustbelt three”—Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—which loom so large in this election, here are the RCP averages for this point in the cycle for 2024 Harris-Trump, 2020 Biden-Trump, and 2016 Clinton-Trump in that order and for each state:

Michigan: +2.4/+6.7/+6.8

Pennsylvania: -.2/+6.4/+9.2

Wisconsin: +1.2/+6.5/+9.4

Given that Clinton lost all three of these states in 2016 and Biden carried them by an average of only 1.6 points in 2020, this pattern does not inspire confidence. In general, and particularly with these data in mind, the race is still way too close for comfort.

Of course, just because the polls tended to underestimate Trump support in 2020 and 2016 both nationally and in key states doesn’t mean they are today. But that remains a possibility. As Sean Trende notes:

[T]here is a sound social science concept of which we should be aware. In fact, it is particularly dangerous right now. It is known as partisan non-response bias. The idea is this: When events favor one political side or the other, partisans become more (or less) likely to take a poll.

The intuition is this: After Biden’s disastrous June debate, Democrats really didn’t want to talk about the election. Republicans on the other hand, wanted to talk about nothing else. It was probably the best time to be a Republican in a presidential election since, well, Mitt Romney beat Barack Obama in the first presidential debate. Some of Trump’s poll lead in July probably was due to a newfound Republican eagerness to respond to polls.

At the same time, Democrats are overwhelmingly engaged right now. They have reason to believe they just avoided a near-death scenario and potential wipeout. They have a new presidential nominee, about whom they are overwhelmingly excited, and they like the vice presidential selection. They would love nothing more than to talk to you, or a pollster, about the 2024 election.

Unfortunately, there is no way to know for sure whether this is happening or not. But it could be in which the case the race, already close, may be closer than it looks. If you’re the Harris campaign you want to keep this in mind and take appropriate evasive action. “Kamalamania” may be more fragile than it appears.

A relevant cautionary tale is provided by an earlier example of a politician suddenly ascending to be their party’s standard-bearer and rocketing into the lead. This is the example of “Jacindamania” where Jacinda Ardern in New Zealand in 2017 replaced Labour leader Andrew Little who appeared to be headed to a landslide defeat (sound familiar?). Her candidacy caught fire and very soon her party was in the lead. But the conservative party, the National Party, counter-attacked, aiming withering fire at Ardern’s considerable vulnerabilities. By the time the election arrived the National Party actually out-polled Labour and Ardern by 7 points. (She was still able to form a government, but only by forming a coalition with New Zealand’s right-populist and green parties.)

This suggests a missing part of the current Trump campaign that is no doubt helping Harris—disciplined, withering fire directed at Harris’s vulnerabilities, of which there are many, has been lacking. Trump, by general consensus, has done a poor job on this politics 101 part of his campaign, indulging his proclivities for dwelling on various pet beefs, rather than concentrating attacks where they would most hurt his opponent (see this brutally effective ad from the McCormick Senate campaign in Pennsylvania for how this could be done). If he continues on the former course, the Harris campaign may continue to dominate; if he and his campaign take the latter path, Kamalamania may go the way of Jacindamania.

The question for the Harris campaign therefore should be how to armor themselves against such a turn in the campaign. This is where recovering the ancient wisdom of the Obama era could come in handy. Harris is perfectly willing to disavow previous unpopular positions on controversial issues and allude in very general terms to a current position that is closer to the center of public opinion. But what’s she’s not willing to do is piss off the left. And unless you’re willing to piss off the left, you can’t convincingly and durably occupy the center of American politics. That’s the real insurance against a counterattack by the GOP.

Obama understood this. He was willing to piss of the left in pursuit of a broader coalition. Here are a couple of examples but there are many more.

On immigration:

“We simply cannot allow people to pour into the United States undetected, undocumented, unchecked, and circumventing the line of people who are waiting patiently, diligently, and lawfully to become immigrants to this country.”

He added that those who employ people living in this country illegally “disrespect the rule of law.”

On energy/climate change:

“We need an energy strategy for the future—an all-of-the-above strategy for the 21st century that develops every source of American-made energy.”

He added that his administration had “quadrupled the number of operating oilrigs to a record high” and “opened up millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration.”

Different times, different politician for sure. And of course the progressive left within the Democratic Party is much stronger now than it was then. But the principle remains valid. If you want to define yourself as being in the center of American politics you have to be willing to piss off those who are constantly trying to push you out of the center.

This is particularly important for the Harris campaign among difficult demographics like white working-class voters, where recent improvement—particularly in the Rustbelt—has been key to the campaign’s improved fortunes. These voters could stick or they may be just visiting; much will depend on whether the Harris campaign can convince them she is truly a different kind of Democrat than what she used to be.

It seems like a long time ago but it really wasn’t when Democrats generally understood the need to aggressively capture the center and, if the left stood in the way, the need to push them aside. Clinton and Obama understood this and they prospered accordingly. What seems to have happened is that intense criticisms within the party of various policy actions of these leaders—some justified, some not—have induced a collective amnesia about that era’s political wisdom. As a result, today’s Democratic leaders are now absolutely terrified of pissing off the left even where it would be greatly to the party’s benefit to do so.

It’s time to recover that ancient wisdom. The stakes are high and the time is short. Democrats can’t afford to rely on Trump’s incompetence to cede them the center of American politics. They must seize it.

Political junkies talk a lot about various constituencies based on race, class, age, sex etc., and who they do and don’t support and why. But we tend to overlook one of the largest groups of American voters who share some unique concerns — people running and employed in small businesses, which had less than 12 employees on average in 2023. Many of them are working-class contractors, while some of them have managerial or professional training. But they are all engaged in private enterprise, often competing against huge corporations and sometimes working on government contracts. For starters, consider that 61.7 million people were employed in more than 33 million small businesses in 2023, according to the small Business Administration. 

So, please check out “How Kamala Harris can win over small businesses” by Gene Marks, founder of The Marks Group, a small-business consulting firm, which is cross-posted from The Hill:

Pew Research reports that two-thirds of the nation’s 33 million small-business owners have fewer than four employees. Also, 85 percent of them are white and 76 percent are men. More than half are over age 50.

Today, these small-business owners are not a happy bunch. Despite a surge in startups, lower inflation, a softening labor market, fewer supply chain issues and a growing economy, their sentiment and confidence levels are still at historic lows.

Not surprisingly, more than half of small-business owners in one recent survey say they believe another Donald Trump administration would have the best impact on their businesses, compared with only 14 percent for Joe Biden. In another recent survey, 33 percent of small-business owners believe that Trump winning the election will positively impact their business, versus 16 percent for Biden.

Today, Kamala Harris has taken over for Biden as the Democratic nominee. So now this is her challenge. Can she win over small-business owners this election year? I believe there is a way.

When government is friendly toward business, businesses feel more comfortable investing, hiring and taking risks. Taxing “the rich,” going after “the wealthy” to “pay their fair share” and vilifying “big corporations,” on the other hand, makes businesses seem evil. This may be a great plot line for a Hollywood movie or for populist fringe groups, but it’s not a terrific strategy for a government that needs to win over a large swathe of voters.

Remember that there are many small-business owners who, with their spouses, do make more than $400,000 per year (the “wealthy”) but use a substantial amount funds to reinvest in their companies. Also remember that countless small businesses — from pizza shops to landscapers — rely on big corporations and their employees for their livelihoods. And while it’s important to help business owners of color or in historically disadvantaged neighborhoods, it’s also important to recognize that 85 percent of us would not be included in that group. We need support and a little love too.

As I’ve previously written, the Republicans will work hard to make permanent the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which includes many provisions that benefit small-business owners. Without that, my tax bill personally will increase between 20 and 30 percent.

Harris has so far been mostly silent on this issue, so most of my clients are assuming she’ll continue with Biden’s policies, letting the tax cuts expire. My advice for her is to compromise and champion a few of the TCJA’s provisions that specifically benefit small businesses — most importantly the Qualified Business Income Tax. She should also support making permanent first-year deductions for capital equipment and research and development expenditures. That would make me, and many of my clients, much less concerned about a tax increase if she were elected.

Over the last few years, we’ve seen many new regulations emerge from various government agencies working under Biden’s direction that require all businesses to reclassify certain independent contractors, pay more overtime wages, eliminate non-compete contracts and be subject to new and more rules (and fines) for safety, harassment and discrimination violations. These are important. But they come with significant costs.

Big corporations can absorb these costs, which is why an overwhelming number of both Republican and Democratic small-business owners say business policies today favor large companies over small businesses. Small businesses struggle to keep up with and pay for these regulations. A blanket exemption on many of these rules for employers with less than 10 employees or so would win over many voters.

Isabella Guzman is perhaps one of the best Small Business Administration leaders I’ve ever seen. She’s worked hard and travelled extensively. She deserves a promotion to the Department of Commerce or Department of Defense, where she can do the same thing for the many small-business programs there that need attention. And she should be significantly involved in choosing her successor at the SBA to ensure that her work continues.

Harris also needs to set forth a plan on immigration, which needs to be a priority. Congress must compromise and pass a bill already. No one wants to see families physically deported, but everyone knows that illegal immigrants are breaking the law and creating a burden. Sort this out with Congress, secure the border and create a better legal path for citizenship. Small businesses need workers. The economy needs more entrepreneurs. Law-abiding business owners need help competing with those that flout the law and hire illegal workers. The country needs a strong president who will work with Congress to fix this major problem.

Finally, consider a new funding program for succession. As mentioned above, the majority of small-business owners are over the age of 50 (the average age is about 55). Many of my clients are thinking hard about exiting their businesses over the next few years, and many others have already gotten started. Sales of business are up more than 20 percent from a year ago. But tax, financing and other obstacles remain.

Harris would do well to support and expand the tax benefits for Employee Stock Ownership Plans, so that more workers can have equity in their workplaces and business owners can get help cashing out. Direct the SBA to create special financing programs for those looking to buy businesses. This is not only an enormous opportunity to provide for retirement but also a chance for younger generations — and even employees — to own businesses.

I’m a moderate Republican business owner. My vote is still up for grabs. Taking the above actions would go a long way toward winning my support — and the support of many other business owners — for Kamala Harris.

Kyle Kondik shares his insights about the effect of 2024 third party/independent presidential candidates at Sabato’s Crystal Ball:

A smaller number of “double-haters” naturally will have the effect of reducing the number of voters open to third party candidates. Back in 2016, the national exit poll indicated that third party voters generally had unfavorable views of both major party nominees. Trump and Clinton each won 98% of the voters who were favorable only toward them, with just 1% voting for the other candidate and another 1% voting third party and/or not answering the question. But 23% of the nearly one-fifth of voters who had negative views of each said they voted third party (or did not answer). So those kinds of voters provided the lion’s share of the total third party votes in 2016, which made up 6% of the electorate that year (Clinton and Trump won, combined, 94% of the total votes cast).

With a smaller number of double-haters likely this time, the total third party vote probably will be lower than 6% nationally. Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the most prominent third party candidate, has already seen his share of the vote dip into just the mid-single digits lately. In the final FiveThirtyEight polling average of the Biden vs. Trump matchup, Kennedy was getting about 9% of the vote. He’s now at about 5%.

Libertarian Gary Johnson—the former New Mexico governor and Republican presidential aspirant who was the 2016 cycle’s most prominent third party option—was polling at 8%-9% for much of the late summer. He ended up getting just 3.3% of the vote in November. With Kennedy now polling clearly worse than Johnson was at this point in the race, Kennedy may end up performing even worse than Johnson ultimately did (and ballot access remains a question for RFK Jr. and the other third party options—RFK Jr. was dealt a setback in New York on Monday, for instance).

Since Harris entered the race, it appears that she has pulled some Democrats back from the Kennedy column, and most polls now suggest Kennedy is hurting Trump more than Harris. This could actually represent a small but still hidden source of Trump growth—if one believes that RFK Jr. is still polling higher than what he’ll ultimately get in November, perhaps Trump will benefit from further Kennedy erosion just as Harris has benefited recently. The other noteworthy third party candidates—likely Green Party nominee Jill Stein, progressive academic Cornel West, and Libertarian nominee Chase Oliver—all appear likelier to see their level of national support measured in tenths of a percentage point as opposed to 1% or more come November.

It is likely that all of the these third party candidates know they aren’t going to be elected and that they are well-aware of their ‘spoiler’ potential. Some soul-searching about the point of their campaigns might serve them well.

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

The Democrats have had a good two weeks, nosing ahead of Trump in the national polling averages and even in some key swing states. Nate Silver’s prediction model shows the race now as basically a toss-up, with Harris actually on the good end of a 53-47 probability-of-victory split. That’s a dramatic improvement from where the Democrats were in the fading days of Biden’s campaign.

But it’s still a campaign on a knife’s edge that could go either way. Recognizing this, the Harris campaign has sought to remedy Harris’s vulnerabilities on a host of issues where her status as a liberal California Democrat and her publicly-stated past positions put her far away from the median American voter. They know the more voters view her as a moderate and close to the center of American politics, the better her chances of winning the election.

So far, this move to the center has revolved around several strategies. None of them seem very likely to remedy the problem to which they are addressed. They include:

(1) The “I take it back” strategy. Harris has a long record of taking unpopular, even toxic, stances on various policies that played well, at various times, with the progressive wing of the Democratic Party but are not remotely centrist. These include, but are hardly limited to, banning fracking, banning offshore drilling, backing a Green New Deal, mandatory gun buybacks, defunding the police and casting doubt on whether police really improve public safety, abolishing ICE, decriminalizing illegal border crossings, and abolishing private health insurance.

Do you, the median voter, see something there you don’t like? The Harris campaign says: no problem. Harris now takes it back! Whatever she said in the past that seems bonkers, she now enthusiastically disavows.

Of course, these position reversals raise many questions. Why did she have these positions in the first place? Why did she change those positions—what accounts for her conversion? And what is her position now on those contentious policy issues—besides not being for dumb position X? That leads to a second strategy in the moving-to-the-center campaign.

(2) The “No questions please—we’re Democrats!” strategy. The Harris campaign’s current approach to the logical and potentially embarrassing questions raised by these policy reversals has the beauty of simplicity: don’t answer them! In fact, avoid questions entirely by confining Harris’s activities to scripted rallies. After all, you can’t get in trouble for your answers if nobody gets to ask you questions.

The downside of course is it makes the disavowals less convincing, leaving voters wondering whether Harris’s views really have changed and, critically, whether and to what extent Harris’s positions are really centrist and close to their own.

The media has been remarkably tolerant of this strategy which has contributed to the almost 100 percent positive coverage of her campaign so far. While it doesn’t seem like that can last, the Harris campaign certainly hopes it will; they much prefer a “vibes” campaign with only vague policy commitments (the campaign website does not even have an issues section), super-broad themes like “freedom” and social media memes around policy-independent things like “brat,” “coconut tree,” and “weird.”

But perhaps not all the voters they need to reach will be susceptible to a vibes campaign, especially non-online, working-class voters in key states. That brings us to a third moving-to-the-center strategy, designed especially to reach recalcitrant working-class voters.

(3) The “Hey, we’re working class too!” strategy. This appears to be part of the thinking behind the selection of Minnesota governor Tim Walz as Harris’s running mate, instead of Pennsylvania governor Josh Shapiro. Shapiro, of course, was not beloved of the progressive left and their campaign against him and for Walz apparently had an effect. But Shapiro also, in terms of background and personal affect, does not code as working class in a way Walz does. The Harris campaign hopes that his persona will help them reach the working class, particularly white working-class voters, whose support they so desperately need in key Midwestern/Rustbelt states.

There are some problems with this. Walz, while he was a relatively conservative Democrat when he was representing a rural district in the House of Representatives, as governor of Minnesota he has been pretty much a down-the-line progressive. Indeed, in his current incarnation he is more a coastal liberal Democrat’s idea of what white working-class guys from the Midwest should be like rather than what they really are like.

Nor does his electoral record suggest unusual blue collar appeal. Shapiro in 2022 won his governor’s race in Pennsylvania by 15 points in a state with a +3 Republican partisan lean. He outran Biden’s 2020 performance in the state by 14 points. In contrast, Walz won his governor’s race in 2022 by 8 points in a state with a +2 Democratic partisan lean. And he ran ahead of Biden’s 2020 performance in the state but just a single percentage point. Walz also lost white working-class voters in his state by 8 points, 6 points worse than Shapiro did in his race.

An interesting analysis by Steve Kornacki underscores this point. He explains:

Forty-nine of Minnesota’s 87 counties might be considered “Trump surge” counties; that is, Republicans ran at least 20 points better there under Trump in 2016 and 2020 than they had in the 2012 election, when Mitt Romney was the GOP nominee. Those counties are all part of Greater Minnesota, many are rural, and virtually all are overwhelmingly white. The share of white adults without four-year degrees in those counties 72 percent to 85 percent.

Demographically, those counties almost perfectly fit the mold of the swaths of Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania where Democrats have lost the most ground in the Trump era. They were also, before Trump, politically competitive, and some even voted for Barack Obama in 2012. In other words, these are the first counties you’d look at to assess whether Walz has unique appeal where his party has experienced its most dramatic Trump-era slide.

As it turns out, Walz had no special appeal in these counties; his performance was similar to Biden’s but vastly inferior to how Obama did in 2012. Kornacki adds:

“What’s striking…is how different the Walz and Biden numbers are from Obama’s. When Obama won his two elections, he joined strong metro-area support with respectable showings (and sometimes better) among small-town and blue-collar voters. A primary feature of American politics since Obama has been the virtual disappearance of that kind of demographic and geographic balance from the Democratic coalition.

In his ’22 campaign, Walz didn’t restore that old balance. His coalition, instead, looked just like what has become the standard post-Obama coalition for Democrats. He rolled up massive margins in metro areas and took a beating practically everywhere else.

This is consistent of course with my analysis from last week, “The Harris Coalition Is *Not* the Second Coming of the Obama Coalition.” It’s also consistent with a fascinating new piece by the New York Times’s Jess Bidgood on Walz campaigning in Wisconsin, which suggests what the Harris-Walz campaign in the Midwest may really be about:

Eau Claire is a deep blue college town, and it’s far from clear that the appeal of the governor from the other side of the St. Croix will translate beyond liberal bastions like this one and expand his ticket’s competitive terrain. But as I wound my way through the crowd today, it occurred to me that the Eau Claires of the world might be the main point.

In recent years, Wisconsin Democrats have notched major victories by running up their numbers in strongholds like Madison, La Crosse and Milwaukee. That means Walz was here not simply to sound folksy, talk about hunting and reach out to rural voters. His purpose, electorally speaking, is to fire up Wisconsin progressives who wish their state was just a little more like his….

The Harris campaign is betting that leaning into Walz’s unabashed progressivism might work—and, given Wisconsin’s famous swinginess, that comes with some risk. But Dane County, the Democratic stronghold that contains Madison, is growing rapidly….

Tim McCarthy, 60, a teacher from the college town of Ripon, said he was thrilled both to see Walz and to be at a rally with “like-minded people.”

“There’s a lot of conservatism in northern Wisconsin that you’re not going to shake loose,” McCarthy said. “They’ll support Trump no matter what.”

But he thought that Walz would catch on in his town—and suggested that the campaign might not even need to bother with more conservative parts of the state.

Hmm. Very interesting, if questionable as a political strategy. In the end, an attempt to move to the center that does not involve actively embracing centrist, moderate positions—as appears to be the current Harris campaign strategy—may fall short of its political goals. Jonathan Chait makes the case well:

Rather than move to the center on policy, they [the left] hope nominating candidates with a reassuring personal affect and personal biography can reassure moderate voters.

Walz generates so much enthusiasm on the left in part because he represents the apotheosis of this strategy….

But at the end of the day, issue positioning matters a lot. There is a reason Walz is less popular in a light-blue state than Josh Shapiro is in a purple state—indeed, when Walz shared a ballot in his own state with the moderate Amy Klobuchar [2018], her victory margin (24 points) was more than double his (11.4 points). It’s not because Walz is less likable than Shapiro or Klobuchar. It’s because he’s less moderate.

Walz had a fairly conservative voting record in Congress, where he represented a red district. He used that record to win the governorship, and then moved sharply left. The lesson he seems to have taken from this experience is that there is no cost in adopting progressive positions across the board. “Don’t ever shy away from our progressive values,” Walz said on a recent call. “One person’s socialism is another person’s neighborliness.”

I can’t emphasize enough what a bad idea this is. On issues where progressive values are unpopular, and there are several, Democrats should definitely shy away from progressive values. For example, their stance on socialism, which is an extremely unpopular concept, should not be to liken it to neighborliness, but to say it’s bad and promise not to do it….

What the selection does…is forfeit her best opportunity to send a message that she is a moderate. She needs to take every possible opportunity between now and November to make up for that. Harris needs to adopt positions that will upset progressive activists. She needs to specifically understand that the likelihood a given action or statement will create complaints on the left is a reason to do something, rather than a reason not to.

That is an approach to moving to the center the Harris campaign has apparently ruled out. If that is the case, Donald Trump, with all his unattractive qualities and unforced political errors, is likely to remain competitive through November and, let’s face it, could easily win. As Chait puts it, somewhat wistfully, “I don’t want to bet the future of this country on a coin toss. I want to build a political coalition with a clear majority.” Unfortunately, it looks far more likely he’ll get the former than the latter.

One more time on the Walz veep selection, before other campaign topics dominate the presidential debate – Check out “Walz unifies the party, will bring working class voters back into the fold” by The Hill’s Max Burns, who writes that “Harris’ choice also did the impossible, uniting progressive and conservative lawmakers in Washington. Progressive Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) hailed Walz as an “excellent decision” and a leader who “won’t back down under tight odds.” Meanwhile, Sen. Joe Manchin (I-W.Va.) — no friend of the left — wrote on X that he could “think of no one better than Governor Walz to help bring our country closer together.”

That’s an impressive ideological range. Burns adds that “in selecting Walz, Harris has done more than just unify her party ahead of a major election. She’s found a running mate Republicans can’t seem to hit.” Of course, they will continue to attack Walz and they will score a few hits, which will resonate mostly with their hard-core supporters. It is hard to imagine cheap shots from the GOP ticket winning over many swing voters.

Burns explains further, “In a time when many Midwestern and Rust Belt voters are abandoning their ancestral loyalty to the Democratic Party in favor of Trumpian populism, Walz represents a vision of the Democratic Party that harkens back to its core farmer-labor progressivism. He’s built a political legacy by winning over exactly the voters Trump needs in November. That’s a nightmare for a GOP that has wrapped itself in working class rhetoric while coddling the world’s richest and most powerful business tycoons.”

Also, “As governor, Walz has also been strategic in his progressive priorities. He championed broadly popular proposals that often received bipartisan legislative support, including enacting universal free school meals, expanding paid family and medical leave, and passing universal background checks for gun purchases. A hunter and gun owner himself, Walz found a path to enacting serious gun safety reforms by reminding gun-owning Minnesotans that the NRA has left them behind in its quest to value firearms over human lives….“We can’t turn on the TV and have these things happen,” Walz said in 2017. “The NRA you see now is not the NRA when they were teaching us gun safety classes when we were growing up. It’s been a clear change from their position for advocating for responsible gun ownership to a position that is extreme and unhelpful to the conversation.”

In addition, “As a former high school football coach, a teacher and later a member of Congress, Walz has actually served the kinds of rural communities Vance pretends to be from. He speaks the language and understands the values in a way that can’t be faked. No wonder Trump and Vance are working overtime to try and minimize Walz’s down-home bona fides.”

Burns concludes, “The bigger question is whether Vance will risk his delicately-assembled public persona in a head-to-head debate with Walz. Trump’s campaign has in theory committed to a vice presidential debate, but quickly cast doubt on those plans when Joe Biden exited the race last month. Since then, Trump has repeatedly ducked calls for a debate anywhere except on friendly Fox News, likely reasoning that his campaign can hardly afford a major fumble this close to Election Day. It doesn’t sound like Trump is very confident in his running mate’s debating prowess.”

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

These are heady days for Democrats. After a near-death experience with the fading Biden candidacy they have been revived by the Biden-Harris switcheroo. The presidential race has tightened considerably and, though Trump is still favored to win, they’re feeling mighty good about themselves. Inspired by their historic standard bearer, exuberant partisans proclaim the second coming of the Obama coalition, which will decisively sweep away Trump and his deplorable legions. They’re getting the band back together!

Or are they? In truth, the Harris coalition bears more resemblance to the Biden coalition…but without as many working-class voters. Or to the Hillary Clinton coalition…but with far fewer white working-class voters. Indeed, that people would analogize Harris’ emerging coalition to Obama’s shows how much they’ve forgotten (or perhaps never knew) about the Obama coalition and how little they understand about how the party has changed in the last 12 years.

Here are some facts about the Obama coalition (based on 2012 election data from Catalist):

1. In 2012, Obama carried both college-educated and working-class (noncollege) voters. And there wasn’t much difference in the margins; he carried the college-educated by 6 points and the working class by 4 points.

2. Obama carried the nonwhite working class by 67 points; overall he carried nonwhites by 64 points.

3. Obama lost both the white working class and college-educated whites, the former by a comparatively modest 20 points and the latter by 8 points.

All this is very far from the Harris coalition today and how it seems to be evolving. The following data illustrate this. I use the post-switcheroo New York Times/Siena poll (one of only four pollsters rated “A+” by Nate Silver) for comparison. I also provide intermediate figures—Clinton, 2016 and Biden, 2020—so that the political evolution from the Obama coalition to today can be clearly discerned.

Start with the working class. While Obama carried them by 4 points, four years later Clinton lost them by 3 points. Four years after that, Biden lost them by 4 points and, four years later, Harris in the Timespoll is losing them by 15 points.

Contrast this with the trajectory of the college-educated vote. As noted, Obama carried these voters by 6 points. In 2016, Clinton carried them by 13 points and four years later Biden carried them by 18 points. Today, Harris’ lead over Trump among the college-educated is 20 points. This takes the college-educated/working class margin gap from +2 under Obama to +35 today—that is, from doing barely better among college voters in 2012 to a massive class gap today. That’s because Democratic support in the two groups has gone in completely different directions. You miss this and you can’t possibly understand the Obama coalition and why it is so different from the Democratic coalition we see today.

Similarly, consider the class trajectories within the white vote. In 2012, Obama lost the white working-class vote by 20 points, a bounce back performance after the Democrats’ catastrophic performance with this demographic in the 2010 election. Gaining back some of Democrats’ lost white working-class support was a widely-ignored key to his re-election, particularly his success in Midwest/Rustbelt states. But famously Clinton in 2016 did much less well, losing these voters by 27 points (and the election in the process because of these voters’ defection in three key Rustbelt states). Then in 2020, Biden lost this demographic nationally by a slightly lower 26 points, which included slight improvements in those key Rustbelt states—an underrated factor in his victory. But today in the Times poll, Harris is losing these voters by a whopping 38 points.

The trajectory of the white college vote has gone in the completely opposite direction. Obama lost these voters by 8 points. Then Clinton moved this demographic to the break-even point, followed by Biden’s solid 9-point lead among these voters in 2020. Now Harris has a 15-point lead over Trump among white college graduates. That’s quite a trend. And it’s taken the class gap among white voters from 12 points in the Obama coalition to 53 points (!) today.

The trajectory of the nonwhite working class also highlights another key difference between the Harris coalition and the Obama coalition. Recall Obama’s massive 67-point margin with these voters in 2012. That margin dropped to 60 points for Clinton in 2016 and further to 48 points for Biden in 2020. Now Harris, despite her progress relative to this year’s fading Biden campaign has only a 29-point margin among these very same voters. Moreover, this reverses the class gap among nonwhites that had existed under Obama—he did 11 points betteramong the nonwhite working class than among the nonwhite college-educated. Now Harris is doing 11 points worse among the nonwhite working class than among nonwhite college voters.

Finally, when looking at the nonwhite voting pool as a whole, we see the following trend in Democratic margin: Obama 2012, +64 points; Clinton 2016, +58; Biden 2020, +48; Harris today, +34.

It is difficult to look at these data and not see profound differences between the Obama coalition and the emerging Harris coalition. These differences reflect how much the party has evolved in 12 short years.

Of course, none of this means Harris can’t win. But no one should kid themselves that, even if successful, Harris’ coalition will represent the second coming of the Obama coalition. Instead it is likely to be a more class-polarized version of the post-Obama Democratic coalition with even more reliance on the college-educated vote, particularly the whitecollege-educated vote.

This seems consistent with how the nascent Harris campaign has been unfolding. Layering on top of Biden’s themes before he dropped out—”saving democracy” and abortion rights (particularly the latter)—we have seen a great deal of emphasis on social media and the production of memes that capture the “vibes” of the Kamala! campaign. The latter has certainly garnered a lot of attention but, as Freddie DeBoer acerbically remarks, Harris is not running for President of Online America but rather America as a whole. He detects, not without reason, a whiff of Hillary Clinton’s campaign and their misplaced faith in online success.

Related to this, we have seen a rather strange online manifestation of the identitarian politics that still dominates the Democratic Party and is certainly alive and well in the Harris campaign. This is the raft of sex- and race-segregated zoom fundraisers for Harris. This has included the “White Women for Kamala Harris” fundraiser and the just plain embarrassing “White Dudes for Kamala Harris” extravaganza.

On the white women call, the following wisdom was imparted by social media influencer Arielle Fodor:

As white women we need to use our privilege to make positive changes…If you find yourself talking over or speaking for BIPOC individuals, or God forbid, correcting them, just take a beat, and instead we can take our listening ears on…So, do learn from and amplify the voices of those who have been historically marginalized and use the privilege you have in order to push for systemic change. As white people we have a lot to learn and unlearn, so do check your blind spots.

Shades of 2020! It is hard to see a persuadable white working-class woman—a type of voter where Harris desperately needs help—responding positively to talk of her “privilege” etc. Really, the call should more properly have been labelled “White Liberal College-Educated Women for Kamala Harris.”

The same could be said of the “White Dudes for Kamala Harris” call. The call’s organizer averred that when white men organize “it’s usually with pointed hats on” and that the call and supporting Harris was a way for the trope (?) of masculinity to be properly channeled. This is how to be one of the good white men. I can’t imagine white working-class men of practically any flavor responding positively to this sort of appeal. Again, the call should really have been billed as “White Liberal College-Educated Men for Kamala Harris.”

And there were many other and more finely-grained identity group fundraising calls for Harris. This aggregation of identity and interest groups approach to organizing and coalition-building is exactly what Obama wanted to get away from. As Obama memorably put it 20 years ago:

There is not a liberal America and a conservative America. There is the United States of America. There is not a black America, a white America, a Latino America, an Asian America. There’s the United States of America.

We need to get back there….and fast. And that includes the Harris campaign. Right now, they’re on a narrow, polarized path to November and their reckoning with Donald Trump. They can do better, starting with remembering what the Obama coalition really was and  really was about.

There’s always plenty of jabber about swing states the summer before a presidential election. But, really, “swing states” are often made by the trends in swing counties. Steve Kornacki explains at msnbc.com, highlighting the critical importance of two of them in Georgia and Pennsylvania:

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

Democrats are nothing short of giddy. Biden, who looked like a sure loser, bowed out of the presidential race and was seamlessly replaced by Kamala Harris through deft and lightning-fast intraparty maneuvering. The race is reset! All is possible!

Who can blame Democrats for being a bit slap happy? They were staring into the abyss and now have a reprieve. They have a younger candidate and a more enthusiastic, unified party. Those are important and positive differences. But there are also similarities to their previous situation that are highly negative and can’t be wished away. Here’s one that I wrote about back in January:

Here is a simple truth: how working-class (noncollege) voters move will likely determine the outcome of the 2024 election. They will be the overwhelming majority of eligible voters (around two-thirds) and, even allowing for turnout patterns, only slightly less dominant among actual voters (around three-fifths). Moreover, in all six key swing states—Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin—the working-class share of the electorate, both as eligible voters and as projected 2024 voters, will be higher than the national average.

It follows that significant deterioration in working-class support could put Biden [now Harris] in a very deep hole nationally and key states. Conversely, a burgeoning advantage among working-class voters would likely put Trump in a dominant position.

This is very important to keep in mind as we are swamped by a tsunami of favorable Harris coverage in legacy and other center-left media. Where once her retail political skills were disparaged, we are told that she is now (or always has been) a consummately effective, charismatic retail politician.

Polls of course will be scrutinized for signs that the race is shifting in the Democrats’ favor and even small changes will be interpreted as signs that Trump is on the run. But in truth it will take a few weeks for the race to settle out and one should be cautious about interpreting initial results.

That said, what we have seen so far does not suggest a fundamentally altered race. Trump was ahead and is still ahead. Democrats still badly trail among working-class voters and have compressed margins among nonwhite and young voters relative to 2020. Of course, that may change in coming weeks but that is what we see now.

Looking at the running poll averages, we have the following for Trump-Harris matchups: RCP has Trump over Harris by 1.7 points (2.8 pointswith the full ballot including Kennedy/West/Stein). New York Times has Trump over Harris by 2 points and DDHQ/The Hill has Trump by 2 points. Pretty consistent.

Another approach is to compare averages of Biden vs. Trump and Harris vs. Trump. Naturally, these only overlap when Biden was the actual candidate and Harris was a notional candidate. But the data are still of interest.

Split Ticket has the most recent data on this, covering the month of July, and they do not show much difference between the candidates. Harris does slightly worse overall, with a margin against Trump .4 points worse than Biden. She does worse among men, a bit better among women; worse among seniors, better among those under 30; worse among whites and Hispanics and better among blacks and, significantly, worse among working-class voters and better among the college-educated. But the differences are generally quite small.

If you confine one’s sample of polls to those that were entirely in the field after Biden dropped out (i.e., after July 20), rather than just partially—a tiny group–there are some signs of a tightening race. But Trump is still ahead.

CNN is one of those polls and it does indeed show Harris doing better against Trump than Biden did prior to dropping out. But Trump is still ahead and, interestingly, Harris is doing no better against Trump than she did before Biden dropped out—in fact, a bit worse (3 point deficit now vs. a 2 point deficit in late June). And the internal demographics are quite similar to the earlier reading and all run far behind how Biden did in the 2020 election. Notably, her working-class deficit to Trump is 15 points, compared to Biden’s 4 point deficit in 2020.

These double digit Democratic deficits among the working class have been a regular feature of this election cycle. These deficits have been driven by worsening performance among the white working class (recall that Biden in 2020 actually did a bit better among these voters relative to Clinton in 2016) and much lower margins among nonwhiteworking-class voters. It is difficult to see how Harris prevails without strong progress on this front.

Can she do it? Sure, anything’s possible. But Democrats would be well-advised to be clear-eyed about the challenge. What Harris has to overcome is illustrated by an early July Pew poll that had a large enough sample size (N=over 9,400) to allow blacks and Hispanics to be broken down by working-class vs. college-educated. Both racial groups show strong educational polarization that is much larger than what was observed in 2020. Hispanic working-class voters in this poll preferred Trump by 3 points over Biden, compared to a 22 point margin for Biden over Trump in 2020. Among black working-class voters, Biden was leading by 47 points over Trump, compared to an 82 point lead for Biden in 2020.

A working class-oriented campaign would appear to be in order. But so far there is little indication that is what the Harris campaign has in mind. A widely-circulated memo from the campaign sees Harris’ candidacy as building on the “Biden-Harris coalition of voters” and mentions black voters, Latino voters, AANHPI voters, women voters and young voters. Working-class voters are conspicuous by their absence. The memo proposes to expand this coalition among, for example, white college-educated voters by taking advantage of the fact that:

…[Harris] has been at the forefront on the very issues that are most important to these voters—restoring women’s reproductive rights and upholding the rule of law following January 6, Donald Trump’s criminal convictions, and the Supreme Court’s immunity decision.

There is little mention of any other issues. This is despite the fact that Harris is rated far below Trump on handling issues like crime, inflation, and immigration. The latter two issues typically top voters’ list of concerns.

To the extent Harris has talked about issues other than abortion, “democracy is on the ballot,” and Trump’s character it has been to emphasize, according to Axios, that:

…she’ll pursue big—and expensive—parts of Joe Biden’s domestic agenda that never made it across the finish line…Harris is signaling that even as Democrats play defense on Biden’s mixed economic record, she’s eager to go on offense for the next four years…Her plans include pushing for nearly $2 trillion to establish universal pre-K education and improve elderly care and child care…

This seems…unwise in light of working-class voters’ inflation fears and how poorly they view Biden administration economic management. Pushing for massively increased spending is highly unlikely to win them over to your side, even if they approve of some of the end goals.

As some of the saner voices on the left have noted, Harris needs to make a serious effort to assure skeptical voters, particularly working-class voters, that she will in fact do things differently from the Biden administration on key issues where Democrats are vulnerable. David Leonhardt mentions crime, immigration, inflation, gender issues, and free speech. As Leonhardt points out:

Democrats often describe Donald Trump and other Republicans as radical….But many voters also see the Democratic Party as radical. In fact, the average American considers the Democratic Party to be further from the political mainstream than the Republican Party…

…[S]uccessful presidential candidates reassure voters that they are more moderate than their party. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Biden all did in their own ways. Even Trump did in 2016, by supporting Social Security, opposing trade deals, and endorsing same-sex marriage. The strategy works because most voters see themselves as less conservative than the Republican Party and less liberal than the Democratic Party….

[These politicians] were sending a larger message. It was the same one Clinton sent when he called himself “a new Democrat” and George W. Bush did with his talk of “compassionate conservatism.” It was also the one Trump recently tried to send by saying he opposed a national abortion ban.

All these politicians were asserting their independence from their own parties. It’s hard to get elected president without doing so.

So far there is little indication that Harris will do anything of the kind. As Politico Playbook noted: “Three sources in Harris’ orbit we spoke to said people expecting Harris to take drastically different positions [to distinguish herself from Biden] are going to end up disappointed.”

Thus, instead of a “different kind of Democrat” what voters will likely get is a younger, nonwhite, female version of the same kind of Democrat. Put another way, the Democrats seem content to remain a Brahmin Left party and see how things work out. Gulp.

Not to rain on the big parade, but if Kamala Harris is to have even a shred of a chance to win in November, she needs some tough criticism as soon as possible to help prepare her campaign for  attacks. Michael Baharaeen steps up to meet this challenge in his post, “The Kamala Gamble” at The Liberal Patriot. As Baharaeen writes:

Joe Biden rocked American politics over the weekend with the news that he will be the first incumbent president since Lyndon Johnson in 1968 not to seek a second term. The obstacles against him—stubbornly weak polling numbers, a hostile media, defections from his own party, dried-up fundraising—ultimately proved to be too much to overcome. In his announcement, he endorsed his vice president, Kamala Harris, to be his successor.

Harris is not expected to face much serious competition for the nomination from other prominent Democrats, meaning she will likely lead the party’s ticket heading into November. But while shaking things up may offer Democrats a new lease on life, it’s far from clear that Harris is the strongest candidate to take on Trump. Democrats should consider her many vulnerabilities carefully before coronating her at their convention next month.

First, Harris has popularity issues of her own. Part of the argument for Democrats moving on from Biden was his dreary poll numbers—his approval rating had been underwater for nearly three years with no sign that it would ever bounce back. He has also consistently trailed Trump in head-to-head match-ups, which signifies a severe change from 2020, when he never trailed at all.

But Harris hasn’t fared any better than Biden. Not only has her own approval tracked very closely with Biden’s, sinking into negative territory in mid-2021, but she has also never cracked 50 percent (while Biden at least sat in the mid-50s for the first several months of his presidency). This is a good indication that Harris has been less popular than Biden from the start. And, at least in initial surveys, Harris doesn’t appear to do much better against Trump than Biden did, though there is still time for that to change. Suffice it to say, she will have to work to endear herself more to a skeptical public if she becomes the Democratic nominee.

Second, Harris has a concerning electoral track record. Her first election to a major office came in 2010. That cycle, she won a close race for California’s open attorney general seat, defeating her Republican opponent by less than one point, 46.1–45.3. Though some might be tempted to attribute this to running in a difficult midterm election, except every other California Democrat in a statewide contest significantly outperformed Harris, earning at least 50 percent of the vote and winning their races by double digits.

However, her presidential campaign was perhaps an even bigger disappointment. Despite being a media darling for much of the primary race, her campaign flamed out before the first voters had the chance to cast their ballots in the Iowa caucuses. Some observers attributed this to the lack of a coherent message or reason for her candidacy—and the fact that her campaign became beset by infighting.

Another likely reason was her desire to placate her party’s activist base. For example, rather than touting her accomplishments as a prosecutor and explaining her pragmatic vision for criminal justice, Harris ran from her record, which some on the left viewed as too punitive. She also endorsed some deeply unpopular proposals, including the decriminalization of border crossings and the Green New Deal. All this may have stemmed from the fact that Harris surrounded herself with campaign staffers who seemed to embrace the idea that “Twitter is real life,” and that what progressive voices on the platform espoused was representative of the broader public’s views.¹

If Harris wants to shed any part of her past as she looks for ways to appeal to median voters in swing states, she might consider rebuking these lefty fads in favor of a message that highlights her track record of prosecuting criminals—something that could set up a favorable contrast against Trump.

Third, although Biden will no longer be on the ticket, Harris will be forced to defend his administration, including its less popular facets. In 2021, Biden tasked Harris with the thankless job of trying to help resolve the crisis at the southern border. But far from successfully addressing the “root causes” of the problems there, they grew exponentially worse in the following years, with migrant encounters hitting a record high by the end of 2023. Recent polling has shown that voters trusted Trump over Biden to handle issues related to immigration and inflation, which are top-of-mind for many of them. Switching to that president’s second-in-command isn’t likely to immediately assuage voters’ concerns about Democrats’ ability to handle either one.

Fourth, while the latest polls have shown Harris mirroring Biden’s statistical tie against Trump nationally, this alone doesn’t leave Democrats in a particularly strong position. Consider: in 2020, when Biden defeated Trump, his national polling heading into the election was 8.4 points. Ultimately, Biden won by a more modest 4.5 points. As we know, though, presidential elections are decided not by national popular vote but the Electoral College, and Biden’s win at that level was actually extremely narrow. So simply tying Trump in the national polls still reflects a massive shift relative to 2020 and puts an Electoral College win very much within reach for him. To overcome that, Harris would need to move the needle back in the other direction and probably build a lead of at least a couple points to have a chance of winning.

Finally, in addition to issues related to herself and the Biden administration, Harris will be contending with broader problems that the Democratic Party has not fully reckoned with. For instance, survey data indicates that they have experienced substantial attrition among black and Hispanic voters, which may at least partially explain why important swing states like Arizona, Georgia, and Nevada have shifted in Trump’s favor this time around. Trump has also made more overt overtures to union voters, a longtime Democratic constituency that has shown cracks in recent years—and that could put other battlegrounds like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin in play.

Democrats have also lost ground with rural voters, working-class voters, and even some young voters, a group that hasn’t been competitive in a generation. While Biden appeared to be attracting higher levels of support among seniors, a higher-turnout bloc that has historically leaned Republican, it’s not clear that those voters would stick with another Democratic nominee.

Some of these are longer-term issues that the party has been contending with since at least the start of the Trump era. Some may be specific to this cycle: third-party candidates like Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., for example, are disproportionately attracting younger and non-white voters. There is also early evidence that Harris may perform better than Biden with some of these groups and have more success pulling them back into the fold. Still, she’ll be confronting these bigger coalitional issues with less than four months to go in the campaign.

Democrats’ best case for Harris is that she is a wild card: neither they nor Trump’s campaign know how her candidacy would shake up the race. If voters’ views of her aren’t as entrenched as they are for Biden, she might have a slightly higher ceiling. Given the opportunity to prosecute the case against Trump, she is also likely to be far stronger and more effective than Biden, which could level the playing field more in Democrats’ favor. And polls show that many Americans want someone, anyone, who isn’t Biden or Trump. Maybe all that is enough for someone like Harris to succeed.

Even so, a simple swap of candidates isn’t guaranteed to immediately put Democrats in a stronger position than they’re in today. Harris will need to distance herself from the perceived setbacks of the Biden administration, come into her own as a candidate, and develop a campaign pitch that will appeal to the handful of voters in swing states who will decide this election—all in the next three months (or less). It will still be an uphill fight, but if she can achieve these things, she might yet be able to pull out the win.