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TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira: Conservative Cuts Unpopular

Despite the acrimonious debate between conservatives about the depth of spending cuts, the latest Pew opinion data (poll conducted Feb 2-7) indicates that the public is skeptical about the need for cuts in social spending and strongly opposed to deep cuts, according to TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira’s latest ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’ at the Center for American Progress web pages.

…When asked about a number of possible areas where the federal budget could be cut the public shied away from decreasing spending in area after area. Under 30 percent called for spending cuts in 16 of 18 areas with the least enthusiasm for cuts in veterans’ benefits (6 percent), education (11 percent), Medicare (12 percent), Social Security (12 percent), public schools (13 percent), and college financial aid (16 percent).

Nor do conservatives win much support when it comes to cutting state budgets:

…Just 18 percent support decreasing funding for K-12 schools, 21 percent support decreasing health care services, and 31 percent support decreasing funding for roads and public transportation. And support is still only split (47-47) on cutting the pension plans of public employees despite the relentless barrage of conservative attacks on public-sector workers.

Apparently conservatives don’t pay much attention to the views of American voters on spending cuts. As for hoping they will come around and listen to their constituents, there’s not much precedent for that. As Teixeira says, “I suppose we shouldn’t hold our breath.”


TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira: Public, Conservatives at Odds on Cuts

Conservatives are about to launch their full-court press on budget cuts. But their problem is, the cuts they want are the diametrical opposites of the cuts the public supports, — and vice versa. As TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira explains in his latest ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’:

…Their proposed cuts leave the military largely untouched while taking a meat axe to nonmilitary discretionary spending–that is, spending on areas such as education, energy, the environment, and poverty. As usual, conservative priorities are backward when compared to public opinion.
In a fascinating new survey the Program for Public Consultation conducted, respondents were asked to make their own cuts (or increases) to a projected discretionary budget for the year 2015 with a $625 billion deficit. The top three areas for cuts were defense ($109 billion average cut), intelligence agencies ($13 billion), and Iraq/Afghanistan ($13 billion)–the very areas conservatives are going light on.

As for the budget items the conservatives want to eviscerate,

On the other hand, the public wanted to see spending increases in a number of other areas. The top four areas for increases are exactly the kinds of programs conservatives are ready to cut deeply in their current antispending frenzy: job training ($5 billion average increase), higher education ($5 billion), renewable energy ($3 billion), and elementary and secondary education ($3 billion).

It looks like Democrats who hold the line on social spending while cutting the military budget will be on solid ground with their constituents, while conservatives who stand for the reverse will have some explaining to do.


Entrepreneurial Populism: How Progressives Can Unite with Small Business

This post by Democratic strategist and TDS advisory board member and contributor Mike Lux, author of The Progressive Revolution: How the Best in America Came to Be, is cross-posted from The HuffPo.
The progressive movement is at a challenging but fascinating time in our country’s history. Even when the Democrats had a newly-elected president who ran on a platform of big change, 60 votes in the Senate, a big margin of control in the House and the most progressive Speaker in history, we still had trouble getting big changes passed. We accomplished some important things, but not nearly as much or as progressively as we had hoped. Now, with a Republican House, only 53 Democratic senators, and a president who has signaled he wants to move more to the center, progressives have even less power than before.
There’s one other factor that even this old-school, lefty populist needs to acknowledge at this moment in our political history: While most voters remain very angry at Wall Street, health insurance companies, big businesses that keep outsourcing jobs, and other corporate special interests, they also are very angry with a government that seems pretty dysfunctional. Swing voters in particular are generally tired of traditional political arguments, and just want political leaders who are going to be very pragmatic about actually delivering jobs and other tangible economic benefits. In this environment, progressives should not shy away from making populist arguments, but need to temper that populism with a pragmatic message about helping small businesses and manufacturers create more jobs.


TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira: Public Priorities in Line with SOTU

In his current ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’ at the Center for American Progress web pages, TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira discusses data from a DCorps focus group indicating that President Barack Obama’s State of the Union or SOTU address was popular with swing voters, ands even Republicans, as well as Democrats. Teixeira explaoins the DCorps exercise:

…They gathered 50 swing voters together in Denver, Colorado to watch and react to the speech. These swing voters were decidedly not partisans of the president’s party or Obama backers in general–48 percent were Republican and just 18 percent were Democratic, while they split their 2008 ballots evenly between McCain and Obama.
Among this skeptical audience, Obama’s speech played very well indeed. Comparing pre-speech to post-speech assessments, his job approval went up 26 points. The proportion believing he has realistic solutions to the country’s problems increased by 34 points, and the proportion believing he has a good plan for the economy went up 36 points. The total confident he could create new jobs went up by 28 points, the percent confident in his energy plans went up 22 points, and the proportion confident in his handing of the budget increased by 36 points. In addition, the proportion seeing him as a tax-and-spend liberal went down by 36 points.

Teixeira explains that “Obama connected the need for increased public investment (infrastructure, education, science) and safeguarding key social programs to budget challenges in a way that resonated with the public as a whole.: He adds,

…A recent CNN poll asked the public about a series of federal programs in the context of reducing the budget deficit. The specific query was whether they thought it was more important to cut spending in that program to reduce the deficit or more important to prevent that program from being significantly cut.
By 85-14, the public did not want to see veterans’ benefits cut and voiced similar sentiments about Medicare (81-18), Social Security (78-21), education (75-25), Medicaid (70-29), assistance to the unemployed (61-38), and programs to build and maintain bridges, roads, and mass transit (61-39).

So much for the notion that Americans are persuaded by budget-cutting deficit hawks. As Teixeira concludes, “…The public has very strong priorities in the area of public spending and these are far closer to Obama’s views than theirs. In fact, as shocking as it may seem, conservatives might want to consider working with the president rather than against him.”


Democracy Corps: Swing voters reaction to Obama’s SOTU speech

Dial testing and follow-up discussions with 50 swing voters in Denver, Colorado showed that President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union struck a powerful chord as he described his economic vision for the country. Following the speech, voters gave the President impressive assessments on key economic measures and were especially drawn to the President’s emphasis on three of the themes he emphasized in his speech; innovation, education, and America’s competitiveness in the future. As one of these swing voters put it, “the future belongs to the people who make the what and the how.”
Despite their strong response to the State of the Union, these swing voters remain skeptical about Washington’s ability to deliver and are hungry for tangible changes in the economy. The President’s references to the nation’s past accomplishments and his description of how we must invest in small businesses and out-innovate to create tomorrow’s jobs helped overcome this skepticism, but getting past their skepticism will clearly be a central challenge.
This was a difficult audience for Obama, yet his speech largely won them over. It was a heavily Republican-leaning group (48 percent Republican, 18 percent Democratic) that split their votes in 2008 (48 percent Obama, 48 percent McCain) but had moved away from the President over the past two years. At the outset, majorities expressed disapproval with his job performance and unfavorable views of him on a personal level.
Despite this Republican tilt, Obama saw significant shifts in his overall standing — larger even than after his well-received State of the Union address last year. His overall job approval among these voters jumped by 26 points (10 points more than he gained last year) while his personal standing flipped from decidedly cool (30 percent warm versus 62 percent cool) to much warmer (52 percent warm, 27 percent cool).


TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira: Support for ACA Repeal Soft

House Republicans passed repeal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), with loads of bluster about their doing the will of the people. But when you look at public opinion poll data, that support is “very soft indeed,” according to TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira’s latest ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’ in the Center for American Progress web pages.

…The fact is people like a great deal about the new health care reform law and are reluctant to give up these advances. Consider these results from the latest CBS/New York Times survey. Forty-eight percent of those polled said they preferred to let the new law stand compared to 40 percent who wanted to see it repealed. The latter figure is obviously significant and, in fact, has been up to 10 points higher in other surveys.

Turns out, however, that support for repeal gets downright mushy when respondents are asked “whether they would still support repeal if that meant insurance companies were no longer required to cover those with pre-existing medical conditions.” Teixeira adds, “This query reduced the number supporting complete repeal to just 21 percent.”
No matter how loudly House conservatives crow about their “victory,” the public is not ready to sign on this particular take-away, especially with no alternative to replace it.


DCorps/CAF Poll: Jobs Trump Deficit, Spending Concerns

A new poll conducted 1/9-12 by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner for Democracy Corps and Campaign for America’s Future presents “a clear and dramatic message” for the President and Congress: It’s all about jobs and the restoration of a healthy economy. As the memo from TDS Co-Editor Stan Greenberg, James Carville and Robert Borosage, explains:

The media pundits and Washington conventional wisdom say deficit reduction and cutting gov-ernment spending are the top priorities for the nation; yet, the Republican Congress has prioritized health care repeal and Social Security cuts (which are on the table for the first time.) They could not have it more wrong. It is jobs, stupid.

This survey results, released on the eve of the President’s State of the Union address, shows a significant uptick in his “personal favorability” ratings, all the more impressive since it was conducted before his much-praised address memorializing the victims of the Tucson shooting. Also, for the President, “strong disapproval has plummeted.” Moreover, President Obama is “marginally ahead of Mitt Romney and dramatically ahead of Sarah Palin in the 2012 race.”
The poll also shows some modest improvement for congressional Democrats over 2010, when they were down by 8 points. Dems trail Republicans in a named Congressional ballot by 3 points and by 4 among Independents. The survey concludes that Dems and the GOP “are at rough parity in public image.” The authors warn, however, that,

…Right now, Democrats are basically invisible on the economy and jobs. Republicans are more trusted by 4 points on the economy and the parties are at parity on creating jobs…We all know the unemployment rate will exceed 9 percent for some time to come, and will probably remain above 8 percent up to the election. There is no more important fact. In this survey, 17 percent report being unemployed in the past year; 41 percent counting themselves or someone in their immediate family – one half of white non-college men.

But, looking forward, Dems could gain traction:

Voters could be on the verge of registering some buyers’ remorse for the Republican leadership…Republicans are about to confront the gap between the mandate they claim and the voters’ priorities. This presents an opportunity for Democrats to define themselves, the choice ahead, and more importantly, to finally show what they believe about the economy and how they plan to achieve growth – above all, how to create jobs now and in the future…The President and the Democrats have to start over in communicating their vision on the economy. The country embraces long-term plans for investment to create jobs and favors growth as the best route to deficit reduction – strongly favoring investment over austerity.

In terms of priorities, the survey findings couldn’t be more clear:

Though respondents could choose two problems, just 25 percent say “the budget deficit is big and growing.” While it is important, it is not their top concern.
Just 17 percent think the priority for the new Congress should be repealing health care. The Republican obsession with health care repeal does not correspond with the views of the voters…
The new Congress is about to get it very wrong. The voters believe the top priority should be economic recovery and jobs (46 percent), protecting Social Security and Medicare (34 percent), and making sure children receive an education for these times (27 percent). Cutting spending and the size of government is fourth on the list, at 25 percent, and reducing the size of the budget deficit is sixth–at only 15 percent.

The poll presents additional data indicating that the Republicans are on shaky ground with proposals to cut Social Security, reduce spending and repeal health care reform. For Dems, it is a “better environment than last November,” according to the authors, who dilineate the demographic challenge ahead for Dems:

…In the broad base at the heart of their electoral majority, Democrats are doing respectably at the outset of 2011, though they have to make significant additional gains with young voters and unmarried women if they are to get back to 2012 levels. They also need to do better with union households.

In addition, the authors note continuing Democratic weak support with “white non-college voters,” “white seniors” and “rural non-South white voters.” To make inroads with these and all constituencies, Greenberg, Carville and Borosage see a clear path to victory in 2012: “This is an opportunity for Democrats and the president to show that they get the message: jobs and a big plan to get America going. Protect Social Security and Medicare. This is both good policy and good politics.”


POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ABSTRACTS – JANUARY 2011

From American Journal of Political ScienceThe Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification
David E. Campbell, John C. Green, Geoffrey . Layman
We argue that the factors shaping the impact of partisanship on vote choice–“partisan voting”–depend on the nature of party identification. Because party identification is partly based on images of the social group characteristics of the parties, the social profiles of political candidates should affect levels of partisan voting. A candidate’s religious affiliation enables a test of this hypothesis. Using survey experiments which vary a hypothetical candidate’s religious affiliation, we find strong evidence that candidates’ religions can affect partisan voting. Identifying a candidate as an evangelical (a group viewed as Republican) increases Republican support for, and Democratic opposition to, the candidate, while identifying the candidate as a Catholic (a group lacking a clear partisan profile) has no bearing on partisan voting. Importantly, the conditional effect of candidate religion on partisan voting requires the group to have a salient partisan image and holds with controls for respondents’ own religious affiliations and ideologies.
Gendered Perceptions and Political Candidacies: A Central Barrier to Women’s Equality in Electoral Politics
Richard L. Fox, Jennifer L. Lawless
Based on the second wave of the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study, we provide the first thorough analysis of how gender affects women and men’s efficacy to run for office. Our findings reveal that, despite comparable credentials, backgrounds, and experiences, accomplished women are substantially less likely than similarly situated men to perceive themselves as qualified to seek office. Importantly, women and men rely on the same factors when evaluating themselves as candidates, but women are less likely than men to believe they meet these criteria. Not only are women more likely than men to doubt that they have skills and traits necessary for electoral politics, but they are also more likely to doubt their abilities to engage in campaign mechanics. These findings are critical because the perceptual differences we uncover account for much of the gender gap in potential candidates’ self-efficacy and ultimately hinder women’s prospects for political equality.
How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court
Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns, Patrick C. Wohlfarth
Although scholars increasingly acknowledge a contemporaneous relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions, debate continues as to why this relationship exists. Does public opinion directly influence decisions or do justices simply respond to the same social forces that simultaneously shape the public mood? To answer this question, we first develop a strategy to control for the justices’ attitudinal change that stems from the social forces that influence public opinion. We then propose a theoretical argument that predicts strategic justices should be mindful of public opinion even in cases when the public is unlikely to be aware of the Court’s activities. The results suggest that the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions is real, substantively important, and most pronounced in nonsalient cases.
From British Journal of Political Science
Research Article
Downs, Stokes and the Dynamics of Electoral Choice
David Sanders, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley
January 2011
ABSTRACT
six-wave 2005-09 national panel survey conducted in conjunction with the British Election Study provided data for an investigation of sources of stability and change in voters’ party preferences. The authors test competing spatial and valence theories of party choice and investigate the hypothesis that spatial calculations provide cues for making valence judgements. Analyses reveal that valence mechanisms – heuristics based on party leader images, party performance evaluations and mutable partisan attachments – outperform a spatial model in terms of strength of direct effects on party choice. However, spatial effects still have sizeable indirect effects on the vote via their influence on valence judgements. The results of exogeneity tests bolster claims about the flow of influence from spatial calculations to valence judgments to electoral choice.
‘The Arithmetic of Compassion’: Rethinking the Politics of Photography
James Johnson
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Compassion, theorists from Arendt to Nussbaum suggest, carries an ineluctable pressure to identify with individual suffering. The very idea of a politics of compassion verges on incoherence. Politics typically demands attention to the aggregate and it is just there that compassion falters. This is a problem for critics addressing the politics of photography, who typically presume that the point of photographs must be to elicit compassion among viewers. But a proper understanding of compassion makes this presumption highly problematic. The role of compassion in exemplary writings on the politics of photography reflects a fixation with ’emblematic’ individual subjects in ‘classic’ American documentary practice, which prevents critics from properly grasping the best of contemporary documentary. The conclusion is that promoting solidarity provides a more plausible, if elusive, aim for the politics of photography.
National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern about Immigration in Britain and the United States
Daniel J. Hopkins
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Theories of inter-group threat hold that local concentrations of immigrants produce resource competition and anti-immigrant attitudes. Variants of these theories are commonly applied to Britain and the United States. Yet the empirical tests have been inconsistent. This paper analyses geo-coded surveys from both countries to identify when residents’ attitudes are influenced by living near immigrant communities. Pew surveys from the United States and the 2005 British Election Study illustrate how local contextual effects hinge on national politics. Contextual effects appear primarily when immigration is a nationally salient issue, which explains why past research has not always found a threat. Seemingly local disputes have national catalysts. The paper also demonstrates how panel data can reduce selection biases that plague research on local contextual effects
From Electoral Studies
Uncovering the Micro-foundations of Turnout and Electoral Systems
Tse-hsin Chen
January 2011
ABSTRACT
This paper tackles the micro-foundations of voting and addresses why proportional representation systems (PR) are associated with higher turnout than majoritarian systems (SMD). I argue that individual evaluations of the differential benefit in the calculus of voting are affected by spatial party competition framed by electoral institutions. Unlike PR, SMD constrains the number of parties and creates large centripetal forces for party competition, which reduces the perceived benefits of voting. A citizen’s voting propensity is related to the distance between her preferred policy position and those of her most- and least-favored parties. I use multilevel modeling to analyze individual voting decisions structured by aggregate variables across 64 elections. The empirical findings confirm the argument and the mechanism holds both in established and non-established democracies.
From The Journal of Politics
When Candidates Value Good Character: A Spatial Model with Applications to Congressional Elections
James Adams, Samuel Merrill III, Elizabeth N. Simas and Walter J. Stone
January 2011
ABSTRACT
We add to the literature that examines the relationship between candidate valence and policy strategies by arguing that candidates intrinsically value both the policies and the personal character of the winning candidate. In making this argument, we distinguish between two dimensions of candidate valence: strategic valence refers to factors such as name recognition, fundraising ability, and campaigning skills, while character valence is composed of qualities that voters and candidates intrinsically value in office holders, including integrity, competence, and diligence. Our model considers challengers who value both the policies and the character-based valence of the incumbent and assumes that the incumbent’s policy position is fixed by prior commitments. Under these conditions, we show that challengers who are superior to the incumbent in their character-based valence have incentives to moderate their policy positions. We report empirical tests of this good-government result of our model, using data on the 2006 congressional elections.
The Role of Candidate Traits in Campaigns
Kim L. Fridkin and Patrick J. Kenney
January 2011
ABSTRACT
We examine how candidates shape citizens’ impressions of their personal traits during U.S. Senate campaigns. We look at the personality traits emphasized by candidates in their controlled communications and in news coverage of their campaigns. We couple information about campaign messages with a unique survey dataset allowing us to examine voters’ understanding and evaluations of the candidates’ personalities. We find that messages from the news media influence people’s willingness to rate the candidates on trait dimensions. In addition, negative trait messages emanating from challengers and the press shape citizens’ impressions of incumbents. In contrast, voters’ evaluations of challengers are unmoved by campaign messages, irrespective of the source or tone of the communications. Finally, we find citizens rely heavily on traits when evaluating competing candidates in U.S. Senate campaigns, even controlling for voters’ party, ideological, and issue preferences.
Do Women and Men Know Different Things? Measuring Gender Differences in Political Knowledge
Kathleen Dolan
January 2010
ABSTRACT
That women exhibit lower levels of political knowledge than men is a common and consistent finding in political science research. Recently, scholars have begun examining whether the content and structure of political knowledge measures contribute to women’s perceived knowledge deficit. In an attempt to enter the debate on the explanations for gender differences in knowledge, I create and test a number of measures of gender-relevant political knowledge to determine whether broadening our definitions of what constitutes “knowledge” may help us more clearly understand the apparent gender gap in political knowledge in the United States. The results indicate that expected gender differences disappear when respondents are asked about the levels of women’s representation in the national government.
The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Based Approach
Alan S. Gerber, Daniel P. Kessler and Marc Meredith
January 2011
ABSTRACT
During the contest for Kansas attorney general in 2006, an organization sent out six pieces of mail criticizing the incumbent’s conduct in office. We exploit a discontinuity in the rule used to select which households received the mailings to identify the causal effect of mail on vote choice and voter turnout. We find these mailings had a politically significant effect on the challenger’s vote share, which is statistically significant in most, but not all, of our specifications. Our point estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the amount of mail sent to a precinct increased the challenger’s vote share by 1.5 to 3.5 percentage points. Furthermore, our results suggest that these mailings had little mobilizing effect, suggesting that the mechanism for this increase was persuasion.
Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation
Nicholas A. Valentino, Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz and
Vincent L. Hutchings
January 2011
ABSTRACT
A large literature has established a persistent association between the skills and resources citizens possess and their likelihood of participating in politics. However, the short-term motivational forces that cause citizens to employ those skills and expend resources in one election but not the next have only recently received attention. Findings in political psychology suggest specific emotions may play an important role in mobilization, but the question of “which emotions play what role?” remains an important area of debate. Drawing on cognitive appraisal theory and the Affective Intelligence model, we predict that anger, more than anxiety or enthusiasm, will mobilize. We find evidence for the distinctive influence of anger in a randomized experiment, a national survey of the 2008 electorate, and in pooled American National Election Studies from 1980 to 2004.
The Long-Term Dynamics of Partisanship and Issue Orientations
Benjamin Highton and Cindy D. Kam
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Partisanship and issue orientations are among the foundational concepts for behavioral researchers. We seek to understand their causal relationship. One view suggests that party identification, as a central and long-standing affective orientation, influences citizens’ issue positions. Another view claims that issue orientations influence party identification. We take both theories into account in this article and argue that the direction of causality may depend upon the political context. Using the Political Socialization Panel Study, we analyze the long-term dynamic relationship between partisanship and issue orientations. The results from our cross-lagged structural equation models are inconsistent with a single, time-invariant, unidirectional causal story. The causal relationship between partisanship and issue orientations appears to depend upon the larger political context. In the early period from 1973 to 1982, partisanship causes issue orientations. In the later period, from 1982 to 1997, the causal arrow is reversed, and issue orientations significantly shape partisanship.
A Genome-Wide Analysis of Liberal and Conservative Political Attitudes
Peter K. Hatemi, Nathan A. Gillespie, Lindon J. Eaves, Brion S. Maher, Bradley T. Webb, Andrew C. Heath, Sarah E. Medland, David C. Smyth, Harry N. Beeby, Scott D. Gordon, Grant W. Montgomery, Ghu Zhu, Enda M. Byrne and Nicholas G. Martin
January 2011
ABSTRACT
The assumption that the transmission of social behaviors and political preferences is purely cultural has been challenged repeatedly over the last 40 years by the combined evidence of large studies of adult twins and their relatives, adoption studies, and twins reared apart. Variance components and path modeling analyses using data from extended families quantified the overall genetic influence on political attitudes, but few studies have attempted to localize the parts of the genome which accounted for the heritability estimates found for political preferences. Here, we present the first genome-wide analysis of Conservative-Liberal attitudes from a sample of 13,000 respondents whose DNA was collected in conjunction with a 50-item sociopolitical attitude questionnaire. Several significant linkage peaks were identified and potential candidate genes discussed.
From PS: Political Science & Politics
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: The Predicted Midterm Landslide
James E. Campbell
January 2011
ABSTRACT
The “Seats in Trouble” forecasting model predicted in mid-August that Republicans would gain a landslide number of seats in the 2010 elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, and that this number would be sufficiently large to restore their majority control of the House, which was lost in the 2006 midterms. Republicans were predicted to gain approximately 51 or 52 seats, about the magnitude of their 1994 midterm victory and the largest seat change since the Truman-Dewey election of 1948. As predicted, on Election Day, Republicans won a landslide number of seats, enough to give them a substantial House majority.
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: Forecasting House Seats from Generic Congressional Polls: A Post-Mortem
Joseph Bafumi, Robert S. Erikson and Christopher Wlezien
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Based on information available in July, we predicted that the Republicans would receive 52.9% of the total House vote and end up holding 229 seats, gaining control from the Democrats in the process (Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien 2010b). Our national vote forecast proved to be nearly correct, undershooting the actual Republican share (53.8%) by slightly less than one percentage point. Our seat forecast was a little less accurate. Although we did foresee the House changing hands, we did not predict such a large Republican windfall in seats–we forecast a “mere” swing of 50 seats, which was short of the actual outcome by about 13 seats. The Republican seat total of 242, however, was well within the 95% confidence interval (199 to 259).
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: Congressional Forecasts: Theory Versus Tracking in 2010
Michael S. Lewis-Becka1 and Charles Tien
January 2011
ABSTRACT
In our recent article forecasting the 2010 U.S. congressional elections, we argue for a model based on theory rather than tracking (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2010). A sound theoretical explanation of vote choice in House races should, ceteris paribus, predict better than a simple dependence on variables that proxy the vote, such as the generic ballot question. We posited a simple but classical explanation of the 2010 House vote–the referendum model–in which voters punish or reward the party in power according to its performance in office and the time available for that performance. In words, the model reads: House Seat Change = f(Economy, Popularity, Midterm). A measurement of these variables, at lags appropriate for forecasting, yields the estimates (OLS) of model 1, shown in column 1 of table 1. Model 1 gives a forecast of −22 seats for the Democrats in 2010, when, in fact, they scored about −60 seats. The model 1 forecast appears “wrong” in two senses. First, substantively, it fails to predict the Republican takeover of the House. Second, scientifically, it is off by over two standard errors of estimate (i.e., 38/17 > 2.0). Why did the model get it wrong this time, when the forecast was off by only one seat in the last midterm in 2006? To answer this question, the specifications of the model need consideration. Such consideration signals the scientific value of the forecasting exercise in providing a systematic trial-and-error method for model improvement.
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: Assessing The 2010 State Legislative Election Forecasting Models
Carl Klarner
January 2011
ABSTRACT
This brief note reports the accuracy of my two forecasts for the 2010 state legislative elections, one made on July 22 and reported in the October 2010 issue of this journal (the “PS model”; Klarner 2010a), and the other made on September 18 and reported in the October issue of Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics (i.e., the “Forum model”; Klarner 2010b). Both models used presidential approval, the state of the economy, and midterm loss as national-level predictor variables, while the later forecast also used Gallup’s generic ballot question asking respondents which party they would vote for in the upcoming U.S. House election. The PS model predicted the Republicans would pick up 11 chambers, while the Forum model forecast a 15-chamber pickup. In actuality, the Republicans picked up 21 chambers, in contrast to the average 3.2-net chamber shift in party control toward one party or the other from 1962 to 2008. While both forecasts understated the extent of the Republican wave, the July forecast especially did. Overall, the Forum forecast did a good job of predicting the Republican wave, calling about three-fourths of its magnitude.
Partisan Vision Biases Determination of Voter Intent
Peter A. Ubel and Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher
January 2011
ABSTRACT
In close, disputed elections, outcomes can depend on determinations of voter intent for ballots that have been filled out improperly. We surveyed 899 adult Minnesotans during a time when the state’s U.S. Senate election was still disputed and presented them with ambiguous ballots similar to ballots under dispute in the same election. We randomized participants to three experimental groups, across which we varied the names on the ballot. We found that participants’ judgments of voter intent were strongly biased by their voting preferences (p < .002 in all four ballots). From Political Behavior
Mobilizing Collective Identity: Frames & Rational Individuals
Christy Aroopala
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Mobilization of collective identities is a common tool in election campaigns and policy debates. Frames that target group identity can mobilize groups; however it is unclear when these group frames are likely to be successful. This project explores whether moderators, or factors that limit framing effects, can help predict whether individuals will respond to group mobilization attempts. Drawing on the rational choice approach, I assess whether the presence of thresholds (i.e. rules that determines how far the group is from attaining its goal) works as a moderator of framing effects. Using a voting game laboratory experiment, I analyze the impact of group frames when distance from a fixed threshold varies and when we account for differences in group identity strength. The findings indicate that the interaction of group identity strength, group frames, and moderators of frames has an important impact on participation, suggesting that environmental factors play a significant role in group mobilization.


POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ABSTRACTS – DECEMBER 2010

From The American Political Science Review
Dynamic Public Opinion: Communication Effects over Time
DENNIS CHONG and JAMES N. DRUCKMAN
December 2010
ABSTRACT
We develop an approach to studying public opinion that accounts for how people process competing messages received over the course of a political campaign or policy debate. Instead of focusing on the fixed impact of a message, we emphasize that a message can have variable effects depending on when it is received within a competitive context and how it is evaluated. We test hypotheses about the effect of information processing using data from two experiments that measure changes in public opinion in response to alternative sequences of information. As in past research, we find that competing messages received at the same time neutralize one another. However, when competing messages are separated by days or weeks, most individuals give disproportionate weight to the most recent communication because previous effects decay over time. There are exceptions, though, as people who engage in deliberate processing of information display attitude stability and give disproportionate weight to previous messages. These results show that people typically form significantly different opinions when they receive competing messages over time than when they receive the same messages simultaneously. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for understanding the power of communications in contemporary politics.
Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment
ALAN S. GERBER, GREGORY A. HUBER and EBONYA WASHINGTON
December 2010
Abstract
Partisanship is strongly correlated with attitudes and behavior, but it is unclear from this pattern whether partisan identity has a causal effect on political behavior and attitudes. We report the results of a field experiment that investigates the causal effect of party identification. Prior to the February 2008 Connecticut presidential primary, researchers sent a mailing to a random sample of unaffiliated registered voters who, in a pretreatment survey, leaned toward a political party. The mailing informed the subjects that only voters registered with a party were able to participate in the upcoming presidential primary. Subjects were surveyed again in June 2008. Comparing posttreatment survey responses to subjects’ baseline survey responses, we find that those reminded of the need to register with a party were more likely to identify with a party and showed stronger partisanship. Further, we find that the treatment group also demonstrated greater concordance than the control group between their pretreatment latent partisanship and their posttreatment reported voting behavior and intentions and evaluations of partisan figures. Thus, our treatment, which appears to have caused a strengthening of partisan identity, also appears to have caused a shift in subjects’ candidate preferences and evaluations of salient political figures. This finding is consistent with the claim that partisanship is an active force changing how citizens behave in and perceive the political world.
Competition between Specialized Candidates
STEFAN KRASA and MATTIAS POLBORN
December 2010
Abstract
Opposing candidates for a political office often differ in their professional backgrounds and previous political experience, leading to both real and perceived differences in political capabilities. We analyze a formal model in which candidates with different productivities in two policy areas compete for voters by choosing how much money or effort they would allocate to each area if elected. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median voter model. Although candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. From a welfare perspective, candidates are “excessively moderate”: almost certainly, a majority of voters would prefer that the winning candidate focus more on his or her strength.
Political Consequences of the Carceral State
VESLA M. WEAVER and AMY E. LERMAN
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Contact with the criminal justice system is greater today than at any time in our history. In this article, we argue that interactions with criminal justice are an important source of political socialization, in which the lessons that are imprinted are antagonistic to democratic participation and inspire negative orientations toward government. To test this argument, we conduct the first systematic empirical exploration of how criminal justice involvement shapes the citizenship and political voice of a growing swath of Americans. We find that custodial involvement carries with it a substantial civic penalty that is not explained by criminal propensity or socioeconomic differences alone. Given that the carceral state has become a routine site of interaction between government and citizens, institutions of criminal justice have emerged as an important force in defining citizen participation and understandings, with potentially dire consequences for democratic ideals.
From British Journal of Political Science
Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting
Samuel Abrams, Torben Iversen and David Soskice
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their own survey data, the authors argue that the ISN model can explain individually rational non-altruistic turnout. If group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically.
From Electoral Studies
Measuring party positions and issue salience from media coverage: Discussing and cross-validating new indicators
Marc Helbling and Anke Tresch
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Recent studies have started to use media data to measure party positions and issue salience. The aim of this article is to compare and cross-validate this alternative approach with the more commonly used party manifestos, expert judgments and mass surveys. To this purpose, we present two methods to generate indicators of party positions and issue salience from media coverage: the core sentence approach and political claims analysis. Our cross-validation shows that with regard to party positions, indicators derived from the media converge with traditionally used measurements from party manifestos, mass surveys and expert judgments, but that salience indicators measure different underlying constructs. We conclude with a discussion of specific research questions for which media data offer potential advantages over more established methods.
Do voters affect or elect policies? A new perspective, with evidence from the U.S. Senate
David Albouy
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Using quasi-experimental evidence from close elections, Lee et al. (2004) – henceforth LMB – argue competition for voters in U.S. House elections does not affect policy positions, as incumbent Senate candidates do not vote more extremely if elected than non-incumbents. Despite stronger electoral competition and greater legislative independence, similar results, shown here, hold for the Senate. Yet, the hypothesis that voters do not affect policies conflicts with how Senators moderate their positions prior to their next election. LMB-style estimates appear to be biased downwards as junior members of Congress prefer to vote more extremely than senior members, independently of their electoral strength. Corrected estimates are more favorable to the hypothesis that candidates moderate their policy choices in response to electoral competition.
The dynamic political economy of support for Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential election campaign
Thomas J. Scotto, Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg, Jason Reifler, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, Paul Whiteley
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In recent years, students of voting behavior have become increasingly interested in valence politics models of electoral choice. These models share the core assumption that key issues in electoral politicds typically are ones upon which there is a widespread public consensus on the goals of public policy. The present paper uses latent curve modeling procedures and data from a six-wave national panel survey of the American electorate to investigate the dynamic effects of voters’ concerns with the worsening economy–a valence issue par excellence–in the skein of causal forces at work in the 2008 presidential election campaign. As the campaign developed, the economy became the dominant issue. Although the massively negative public reaction to increasingly perilous economic conditions was not the only factor at work in 2008, dynamic multivariate analyses show that mounting worries about the economy played an important role in fueling Barack Obama’s successful run for the presidency.
Policy attitudes, ideology and voting behavior in the 2008 Election
William G. Jacoby
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This article examines the impact of policy attitudes and ideology on voting behavior in the 2010 U.S. presidential election. The analysis uses data from the 2008 American National Election Study. The empirical results indicate that the 2008 election should not be regarded as a simple referendum on the George W. Bush presidency. At the same time, voting behavior was not particularly aligned along stark policy divisions; the direct effects of issue attitudes were confined largely to the most sophisticated stratum of the electorate. Finally, liberal-conservative orientations did affect citizens’ political attitudes and candidate choices in ways that are fairly unique, compared to other recent elections.
The dynamics of candidate evaluations and vote choice in 2008: looking to the past or future?
Roy Elis, D. Sunshine Hillygus, Norman Nie
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we leverage a 10-wave election panel to examine the relative and dynamic effects of voter evaluations of Bush, Palin, Biden, McCain, and Obama in the 2008 presidential election. We show that the effects of these political figures on vote choice evolves through the campaign, with the predictive effects of President Bush declining after the nominees are known, and the effects of the candidates (and Palin), increasing towards Election Day. In evaluating the relative effects of these political figures on individual-level changes in vote choice during the fall campaign, we also find that evaluations of the candidates and Sarah Palin dwarf that of President Bush. Our results suggest a Bayesian model of voter decision making in which retrospective evaluations of the previous administration might provide a starting point for assessing the candidates, but prospective evaluations based on information learned during the campaign helps voters to update their candidate preference. Finally, we estimate the “Palin effect,” based on individual-level changes in favorability towards the vice-presidential nominee, and conclude that her campaign performance cost McCain just under 2% of the final vote share.
Transformation and polarization: The 2008 presidential election and the new American electorate
Alan I. Abramowitz
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Along with the unpopularity of President Bush and the dire condition of the U.S. economy, changes in the composition of the American electorate played a major role in Barack Obama’s decisive victory in the 2008 presidential election. The doubling of the nonwhite share of the electorate between 1992 and 2008 was critical to Obama’s election as African-American and other nonwhite voters provided him with a large enough margin to overcome a substantial deficit among white voters. In addition, voters under the age of 30 preferred Obama by a better than 2-1 margin, accounting for more than 80 percent of his popular vote margin. Despite the overall Democratic trend, the results revealed an increasingly polarized electorate. Over the past three decades the coalitions supporting the two major parties have become much more distinctive geographically, racially, and ideologically. The growth of the nonwhite electorate along with the increasing liberalism and Democratic identification of younger voters suggest that a successful Obama presidency could put the Democratic Party in a position to dominate American politics for many years. However, these trends appear to be provoking an intense reaction from some opponents of the President. The frustration and anger displayed at “tea party” demonstrations and town hall meetings may reflect not just discomfort with Barack Obama’s race but the perceived threat that Obama and his supporters represent to the social status and power of those on the opposing side.
The personal vote and voter turnout
Joseph W. Robbins
December 2010
ABSTRACT
The level of electoral turnout is arguably the most widely monitored form of electoral participation. Consequently, electoral systems have often been cited as having a significant effect on turnout levels even though scholars do not agree on the effects of these complex institutions. Since most previous studies have relied on categorical or dichotomous electoral system indicators, this study utilizes Carey and Shugart’s personal vote index to gain theoretical leverage on other electoral system components. In short, I find that where electoral competition is predicated on party, rather than candidates’, reputations, turnout levels rise. The results of a time-series cross-sectional analysis reveal that the personal vote index significantly influences turnout levels even when controlling for a host of other factors.
From Political Research Quarterly
Beyond Supply and Demand: A Feminist-institutionalist Theory of Candidate Selection
Mona Lena Krook
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Dynamics of candidate selection are central to political representation. The dominant model used to study the case of women focuses on the supply of and demand for female aspirants. This article develops a critique of this approach, by drawing on two sets of theoretical tools: institutionalism and feminism. It subsequently elaborates an alternative perspective on candidate selection based on configurations of three kinds of gendered institutions: systemic, practical, and normative. The utility of this approach is then explored through three paired comparisons of cases in which quota policies have been introduced, disrupting some but not necessarily all aspects of gendered institutional configurations.
Campaign Effects on the Accessibility of Party Identification
J. Tobin Grant, Stephen T. Mockabee and J. Quin Monson
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This study uses response latency, the time required for a survey respondent to formulate an answer upon hearing a question, to examine the accessibility of partisan self identifications over the course of a political campaign season. Although the aggregate distribution of partisanship remains fairly stable during the campaign, party identifications become more accessible to individuals with weaker party identifications as the election approaches. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the authors find that partisan orientations are more useful in forming political judgments when those orientations are more accessible to the voter. The effect of partisanship on vote choice is a third greater for voters with highly accessible party identifications than for those with less accessible party identifications.
Candidate Gender and Voter Choice: Analysis from a Multimember Preferential Voting System
Gail McElroy and Michael Marsh
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Women are greatly underrepresented in elected office. A large literature on the subject has considerably advanced our understanding of this phenomenon, but many questions remain unanswered. Using original aggregate and individual-level data, the authors explore the interplay of candidate gender, partisanship, incumbency, and campaign spending in a multimember preferential voting system. This setting allows unparalleled exploration of the heterogeneous nature of voter decision making. The authors find little evidence for an independent effect of candidate gender on voter choice. Voters do not discriminate against women even in an electoral environment that affords them this opportunity without any cost to their partisan preferences.
Serving Two Masters: Redistricting and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Michael H. Crespin
December 2010
Abstract
This article explores the consequences for representation after a redistricting by reexamining the finding that members of Congress will alter their voting behavior to fit their new district. Specifically, it applies partisan theories of congressional organization to test if members are changing their behavior on all or just some votes. The results indicate that representatives adjust their roll call behavior to fit their new districts on votes that are visible to their constituents. However, when it comes to votes that are important to the party for controlling the agenda (i.e., procedural votes), members do not respond to changes in the district.
Obama and the White Vote
Todd Donovan
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This article draws on the racial threat thesis to test if white voters who lived in areas with larger African American populations were less receptive to Barack Obama in 2008. Racial context is found to structure white voters’ evaluations of Obama and, thus, affect where the Democrats gained presidential vote share over 2004. The overall Democratic swing was lower in states where a white Democrat (Hillary Clinton) had more appeal to white voters than Obama. Obama increased the Democrats’ share of the white vote, but gains were associated with positive evaluations of Obama among white voters in places with smaller African American populations. The likelihood that a white voter supported Obama also decreased as the African American population of the respondent’s congressional district increased. The results are relevant to discussions of the future of the Voting Rights Act and to conceptions of a “postracial” America.
Voters, Emotions, and Race in 2008: Obama as the First Black President
David P. Redlawsk, Caroline J. Tolbert and William Franko
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Social desirability effects make it difficult to learn voters’ racial attitudes. List experiments can tap sensitive issues without directly asking respondents to express overt opinions. The authors report on such an experiment about Barack Obama as the first black president, finding that 30 percent of white Americans were “troubled” by the prospect of Obama as the first black president. The authors examine policy and emotional underpinnings of these responses, finding that expressed emotions of anxiety and enthusiasm condition latent racial attitudes and racial policy beliefs especially for those exhibiting a social desirability bias. The results suggest that Obama’s victory despite this level of concern about race was at least in part a result of intense enthusiasm his campaign generated. This enthusiasm for Obama may have allowed some white voters to overcome latent concerns about his race. The research suggests emotions are critical in understanding racial attitudes.
Race and Turnout: Does Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures Increase Minority Voting?
Rene R. Rocha, Caroline J. Tolbert, Daniel C. Bowen and Christopher J. Clark
December 2010
ABSTRACT
The 2008 election marked an end to the longstanding gap in the level of black and white voter turnout, offering further evidence that minority empowerment affects voter turnout. In this article, the authors move beyond a dyadic conceptualization of empowerment and argue that the level of descriptive representation within the legislative body as a whole is crucial to understanding how context affects voter turnout. They find African Americans and Latinos are more likely to vote when residing in states with increased descriptive representation in the state legislature measured by the percentage of black or Latino lawmakers.
A New Measure of Group Influence in Presidential Elections: Assessing Latino Influence in 2008
Matt A. Barreto, Loren Collingwood, Sylvia Manzano
December 2010
ABSTRACT
The importance of the Latino electorate has been the subject of both academic inquiry and media discourses. The question of Latino influence is frequently limited by an approach that focuses on single variable considerations (e.g., voter turnout or ethnic-targeted campaign spending) that are often contest-specific idiosyncrasies. Relying on theoretically appropriate concepts, the authors measure Latino political influence as a function of three factors: in-group population traits, electoral volatility, and mobilization. Using the 2008 presidential election, the authors demonstrate the utility of incorporating a multifaceted measure that accounts for the contemporary complexity within the electoral environment. Because this framework is rooted in theoretical concepts, as opposed to discrete group or contest characteristics, it may be applied to any “influence group” in different electoral settings. Data are culled from several publicly available outlets, making it possible for scholars to replicate these measures and further investigate questions associated with group influence in American politics.
From Political Behavior
The Electoral Consequences of Skin Color: The “Hidden” Side of Race in Politics
Vesla M. Weaver
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Despite the significant role that skin color plays in material well-being and social perceptions, scholars know little if anything about whether skin color and afrocentric features influence political cognition and behavior and specifically, if intraracial variation in addition to categorical difference affects the choices of voters. Do more phenotypically black minorities suffer an electoral penalty as they do in most aspects of life? This study investigates the impact of color and phenotypically black facial features on candidate evaluation, using a nationally representative survey experiment of over 2000 whites. Subjects were randomly assigned to campaign literature of two opposing candidates, in which the race, skin color and features, and issue stance of candidates was varied. I find that afrocentric phenotype is an important, albeit hidden, form of bias in racial attitudes and that the importance of race on candidate evaluation depends largely on skin color and afrocentric features. However, like other racial cues, color and black phenotype don’t influence voters’ evaluations uniformly but vary in magnitude and direction across the gender and partisan makeup of the electorate in theoretically explicable ways. Ultimately, I argue, scholars of race politics, implicit racial bias, and minority candidates are missing an important aspect of racial bias.
From Political Psychology
The Minimal Cue Hypothesis: How Black Candidates Cue Race to Increase White Voting Participation
Gregory A. Petrow
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Racial group interests can compete in politics. One way competition may occur is when Black candidates cue racial thinking among Whites, leading to rivalry at the ballot box. I address this hypothesis with theories of identity, affect, and racial cognition. I argue that Black Congressional candidates cue these factors among Whites, leading the factors of White racial prejudice and White race liberalism to impact Whites’ voting participation. I employ logistic regression analysis of data from the American National Election Study in 1988, 1992, and 2000. The effects of racial prejudice on the predicted probability of voting occur among all Whites, as well as White Republicans, White Democrats, and White conservatives. The effects of White race liberalism occur among all Whites, as well as White Democrats and White liberals. The effects are strongest when Whites are in elections with Black candidates that are either challengers or in open seats.
From Politics and Society
Xenophobia and Left Voting
Kåre Vernby and Henning Finseraas
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In this article, the authors set out to evaluate two competing mechanisms that may account for the negative relationship between xenophobia and left voting. Xenophobia may reduce left voting because parties of the right are more conservative on issues relating to immigration and ethnic relations (the policy-bundling effect), or it may reduce left voting because many potential left voters lack sympathy with the groups to whom redistribution is thought to be directed (the anti-solidarity effect). These two mechanisms imply radically different scenarios for political competition. Using a multilevel modeling approach, the authors analyze the data compiled in fifteen different surveys carried out in ten Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries between 1990 and 2000. This study is the first to draw out the implications of these mechanisms for left voting and to subject them to empirical scrutiny in a large-scale comparative study. The results are consistent with the existence of a relatively strong policy-bundling effect; by contrast, the anti-solidarity effect is trivial in most of the surveys analyzed.
From Public Opinion Quarterly
Explaining Politics, Not Polls: Reexamining Macropartisanship with Recalibrated NES Data
James E. Campbell
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Like all surveys, the American National Election Studies (NES) imperfectly reflects population characteristics. There are well-known differences between actual and NES-reported turnout rates and between actual and NES-reported presidential vote divisions. This research seeks to determine whether the aggregate misrepresentation of turnout and vote choice affects the aggregate measurement of party identification: macropartisanship. After NES data are reweighted to correct for turnout and vote choice errors, macropartisanship is found to be more stable, to be less sensitive to short-term political conditions, and to have shifted more in the Republican direction in the early 1980s. The strength of partisanship also declined a bit more in the 1970s and rebounded a bit less in recent years than the uncorrected NES data indicate.
Generational Conflict Or Methodological Artifact? Reconsidering the Relationship between Age and Policy Attitudes in the U.S., 1984-2008
Andrew S. Fullerton and Jeffrey C. Dixon
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In light of claims of a generational conflict over age-specific policies and the current fiscal troubles of related governmental programs, this article examines Americans’ attitudes toward education, health, and Social Security spending through the use of a new methodology designed to uncover asymmetries in public opinion and disentangle age, period, and cohort effects. Based on generalized ordered logit models within a cross-classified fixed-effects framework using General Social Survey data between 1984 and 2008, we find little evidence consistent with gray peril and self-interest hypotheses suggesting that older people support spending for health care and Social Security but not education. The divide in attitudes toward education spending is the result of cohort–not age–effects. Yet these cohort effects extend to other attitudes and are asymmetrical: The so-called greatest generation (born around 1930 or earlier) is ambivalent about government spending and especially likely to say that we spend the “right amount” on health care. As people approach retirement age, they also become more likely to say that we spend the “right amount” on Social Security. The nuanced ways in which American public opinion is divided by age and cohort are uncovered only through the use of a new methodology that does not conceive of public support and opposition as symmetrical. Historical reasons for these divides, along with their contemporary implications, are discussed.
From The Forum
Advertising Trends in 2010
Erika Franklin Fowler and Travis N. Ridout
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Political advertising offers an important window on American campaigns and elections. We analyze a comprehensive database of political ads aired during the 2010 midterms to shed light on campaign strategies in this history-making election. We find that with the increase in competitive races in 2010, the volume of advertising rose too, as did its negativity. Moreover, we track the issues mentioned by each party, finding that while the parties agreed that employment was the top issue, there was also much divergence in issue priorities, with Republicans taking up some unlikely themes such as health care and “change.” The high volume of advertising in 2010 suggests a greater potential for voter learning, but the high levels of ad negativity could have had both positive and negative consequences on the electorate.
The Citizens United Election? Or Same As It Ever Was?
Michael M. Franz
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In January 2010, the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC overturned long-standing regulations governing the role of unions and corporations in sponsoring pro-candidate advocacy. Many predicted a deleterious effect on the electoral process. In the aftermath of the midterm elections, a number of questions deserve consideration. Was the observed level of outside spending abnormally high in 2010? What can we say about the potential effect of outside spending on the outcomes of House and Senate races? Moreover, what has the decision done to the power of parties and, most especially, their ability to compete with special interests in backing federal candidates? This paper investigates these questions using data from the Wesleyan Media Project, which tracked political ads in 2010. The initial evidence suggests that while interest groups were aggressive players in the air war, their impact may not have been as negative or as large as initially predicted.
Voter Turnout in the 2010 Midterm Election
Michael P. McDonald
December 2010
ABSTRACT
I place national turnout rates in historical perspective and investigate what state turnout rates may tell us about what factors are related to higher levels of voter participation. In midterm elections compared to presidential election, voter turnout is lower among all groups, but more so for young people. I discuss the implications of younger citizens’ disengagement in midterm elections in light of an increasing gap in support for the political parties’ candidates among the young and the old.
The Dynamics of Voter Preferences in the 2010 Congressional Midterm Elections
Costas Panagopoulos
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This article examines campaign dynamics and the evolution of voter preferences for congressional candidates during the 2010 midterm election cycle. Using national pre-election polls of registered voters, I show that there was meaningful change in voter preferences over the course of the campaign and that support for Democratic contenders declined considerably between early March and Election Day. The evidence I present also reveals growing support for Republican contenders was linked to developments during the campaign period. Specifically, the erosion in Obama approval, deterioration in national economic conditions and the passage of the health reform legislation appeared to fuel the Democratic downturn.
The 2010 Elections: Party Pursuits, Voter Perceptions, and the Chancy Game of Politics
Jeffrey M. Stonecash
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Forming party strategy is never easy because of the uncertainty of how the electorate will react. In 2009 and 2010, Democrats sought to address two major problems – the economy and health insurance – and hoped they would get credit for responding effectively. Quite the opposite occurred. Forming party strategy remains an art.


Beyond “sabotage” – the central issue about the growing political extremism of the Republican Party is that it’s undermining fundamental American standards of ethical political conduct and behavior. It’s time for Americans to say “That’s enough”.

by Ed Kilgore, James Vega and J. P. Green
In a recent Washington Monthly commentary titled “None Dare Call it Sabotage,” Steve Benen gave voice to a growing and profoundly disturbing concern among Democrats — that Republicans may actually plan to embrace policies designed to deny Obama not only political victories but also the maximum possible economic growth during his term in order weaken Democratic prospects in the 2012 elections.
The debate quickly devolved into an argument over the inflammatory word “sabotage” and the extent to which the clearly and passionately expressed Republican desire to see Obama “fail” will actually lead them to deliberately choose economic and other policies that are most conducive to achieving that result.
Download the entire memo.