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TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira: Conservative ‘Mandate’ — Not

TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira crunches some interesting numbers in his latest ‘Public Opinion Snapshot,’ and in the process shreds the conservatives’ most treasured myths about the November 2nd ‘mandate.’ As Teixeira explains, conservatives are spinning a dubious interpretation, in light of the more telling statistics:

…For them, the 2010 election was all about voters embracing conservative ideas on the economy, health care, and tax cuts. But the 2010 exit polls tell a different story.
Only 23 percent of voters blamed President Barack Obama for today’s economic problems. Instead, they blamed either Wall Street (35 percent) or President George W. Bush (29 percent).
Nor was the election a repudiation of the new health care reform law. Even among a midterm electorate with an abnormally conservative composition, about as many said they wanted to see the law remain as is or be expanded (47 percent) as said they wanted it repealed (48 percent).
Voters weren’t embracing the conservative position on tax cuts, either. A 52 percent majority of voters wanted to either keep only the Bush tax cuts for those with less than $250,000 or let them all expire compared to 39 percent who wanted to keep all the tax cuts.

A rather shaky mandate, indeed. Teixeira attributes GOP gains, more realistically to the economy, the structure of the mid term turnout and the vulnerable seats in conservative areas, factors which are assessed in clarifying detail in Teixeira’s and John Halpin’s new memo for the Center for American Progress Action Fund, “Election Results Fueled by Jobs Crisis and Voter Apathy Among Progressives,” recommended for those who prefer sober data-driven analysis to hyperactive GOP spin.


A Skirmish Lost, A Great Battle Won

William Saletan has a perspective-stretcher at Slate.com that might get a more receptive reading as a year-ender, but also makes a point worth considering, post-mid terms. As Saletan writes in “Pelosi’s Triumph: Democrats didn’t lose the battle of 2010. They won it,”

…In the national exit poll, voters were split on health care. Unemployment is at nearly 10 percent. Democrats lost a lot of seats that were never really theirs, and those who voted against the bill lost at a higher rate than did those who voted for it. But if health care did cost the party its majority, so what? The bill was more important than the election.
I realize that sounds crazy. We’ve become so obsessed with who wins or loses in politics that we’ve forgotten what the winning and losing are about. Partisans fixate on punishing their enemies in the next campaign. Reporters, in the name of objectivity, refuse to judge anything but the Election Day score card. Politicians rationalize their self-preservation by imagining themselves as dynasty builders. They think this is the big picture.
They’re wrong. The big picture isn’t about winning or keeping power. It’s about using it.

Saletan quotes former Bush speechwriter David Frum to bring it home:

Legislative majorities come and go. This healthcare bill is forever. A win in November is very poor compensation for this debacle now. … No illusions please: This bill will not be repealed. Even if Republicans scored a 1994 style landslide in November, how many votes could we muster to re-open the “doughnut hole” and charge seniors more for prescription drugs? How many votes to re-allow insurers to rescind policies when they discover a pre-existing condition? How many votes to banish 25 year olds from their parents’ insurance coverage?

Saletan concedes that there will undoubtedly be amendments to the HCR law. He may be understating the case. Boehner and his minions may try to sabotage it, and with some success — but not without a price.
Saletan adds, “Most bills aren’t more important than elections. This one was.” He predicts, optimistically,

A party that loses a House seat can win it back two years later, as Republicans just proved. But a party that loses a legislative fight against a middle-class health care entitlement never restores the old order. Pretty soon, Republicans will be claiming the program as their own. Indeed, one of their favorite arguments against this year’s health care bill was that it would cut funding for Medicare. Now they’re pledging to rescind those cuts. In 30 years, they’ll be accusing Democrats of defunding Obamacare.

As for Speaker Pelosi’s legacy:

…By the thinnest of margins, they rammed a bill through. They weren’t going to get another opportunity for a very long time. It cost them their majority, and it was worth it…And that’s not counting financial regulation, economic stimulus, college lending reform, and all the other bills that became law under Pelosi. So spare me the tears and gloating about her so-called failure. If John Boehner is speaker of the House for the next 20 years, he’ll be lucky to match her achievements.

Not to diminish the consequences of the electoral rout Dems have just experienced and the challenges that lie ahead in rebuilding a congressional majority. Those for whom electioneering is the end goal of politics will not find much comfort in Saletan’s take. But under the leadership of Speaker Pelosi, as much, if not more than President Obama, House Democrats have enacted reforms that will save countless lives and make American society better for millions. As time passes the 2010 mid terms will be viewed in context as a political skirmish, but it’s likely that the 2010 HCR law will go down in history as a landmark reform.


POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH – OCTOBER 2010

From PS: Political Science and Politics

 

Symposium: Forecasts of
the 2010 Midterm Elections

Editor’s Introduction by James E. Campbell

October 2010

There is a broad consensus among
the models that the Republicans will make substantial gains in the House in the
2010 midterms. There is not a consensus, however, over how large those gains
will be. There is a 30-seat spread between the low and high end of the seat
change forecast range, with two forecasts giving an edge to Democrats in
controlling the House and three placing the odds in the Republicans’ favor.
Lewis-Beck and Tien forecast a 22-seat gain for the Republicans. Their 200
seats would leave Republicans 18 seats short of a majority. Cuzán forecasts
Republican gains of 27 to 30 seats, leaving Republicans with 205 to 208 seats
and Democrats with continued control of the House. Abramowitz predicts a
43-seat gain for the Republicans. Since he uses a 179 pre-election seat base,
this outcome would install a new Republican majority in place by five seats.
Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien predict that Republicans are likely to gain 51
seats, which would give Republicans 229 seats and a 12-seat majority. Finally,
my forecast is for Republicans to gain 51 or 52 seats, giving them a 12 or 13
seat majority. Whether Democrats or Republicans control the House in 2011,
their majority is likely to be much narrower than the current Democratic
majority. This may well present a roadblock to the Obama administration’s
legislative agenda and will quite probably make control of the House a real
question again in 2012.




What
Health Reform Teaches Us about American Politics

Lawrence R.
Jacobs

October 2010

ABSTRACT

The tumultuous journey of health reform from President
Barack Obama’s opening push in February 2009 to his bill signing in March 2010
may be inexplicable from afar. Swept into power on promises of change,
Democrats controlled the White House and enjoyed the largest Congressional
majorities in decades, and they agreed that the existing health care system
cost too much and delivered too little–stranding over 30 million with no health
insurance and leaving millions more with only inadequate coverage or dependent
on emergency rooms for urgent care. Unified party control and programmatic
agreement would seem like a veritable checklist of what was needed to pass
health reform legislation.

 

The
Seats in Trouble Forecast of the 2010 Elections to the U.S. House

James E. Campbella

October 2010

ABSTRACT

All indications are that 2010 will be a very good
year for Republicans. After two election setbacks, they are poised for a
comeback. Partisanship, ideology, the midterm decline from the prior
presidential surge, the partisanship of districts being defended, and even
President Obama’s approval ratings have set the stage for significant seat
gains by Republicans in the House.

 

How
Large a Wave? Using the Generic Ballot to Forecast the 2010 Midterm Elections

Alan I. Abramowitz

October 2010

ABSTRACT

As Election Day approaches, many political
commentators are asking whether the 2010 midterm elections could be a reprise
of 1994, when Republicans picked up eight seats in the Senate and 52 seats in
the House of Representatives to take control of both chambers for the first
time in 40 years. There is almost universal agreement that Republicans are
poised to make major gains in both the House and the Senate. And while the
GOP’s chances of gaining the 10 seats needed to take control of the upper
chamber appear remote, results from the generic ballot forecasting model
indicate that the 39 seats required to take back the House of Representatives
are well within reach.

 

Forecasting
House Seats from Generic Congressional Polls: The 2010 Midterm Election

Joseph Bafumia, Robert S.
Eriksona and Christopher Wleziena

October 2010

ABSTRACT

In this article, we present a forecast of the 2010
midterm House election based on information available in early July 2010. We
combine this forecast with a note of caution, explaining why electoral
circumstances might lead our forecast to err. Finally, we present guidance
regarding how to update the electoral forecast for 2010 based on new
information that will become available leading up to Election Day.

 

The
Referendum Model: A 2010 Congressional Forecast

Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Charles
Tien

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Congressional election forecasting has experienced
steady growth. Currently fashionable models stress prediction over explanation.
The independent variables do not offer a substantive account of the election
outcome. Instead, these variables are tracking variables–that is, indicators
that may trace the result but fail to explain it. The outstanding example is
the generic ballot measure, which asks respondents for whom they plan to vote
in the upcoming congressional race. While this variable correlates highly with
presidential party House seat share, it is bereft of substance. The generic
ballot measure is the archetypical tracking variable, and it holds pride of
place in the Abramowitz (2010) model. Other examples of such tracking variables
are exposed seats or lagged seats, features of the Campbell (2010) model. The difficulty with
such tracking models is twofold. First, they are not based on a theory of the
congressional vote. Second, because they are predictive models, they offer a
suboptimal forecasting instrument when compared to models specified according
to strong theory.

 

Will
the Republicans Retake the House in 2010?

Alfred G. Cuzána

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Historically, statistical models
for forecasting the outcome of midterm elections to the United States House of
Representatives have not been particularly successful (Jones and Cuzán 2006).
However, in what may have been a breakthrough, most models correctly predicted
that the Democrats would re-emerge as the majority party in 2006 (Cuzán 2007).
One successful model was estimated using 46 elections, beginning with 1914
(only the second time that 435 representatives, the present number, were
elected). The model was relatively simple, making use of national-level
variables only (Cuzán and Bundrick 2006). Using a similar model, I generated a
forecast for the 2010 midterm election. Forecasting the 2010 State Legislative
Elections

 

Forecasting the 2010 State Legislative
Elections

Carl Klarner

October 2010

ABSTRACT

This article offers forecasts made on July 22,
2010, for the 2010 state legislative elections. Most work in the election
forecasting field has been done on presidential and U.S. House elections. Less
has been done for U.S. Senate elections, and almost none for gubernatorial or
state legislative elections. This year will see much attention directed at the
43 state legislatures holding elections, because many will have the
responsibility for drawing new district lines based on the 2010 census.
Furthermore, of those chambers with elections scheduled in 2010, seven
currently contain one party with less than a 5% margin of control. With so much
at stake, these will clearly be contests to watch.

 

From Political
Psychology

A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism
Model

 

John Duckitt, Boris Bizumic, Stephen W. Krauss and Edna
Heled

 

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been
conceptualized and measured as a unidimensional personality construct
comprising the covariation of the three traits of authoritarian submission,
authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. However, new approaches have
criticized this conceptualization and instead viewed these three “traits” as
three distinct, though related, social attitude dimensions. Here we extend this
approach providing clear definitions of these three dimensions as ideological
attitude constructs of Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism.
These dimensions are seen as attitudinal expressions of basic social values or
motivational goals that represent different, though related, strategies for
attaining collective security at the expense of individual autonomy. We report
data from five samples and three different countries showing that these three
dimensions could be reliably measured and were factorially distinct. The three
dimensions also differentially predicted interpersonal behaviour, social policy
support, and political party support. It is argued that conceptualizing and
measuring RWA as a set of three related ideological attitude dimensions may
better explain complex sociopolitical phenomena than the currently dominant
unidimensional personality based model.

Communication, Influence, and Informational Asymmetries among
Voters

T. K. Ahn, Robert Huckfeldt and John Barry Ryan

October 2010

ABSSTRACT

The costs of political information vary
dramatically across individuals, and these costs help explain why some
individuals become politically expert while others demonstrate low levels of
political knowledge and awareness. An attractive alternative, particularly for
those with high information costs, is to rely on information and advice taken
from others who are politically expert. This paper focuses on the complications
that arise when the informant and the recipient do not share preferences. A
series of small group experiments show that subjects tend to weight expertise
more heavily than shared preferences in selecting informants, thereby exposing
themselves to diverse views and biased information. Experimental subjects
employ several heuristic devices in evaluating the reliability of this
information, but depending on their own levels of information, these heuristics
often lead subjects either to dismiss advice that conflicts with their own
prior judgments or to dismiss advice that comes from an informant with
divergent preferences. Hence these heuristics produce important consequences
for patterns of political influence, as well as reducing the potential for
political change.

 

From American
Journal of Political Science

Valuing Diversity in Political Organizations: Gender and Token
Minorities in the U.S.
House of Representatives

 Kirstin Kanthak and George A. Krause

 October 2010

ABSTRACT

Political
scientists are keenly interested in how diversity influences politics, yet we
know little about how diverse groups of political actors interact. We advance a
unified theory of colleague valuation to address this puzzle. The theory
explains how minority group size affects how members of a political
organization differentially value majority and minority group colleagues,
predicting that the effect of preference divergence on individual-level
colleague valuation is greatest when the minority group is smallest. We test
this prediction using member-to-member leadership political action committee
(PAC) contributions in the U.S. House of Representatives. The results obtain
strong, albeit not uniform, support for the theory, demonstrating that the
gender gap in colleague valuations declines as preference divergence increases
in all but one instance. In contrast to conventional wisdom, the theory and
evidence indicate that women serving in the U.S. House of Representatives
receive less support from men colleagues as their ranks increase.

Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The
Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences

Nathan J. Kelly and Peter K. Enns

October 2010

ABSTRACT

This
article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public’s policy
mood. Recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship
between inequality, public opinion, and government redistribution. One group of
scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups
reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich.
Another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional
outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor
as to the rich. Utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political
economy and time-series data from 1952 to 2006, supplemented with
cross-sectional analysis where appropriate, we show that economic inequality
is, in fact, self-reinforcing, but that this is fully consistent with the idea
that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy
enactments.

 

From
The Journal of Politics

 

“An
Appeal to the People”: Public Opinion and Congressional Support for the Supreme
Court

Joseph Daniel Ura and Patrick C.
Wohlfarth

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Scholars
often assert that public support for judicial authority induces Congress to
grant resources and discretion to the Supreme Court. However, the theory of
competing public agency embraced by the Constitution suggests that public
support for courts cannot, by itself, explain congressional support for
judicial authority. Instead, the logic of the separation of powers system
indicates that legislative support for the institutional capacity of courts will
be a function of public confidence in the legislature as well as evaluations of
the judiciary. We test this theory, finding that public confidence in both
Congress and the Court significantly affect congressional support for the
Supreme Court, controlling for the ideological distance between the Court and
Congress as well as the Court’s workload. The results offer a more refined and
complex view of the role of public sentiment in balancing institutional power
in American politics.

 

Engaging
Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions

Miki Caul Kittilson and Leslie
Schwindt-Bayer

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Drawing
on established theories of comparative political institutions, we argue that
democratic institutions carry important messages that influence mass attitudes
and behaviors. Power-sharing political institutions signal to citizens that
inclusiveness is an important principle of a country’s democracy and can
encourage citizens to participate in politics. Applying multilevel modeling to
data from the World Values Survey, we test whether democratic institutions
influence political engagement in 34 countries. Further, we examine whether
underrepresented groups, specifically women, are differentially affected by the
use of power-sharing institutions such that they are more engaged in politics
than women in countries with power-concentrating institutions. We find that
disproportional electoral rules dampen engagement overall and that gender gaps
in political engagement tend to be smaller in more proportional electoral systems,
even after controlling for a host of other factors. Power-sharing institutions
can be critical for explaining gender differences in political engagement.

 

Representation
and Policy Responsiveness: The Median Voter, Election Rules, and Redistributive
Welfare Spending

Shin-Goo Kang and G. Bingham
Powell Jr.

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Many
economic and social conditions shape public welfare spending. We are able to
show, however, that after taking account of these conditions, the expressed
left-right preferences of the median voters significantly affect comparative
welfare spending. These new findings support the representational claims of
liberal democracy and the theoretical expectations of the literature on
ideological congruence. However, we also show that insofar as the preferences
of citizens and the promises of governing parties (which are highly
correlated,) can be disentangled, it is the former that affect the long-term
redistributive welfare spending equilibrium, while the latter have small, but
significant short-term effects. Surprisingly, despite greater representational
correspondence between positions of voters and governments under PR than SMD,
the impact of the median voter preferences is quite similar under the two
systems.

 

Foreign
Policy at the Ballot Box: How Citizens Use Foreign Policy to Judge and Choose
Candidates

Shana Kushner Gadariana

October 2010

ABSTRACT

This
paper uses the elections of 1980 to 2004 to illustrate that political
candidates from opposing parties face different incentives in mentioning
foreign policy during campaigns and in taking foreign policy positions. The
paper demonstrates that citizens connect their own foreign policy views clearly
to their evaluations of Republican candidates, but these same foreign policy
opinions are much less likely to affect evaluations of the Democratic party and
Democratic candidates. In addition, this paper reveals another significant
asymmetry–in a threatening environment, Americans reward candidates and parties
perceived to hold hawkish positions but even more severely punish candidates
perceived to be dovish. Using two datasets, I find that Americans’ opinions on
defense spending and diplomacy mattered significantly for the type of political
leadership the public preferred at election time.

 

The
Theory of Conditional Retrospective Voting: Does the Presidential Record Matter
Less in Open-Seat Elections?

James E. Campbell, Bryan J.
Dettrey and Hongxing Yin

October 2010

ABSTRACT

This
research tests the idea that retrospective voting in presidential elections is
conditional, that retrospective evaluations are applied more strictly to
incumbents seeking election than to in-party candidates (successor candidates)
who are not incumbents. Voters may assign only partial credit or blame for
national conditions to successor candidates because, unlike incumbents, these
candidates did not personally have power over the policies that might have
affected the national conditions leading up to the election. This theory of
conditional retrospective voting is examined at both the aggregate level on elections
since 1948 and with individual-level survey data since 1972. The analysis
consistently finds, as the theory of conditional retrospective voting contends,
that the electorate’s retrospective evaluations matter significantly more to
the vote for an incumbent than to the vote for a successor candidate of the
in-party.

 

The
Impact of Explicit Racial Cues on Gender Differences in Support for Confederate
Symbols and Partisanship

Vincent L. Hutchings, Hanes
Walton Jr. and Andrea Benjamin

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Researchers
have argued that explicit racial appeals are rejected in contemporary American
politics because they are perceived as violating the norm of racial equality.
We test this claim with an experimental design, embedded in a representative
survey of Georgia
where, until recently, the state flag featured the Confederate battle emblem.
In our experiment, we manipulate the salience of racial cues in news accounts
of the state flag controversy in Georgia. We hypothesize that women
are more likely than men to reject explicit racial appeals. We focus on the
effects of explicit messages in two areas: support for Confederate symbols and
identification with the Democratic Party. As hypothesized, when the racial
significance of this debate is made explicit support for the Confederate flag
declines, but only among women. Similarly, explicit appeals lead to lower
levels of Democratic identification among men, but among women the effects are
weaker and less consistent.

 

A
Latino on the Ballot: Explaining Coethnic Voting Among Latinos and the Response
of White Americans

Corrine M. McConnaughy, Ismail K.
White, David L. Leal and Jason P. Casellas

October 2010

ABSTRACT

In
recent campaigns, candidates have sought to attract votes from the growing
Latino electorate through ethnic cues. Yet, we know very little about the
impact of appeals to ethnicity. This article examines the role that ethnic cues
play in shaping the political opinions and choices of Latinos, as well as the
response of non-Hispanic White Americans (Anglos). We take up the simplest of
group cues, the ethnicity of the candidate. We argue that candidate ethnicity
is an explicit ethnic cue that alters the political choices of Latinos through
priming of their ethnic linked fate, but only affects Anglos through spreading
activation of primed ethnic attitudes to national identity considerations.
Evidence from an experiment that manipulated exposure to candidate ethnicity
information provides evidence for these claims. Our results help to explain
coethnic voting among Latinos and resistance to Latino candidates among Anglos.

 

Reversing
the Causal Arrow: The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions in the
2000-2004 U.S. Presidential Election Cycle

Geoffrey Evans and Mark Pickup

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Many
economic voting models assume that individual voters’ reactions to incumbents
are strongly conditioned by their perceptions of the performance of the
macroeconomy. However, the direction of causality between economic perceptions
and political preferences is unclear: economic perceptions can be a consequence
of incumbent support rather than an influence on it. We develop the latter
thesis by examining the dynamic relationship between retrospective economic
perceptions and several measures of political preferences–approval,
partisanship, and vote–in the 2000-2004 U.S. presidential election cycle using
the ANES 2000-2002-2004 panel study to estimate structural equation model extensions
of the Anderson and Hsiao estimator for panel data. Our findings confirm that
the conventional wisdom misrepresents the relationship between retrospective
economic perceptions and incumbent partisanship: economic perceptions are
consistently and robustly conditioned by political preferences. Individuals’
economic perceptions are influenced by their political preferences rather than
vice versa.

 

From Electoral
Studies

 

How do candidates spend their money? Objects of campaign
spending and the effectiveness of diversification


Maria Laura Sudulich and Matthew
Wall
a

October 2010

ABSTRACT

We present a novel approach to the study of
campaign effectiveness using disaggregated spending returns from the 2007 Irish
general election. While previous studies have focused on overall levels of
expenditure as a predictor of electoral success, we consider the types of activities on which
candidates spent money and the overall diversification of candidates’ campaign
expenditure as predictors of electoral success. We offer a replicable framework
for the measurement of campaign diversification as well as for the evaluation
of its effects on electoral performance. We examine how factors such as
campaign expenditure and candidates’ incumbency status condition the effects of
campaign diversification. It is shown that diversification is only related to
electoral success when campaigns are well-financed.

 

Optimists and Skeptics: Why Do People Believe in the Value
of their Single Vote?


Andre Blais and Ludovic Rheault

October 2010

ABSTRACT

We investigate the origins of voters’ beliefs
about the value of their single vote. We construe such beliefs as a function of
psychological predispositions and exposure to information about the
competitiveness of the electoral race. We test this theoretical model using
data from the 2008 Canadian federal election and a new survey question tapping
voters’ beliefs about whether their vote can make a difference. Our results
show that sense of efficacy has a strong effect, efficacious voters being more
prone to optimism. Competitiveness of the race also matters, but only among
attentive voters.

 

Electoral Losers Revisited- How Citizens React to Defeat at
the Ballot Box

Peter
Esaiasson

October 2010

ABSTRACT

The paper seeks to reconcile insights from winner-loser
gap research with mainstream understanding of election legitimacy. The paper
acknowledges that winning and losing elections creates differential incentives
for citizens to remain supportive of their political system, but it argues that
losers nevertheless have enough reasons to remain supportive in absolute terms.
Drawing on democratic theory, the paper develops a rationale for why citizens
are willing to accept electoral defeat voluntarily, and suggest a new way to
conceptualize citizen reactions to election outcomes. It presents findings from
a sample of election studies in established democracies to show that winners
typically become more supportive whereas losers at minimum retain their level
of support from before the election. It concludes that elections, when
reasonably well executed, as they most often are in established democracies,
build system support rather than undermine it.

 

From Political
Behavior

The Political Ecology of Opinion in Big-Donor Neighborhoods

Brittany H.
Bramlett
, James G. Gimpel and Frances E. Lee

October 2010

Abstract

Major campaign donors are highly
concentrated geographically. A relative handful of neighborhoods accounts for
the bulk of all money contributed to political campaigns. Public opinion in
these elite neighborhoods is very different from that in the country as a whole
and in low-donor areas. On a number of prominent political issues, the
prevailing viewpoint in high-donor neighborhoods can be characterized as
cosmopolitan and libertarian, rather than populist or moralistic. Merging
Federal Election Commission contribution data with three recent large-scale
national surveys, we find that these opinion differences are not solely the
result of big-donor areas’ high concentration of wealthy and educated
individuals. Instead, these neighborhoods have a distinctive political ecology
that likely reinforces and intensifies biases in opinion. Given that these
locales are the origin for the lion’s share of campaign donations, they may
steer the national political agenda in unrepresentative directions.

 

Partisan Differences in Opinionated News Perceptions: A Test of
the Hostile Media Effect

Lauren Feldman

October 2010

ABSTRACT

The proliferation of opinion and
overt partisanship in cable news raises questions about how audiences perceive
this content. Of particular interest is whether audiences effectively perceive
bias in opinionated news programs, and the extent to which there are partisan
differences in these perceptions. Results from a series of three online
experiments produce evidence for a relative hostile media phenomenon in the
context of opinionated news. Although, overall, audiences perceive more story
and host bias in opinionated news than in non-opinionated news, these
perceptions–particularly perceptions of the host–vary as a function of partisan
agreement with the news content. Specifically, issue partisans appear to have a
“bias against bias,” whereby they perceive less bias in opinionated news with
which they are predisposed to agree than non-partisans and especially partisans
on the other side of the issue.

 

An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its Implications for U.S. House
Election Competition

Sean A. Cain

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Does the hiring of political
consultants make election races more competitive? If so, why? Most scholars of
political consulting argue their expertise enhances competition; I argue that
consultant reputation also boosts competition. Many political consultants are
part of the Washington
establishment, which notices their association with candidates. In particular,
congressional candidates of the out party, especially challengers, have an
incentive to hire the most reputable consultants to signal to political elites
their viability. I demonstrate a positive empirical relationship between
out-party candidates hiring top consultants (compared to less reputable ones)
and how competitive their race is perceived by elites. These findings and
theoretical insight provide a basis for understanding the high costs of
political consultants and their impact on election outcomes.

Polarization and Issue Consistency Over Time

Andrew Garner and Harvey Palmer

October 2010

ABSTRACT

The polarization of the political
and social environment over the past four decades has provided citizens with
clearer cues about how their core political predispositions (e.g., group
interests, core values, and party identification) relate to their issue
opinions. A robust and ongoing scholarly debate has involved the different ways
in which the more polarized environment affects mass opinion. Using
heteroskedastic regression, this paper examines the effect of the increasingly
polarized environment on the variability of citizens’ policy opinions. We find
that citizens today base their policy preferences more closely upon their core
political predispositions than in the past. In addition, the predicted error
variances also allow us to directly compare two types of mass
polarization–issue distance versus issue consistency–to determine the
independent effects each has on changes in the distribution of mass opinion.

 

Education and Political Participation: Exploring the Causal Link

Adam J. Berinsky and Gabriel S. Lenz

October 2010

ABSTRACT

One of the most consistently
documented relationships in the field of political behavior is the close
association between educational attainment and political participation.
Although most research assumes that this association arises because education
causes participation, it could also arise because education proxies for the
factors that lead to political engagement: the kinds of people who participate
in politics may be the kinds of people who tend to stay in school. To test for
a causal effect of education, we exploit the rise in education levels among
males induced by the Vietnam
draft. We find little reliable evidence that education induced by the draft
significantly increases participation rates.

 

From The Forum

Forecasting Control of State Governments and Redistricting
Authority After the 2010 Elections

Carl Klarner, Indiana State
University

October 2010

ABSTRACT

This article makes forecasts for
the 2010 state legislative and gubernatorial elections. These forecasts
indicate the Republicans will add control of 15 legislative chambers and nine
governor’s offices, leaving them with 51 chambers and 32 governorships. Forecasts
about the extent of redistricting authority by the Democratic and Republican
parties indicate the Republicans will have authority over 125 U.S. House seats,
while the Democrats will have authority over 62. In a chamber level analysis of
2,141 legislative and a state level analysis of 758 gubernatorial elections,
four national forces are used in predicting election outcomes from 1950 to
present: presidential approval, change in per capita income, midterm loss, and
the percentage of respondents who say they will vote for a Democrat for the
U.S. House. The differential effect of these forces in states with the
straight-ticket option is also taken into account. Monte
Carlo simulation that takes into account states’ different rules
regarding redistricting authority is then utilized to assess how many U.S.
House seats the Democratic and Republican parties will control.

 

Building a Political Science Public Sphere with Blogs

Henry Farrell and John Sides

October 2010

ABSTRACT

We argue that political science
blogs can link conversations among political scientists with broader public
debates about contemporary issues. Political science blogs do this by
identifying relevant research, explaining its findings, and articulating its
applicability. We identify strategies besides blogging that individual scholars
and the discipline could undertake to enhance its public profile.

 

Political Science and Practical Politics: A Journalist’s Journey

Rhodes Cook

October 2010

ABSTRACT

Political journalism can serve as
a useful bridge between practical politics and political science. This article
recounts the author’s personal journey from a childhood interest in maps,
numbers and elections to a lifetime career as a political journalist. It also
illustrates the partnership that can flourish between journalism and academe in
making sense of our nation’s political scene.

 

The Politics Missed by Political Science

John R. Petrocik and Frederick T. Steeper

October 2010

ABSTRACT

This essay offers some experience-based
observations about electoral phenomena that academic political science misses
because of a focus on conceptual and theoretical debates that often take pride
of place over the empirical phenomena that gave rise to the ideas and concepts
that we highly value. We suggest that academic political science is
increasingly committed to models and methods that serve a theory or an idea
more than they account for observable empirical regularities. Practitioner
methods and innovations for persuading voters and winning elections under
varying electoral conditions are largely unknown to scholars, with consequences
for our collective factual knowledge and ability to test current hypotheses and
theories about elections in an appropriate wide range of circumstances.


TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira: Public Says, “No Thanks on That Repeal Thing”

It appears that the GOP leadership is already a tad delusional about the dimensions of the political leverage they gained on Tuesday, at least judging by the comments of Speaker-in-waiting John Boehner, who is quoted in today’s New York Times thusly:

I believe that the health care bill that was enacted by the current Congress will kill jobs in America, ruin the best health-care system in the world and bankrupt our country…That means that we have to do everything we can to try to repeal this bill, and replace it with common-sense reforms that will bring down the cost of health insurance.

Never mind the legislative obstacles to repealing HCR just yet. Boehner has a ways to go before he can claim support from the public, as TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira explains in his latest ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’:

…Claiming a mandate doesn’t make it so. Consider these results from two recent polls…A mid-October AP-GfK poll asked respondents what they would prefer Congress to do about the new health care law. Contrary to the conservative story line, 57 percent wanted to either leave the law as is (18 percent) or change it so it does more to change the health care system (39 percent). On the other side, 41 percent wanted the law changed so that it does less to change the health care system (9 percent) or completely repealed (32 percent).
In a late October CBS News/New York Times poll respondents were first asked if they favored repeal of health care reform: 45 percent said no and 41 percent said yes. Those favoring repeal were then asked whether they would still support repeal if that meant “insurance companies were no longer required to cover people with existing medical conditions or prior illnesses.” That query reduced the pro-repeal contingent to just 25 percent.

As Teixeira says, “That’s not exactly a mandate for appeal.” You can’t blame Boehner for feeling a smidge triumphalist today. But the public has a different take on the repeal thing. Earth to Boehner.


TDS contributor Bob Creamer: What yesterday’s election means for progressives

Last week I argued that there was a path to victory for Democrats in the House. That turned out to be wrong. It was a brutal night for Democratic Members of the House. Many lost by narrow margins — but a loss of any amount is still a loss.
What caused this disaster? First let’s talk about what didn’t cause Democratic defeat.
The Republicans will argue that their electoral success represented a ringing rebuke of progressive policies and values — and a popular renunciation of the Obama administration. That reading of this election would be completely wrong.
The polling shows that Americans still very much support Social Security and Medicare and want nothing to do with the Ryan “roadmap” that would privatize Social Security, eliminate Medicare and replace it with vouchers.
Americans support Wall Street reform and the reject attempts to allow the big banks to return to the recklessness that cost eight million Americans their jobs.
Americans do not favor eliminating the new law that prevents insurance companies from discriminating against people with pre-existing conditions.
Americans favor more investment in education, good public schools, money spent on infrastructure and spending by the government that creates new jobs.
Why then did they buy the Republican sales pitch and once again hand them the gavel of the House?


TDS Contributor Bob Creamer on GOTV (Get out the vote)

First and foremost, for Democrats to beat the odds next Tuesday, our get out the vote operations must function flawlessly. Basically, these operations must defy the “likely voter” models that have dictated the gloomy scenario in most polls.
There is little question that between the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the DNC’s Organize for America (OFA), the individual campaigns, and Democratic allies like AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SEIU, MoveOn.org, USAction, NEA, Center for Community Change, et al, Progressives are conducting the most effective Get Out the Vote (GOTV) effort of any Mid-term in history. Many Latino, African American and women’s organizations are also conducting special programs targeting their communities.
Many of the veterans of the Obama campaign — which ran the most effective GOTV program in American history — are deeply involved. The culture and systems developed by the Obama field structure will go a long way to creating well oiled, efficient GOTV organizations. Well organized coordinated campaigns are functioning in key states, focusing heavily on early voting and mail vote in many, and this accounts for a robust showing by Democratic-registered voters in many states. And they all plan massive 72-hour voter contact drills and Election Day operations to run votes.
Democrats are relying heavily on door-to-door contact, while Republicans use paid phone calls and mail. But studies show conclusively that door-to-door contacts are far superior to phones and mail.
Over the next five days, Democrats have to deliver in the field if they intend to upset the odds. We must make millions of door-to-door and phone contacts. We must repeatedly contact voters who would vote Democratic, but our unlikely to vote. We need to explain to these voters how critical it is that they vote. And we need to deliver that very effective Election Day message: “I won’t get off your porch until you vote!”
Everyone, no matter where you live can increase Democratic effectiveness in getting out the vote. Pick up the phone and call your local campaign, Democratic Party, your union, or MoveOn.org. Volunteer to go door to door or get on the phones.
We know from research that the more we contact mobilizable voters, the more likely they are to vote. You don’t have to “persuade” them, you just have to contact them. You just have to get their attention, and the likelihood they’ll vote goes way up.
And if you don’t live where there is a critical campaign, you can still get involved. OFA and MoveOn both have programs that allow you to call voters in swing states from the comfort of your own home.
To volunteer, go to OFA.BO/GOTV
To call swing districts: Call.BarackObama.com. That will automatically give you a targeted list of voters in a swing district.
To volunteer with MoveON with a campaign near your home, go here: www.moveon.org/2010
If you want to call from home, go here: pol.moveon.org/2010
If you want to go to a MoveOn campaign event, go here: pol.moveon.org/event/lastchance


Greenberg and Carville: How Dems Can Keep Control

In their Saturday New York Times op-ed “Can Democrats Still Win?” TDS Co-Editor Stanley B. Greenberg and James Carville, Bill Clinton’s campaign manager, take on the common political wisdom that says a Republican takeover of congress is a done deal.
The authors, both founders of Democracy Corps, begin with a discussion of the 1998 midterm elections, noting predictions that the Dems were doomed in that election, including Speaker Gingrich’s boast that GOP gains could exceed the landslide of 1994. Greenberg and Carville note that their early polling that year affirmed a bad outcome for Dems, but once the impeachment battle got underway, their subsequent polling indicated that voters were indeed ready to move-on, to end impeachment and have congress focus on more substantive issues that affected the daily lives of Americans..
Enough Democratic candidates got the message and began to focus their campaigns on the findings of the Greenberg/Carville polling, while Republicans doubled down on the scandal-mongering in their ads. The result, as the authors write:

Democrats surprised everyone: no net losses in the Senate and a net gain of five seats in the House — the best showing for the incumbent president’s party in a midterm election since 1934. Newt Gingrich resigned.

Greenberg and Carville concede that it’s a very tough environment for Dems:

With the 2010 midterm elections just over a week away, Democrats find themselves in a similarly perilous situation. There are fears that Democrats could lose as many as 50 House seats; the Senate could go either way. A survey last week by our polling group, Democracy Corps, had Democrats down five points in the House ballot. Add to this early voting, heavy campaign spending by outside corporate groups, high unemployment and the general feeling that the country is on the wrong track, and it is hard to imagine that Nov. 2 will be a good day for Democrats.

But even in this context there are a couple of factors Dems can leverage:

…In our latest national poll, we found that the Republican Party and the Republicans in Congress are as unpopular as the Democrats — unusual for a party riding a wave of support. With Republican candidates like Sharron Angle, Joe Miller, Christine O’Donnell, Rand Paul and Carl Paladino dominating the spotlight, Republicans find themselves no more appealing to voters now than they were in 2008.
In addition, there are signs that voters are still open to hearing from Democrats. An NPR poll that surveys likely voters in key House districts found this month that a Democratic message focused on the middle class and American jobs won out over a Republican message of deficit reduction and wasteful spending. (Disclosure: Greenberg Quinlan Rosner helped conduct this survey.) True, voters are not particularly moved by Democratic messages about Republican extremism or the policies that produced the recession. But they are open to hearing about how to repair the economy and put Americans back to work. This is surprising, because voters normally tune out the party they want to punish at the polls.

Greenberg and Carville conclude that “…based on our experiences leading up to the last supposed Democratic debacle, candidates may have more control over their destinies than they think.” Coming from the team that advised the only Democrat since FDR to win two consecutive Presidential elections — as well as advocated the strategy that helped Dems hold the line in ’98 midterms — their advice merits serious consideration from Democratic candidates and campaigns.


Blue Surge Emerging in Senate Races

Mike Lux has a morale-booster for Dems at Open Left:

…The polls coming out over the last 48 hours or so are giving Democratic optimists more numbers to buttress their case…Brown is back up in CA, Sink is back up in FL, Patrick Murphy has pulled ahead in PA, Kagen in WI is back into a dead heat- but they remain all over the map, and it’s harder to spot an overall trend. …
National patterns really stand out in the Senate races. That is why I am encouraged by what I am seeing in the last few days of polling. Democratic candidates in a bunch of different races around the country seem to be gaining ground, in most cases even though they are being dramatically outspent. Check out this pattern:
* WI. Russ Feingold has been down for a while, 8-10 down, and the two latest polls I’ve seen show him in a dead heat.
* AK. The little known and way underfunded Democratic nominee, Scott McAdams, has been stuck in 3rd place behind his two better known and funded Republican rivals, but he has climbed 7.5 points in the latest polling.
* PA. Joe Sestak is in a statistical dead heat in two polls out the last 24 hours. In one of those polls he is ahead by 1 point, the other by 3. He had been trailing Toomey by 6 points or more in most polling done over the last several weeks.
* KY. Rand Paul had built a lead of 6-10 points in most of the polling coming out recently, but Conway has come back to a statistical dead heat.
* MO. Robin Carnahan had slipped to 8-10 down in most recent polls. 2 new polls out the last couple days show her at 5 and 6 points down.
* NC. Badly outspent, Elaine Marshall has had to wait until the end to run TV ads, and had been trailing in the teens. With her up on TV, even though still being badly outspent, she is back within 8.
* CT. Richard Blumenthal has been taking scores of millions of dollars worth of body slam style attack ads from the queen of body slamming herself, Linda McMahon, and McMahon had pulled even in their race, but recent polling shows Blumenthal re-establishing a small but statistically significant 5-6 point lead.
I can’t put this in the same category, because the public polls are contradictory, but after trailing by double digits most of the race, Lee Fisher has pulled within 6 or 9 in his race with Bush’s former trade and budget czar. There’s another (less reliable in my view because they oversample Republicans) that shows the race going in the opposite direction, so in this race the surge is more uncertain, but given that Gov. Strickland and other statewide Democrats seem to be moving up I think it is likely that Lee is moving positively as well.

It’s not yet the rising blue tide that lifts all boats. Lux points out that Boxer and Murray are struggling in the very latest polls. But these two races appear to be exceptions in the larger context. Lux adds that the latest data from DCorps indicates an uptick in voter enthusiasm among Black, Latino, young an unmarried women voters. Good news from coast to coast — but let none of it allow Dems to be lulled into complacency about the urgency of mobilizing a record Democratic turnout in the next two weeks.


Money Talks, Brooks Walks

David Brooks’s New York Times column “Don’t Follow the Money” provides an excellent example of an op-ed column that does a superb job of marshaling statistics and arguments to make a point. Expect to see it in future anthologies of ‘Persuasive Writing.’
Doesn’t mean he is right, however, as some of the responses to his column in The Times’ letters, indicate. Here’s an excerpt from Common Cause President Bob Edgar’s response:

…It’s clear that money counts in our elections. Since 2000, the average winner in contests for open House seats has outspent the average loser by at least $310,000, according to figures compiled by the nonpartisan Campaign Finance Institute. In races for open Senate seats, winners outspent losers, on average, in every year except 2002.

Mark Green, a former Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate and NYC Mayor and author of “Selling Out: How Big Corporate Money Buys Elections, Rams Through Legislation and Betrays Our Democracy,” adds:

…But it’s a very big deal when anonymous special interests drop several hundred thousand dollars in targeted competitive House races or several million in swing states, as Representative Peter deFazio, an Oregon Democrat, and Senator Michael Bennet, a Colorado Democrat, have discovered to their consternation.
Mr. Brooks selectively argues that well-financed candidates like Phil Gramm and John Connally did poorly in their presidential races. That’s true, though one wonders whether he also thinks that Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg’s money was irrelevant (only asking).
While independent or candidate spending is not the only or even the most important variable — message, economy, scandal can count for more — only someone who’s never run for office can theorize that money doesn’t matter.
Since Meg Whitman and Linda McMahon have invested a combined $160 million of their own fortunes in their campaigns — and candidates spend half to two-thirds of their time “dialing for dollars” — one wonders why they all waste so much money and time. Mr. Brooks suggests that candidates are foolish to seek and spend such large sums.
Really?

Over at Salon.com, Glenn Greenwald does a compelling job of shredding Brooks’s cherry-picked stats, and adds:

Given that all of this funding can be (and is being) directed to close races, and given that the vast bulk of this funding is completely unknown and anonymous (a five-fold increase in anonymous spending since 2006), it requires misleading formulations to depict these amounts as insignificant and trivial in the scheme of things. With his column today, Brooks seems to have relied on exactly that approach to make his point. Brooks purposely concealed from his readers that just these two entities alone were spending $140 million to shape election outcomes — most of which are from unknown sources — because that fact renders Brooks’ dismissal absurd on its face.

Brooks’s argument may apply better to primary contests, before the really big dough shows up. There will be high-profile exceptions, like the ones Brooks has noted. But, overall, the candidates who have less money behind them remain the underdogs.


TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira: Public Not Hung Up on Cutting Govt

Shrinking government is the big priority with Republicans. But they have failed to make it the central priority of voters, according to TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira, whose latest public opinion snapshot crunches data from a new poll on Americans’ attitudes toward government conducted by The Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University. Teixeira explains:

The public was asked if they supported more, less, about the same, or no federal government involvement in dealing with a variety of issues. On five domestic policy issues majorities ranging from 67 to 84 percent wanted to see either the same or more federal government involvement in the issue. (In fact, on four of these issues outright majorities actually wanted to see more federal involvement.) Those wanting to see less or no involvement ranged from only 32 down to 16 percent.

And asked whether they would rather have the federal government provide more services even if it cost more in taxes or have the federal government collect less in taxes while providing fewer services:

A slight plurality (49 percent) preferred the first government-expanding option over the second government-cutting option (47 percent). Even more interestingly, these sentiments are notably less hostile to government’s role than has been the case at a number of points in the past. In 1994 only 28 percent selected the government-expanding option, while 57 percent preferred the government-cutting option.

Asked if they want their representative in Congress to fight for more spending to create jobs in their district or fight to cut government spending even if that means fewer jobs in the district, respondents said:

It turns out that, by 57-39, they want their representative to fight for more spending to create jobs. Again, there is no evidence here of an overriding commitment to cut government. And again we see a less hostile attitude toward government’s role than was seen back in 1994 when, by 53-42, the public came down on the cutting spending side of the choice.

As Teixeira concludes, “…Does the public want to see government performance improved? Yes, and in a big way. But don’t believe the conservative hype about a public thirsty to cut government. It’s just not happening.”