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Scher: ‘Get a Grip Democrats’ – You Can Still Win

In “Get a Grip, Democrats. You Can Still Win This: Biden’s not far behind, the economic conditions remain excellent, and a vile assassination attempt in July doesn’t determine November’s outcome,” Bill; Scher writes at Washington Monthly:

It is trite but true to note that a lot can happen over the next three months. We can’t be clairvoyant, but optimism is warranted. Israel and Hamas may soon agree to a ceasefire. Biden’s border crackdown may continue to drive down the number of illegal crossings and relieve pressure on municipalities. Perhaps most importantly, the Federal Reserve may cut interest rates and buoy public perception of the growing economy.

Many Democrats are understandably nervous about how Biden will perform in the campaign’s final weeks, but let’s not forget that Trump may do plenty to rankle swing voters, as he has throughout his political career. It’s not true that Trump always “gets away with it.” If he did, Republicans would have had better electoral performances in 2018, 2020, and 2022.

The brazen attempt by Republicans to deify Trump and claim God intervened to save him from the assassination attempt could well be viewed by swing voters as crass opportunism, especially if the Trump campaign tries to milk the tragedy for months.

Scher is not a ‘Biden only’ supporter, as he explains:

I’ve already made my case that Biden should not only withdraw from the 2024 presidential race but also resign and give President Kamala Harris the best chance to win in November. I stand by it, and I worry that Biden will have more episodes raising questions about his neurological health. There is still time for Biden to withdraw, and any Democrat concerned about his ability to campaign and govern effectively should continue to press the case.

But Scher sees a significant edge for Democrats in terms of campaign muscle:

If the contours of the race remained fixed, its outcome may hinge upon the quality of their two parties’ get-out-the-vote operations. And on this front, Democrats should retain their optimism. As I recently wrote, the Trump campaign has made a reckless bet on the far-right Turning Point network to shoulder much of its GOTV effort despite its nonexistent track record of successful electioneering and its reputation for financial mismanagement.

Biden and the Democrats have a good record to run on, Scher writes:

The fundamentals of the 2024 election remain favorable to Democrats. Gross Domestic Product is growing. Unemployment is low. Wages have been beating inflation for more than a year. American soldiers aren’t fighting and dying in an unpopular ground war. For over a century, incumbent parties in power have won American elections under these conditions.

Scher concludes:

Yes, we are facing an unusual set of X-factors that could render the lessons of history inoperative. But defeatism guarantees defeat. The Democrats may need to fight more of an uphill battle than necessary, but uphill battles can still be won.

Anything can happen in this crazy political year. There is still time to persuade a critical mass of swing voters in battleground states to honestly compare Biden’s record to that of his opponent. If that happens, all of the bad news of the last month could look like old news in November.


Teixeira: Last Hurrah for the Brahmin Left?

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

Since the latter part of the 20th century, the left has had a plan. Well, not really a plan, it just kind of….happened. Call it, to use Thomas Piketty’s term, the Brahmin Left. That is his characterization of Western left parties increasingly bereft of working-class voters and increasingly dominated by highly educated voters and elites. The Brahmin Left has evolved over many decades and certainly includes today’s Democratic Party, Britain’s Labour Party, and the French left. The chart below illustrates this trend.



For Brahmin Left parties, the temptation is great to lean into their emerging strengths and just hope they can retain enough of their working-class base to make the political arithmetic work. That is the natural inclination of the elites and activists who now dominate the parties. But these parties have been increasingly battered by right populist competitors who are bleeding off more and more of the left’s working-class support. That calls the viability of the Brahmin Left model into question. There is a point beyond which the loss of working-class voters cannot be plausibly balanced by increased support among college-educated and professional voters and the model is fatally undermined.

We’re certainly not there yet but we may not be very far away. We have two recent elections in France and the UK to look at and an upcoming one in the United States that provide a real-time update on where we are in this process. Is it a last hurrah for the Brahmin Left or a new stage in the model’s success? Let’s take a look.

France. After a stunning showing for Marine Le Pen’s right populist National Rally (RN) party in the EU parliamentary elections, where her party garnered far and away the most votes, President Macron decided to dissolve the national parliament and call new elections. (His motivations for doing so were complicated and perhaps not completely knowable.)

The result in the first round of France’s two round elections was another triumph for RN. Their alliance took 33 percent of the vote, compared to 28 percent for the New Popular Front (NFP)—a left coalition of Jean-Luc Melenchon’s La France Insoumise (LFI), the Socialists, the Communists, and the Greens—and 21 percent for the centrist Ensemble coalition, which includes Macron’s party. In the second round, the RN alliance actually increased its vote share but did not gain the most seats because NFP and Ensemble made a deal to pool their support against National Rally in districts where their candidates were trailing RN. The leftist NFP wound up with 180 seats, the most of any group, despite getting only 26 percent of the popular vote. Macron’s Ensemble got 159 seats with 25 percent of the vote and, bringing up the rear, the RN alliance got a mere 142 seats, despite their 37 percent of the vote. The seat result was a big disappointment for RN even though it represented big gains for them over the previous election.

The demographics of the vote for left and right in the election are instructive. NFP had a classic Brahmin Left profile: they did by far the best of the different political groupings among managers/professionals and those with the highest levels of education. The RN in contrast did by far the best among blue collar and low-level white collar workers and those with the lowest levels of education. Indeed, the RN got an absolute majority (57 percent) of blue collar workers despite the many ways in which the vote was split. In the view of Emile Chabal, an academic specialist in French political history, “the RN can fairly lay claim to being the party of the French working classes.”

So are the French results a big victory for the Brahmin Left? Through the vagaries of the French electoral system and shifting alliances, one could say yes but it does have the air of a last hurrah. The right populists have barely been kept out of power and have considerably increased their overall strength and hold over the French working class. And the prospects for effective governance in France seem very poor. The program of the NFP, the group with the most seats, is ludicrously left-wing and seems on a collision course with the preferences of Macron’s Ensemble coalition, their presumed partners in forming a government. The NFP program includes:

…overturning Macron’s pension, unemployment, education, immigration, police, guaranteed minimum income, and universal national service reforms, as well as his cuts to funding for low-income housing and his merger of French nuclear safety organisations; lowering the retirement age to 60 in the longer-term; implementing price freezes on essential food, energy, and gas; raising the minimum wage to €1,600 per month (representing a 14 percent increase) and personalised housing assistance by 10 percent; moving towards a 32-hour work week for arduous or night shift jobs; conditioning government support for businesses on adherence to environmental, social, and anti-discriminatory regulations; reserving workers one-third of seats on boards of directors; increasing financial transaction taxes; banning bank financing for fossil fuels; nationalising control over water; reforming the generalised social contribution and inheritance taxes (capping the latter), as well as nearly tripling the number of income tax brackets from 5 to 14, to make them more progressive; re-instituting a solidarity tax on wealth “with a climate component”; enacting an exit tax on funds withdrawn from the country; charging a vehicle miles traveled tax on imports; guaranteeing a price floor for agricultural products; cancelling the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and any future free trade treaties; and forbidding the imports of agricultural products which do not meet domestic social and environmental standards.

Other key NFP proposals included raising the image and salaries of public healthcare, education, justice, and government jobs; strengthening the industrial sector in key strategic areas; establishing the right to menstrual leave; prohibiting new major highway projects; outlawing intensive animal farming and the usage of all PFASsneonicotinoids, and glyphosate; re-examining the Common Agricultural Policy; providing partial or full government financing for home insulation; creating free public water fountains, showers, and toilets; constructing 200,000 new public housing units per year; requiring mandatory rent control in high-rent areas; introducing proportional representation; removing article 49.3 from the constitution; outlawing the usage of blast balls by riot police; continuing to supply weapons to defend Ukraine; recognising the state of Palestine along with Israel; and demanding compliance with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) order against Israel and ceasing support for Benjamin Netanyahu‘s government.

OK then! It seems a bit much I’d have to say—though I do like the idea of free public water fountains. I mean, who doesn’t like a water fountain? Overall however the common ground between this program and that of the Macronist Ensemble seems close to non-existent. That suggests that it’ll be rocky days ahead for France with these mismatched partners and Macron still reigning as president. That further suggests that the RN, by being in opposition, will be well-positioned to benefit from dissatisfaction with chaotic government and ongoing economic and social problems, growing their working class support even further. The 2027 presidential election looms; the Brahmin Left and Macron’s center may have a hard time pulling off their trick again.

UK. The British election presents us with a different picture. Keir Starmer’s Labour gained a mighty majority, dethroning the massively unpopular Tories after 14 years of Conservative rule. Labour took 412 seats out of a possible 650, their second biggest victory since World War II, while the Tories crashed to their worst performance ever. However, Labour’s popular vote share was only 35 percent, the lowest-ever winning share and actually less than the 40 percent Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour got in 2017. The radical disjuncture between vote share (35 percent) and seat share (63 percent) is possible due to the UK’s multi-party, first past the post electoral system.

Despite Labour’s relatively low vote share, the demographics of Labour support represented a U-turn of sorts from the Brahmin Left playbook. Labour did better than the previous election among non-degree holders while actually losing some ground among degree-holders. This narrowed the education differential of the Labour vote from 42 percent degree/28 percent non-degree to 38 percent degree/33 percent non-degree. That’s quite a shift.


Yglesias: 27 More Thoughts on the State of the Race

The following article, “Twenty-Seven More Thoughts on the State of the Race” by Matthew Yglesias, is cross-posted from Slow Boring:

I don’t want this blog to become 100% focused on the question of who the Democratic Party nominee should be or the questions surrounding that. I don’t think our tempo of publication is ideally suited to covering that kind of news story, and I also don’t think my take on this is particularly distinctive. Yesterday I wrote an introspective post because I am uniquely qualified to write about myself, but in terms of the future of the country, I basically agree with what Ezra Klein, Jerusalem Demsas, Eric Levitz, and Jonathan Chait have been saying.

I was glad to have this morning’s guest post about the future of transportation policy, and we’ll be publishing non-horse race pieces on Wednesday and Thursday. I’ll continue to focus on covering the election with an eye to the stakesand trying to provide a highly differentiated product that features primarily non-election content.

That said, I do have thoughts that I want to get off my chest after a week away, and here come 27 of them:

  1. The critical question in the “should Biden stand down” debate has always been, in my opinion, the question of the Kamala Line. It’s been easy to say since the midterms that Democrats would be better off with “a different nominee,” but the right question is would Democrats be better off with Kamala Harris.
  2. That’s not because Harris is the only possible option; it’s just that from the moment she was selected as VP, she’s been the most likely option. You should not wish for “not Biden” unless you’re prepared to get Harris as the alternative.
  3. In 2023, I did not think we had crossed the Kamala Line. When Ezra Klein wrote his open convention piece, the discussion of convention mechanics seemed like a concession that we were still not.
  4. After the debate, we clearly are. This is in part because her numbers have actually been on a positive trajectory recently. But mostly it’s because while I think you can still make a strong case for voting Biden, the only people who will find that case compelling are people who are comfortable with the possibility that Harris will take over if Biden’s health continues to decline — which is very likely given the linear progression of time.
  5. Under the circumstances, we’d be better off letting Harris assume the nomination and make the case for herself. She’s slightly more popular than Biden right now, has dramatically more upside, and could get a mini-burst of positive attention from becoming the nominee and rolling out her VP.
  6. Broadly, I think betting markets and external observers are grossly exaggerating the odds that Biden will, in fact, step aside.
  7. The key error that smart people who I like and respect keep making is assuming that there is some critical mass of “party leaders” or “elder statesmen” who could push Biden out of the race if they wanted to.
  8. This is just not true. A joint press release from Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Chuck Schumer, Hakeem Jeffries, and Nancy Pelosi would not force Biden out of the race. Other people might be able to persuade him to drop out, but they would genuinely have to persuade him.
  9. To understand Biden’s mentality, you have to remember that he did succumb to informal pressure from party leaders to stand down in 2016, and everyone now thinks it was a world-historical mistake of him to do that. People are really good at self-flattery and self-deception, and this is a strong data point to bolster his desire to stay in it.
  10. The other leg of support for Biden’s self-deception — the belief that polls predicated a red wave in 2022 or that the 2022 midterm results were consistent with Biden being on track to win — is totally false, but unfortunately, these false ideas associated with Simon Rosenberg have been widely circulated in liberal circles since the midterms themselves.
  11. Exacerbating the problem is that Biden’s inner circle of advisors all have reputations that are under water at this point, and Biden staying in maximizes their chances for personal vindication. If I got to sit down with the president alone, I would make the case to him that standing down maximizes his odds at a great historical legacy. But does that apply to Mike Donilon? I’m not sure it does.
  12. Right now, the main reason for members of Congress to throw Biden under the bus is not that it will be persuasive to him, but that anyone in a swing seat — or even a D+5 seat — needs to worry about saving their own skin. A convention where leading figures in the Democratic Party stand up on stage and swear that Biden is doing great is going to make them all look like idiots and risk pulling everyone else down.
  13. On Bidenist Twitter, people are acting like “but Republicans will say mean things about any nominee” is a decisive takedown of the concern about Biden. This is like when people denied that running a self-identified socialist could be harmful because Republicans call all Democrats socialists. Just because you get attacked either way doesn’t mean you should make yourself defenseless.
  14. The key problem with Biden is that he was losing decisively before the debates. Not by huge margins, but clearly losing. He needed to make up lost ground at the debate, and he did not. Instead, he slipped. He’s clearly not going to do an impressive media blitz, so what’s he going to do? Run ads. Democrats have great ads. But ads matter less than free media, and Biden was already running ads before the debate, taking advantage of a financial edge that Trump has now eliminated.
  15. A new nominee would have fresh legs to be on television multiple times a week making the case against Trump. If you’re a pure Dem partisan who is angry that none of the media focus is on Trump right now, this is why you want a new (younger) nominee, someone who can be everywhere delivering crisp anti-Trump talking points.
  16. Is Harris the best person in the world to do that? No. In terms of pure skill, I would advocate for Pete Buttigieg, who is great at television and who leads the field in net favorability and whose head-to-head polling against Trump is strong when you adjust for name ID.
  17. Gretchen Whitmer’s polling is almost as good as Pete’s, and she might be an even better choice since she’s not a member of the Biden administration. She can say she didn’t know the details of the president’s condition and also frankly can just wash her hands of some of some of Team Biden’s worst moments, like “transitory inflation.”
  18. But again, Harris is good enough. And the leak that she would look to Roy Cooper or Andy Beshear as VP was, to me, a good sign that she sees the basic dimensions of her political problem clearly. You don’t achieve as much political success as she has without some form of political skills, but she’s never had to get swing voters to vote for her. Beshear and Cooper have, and either would be the right kind of person to add to her team.
  19. For Whitmer, I like Josh Shapiro as VP. In theory, the governor of Michigan plus the governor of Pennsylvania on the ticket together visiting every small town in Wisconsin equals victory. Chill Midwestern politicians usually lack the pizzazz to win a nomination (Barack Obama is the exception that proves the rule), but those are the swing states!
  20. If it’s Pete, I think he should do the Clinton/Gore thing of doubling down on youth rather than trying for “balance.” I’m very intrigued by a Buttigieg + Ritchie Torres ticket.
  21. With any of these tickets, think about how cool it would be to have live town halls as campaign events, five minute call-ins to cable, long sit downs on podcasts. It’s incredibly annoying to have all this focus on Biden’s fitness and acuity when Trump is also extremely old and constantly forgetting stuff and talking nonsense! Make the point by putting forward a young nominee who speaks fluidly!
  22. Just don’t get your hopes up that it will actually happen or spend your time thinking that Barack Obama or some other magic figure can make it happen. That’s not how it works.
  23. Given how central the jitters about Harris have been to this whole process, I think the question of why there was so much insider conventional wisdom in her favor in 2020 has never been properly litigated. Her problem — she’s never won votes outside of the base — was obvious. I said it at the time, and the reaction to my take was not positive. At this point, I’d be happy to support her as better than Biden and better than Trump, but Democrats did not need put themselves in this situation.
  24. Pay close attention to the wording of The Procedural Rules of the 2024 Democratic National Convention (Section IX) as stated in the official Call For The 2024 Democratic National Conventional. Specifically, look at paragraph F2(d) governing the behavior of pledged delegates on the first ballot where superdelegates do not vote: “All delegates to the National Convention pledged to a presidential candidate shall in all good conscience reflect the sentiments of those who elected them.”
  25. Biden is probably going to be the nominee and he is probably going to lose, and I think media coverage of the 2024 election ought to reflect that fact — not in the spirit of the press needing to do partisan anti-Trump crusading, but just like the pre-election coverage in the UK focused much more on Labour’s plans than on the Conservatives, because they were obviously going to win. As long as Biden is clinging to the nomination, Trump is the important story.
  26. It’s worth saying, as one moderate factionalist to others, that if Democrats lose with Biden as their standard-bearer, our side is realistically going to take the lion’s share of the blame for defeat. Of course, I and others will do our best to make our case, but the most likely outcome is not just Biden losing to Trump, but nascent efforts to revive a common sense factional project suffering a big setback as well.
  27. This is not my brand personally, but given the range of wild things people have been bullied into signing on to in the name of identity politics, I think “it’s racist to believe a Black woman is less electable than a white man who can’t get through a 30 minute television interview” is a pretty reasonable take.

Teixeira: No, Democracy is *Not* on the Ballot

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

What is the Biden campaign’s theory of the case? They have persistently been running behind Trump for months and most forecasting models currently tip Trump to win the election. A just-released New York Times/Siena poll has Biden behind by 6 points among registered voters and 3 points among likely voters. How are they planning on turning the election in their favor in the coming months?

Naturally, the Biden campaign will seek to put a number of messages into play where they feel they have an advantage. But numerous reports indicate that, above all, they believe emphasizing threats to democracy will the key to victory. Mike Donilon, probably Biden’s closest and most influential advisor, has said that by election day this year:

…the focus will become overwhelming on democracy. I think the biggest images in people’s minds are going to be of January 6th.

Axios quotes Biden advisors as saying:

This is Joe Biden’s strategy — and Mike Donilon and his top advisers are in agreement with the president. The polling shows that democracy ended up a top issue of concern for voters in 2022, and it will be in 2024.

Izzat so? There are grounds for, to put it gently, considerable skepticism here. Let’s take a look at the data.

1. To begin with, preserving/defending/whatever democracy persistently trails the economy/inflation as the issue voters think is most important, even when the democracy issue is specifically mentioned as part of a list.

2. And when respondents’ most important issue is solicited in an open-ended format, where respondents give an unprompted, top-of-mind answer, democracy simply does not rate very high. In the most recent Gallup poll, only 4 percent fall into a bucket they term “elections/election reform/democracy.” This vastly trails key economic problems, immigration, etc.

3. Even more recently, the new New York Times/Siena poll finds just 5 percent of voters (3 percent of working-class voters) saying “the state of democracy/corruption” will be the most important issue in deciding on their November vote, again substantially trailing the same set of issues. In an interesting followup, the poll asked voters who they thought could do a better job of handling whatever issue they designated as most important. By 14 points (24 points among the working class), voters thought Trump could do a better job than Biden of handling that issue.

4. Further undercutting the Biden campaign theory, an earlier New York Times poll asked voters what was the one thing they remembered most from Trump’s presidency; that most definitely was not January 6th. Just 5 percent mentioned it, again dwarfed by other events and trends.

5. And, as John Sides has pointed out, Biden’s victory over Trump in 2020 was not attributable to running on democracy or anything like that. Campaign messages and advertisements focused instead on the economy, the pandemic, health care and other less abstract issues. If there was a broader theme, it was a return to normalcy not saving democracy.

6. So, democracy does not appear to be the mega-salient issue the Biden campaign is envisioning. What makes the apparent drive to center the issue in the Biden campaign even less understandable is that the issue, as an issue, does not even cut very much in Biden’s direction unlike, say, abortion rights or health care. This is because preserving/defending democracy means different things to different voters; many voters don’t see the choice between Biden and Trump on the issue as blindingly obvious. They don’t, as the Democratic faithful would have it, believe Biden = democracy and Trump = fascism. Many see Trump as their paladin and view Biden and the Democrats as privileging the interests and preferences of their supporters, especially educated elites, in a distinctly non-democratic way.

7. That explains why Biden is not typically preferred by much over Trump on democracy and related issues. One of the most favorable results is in the latest Fox News poll where Biden is preferred over Trump by a modest 6 points on “the future of American democracy.” Even here, Trump gets the nod over Biden by 4 points among working class voters.

8. And there are many results that aren’t nearly so favorable. A March Wall Street Journal poll of battleground states had Biden ahead by just a point on “protecting democracy.” Similarly, over two waves of Democracy Corps’ battleground surveys, Biden and the Democrats were favored over Trump and the Republicans by an average of only 3.5 points on “presidents not being able to act as autocrats,” by 2.5 points on “democracy being secure,” and by 2 points on “protecting democracy” (first wave only). And Trump and the Republicans were favored over Biden and the Democrats by 1.5 points on “opposing extremism” (!) and by 5 points on “protecting the US constitution” (!!). All this hardly makes the democracy issue seem like a slam-dunk for the Biden campaign.

9. Even more devastating, a massive (3,500 registered voters) Washington Post/George Mason Schar School April-May survey of the battleground states found Trump favored over Biden by 11 points on who could do a better job handling “threats to democracy in the US.” And among a group of voters the survey dubbed “the Deciders,” more peripheral voters who will surge into the voting pool in 2024 and likely decide the election, Trump is favored by 9 points over Biden to safeguard democracy.

10. Looking over these data, one must conclude that the Biden campaign plan is to somehow dramatically raise the salience of democracy and January 6th among ordinary voters in coming months and simultaneously generate a robust advantage on the issue among these same voters. This is not impossible but it does not really seem advisable; a little like drawing to an inside straight in poker. You might make it but you probably won’t.


It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that Biden and his campaign are unduly influenced by what they believe should be true rather than what is true. They see Trump as an unspeakably evil man who is an existential threat to democracy and can’t imagine why that view wouldn’t be everybody’s and drive their vote inexorably toward Biden. But it isn’t and the sooner they realize that, the better their chances of actually beating the Bad Orange Man.

That means dropping the absurd Hitler/end of the Weimar Republic analogies and developing a more realistic model of the situation they’re in. David Leonhardt provides some helpful observations along these lines:

I’m reminded of the arguments of Luigi Zingales, an economist at the University of Chicago. Zingales grew up in Italy, where a bombastic right-wing populist—Silvio Berlusconi—presaged Trump by becoming prime minister in 1994 and holding the job on and off for years…Shortly after Trump’s 2016 victory, Zingales wrote an Opinion essay in The Times outlining the political strategies that tend to fail when opposing a figure like Trump.

Berlusconi’s least-effective opponents focused on his personality and argued that he was beyond the pale of acceptable politics. This criticism made many Italian voters like him even more. They reasoned that if the elites who had done such a poor job running the country hated Berlusconi, maybe he was the solution after all.

Berlusconi’s most effective opponents, by contrast, treated him like an ordinary politician who would not improve their lives. “They focused on the issues, not on his character,” Zingales wrote.

Biden’s campaign sometimes makes arguments along these lines….So far, though, these messages tend to be less prominent than the arguments about democracy and the soul of America.

Just so. The Biden campaign desperately needs a new theory of the case. Otherwise, they really will be drawing to an inside straight and we could all suffer the consequences.


Biden Campaign Plays N.C. Wild Card

Some excerpts from “Biden Is Pouring Millions Into a State Democrats Haven’t Won Since 2008” by Tarini Parti at The Wall Street Journal:

President Biden’s re-election campaign is making a larger investment in North Carolina than recent Democratic presidential efforts, laying the groundwork for an alternative path to retaining the White House and potentially forcing Donald Trump to play defense in a Republican-dominated state.

The Biden campaign has 16 offices and hired more than 60 staff members, a campaign official and county officials said, marking a larger footprint—at an earlier point in the race—than Biden’s 2020 effort or Hillary Clinton’s in 2016. Biden and his allies have spent $5.2 million in the state through June 19 on broadcast and cable advertising, as well as radio and online, data from AdImpact shows. Trump’s campaign has spent nothing on advertising in the state so far for the general election, a sign his campaign sees the state as safely Republican.

Biden’s big bet on North Carolina could pay dividends this fall if he loses any of the three “Blue Wall” states—Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin—where Democrats have invested most heavily. Those states were reliably blue presidential states from 1992 until Trump, the former president, captured them in 2016. Biden won them back in 2020, but some polls there show Trump with a slight edge.

Biden is expected to visit North Carolina after the first presidential debate next week, which would be his fourth trip to the state this year. Vice President Kamala Harris has visited five times.

“This is a bigger, bolder effort,” Geoff Garin, a Biden pollster, said of North Carolina. “And there’s nothing like it on the Trump side.”

Garin said one of the issues the campaign would focus on is abortion rights in North Carolina. Republicans in the legislature there banned nearly all abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy, with limited exceptions for rape, incest and serious fetal anomalies.

An official with the NC GOP said the campaign’s investments in the state had been unconventionally minimal so far. Karoline Leavitt, a spokeswoman for the Trump campaign, said it was expanding its operations with the launch of a new canvassing program through volunteers and had hired a dozen paid staffers.

Anna Kelly, a spokeswoman for the Republican National Committee, said: “In 2016 and 2020, Democrats lit money on fire in North Carolina only to lose to President Trump.”

However, “A Wall Street Journal poll conducted in March showed Trump leading Biden in six of seven battlegrounds including North Carolina, and the two men tied in Wisconsin. Trump’s lead of 6 percentage points in North Carolina was his widest margin in the battleground states. More recent presidential polls in the state have continued to find Trump with a solid lead in North Carolina—and one that is generally bigger than other swing states….Part of Biden’s challenge is that North Carolina is more rural than other presidential battlegrounds, and Republicans have built a formidable advantage in those communities.”

Nonetheless, “Democrats—hopeful Biden can be the first Democratic presidential nominee to win the state since Barack Obama in 2008—take solace in how close Biden came to winning in 2020. He lost the state by 74,000 votes in 2020—the closest since Obama’s victory there.”

Tarini explains that “population growth in North Carolina has made it politically unpredictable.” Also “Nearly 100,000 new residents have moved to the state annually since 2020—in large part from liberal states such as New York and California—to Democratic-leaning parts of the state, according to a state analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.”

Tarini notes that Black turnout presidential elections in 2020 was down from Obama’s 2008 victory by a margin of 5 percent. Black citizens are today about 22 percent of NC’s population, but about a fourth of them are too young to vote. That ads up to a substantially smaller percentage than in Georgia’s, where about a third of voters were African Americans in 2020.  Yet it’s not all that hard to envision an energetic GOTV campaign in African American communities making a pivotal difference in favor of Biden.

Tarini shares a couple of quotes that bode well for Democrats: “If those folks decide to show up at their political strength, we could see the tipping of North Carolina,” said Michael Bitzer, a professor of politics and history at Catawba College in Salisbury, N.C….“We are in the state that was the closest state that Donald Trump won [in 2020], and we’ve got this gold mine in Mecklenburg,” said Drew Kromer, chairman of the Mecklenburg Democratic Party.” In addition,

Democrats also believe down-ballot races in the state could give Biden some momentum, especially the governor’s race in which Democrat Josh Stein has been leading in polls against Republican Lt. Gov. Mark Robinson. However, in 2016 and 2020, when Democratic Gov. Roy Cooper defeated his GOP opponents, Trump still carried the state.

Robinson is known for many controversial comments, including denying the Holocaust. Trump endorsed Robinson in the GOP primary over more establishment Republican candidates who raised concerns about Robinson’s ability to win in a general election.

“I think that Biden and Stein are going to lift each other up in this race in different ways and with different groups of voters,” said Garin, the Biden pollster.

All in all, it appears that NC may indeed be in play in November – if NC Democrats outwork the opposition.


Teixeira: ‘Greenlash’ Is Here

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

The results from the recent European parliament elections were quite something. Right populists did very well indeed while the European Greens took big losses. They lost 18 of their 72 seats in the European parliament and their performance was particularly bad in the E.U.’s two largest states, Germany and France. In Germany, the core country of the European green movement, support for the Greens plunged from 20.5 percent in 2019 to 12 percent. Shockingly, among voters under 25, the German Greens actually did worse than the hard right Alternative for Germany (AfD). That contrasts with the 2019 elections, when the Greens did seven times better than the AfD among these young voters.

And in France, Green support crashed from 13.5 percent to 5.5 percent. The latter figure is barely above the required threshold for party representation in the French delegation.

The Greens’ overall poor performance means they are now behind not only the traditionally largest party groupings—the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the social-democratic Socialists and Democrats group and the liberal Renew Europe group, but also both right-populist groupings—the European Conservatives and Reformists (which includes Georgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy) and the Identity and Democracy group (which includes Marine LePen’s National Rally group)—and even the non-affiliated group (which includes Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Hungary’s Fidesz party).

There’s a reason for this. While there’s no doubt that concerns about immigration were key to the right populist surge in these elections, the role of backlash against green policies (call it “greenlash”) should not be underestimated. And the fattest target for this greenlash was naturally the Greens, the most fervent proponents of the European “Green Deal” and associated policies. The implications of this are huge. As Adam Tooze, himself a strong supporter of green policies, admits:

The elections have tilted the European political balance against the green agenda which has served as an important reference point for politics in Brussels for the last five years….Even if Ursula von der Leyen succeeds in her bid for a second term as Commission President, she will not be pursuing the full-throated green-forward policy that launched the Green Deal in 2019 and Next Gen EU in 2020….There is a groundswell of opinion in Europe that is preoccupied with the cost of living, wants to keep its internal combustion-engined cars and sympathizes with farmers in their opposition to green regulation.

Speaking of von der Leyen, Manfred Weber, the leader of her EPP party—still the largest grouping in the new parliament—has declared that the 2035 ban on the sale of combustion engine cars was a “mistake.” Peter Liese, lead climate policymaker of the EPP, said the election results indicated support for a less restrictive Green Deal and that, “The ban on combustion engines—that needs to go”.

Greenlash, in short, is for real. A summary article in The New York Times puts the situation well:

There is no sugarcoating it: losing one-third of their seats in the European Parliament elections last week, the Greens tanked.

The European Union has in recent years emerged as the world’s most ambitious frontier in fighting climate change. It did so through major policy shifts like setting high targets to cut emissions, preparing to ditch combustion engines, pushing for nature restoration and curbing the effect of farming on the environment. Green parties across the 27 E.U. member states have successfully driven that agenda.

But over the past few years, something has clearly snapped in much of the European electorate…A backlash against climate change policies as part of broader culture wars has gained momentum.

In many places, the nationalist agendas of far-right parties have been augmented by populist appeals to economically strained citizens. The right surged among voters by targeting the Greens specifically, painting them as unfit to protect poorer working people in rapidly changing societies.

For many voters, Green parties failed to show that their proposals were not just expensive, anti-growth policies that would hurt the poorest the most. And some view them as elitist urbanites who brush aside the costs of the transition to a less climate-harming way of life.

Some may look at these results and say, “Well, that’s Europe—couldn’t happen here”. But not only could it happen here it is happening here. Trump is running aggressively against Biden on exactly the same climate/energy issues and in exactly the same way as the right populists in Europe. And he’s getting traction. Voters really don’t want to be forced, directly or indirectly, to get an electric vehicle when they’re perfectly happy with their internal combustion car. Voters really do care, above all, about cheap energy prices, not the provenance of that energy. And fundamentally most voters simply do not care that much about climate change as an issue relative to other issues like the cost-of-living.

Recent polling by Impact Research for Third Way vividly demonstrates these realities. Just 4 percent of voters attach enough priority to climate change issues to be described as “climate-first” voters, dwarfed by the ranks of voters most concerned about lowering costs and reducing inflation. This mighty 4 percent of voters supports Biden by 96 points (!), a margin that would have made a Soviet Politburo candidate happy back in the day. Doesn’t seem like these voters, unlike the economy-first voters, are really in play.

Moreover, nonwhite and young voters—among whom Democrats have been bleeding support—are disproportionately economy-first voters. And who are the climate-first voters? According to the Third Way report they:

…tend to hold a college degree or higher…They are also far more likely than Economy-First voters to be financially comfortable and to believe the economy is in good shape, by a margin of 35 and 47 points, respectively….

It’s simple: if you’re prioritizing climate change this election, you’re financially comfortable. For everyone else, it remains a fringe issue, and cost-of-living concerns take center stage.

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs anyone?

No wonder Trump thinks he can effectively slam Biden and the Democrats on their climate change approach. They are leaning into an issue and devoting considerable resources to a cause that is fundamentally boutique in nature. Sentiment about electric vehicles has been trending negative and most in the working class now say they would not even consider buying one. Voters are strongly opposed to measures and regulations that would limit the future availability of gasoline-powered cars. And somewhat cluelessly the Biden administration has recently doubled down on doing just that.

Voters of course hate being told what car they must drive, how they must heat their homes, cook their food, etc. And they really, really hate high prices. Rather than fighting climate change, their strong preference is for cheap, reliable, abundant energy. No wonder that, when asked whether they would support paying something extra on their monthly utility bill to combat climate change, working-class voters opposed even paying an extra one dollar. And if the toll was raised to $10, these voters were opposed by a massive 38 points.

This makes it a problem, to say the least, that voters trust Trump more than Biden to address these issues. In an earlier Third Way poll, voters preferred Trump to Biden by 15 points on increasing domestic energy production and by 17 points on reducing the cost of energy and gas. Clearly a different approach is called for in this area other than emphasizing the importance of climate change, as dear to the hearts of liberal activists as this issue may be.

Above all, Democrats should keep in mind the “iron law of climate policy” as originally articulated by Roger Pielke Jr: When policies focused on economic growth and the cost-of-living confront policies focused on emissions reductions, it is economic growth and the cost-of-living that will win out every time.

The funny thing is that the experience of the Biden administration has been quite consistent with the iron law even though they’re loath to admit it. When Biden swept into office, cancelling the Keystone XL pipeline, blocking oil and gas exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and stopping oil and gas leasing on public lands, it seemed like his administration was going to fulfill the dreams of climate activists and dramatically ratchet down fossil fuel production. But economic imperatives soon put paid to those dreams and the Biden administration has presided instead over historic highs in oil and gas production.

The U.S. is an all-of-the-above energy superpower! But Biden and the Democrats never talk about that. Maybe they should. Greenlash is here and coming for them, unless they change course and unapologetically connect to the concerns of ordinary voters, rather than to the tiny group of climate-first voters. Carrying those voters by 96 points will be cold comfort if Trump rides the massive group of economy-first voters into the White House. And right now that looks very possible.


New Biden Ad Spotlights Trump’s Criminal Convictions

Check out the new Biden-Harris ad, followed by some of the commentary of Julianne McShane at Mother Jones:

President Joe Biden is highlighting the fact that his GOP opponent for the presidency is now a convicted felon—a first in American history.

The ad begins with somber, black-and-white pictures of former President Donald Trump in court flashing across the screen. “In the courtroom, we see Donald Trump for who he is,” a narrator explains. “He’s been convicted of 34 felonies, found liable for sexual assault, and he committed financial fraud.” (Fact-check: All true.)

After a brief detour into some of Biden’s accomplishments—”lowering healthcare costs and making corporations pay their fair share”—the narrator reminds viewers of the high stakes in November’s election: “This election is between a convicted criminal who’s only out for himself and a president who’s fighting for your family.”

McShane adds that “The new ad is reportedly part of a $50 million ad blitz the Biden campaign is launching through the end of this month, timed to kick off before the first presidential debate between Biden and Trump, hosted by CNN and set for June 27. It also reflects the Biden campaign’s increasing focus on turning Trump’s conviction into a critical part of its messaging. New polling shows this could matter to certain key voters. A POLITICO Magazine/Ipsos poll found that more than a fifth of independent voters—21 percent—said the conviction made them less likely to support Trump. On the other hand, 44 percent of independents said they somewhat or strongly believed the false narrative that the hush-money case was brought to support Biden’s re-election. In 2020, Biden led Trump among independent voters by 52 to 43 percent.”

McShane concludes:

As Democrats attempt to highlight the contrast between Biden’s and Trump’s records on abortion rights, NBC News reports that the Biden campaign plans to hold more than 30 events in battleground states this Saturday to mark the two- year anniversary of Dobbs, the ruling that struck down Roe. The Democratic Party arm focused on state legislative races also announced a $10 million campaign today in swing states emphasizing the importance of electing Democrats at the state level and putting Biden back in the Oval Office for another term.

It looks like the Democrats’ gloves are finally off—just in time for next week’s battle on the debate stage.

And not a minute too soon.


Trump’s Felony Convictions – No Traction for GOP and Potential Edge for Dems

Trump’s felony convictions did not produce Dems’ hoped-for large decline in his public support. But at least his campaign’s fantasies about the convictions giving him an upward bump did not happen. As Chris Lehman argues in “Trump’s Conviction Was Supposed to Boost His Popularity. It Hasn’t. Contrary to Republican claims that the public would see their presumptive nominee’s criminal trial as a political persecution, polls are showing that voters aren’t convinced” at The Nation:

Amid the steady torrent of MAGA-branded falsehoods and cynical spin jobs streaming through this election season, one whopper has stood out: the notion that Donald Trump’s criminal conviction in New York would prove an asset to his reelection campaign. Duly parroted among the Beltwaypress and right-wing pundits, this claim distilled a long series of GOP talking points on the reckless and tyrannical conduct of Democratic “lawfare” targeting the former president. As righteous Americans saw the fallout from this campaign, they’d rise up in outrage on Trump’s behalf—or so went the standard MAGA refrain.

But now that the verdict has sunk in—and Biden strategists have awakened to the advantages of pitching an aggressive message around Trump’s rampant criminality—voters are looking unlikely to join the retinue of MAGA leaders in storming the Bastille. A new poll from Politico/Ipsos finds that 21 percent of independent voters say that Trump’s conviction makes them less likely to vote for him, with just 5 percent describing themselves as more likely to support him on the basis of his felon status. In what looks to be a close election in which swing voters may once again play an outsize role, these numbers are anything but good news for the Trump campaign.

Karissa Waddick adds at USA Today that “Of those polled, a whopping 40%” in the poll “also said Trump should be imprisoned for his crimes, including 42% of independents.”

Lehman notes that “The survey does, however, show that other elements of the MAGA agitprop campaign against the verdict have been more successful. Forty-three percent of respondents said that President Joe Biden had helped to bring the prosecution against Trump—another rank MAGA falsehood that congressional leaders are trying to sow more widely with bogus inquiries into the New York prosecution.” But a slight majority, 51 percent “repudiated” the notion. Further,

Given the overall distractibility of the voting public, and the GOP’s overt strategy to spread baseless conspiracy theories among low-information voters, it’s critical for Democratic campaign messaging to continue hammering away at this central Trump liability. The good news is that, for once, Democratic strategists are stirring out of their habitual defensive crouch and moving into attack mode. The Biden campaign recently debuted a $50 million ad buy for a cogent TV spot called “Character Matters,” which will blanket swing states in the week leading up to the June 27 presidential debate. “In the courtroom, we see Donald Trump for who he is,” a somber voiceover announces over black-and-white images of Trump in court. “He’s been convicted of 34 felonies, found liable for sexual assault, and he committed financial fraud.” After touting Biden’s record on issues like corporate accountability, the ad archly sums up the stakes of the 2024 presidential balloting: “This election is between a convicted criminal who’s only out for himself and a president who’s fighting for your family.”

It’s a welcome and blunt message after an initial bout of hand-wringing in Democratic circles over how and whether to highlight Trump’s conviction in Biden campaign pitches. The party’s chronic posture of meek institutional deference was clearly unsuited to meet the historic moment of a major party’s presumptive nominee’s conviction in a jury trial; in the first few days after the jury verdict, it appeared that party leaders would continue blindly insisting that the important thing was to contrast the two candidates’ governing records, and to let Trump’s criminal conviction speak for itself.

In reality, of course, criminal conspiracy is the Trump governing record, from the cronyist deals he cut for his business interests and immediate family members to his flagrant auctioning of policy stances in exchange for campaign backsheesh. As the general election season heats up, the main challenge for Biden’s campaign is to reinforce these key connections exposing the pseudopopulist rhetoric of the MAGA movement as nothing more than a rolling grift spearheaded by a felon and lifelong fraudster. As it happens, the new Politico/Ipsos poll points toward that very direction: Instead of documenting rapidly spreading popular suspicion of the basic operations of lower courts, it found that the public most distrusts the US Supreme Court—which Trump steered irrevocably rightward under the direction of the Federalist Society, a hard-right dark-money colossus. Just 39 percent of respondents said they found Supreme Court justices to be trustworthy; by contrast, 54 percent said they trusted the legal judgment of jurors—the same legal actors who put Trump on the verge of a potential jail term.

All of this should prove modestly helpful to Democrats. As Lehman explains, “As Brian Beutler has argued, all the elements are in place for Biden and his Democratic backers to mount a wide-ranging assault on the mobbed-up, pay-to-play model of Trumpian governance….Conveniently, much of this money-driven government makeover is copiously documented in Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s blueprint for a second Trump term—and the subject of The Nation’s most recent cover package.”

Democrats still must figure out some easy-to-grasp soundbites to drive home the message that, not only Trump, but the entire G.O.P. has degenerated into a corrupt personality cult. Lehman concludes, “Now that the Biden campaign has finally found the gumption to draw on Trump’s criminal record for its core messaging, it must press home the broader indictment of Trumpian rule as graft by another name. After all, the payments a con man makes are typically far less consequential than the ones he receives.”


Ruy Teixeira Conversation With Josh Kraushaar: ‘Who Will Capture the Center?”

“This week I’m joined by my good friend, Josh Kraushaar. He’s one of America’s keenest political minds and a long-time journalist who is currently the Editor in Chief of Jewish Insider. We discuss developments in the presidential campaign, the ongoing brand challenges of Biden on the economy and energy policy, and explore the impact of recent anti-Israel protests and emerging divisions within the Democratic Party on the Israel-Hamas war.

“We discuss developments in the presidential campaign, the ongoing brand challenges of Biden on the economy and energy policy, and explore the impact of recent anti-Israel protests and emerging divisions within the Democratic Party on the Israel-Hamas war.”

Josh Kraushaar is the author of Axios’ weekly Sunday Sneak Peek newsletter, which focuses on the big-picture forces driving American politics, and he writes a column analyzing the latest political developments for Jewish Insider. He has served as editor-in-chief of the Hotline, where he authored the biweekly Against the Grain column and hosted a weekly podcast featuring the leading lawmakers, political operatives and journalists for candid interviews. He also was co-author of the 2014 Almanac of American Politics. Kraushaar frequently appears as a political analyst on television and radio. He is a Fox News Radio political analyst, providing political commentary across all the network’s platforms.

Ruy Teixeira is senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter, author of numerous works of political analysis, and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?


A Summation of Trump’s Actual Record

If you were looking for a succinct summary of Trump’s real record as president to share, Heather Digby Parton has a good one, “Worse than inflation: Let’s remember Trump’s real record in office,” at Salon. Start here:

Public opinion polls about the current presidential race are mystifying in a lot of ways. How can it be that the twice impeached, convicted felon Donald Trump is the presumptive nominee for the Republican Party again? As inexplicable as it is to many of us, I think after eight years we have to accept that almost half the country is beguiled by the man while the other half looks on in abject horror and carry on from there. But as much as we may be dismayed by this adoration and fealty to Trump the man, it’s still maddening that so many voters — including even Democrats — insist that everything was so much better when Donald Trump was president. I can’t believe that people have forgotten what it was really like. By almost any measure it was an epic sh**show.

One obvious explanation is that Trump lies relentlessly about his record. So after a while people start to believe him. According to Trump, we had unprecedented prosperity, the greatest foreign policy, the safest, the cleanest, the most peaceful world in human history and it immediately turned into a toxic dystopia upon his departure from the White House.

The reality, of course, was far different.

From the day after the election, Trump’s presidential tenure was a non-stop scandal. Even in the early days of the transition, there were substantial and well-founded charges of corruption, nepotism and collusion with foreign adversaries. There was the early firing of Trump’s national security advisor, the subsequent firing of the FBI director and eventually the appointment of a special counsel. He did manage to set a record while in the White House: the highest number of staff and cabinet turnovers in history, 85%. Some were forced out due to their unscrupulous behavior, others quit or were fired after they refused to carry out unethical or illegal orders ordered by the president. This continued throughout the term until the very last days of his presidency when a handful of Cabinet members, including the attorney general, resigned over Trump’s Big Lie and refusal to accept his loss.

Yes, those were really good times. Let’s sign on for another four years of chaos, corruption and criminality.

But, let’s face facts. What people think they miss about the Trump years was the allegedly great pre-pandemic economy and the world peace that he brought through the sheer force of his magnetic personality. None of that is remotely true. The Trump economy was the tail end of the longest expansion in history begun under President Barack Obama and the low interest rates that went with it. Nothing Trump did added to it and he never lived up to even his own hype:

Trump assured the public in 2017 that the U.S. economy with his tax cuts would grow at “3%,” but he added, “I think it could go to 4, 5, and maybe even 6%, ultimately.”If the 2020 pandemic is excluded, growth after inflation averaged 2.67% under Trump, according to figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Include the pandemic-induced recession and that average drops to an anemic 1.45%. By contrast, growth during the second term of then-President Barack Obama averaged 2.33%. So far under Biden, annual growth is averaging 3.4%.

Inflation started its rise at the beginning of the pandemic (Trump’s last year) and continued to rise sharply in the first year of the Biden administration before it started to come back down. The reasons are complex but the fact that it was lower under Trump is simply a matter of timing. Trump’s economy was good but it wasn’t great even before the pandemic. He had higher unemployment than we have now, he blew out the deficit with his tax cuts and his tariffs accomplished zilch. Sure, the stock market was roaring but it’s even higher now.

Unlike Trump, who simply rode an already good economy, Biden started out with the massive crisis Trump left him and managed to dig out from under it in record time. No other country in the world has recovered as quickly and had Trump won re-election there’s little evidence in his record that he could have done the same. All he knows is tariffs and and tax cuts and he’s promising more of the same.

On the world stage, he was a disaster. From his ill-treatment of allies to his sucking up to dictators from Kim Jong Un to Vladimir Putin, everything Trump did internationally was wrong. He was impeached for blackmailing the leader of Ukraine to get him dirt on Joe Biden, for goodness sakes! Does that sound like a sound foreign policy decision? The reverberations of his ignorant posturing will be felt for a generation even if he doesn’t win another term.

Read more here.