washington, dc

The Democratic Strategist

Political Strategy for a Permanent Democratic Majority

Ed Kilgore

It’s time to face a harsh reality: the GOP no longer behaves like a traditional American political party. It has become an extremist party. Moderates and sensible conservatives need to firmly reject and condemn this deeply disturbing and dangerous trend.

This item by Ed Kilgore, James Vega and J.P. Green was originally published on November 15, 2012.
Although it is only a few days since the 2012 election ended, the national media is already settling into a familiar political narrative regarding the GOP, a narrative that goes as follows: the Republican Party, having suffered major setbacks at the polls, is now “reassessing” its approach and seeking ways to “moderate” its image and positions.
This is a profoundly comfortable and comforting narrative – one that reflects a kind of ceremonial ritual in American politics. A political party, chastened by defeat, is widely praised by mainstream commentators as it moves back toward the center, re-establishing the basic “balance” and “moderation” of American political life.
But in this case there is one overwhelming problem with this narrative: it is profoundly and dangerously wrong.
Beginning last spring, a growing chorus of influential observers and commentators – political moderates and centrists rather than partisan progressive Democrats — began to express a very different view of the GOP – a view that the Republican Party was no longer operating as a traditional American political party. Rather, they argued, it had evolved into an extremist political party of a kind not previously seen in American political life.
During the presidential campaign this perspective was temporarily set aside as journalists and commentators tried to keep up with the almost daily twists and turns of Mitt Romney’s reinventions of himself as a conservative, a moderate and then a conservative once again. But now that the election is over, the underlying issue must be squarely faced.
The first major statement expressing the view that the Republican Party had embraced a dangerous extremism appeared in a very influential Washington Post article, “Let’s just say it, the Republicans are the problem” written by the well known and widely respected congressional scholars Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein. As the article’s key paragraph said:

In our past writings, we have criticized both parties when we believed it was warranted. Today, however, we have no choice but to acknowledge that the core of the problem lies with the Republican Party. The GOP has become an insurgent outlier in American politics. It is ideologically extreme; scornful of compromise; unmoved by conventional understanding of facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition… [It has] all but declared war on the government….

The two authors quoted Mike Lofgren, a veteran Republican congressional staffer, who wrote an anguished diatribe about why he was ending his career on the Hill after nearly three decades.

“The Republican Party is becoming less and less like a traditional political party in a representative democracy and becoming more like an apocalyptic cult, or one of the intensely ideological authoritarian parties of 20th century Europe,”

Mann and Ornstein’s forceful critique provided the impetus for other moderates and centrists to follow their lead and directly address the growing extremism within the GOP. James Fallows, for example, expressed the view as follows in The Atlantic:

Normally I shy away from apocalyptic readings of the American predicament…But when you look at the sequence from Bush v. Gore, through Citizens United…and you combine it with ongoing efforts in Florida and elsewhere to prevent voting from presumably Democratic blocs; and add that to the simply unprecedented abuse of the filibuster in the years since the Democrats won control of the Senate and then took the White House, you have what we’d identify as a kind of long-term coup if we saw it happening anywhere else.
Liberal democracies like ours depend on rules but also on norms — on the assumption that you’ll go so far, but no further, to advance your political ends. The norms imply some loyalty to the system as a whole that outweighs your immediate partisan interest.

American politics has always been open to the full and free expression of even the most extreme ideas, but the profound danger posed by the current extremism of the GOP lies in one deeply disturbing fact: the Republican Party’s extremism goes far beyond support for extreme public policies. Instead, in three key respects, it deliberately seeks to undermine basic norms and institutions of democratic society.
The two very different meanings of political extremism
To clearly demonstrate this, however, it is necessary to carefully distinguish between two entirely distinct meanings of the term “political extremism.”
On the one hand, it is possible for a person or political party to hold a wide variety of very “extreme” opinions on issues. These views may be crackpot (e.g. “abolish all courts and judges”) or repugnant (“deny non-insured children all medical care”). But as long as the individual or political party that holds these views conducts itself within the norms and rules of a democratic society, its right to advocate even the most extreme views is protected by those same democratic institutions.
The alternative definition of the term “political extremism” refers to political parties or individuals who do not accept the norms, rules and constraints of democratic society. These individuals or parties embrace a view of “politics as warfare” and of political opponents as literal “enemies” who must be crushed. Extremist political parties based on a “politics as warfare” philosophy emerged on both the political left and right at various times in the 20th century and in many different countries and circumstances.
Despite their ideological diversity, extremist political parties share a large number of common characteristics, one critical trait being a radically different conception of the role and purpose of a political party in a democratic society. In the “politics as warfare” perspective a political party’s objective is defined as the conquest and seizure of power and not sincere collaboration in democratic governance. The party is viewed as a combat organization whose goal is to defeat an enemy, not a representative organization whose job is to faithfully represent the people who voted for it. Political debate and legislative maneuvering are seen not as the means to achieve ultimate compromise, but as forms of combat whose only objective is total victory.
It is this “politics as warfare” view of political life that leads logically and inevitably to the justification of attempts to attack and undermine basic democratic institutions whenever and wherever they present a roadblock to achieving the ultimate goal of complete ideological victory.
Three tactics of political extremism
The new moderate and centrist critics of Republican extremism have noted three specific kinds of attacks that the GOP has launched on basic American democratic norms and institutions.


Needed: Project to Increase Democratic Turnout in 2014 Midterm Election

This item by J.P. Green was originally published on November 10, 2012.
We know you’re sick of politics and you would like to give it a rest for a while. But Michael Tomasky’s post, “The Obama Coalition in the Off Years” at The Daily Beast has one of the best ideas yet for the mid-term elections, and you should check it out before it fades off the political radar screen. Noting that 2012 voter turnout was near 60 percent, Tomasky explains:

Some rich liberals need to fund a public-education group that will work full-time to make sure the liberal blocs and constituencies come out and vote in off-year elections…And off-year turnout is down around 40 percent. The 20 percent who leave the system are almost entirely Democrats. This has been true all my life. It’s basically because old people always vote, and I guess old white people vote more than other old people, and old white people tend to be Republican. So even when white American isn’t enraged as it was in 2010, midterms often benefit Republicans.

Conceding the exceptions of ’98 and ’06, Tomasky continues,

As long as this is true, the country’s progressive coalition will spend forever taking one step forward in presidential years, and one step back in off years. But imagine if the Obama coalition had voted, even in decent numbers, in 2010. The Democrats might still well have the House.
If liberal blocs can be conditioned in a generation’s time to vote in every federal election, well, combine that with what we know to be the coming demographic changes, and the electoral pressure on Republicans would be constant and enormous. The Republican white voting pool has limits, so the GOP would have to compete even harder for brown and black votes, which would pull our politics even more to the left.
A long-term project along these lines would be $20 million (or whatever) very well spent for some rich liberal who cares about changing the country.

Tomasky’s idea has added appeal, considering that in 2014 an unusually high number of Democratic senators will be up for re-election in red and swing states (6 for each). As for the House, Cameron Joseph notes at The Hill:

On the House side, while Democrats will have some opportunities at districts they missed out on in California and elsewhere, heavily gerrymandered GOP maps in states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, Wisconsin and North Carolina will continue to limit their opportunities.
Democrats tend to live in more urban areas, concentrating their votes into fewer congressional districts, and legally required “majority-minority” districts further pack Democrats into a few districts and make nearby districts more safely Republican.
According to a recent study by the Center for Voting and Democracy, Democrats start off with 166 safe districts while Republicans start off with 195. There are only 74 true swing districts where the presidential candidates won between 46 and 54 percent of the popular vote, down from 89 before redistricting.
That means the GOP needs to win less than one-third of competitive House seats to stay in control — something that shouldn’t be too hard to accomplish, barring a huge Democratic wave. In a politically neutral year Democrats are likely to have around 203 seats, a number that’s only slightly higher than the number they’ll have once the remaining 2012 races are called.

In addition, it’s just possible that some of the creative GOTV techniques Dems deployed so successfully this year could be transferable to the 2014 mid-terms. In any case, meeting the challenge of making the next mid-term electorate resemble this year’s general election demographics could help insure that progressive change replaces continued gridlock and stagnation.


Brownstein: Credit Obama’s Innovative Coalition With Historic Win

This staff post was first published on November 7, 2012.
For insightful analysis of elections, it’s always good to check in with the National Journal‘s ace Ronald Brownstein, who observes today:

President Obama won a second term by marrying the new Democratic coalition with just enough of the old to overcome enduring economic disenchantment and a cavernous racial divide.
In many places, particularly across the Sun Belt, Obama mobilized the Democrats’ new “coalition of the ascendant,” winning enough support among young people, minorities and college-educated whites, especially women, to overcome very weak numbers among blue-collar whites and college-educated men. But in the upper Midwest, where there are not enough of those voters to win, Obama attracted just enough working-class whites to hold the critical battlegrounds of Wisconsin, Iowa, and above all Ohio against Mitt Romney’s forceful challenge.

Brownstein notes that with Obama’s victory, Democrats have matched the GOP record of winning the popular vote in 4 of 5 elections. he adds that “Obama also held all 18 “blue wall” states that have voted Democratic in each election since 1992. By doing so he set a new milestone: that is the most states Democrats have won that often since the formation of the modern party system in 1828.”
Brownstein explains that Obama adroitly rode the “tailwind” of demographic transformation, as people of color now cast 28 percent of the ballots in a presidential election, and Obama received 80 percent of their votes, “including not only more than nine in 10 African-Americans, but also about seven in 10 Hispanics, and about three in four Asians.”
“In the key Midwestern battlegrounds with much smaller minority populations,” adds Brownstein, “the president engineered a different formula for victory…Obama exceeded his national performance among white voters by just enough to repel Romney’s challenge” by successfully characterizing Romney as “an insensitive plutocrat.” yet, nationwide, “Obama captured a smaller share of the white vote than John Kerry did when he lost in 2004.”
In that way, the election offered warning signs to each party.
It’s a warning sign for Democrats, says Brownstein, but a disaster for Republicans: “By winning nearly three-fifths of whites, Romney matched the best performance among white voters ever for a Republican challenger–and yet he lost decisively in the Electoral College.” Brownstein adds,

…By failing to compete more effectively for the growing minority population, Republicans have lowered their ceiling in presidential politics, and left their nominees trying to thread a needle to reach a majority either in the popular or Electoral College vote.

Brownstein concludes of Obama’s re-election,

…His victory underscored the enduring polarization along ideological, regional, and racial lines: For instance, while about three-fifths of Hispanics and three-fourths of African-Americans who voted said they wanted his health care law maintained or even expanded, nearly three-fifths of whites said they wanted it repealed…How Washington makes progress on the biggest challenges we face while the nation is both deeply and closely divided is the largest question looming after Obama’s historic victory.

There is no question that President Obama and the Democrats have won an impressive mandate. The challenge ahead is to increase the comfort level of white working class voters as a permanent constituency in the new Democratic coalition.


Into the Post-Election “Struggle For the Soul” Period

It’s traditional in our system that once the votes are counted and the winners and losers announced, we enter a period where analysis of what happened quickly gives way to ax-grinding and elbowing for position among factions in the losing party, and sometimes the winning party. This happened quickly, but not very deeply, in the GOP, as I’ve written about extensively at Washington Monthly.
By and large Republicans have “searched” for the factors that left them without the White House or control of the Senate in places that are not threatening to their basic conservative ideology. That’s exactly what they did after their 2008 defeat, which made it easy for the GOP to go on a right-wing ideology bender soon afterwards. Don’t be too sure the same thing won’t happen again.
Another familiar meme from the not–too-distant past has been the claim that an exciting new cadre of Republican leaders are rising up from the states, where they are solving problems and promoting “new ideas.” That’s precisely the meme that led to the nomination of George W. “Reformer with Results” Bush in 2000.
Meanwhile, Democrats are at the moment maintaining their impressive level of pre-election unity. But it may not last, given the long-simmering differences of opinion over domestic and foreign policies that go back to the Clinton administration, and could even re-emerge quickly if the Obama administration makes what progressives consider excessive or principle-violating concessions during the upcoming fiscal negotiations.


No “Centrist Reforms” On Tap For Republicans

This item is cross-posted from The New Republic.
As the long-time policy director for the once-influential (if now-defunct) Democratic Leadership Council, I have often been asked whether a clear defeat of Mitt Romney on November 6, of the sort we saw yesterday, might drive Republicans to create a similar party-changing “centrist” organization.
The short answer is “no.” (And I’m tempted to say the long answer is “Hell, no!”) Yes, like the Democrats of the 1980s, the GOP has just gone through a string of brutal national elections. Yes, the GOP is looking down the barrel of a large and growing demographic disadvantage. The Republicans undoubtedly have the occasion to reconsider their direction. But that doesn’t mean they’re actually going to do so.
Perhaps the simplest way to explain why is to re-examine the conditions that led to the formation and rise of the DLC, and compare them to those now facing the Republican Party.
The so-called Electoral College “lock.” When the DLC was founded in 1985, Democrats had just experienced a 525-13 wipeout in the electoral college, and had been particularly demolished in the South, the foundation of their one presidential victory in the previous five elections. Whatever their problems, polarization has given Republicans a virtually unshakable base in both popular and electoral votes. They could run a candidate in clown makeup for president–and in 2012, they might have, judging from the party’s other leading primary candidates–and still win 45 percent of the vote and 150 electoral votes.
Alienated elected officials. The DLC’s real “base” was among congressional, state and local elected officials–not just in the South, but in every competitive state and region–who feared the national party (and the interest and constituency groups that were thought to control it) were in the process of dragging them towards defeat. The dominant Republican office-holders today at every level are products of two GOP landslides–1994 and 2010–that were accompanied by an aggressive, ideologically conservative message. On that basis, there’s no reason to think that any Republican revolt against the “presidential party” will be “centrist” in any tangible way.
Regional disunity. While the southern character of the DLC was always exaggerated by its critics, it’s true it was strongest in areas of the country (the South, but also the West and growing suburbs everywhere) where Republicans were making major gains, and the perceived “paleoliberal” message of the party was not helping. The most remarkable development in the GOP during the last decade, by contrast, has been the gradual extinction of major regional differences, at least outside New England (and even there on many issues, as reflected in the remarkable unanimity of Republican congressional voting on economic and fiscal issues). In particular, Midwestern conservatives are now ideologically very close to their southern cousins on such previously Dixiefied issues as the legitimacy of unions. Pro-choice Republicans are very rare. Perhaps a DLC-style “centrist” organization might serve as a symbolic “triangulating” device in New England, but it would not represent a nationally significant party faction.
Alternative explanations for defeat. Much of the ongoing argument between “New Democrats” and “traditional liberals” that enlivened (or depending on your point of view, enervated) Democrats in the 1980s and 1990s involved varying explanations for the party’s loss of its old majority status. Many of them, on both sides of the intraparty barricades, can be found in the classic 1989 DLC analysis of the presidential party, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck’s The Politics of Evasion. If there is such a debate in the Republican Party today, it is well-hidden (beyond a few notably non-influential party heretics like David Frum and Jon Huntsman, and ex-Republicans like Charlie Crist), or is more a matter of arguing campaign tactics. The overwhelming point of view in the GOP today is that a clearly-articulated “movement conservative” message embracing smaller government, laissez-faire economics, and cultural conservatism (there is a bit, but only a bit, of dissension on national security and immigration) is and remains a winner. “Bad candidates,” or worse yet, half-hearted conservatives, can still lose presidential elections and congressional majorities, but too much conservatism is never the problem.


Election Countdown: Day 1

So the Big Day has finally arrived, and everyone not involved heavily in GOTV efforts is getting nervous and/or excited. FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver has Obama’s probability of re-election at 86.3%; Princeton Election Consortium’s Sam Wang has it at 98.4% HuffPost’s final polling average gives Obama a 1.2% popular vote lead. RCP has Obama leading by 0.7%. Obama has been up in every poll of Ohio taken in the last two weeks, other than those conducted by Rasmussen, which has the race tied. The standard Republican spin has moved from “Romney landslide!” to “Too close to call!”
With this background, here’s some items from today’s blogging at Washington Monthly that may be of special interest to TDS readers:
* Romney’s late effort in Pennsylvania isn’t a “feint” or a sign of an “expanding map,” but simply a desperate tactic of a campaign blocked from other routes to 270. Sorta like Lee’s invasion of the Keystone State in 1863.
* GOP prospects of taking over Senate now lower than chances of Democratic gains, which could go as high as four or five seats.
* Obama on track to beat 2008 margin among Latinos, and enthusiasm is high; GOP gamble on wedge politics backfiring.
* State legislative elections offer targets for both parties, but drive for supermajorities (especially in California) could be biggest story.
Get some rest tonight!


Election Countdown: Day 4

Another day of evidence that all the talk about “Mitt-Mentum” was cloaking a very different reality. Here are some items from the posting at Washington Monthly today that are of particular interest to the TDS community.
* The Mourdock disaster, which probably ended Republican fantasies of retaking the Senate, an abiding reminder of the “human error factor” in this era of professionalized campaigns.
* All the scrutiny of raw numbers in early voting may miss bigger issue of which side is best turning out “sporadic” or “low-propensity” voters.
* Parallels between Bush and Romney escalated greatly by Mitt’s version of “uniter-not-divider” pitch.
* Critical California ballot initiative going down to the wire.


Election Countdown: Day 5

Another tense day as polls begin to slowly turn in Obama’s direction, and Michael Bloomberg trumps Chris Christie’s praise of the president with an actual endorsement.
Here’s some items from today’s blogging at Washington Monthly that may be of particular interest to TDS readers:
* The bizarre conservative demonization of FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver may reflect foundation being laid for post-election blame game.
* The extrusions of GOP pols on rape and abortion reflect a re-framing of the reproductive rights debate in a manner favorable to the pro-choice cause, but also perversely help extremists like Mitt Romney pose as moderates.
* Two prominent Catholic “pro-life” voices weigh in on the elections in very different ways.
* Voters “disappointed” by Obama’s failure to achieve bipartisanship sure to be disappointed again if Mitt wins–for the exact same reasons.


Election Countdown: Day 6

Those of us not directly affected by Sandy are beginning to get fully into the final, teeth-grinding phase of this very long and difficult election cycle. Before getting to items of interest to TDS readers from today’s posting at Washington Monthly, here’s some breaking news: first real national polling on Obama’s handling of Sandy, from ABC/WaPo Tracking Survey, shows very high positive assessments (78/8). We’ll see if it matters.
* Mitt Romney’s “storm relief event” in Ohio a good example of successfully cynical manipulation of media.
* Trende/Cohn agreement on unlikelihood of electoral vote/popular vote “split decision” worth paying attention to, along with belief that either national or state polls are just plain wrong.
* Has-been underachievers as important as Tea Party upstarts in important story of GOP’s likely failure to take back Senate despite most favorable landscape in many years.
* Brief essay on how Iowa extremist Steve King benefits from partisan polarization.


Romney’s Waffling on FEMA Won’t Win Many Votes

This item by J.P. Green was originally published on October 30, 2012.
In his Washington Post article, “Hurricane Sandy highlights how Obama and Romney respond to disasters,” Ed O’Keefe describes the President’s course of action addressing frankenstorm Sandy:

…Obama has signed at least nine federal emergency disaster declarations in the past 24 hours at the request of state governors, directing FEMA to deploy more resources in anticipation of significant recovery efforts. He canceled campaign stops for Monday and Tuesday to return to the White House to oversee the federal government’s evolving storm response.
…Obama campaigned four years ago on a promise to revamp the federal government’s disaster-response functions and has embraced changes long sought by state governors and professional emergency managers. Since becoming president, he has led the federal response to multiple natural disasters, including tornadoes, flooding and major hurricanes, learning from government stumbles during the presidency of George W. Bush — most notably in the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Obama’s posture has been to order federal agencies to aggressively prepare for and respond to major storms and other disasters.

It’s a portrait of a president leaving no task unmet. O’Keefe sees “a moment of sharp contrast between President Obama and Mitt Romney and how their different ideas of governing apply to the federal response to large-scale disasters.” O’Keefe adds that “Obama has been aggressive about bolstering the federal government’s capability to respond to disasters, while his Republican challenger believes that states should be the primary responders in such situations and has suggested that disaster response could be privatized.” Further,

As governor of Massachusetts, Romney requested federal disaster assistance for storm cleanup, and he has toured storm-ravaged communities as a presidential candidate, but he has agreed with some who suggest that the Federal Emergency Management Agency could be dissolved as part of budget cuts.
When moderator John King suggested during a June 2011 CNN debate that federal disaster response could be curtailed to save federal dollars, Romney said: “Absolutely. Every time you have an occasion to take something from the federal government and send it back to the states, that’s the right direction. And if you can go even further and send it back to the private sector, that’s even better.”

At the time, Romney didn’t have much to say about, ahem, how states should work together when a natural disaster overlaps state borders, as they most always do. But in the Romney campaign’s partial walkback statement, we get this:

“Governor Romney believes that states should be in charge of emergency management in responding to storms and other natural disasters in their jurisdictions,” said campaign spokeswoman Amanda Henneberg. “As the first responders, states are in the best position to aid affected individuals and communities and to direct resources and assistance to where they are needed most. This includes help from the federal government and FEMA.”

Which is pretty much how the system works, as O’Keefe points out. He adds that the Romney campaign is also collecting supplies for the storm’s victims, which FEMA says is not such a good idea in the earliest part of the relief effort, because cash and blood donations are more urgently needed and donated supplies can cause logistical bottlenecks too early on.
After President Bush botched the Hurricane Katrina relief effort the agency has undergone major restructuring and reorganization under the leadership of President Obama and FEMA administrator Carl Fugate, as O’Keefe explains:

Fugate and Obama have earned praise for restoring the agency’s reputation in the years since Katrina. Despite working for then-Florida Gov. Jeb Bush as head of the state’s emergency agency, Fugate said he rebuffed overtures from George W. Bush to lead FEMA after Katrina, saying that the GOP administration did not want to rebuild the agency in the fashion since embraced by Obama.

O’Keefe adds that “Fugate has batted away questions before about possible privatization of his agency: “I’m too busy working on other stuff. Ask that to somebody who would give you the time and day to answer that,” he said in a 2011 interview. O’Keefe notes that Obama’s FEMA reforms have “earned plaudits from then-Gov. Haley Barbour (R) of Mississippi and Gov. Bobby Jindal (R) of Louisiana — usually tough Obama critics — and professional emergency managers who had sought the changes for years.” O’Keefe concludes with a quote recalling Bush’s ‘Heckuvajob Brownie” mismanagement of Hurricane Katrina relief:

Obama’s changes at FEMA “have been night and day” compared with those under previous administrations, according to one veteran emergency manager who was not authorized to speak publicly for fear of jeopardizing federal disaster grant requests. “I don’t know who will be the next president, but they can’t put a political hack in the job of leading FEMA ever again.”

Some may protest that it’s unseemly to call attention to the differing approaches of the candidates in a time of national emergency, when Americans should be pulling together. But lives are at stake and it’s important that voters pay attention to the management philosophies and track records of the two candidates in addressing major disasters. This is a matter of national security as much as any foreign policy issue.
What voters are left with is an image of Romney posturing his ideologically-extravagant privatization schema and federal government-bashing, and a more grounded and experienced President Obama taking care of business. My hunch is that the clear distinction will not be lost on observant swing voters.