from American Political Science Review
The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution
Noam Lupu and Joans Pontusson
Against the current consensus among comparative political economists, we argue that inequality matters for redistributive politics in advanced capitalist societies, but it is the structure of inequality, not the level of inequality, that matters. Our theory posits that middle-income voters will be inclined to ally with low-income voters and support redistributive policies when the distance between the middle and the poor is small relative to the distance between the middle and the rich. We test this proposition with data from 15 to 18 advanced democracies and find that both redistribution and nonelderly social spending increase as the dispersion of earnings in the upper half of the distribution increases relative to the dispersion of earnings in the lower half of the distribution. In addition, we present survey evidence on preferences for redistribution among middle-income voters that is consistent with our theory and regression results indicating that left parties are more likely to participate in government when the structure of inequality is characterized by skew.
from British Journal of Political Science
Language and Ideology in Congress
Daniel Diermeier, Jean-François Godbout, Bei Yu and Stefan Kaufmann
Legislative speech records from the 101st to 108th Congresses of the US Senate are analysed to study political ideologies. A widely-used text classification algorithm – Support Vector Machines (SVM) – allows the extraction of terms that are most indicative of conservative and liberal positions in legislative speeches and the prediction of senators’ ideological positions, with a 92 per cent level of accuracy. Feature analysis identifies the terms associated with conservative and liberal ideologies. The results demonstrate that cultural references appear more important than economic references in distinguishing conservative from liberal congressional speeches, calling into question the common economic interpretation of ideological differences in the US Congress.
Casualties and Incumbents: Do the Casualties from Interstate Conflicts Affect Incumbent Party Vote Share?
Michael T. Koch
Research suggests that the costs of international conflict (e.g. casualties) alter public opinion, executive approval and policy positions of elected officials. However, do casualties affect voting in terms of aggregate outcomes and individual vote choices? This article examines how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share. Using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, it is argued that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent vote share. This model is tested with both cross-national aggregate data from twenty-three countries and individual-level British survey data. The results support the argument.
Ideological Hedging in Uncertain Times: Inconsistent Legislative Representation and Voter Enfranchisement
Antoine Yoshinaka and Christian R. Grose
Can ideological inconsistency in legislators’ voting records be explained by uncertainty about constituent preferences? Do legislators ‘hedge their bets’ ideologically when faced with constituency uncertainty? This article presents an uncertainty-based theory of ideological hedging. Legislators faced with uncertainty about their constituent preferences have an incentive to present ideologically inconsistent roll-call records. Legislators experiment with a variety of roll-call positions in order to learn the preferences of their constituents. An examination of US senators during 1961-2004 shows that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and mobilization led to higher ideological inconsistency in legislative voting records. Ideologically inconsistent behaviour by elected officials can be characterized as best responses to a changing and uncertain environment. These results have implications for representation and the stability of democracy.
from The Journal of Politics
A Jamming Theory of Politics
William Minozzi
Competitive political elites frequently offer conflicting, irreconcilable accounts of policy-relevant information. This presents a problem for members of the public who lack the skill, time, and attention to become experts on every complicated policy question that might arise. To analyze problems like these, this article presents a formal theory of political communication with competitive senders who have privately known preferences. In equilibrium, senders can jam messages from their opponents; that is, they can send messages designed to leave receivers uncertain about who has sent a truthful message. The article identifies differences between jamming and existing theories, reports empirical predictions, and discusses substantive implications for the politics of representation, the judiciary, and expertise.
Is the Government to Blame? An Experimental Test of How Partisanship Shapes Perceptions of Performance and Responsibility
James Tilleya and Sara B. Hobolt
The idea that voters use elections to hold governments to account for their performance lies at the heart of democratic theory, and countless studies have shown that economic performance can predict support for incumbents. Nonetheless recent work has challenged this simple link between policy performance and party choice by arguing that any relationship is conditioned by prior political beliefs, notably partisanship. Some have argued that economic perceptions are shaped by party choice rather than vice versa. Others have claimed that voters tend to attribute responsibility for perceived successes to their favored party, but absolve them of responsibility if performance is poor. This study examines the effect of partisanship on both performance evaluations and responsibility attributions using survey experiments to disentangle the complex causal relationships. Our findings show that partisan loyalties have pervasive effects on responsibility attributions, but somewhat weaker effects on evaluations of performance.
Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups
Sarah F. Anzia
It is an established fact that off-cycle elections attract lower voter turnout than on-cycle elections. I argue that the decrease in turnout that accompanies off-cycle election timing creates a strategic opportunity for organized interest groups. Members of interest groups with a large stake in an election outcome turn out at high rates regardless of election timing, and their efforts to mobilize and persuade voters have a greater impact when turnout is low. Consequently, policy made by officials elected in off-cycle elections should be more favorable to the dominant interest group in a polity than policy made by officials elected in on-cycle elections. I test this theory using data on school district elections in the United States, in which teacher unions are the dominant interest group. I find that districts with off-cycle elections pay experienced teachers over 3% more than districts that hold on-cycle elections.
Does Knowledge of Constitutional Principles Increase Support for Civil Liberties? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment
Donald P. Green, Peter M. Aronow, Daniel E. Bergan, Pamela Greene, Celia Paris and Beth I. Weinberger
For decades, scholars have argued that education causes greater support for civil liberties by increasing students’ exposure to political knowledge and constitutional norms, such as due process and freedom of expression. Support for this claim comes exclusively from observational evidence, principally from cross-sectional surveys. This paper presents the first large-scale experimental test of this proposition. More than 1000 students in 59 high school classrooms were randomly assigned to an enhanced civics curriculum designed to promote awareness and understanding of constitutional rights and civil liberties. The results show that students in the enhanced curriculum classes displayed significantly more knowledge in this domain than students in conventional civics classes. However, we find no corresponding change in the treatment group’s support for civil liberties, a finding that calls into question the hypothesis that knowledge and attitudes are causally connected.
Drafting Support for War: Conscription and Mass Support for Warfare
Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew S. Levendusky
How does a military’s recruitment policy–whether a country has a draft or conscript army–influence mass support for war? We investigate how military recruitment affects the way the American public evaluates whether a war is worth fighting. While some argue that conscription decreases support for war by making its costs more salient, others argue that it increases support by signaling the importance of the conflict. Existing evidence is inconclusive, with data limited to one particular conflict. Using an original survey experiment, we find strong support for the argument that conscription decreases mass support for war, a finding that replicates in several different settings. We also show that these findings are driven by concerns about self-interest, consistent with our theory. We conclude by discussing the relevance of these findings for debates about how domestic political conditions influence when states go to war.
“Don’t Know” Means “Don’t Know”: DK Responses and the Public’s Level of Political Knowledge
Robert C. Luskin and John G. Bullock
Does the public know much more about politics than conventionally thought? A number of studies have recently argued, on various grounds, that the “don’t know” (DK) and incorrect responses to traditionally designed and scored survey knowledge items conceal a good deal of knowledge. This paper examines these claims, focusing on the prominent and influential argument that discouraging DKs would reveal a substantially more knowledgeable public. Using two experimental surveys with national random samples, we show that discouraging DKs does little to affect our picture of how much the public knows about politics. For closed-ended items, the increase in correct responses is large but mainly illusory. For open-ended items, it is genuine but minor. We close by examining the other recent evidence for a substantially more knowledgeable public, showing that it too holds little water.
The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting
Anna Bassi, Rebecca B. Morton and Kenneth C. Williams
We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities, and the effect is stronger when voters have less information. Nevertheless, financial incentives reduce this influence when voters have full information. Our results suggest that identity may have an important affect on voter choices in elections where incentives or information are low.
Testing the Double Standard for Candidate Emotionality: Voter Reactions to the Tears and Anger of Male and Female Politicians
Deborah Jordan Brooks
Many have speculated that voters hold double standards for male and female political candidates that disadvantage women. One common assumption is that female candidates are penalized disproportionately for displays of crying and anger; however, the field lacks a theoretical or empirical foundation for examining this matter. The first half of this article establishes the theoretical basis for how emotional displays are likely to influence evaluations of female versus male candidates. Using a large-N, representative sample of U.S. adults, the second half tests these dynamics experimentally. The main finding is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, no double standard exists for emotionality overall: male and female candidates are similarly penalized for both anger and crying. There are, however, different responses to the tears of male and female candidates depending on whether the respondent is a man or woman.
from Political Behavior
The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties
Assuming that migration threat is multi-dimensional, this article seeks to investigate how various types of threats associated with immigration affect attitudes towards immigration and civil liberties. Through experimentation, the study unpacks the ‘securitization of migration’ discourse by disaggregating the nature of immigration threat, and its impact on policy positions and ideological patterns at the individual level. Based on framing and attitudinal analysis, we argue that physical security in distinction from cultural insecurity is enough to generate important ideological variations stemming from strategic input (such as framing and issue-linkage). We expect then that as immigration shifts from a cultural to a physical threat, immigration issues may become more politically salient but less politicized and subject to consensus. Interestingly, however, the findings reveal that the effects of threat framing are not ubiquitous, and may be conditional upon ideology. Liberals were much more susceptible to the frames than were conservatives. Potential explanations for the ideological effects of framing, as well as their implications, are explored.
The Consequences of Political Cynicism: How Cynicism Shapes Citizens’ Reactions to Political Scandals
Logan Dancey
This paper argues cynicism toward elected officials colors how individuals in the mass public interpret information about political scandals. Specifically, citizens rely on prior levels of cynicism toward elected officials when assessing new information about potential political malfeasance. Drawing on panel data surrounding two prominent political scandals, this paper demonstrates prior levels of cynicism shape individuals’ interpretations of information about scandals, but cynicism does not affect the amount of attention individuals pay to scandals. Ultimately, the results shed light on individual-level variation in response to scandals, and suggest expressed cynicism toward politicians is a politically consequential individual-level attitude that affects whether or not political leaders can survive ethical transgressions.
Personality and Political Participation: The Mediation Hypothesis
Aina Gallego and Daniel Oberski
Recent analyses have demonstrated that personality affects political behavior. According to the mediation hypothesis, the effect of personality on political participation is mediated by classical predictors, such as political interest, internal efficacy, political discussion, or the sense that voting is a civic duty. This paper outlines various paths that link personality traits to two participatory activities: voter turnout in European Parliament elections and participation in protest actions. The hypotheses are tested with data from a large, nationally representative, face-to-face survey of the Spanish population conducted before and after the 2009 European Parliament elections using log-linear path models that are well suited to study indirect relationships. The results clearly confirm that the effects of personality traits on voter turnout and protest participation are sizeable but indirect. They are mediated by attitudinal predictors.
Justifying Party Identification: A Case of Identifying with the “Lesser of Two Evils”
Eric Groenendyk
Despite the centrality of party identification to our understanding of political behavior, there remains remarkable disagreement regarding its nature and measurement. Most scholars agree that party identities are quite stable relative to attitudes. But do partisans defend their identities, or does this stability result from Bayesian learning? I hypothesize that partisans defend their identities by generating “lesser of two evils” justifications. In other words, partisan identity justification occurs in multidimensional attitude space. This also helps to explain the weak relationship between attitudes toward the two parties observed by proponents of multidimensional partisanship. I test this hypothesis in an experiment designed to evoke inconsistency between one’s party identity and political attitudes. To establish generalizability, I then replicate these results through aggregate level analysis of data from the ANES.
staff
Ed Kilgore cautions in his post below that it’s a little early to interpret the lovely special election in NY as a harbinger of the future. And the same is probably true for current polling trends elsewhere. But the deck is so stacked against Dems in Florida, that we must flag this encouraging Quinnipiac University survey conducted 5/17-23, as reported by CNN’s political unit:
Nearly six in ten Floridians are giving a thumbs down to the job their new governor is doing, according to a new poll.
A Quinnipiac University survey released Wednesday indicates that 57 percent of Florida voters disapprove of how Republican Gov. Rick Scott is handling his duties, up nine points from early April. Twenty-nine percent of people questioned in the poll say they approve of how Scott’s performing in office, down six points over the past month.
The survey also indicates that 56 percent disapprove of the job the Republican controlled legislature is doing and a majority think the state’s new budget is unfair.
Even better, Independents’ disapproval of Scott hit 57 percent, with only 28 percent approving. Florida being the largest swing state and all, sunshine state Dems should hoist a Guinness, toast their prospects — and then get seriously to work.
‘Birtherism’ is on the decline following the release of the President’s long form birth certificate. But it is nonetheless instructive to consider how the meme was accepted by so many conservatives. Alan I Abramowitz has what is likely be the definitive data-driven post on the subject up at Larry J. Sabato’s Crystal Ball. Abramowitz weighs the data regarding the influence of partisanship, ideology and race on formation of the birther meme:
Until now, debates about the influence of racial attitudes on opinions of Obama have been severely hampered by a lack of survey data including relevant questions. However, the availability of a new data set now makes it possible to directly examine the impact of racial attitudes on whites’ evaluations of President Obama.
The data used in this article come from the October 2010 wave of the American National Election Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey (EGSS). The October 2010 survey was the first of several cross-sectional studies being conducted by ANES in 2010, 2011 and 2012 to test new instrumentation and measure public opinion between the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. The surveys are being conducted entirely on the Internet using nationally representative probability samples. Respondents are members of the Knowledge Networks KnowledgePanel, an omnibus panel of respondents recruited using telephone and address-based sampling methods who are provided free Internet access and equipment when necessary.
Evaluations of President Obama were measured by two questions, a five-point scale measuring positive versus negative feelings about the president and a seven-point scale measuring how strongly respondents liked or disliked him. The correlation between these two questions was a very strong .85, so I combined them into a single Obama rating scale with a range from 0 (extremely negative) to 10 (extremely positive). The mean score on this scale was 5.1 with a standard deviation of 3.6. About a third (34%) of respondents gave Obama a rating of 8 through 10 while 31% gave him a rating of 0 through 2. Thus, opinions of Obama were closely divided and highly polarized.
Abramowitz also notes that “Obama’s approval rating averaged 38% for whites compared with 59% for nonwhites including 85% for African Americans.” Turning to the question of ‘birther’ attitudes, Abramowitz examines the data and adds,
…Racial resentment had a strong impact on beliefs about his place of birth. While recent polling indicates that doubts about whether President Obama was born in the United States have diminished since he released his “long form” Hawaiian birth certificate, the “birther” myth has proven stubbornly resistant to evidence. In fact, 58% of white respondents in the EGSS expressed some doubt about whether Barack Obama was born in the United States including 28% who thought that he definitely or probably was not born in the United States.
Abramowitz concludes that “partisanship and ideology were the strongest predictors of overall evaluations of President Obama and opinions about his place of birth among white Americans” and that “regardless of party or ideology, whites who scored high on racial resentment had more negative opinions of Obama and were more likely to harbor doubts about whether he was born in the United States than whites who scored low on racial resentment.”
Given the tenacity of racial bias among a substantial segment of the public, President Obama’s approval ratings are all the more impressive, as is his ability to calmly navigate around the treacherous shoals of race in America.
The following article by political strategist Robert Creamer, author of “Stand Up Straight: How Progressives Can Win,” is cross-posted from HuffPo.
The ongoing battle over the federal budget and the role of government in America has certainly clarified the fundamental difference in the visions of the Republican and Democratic Parties — and the progressive and conservative forces within American society.
At the same time, however, the budget battle has also opened up two gaping rifts within the Republican Party itself. The first threatens to do massive damage to the GOP’s election chances in 2012. The second may cause the collapse of its 2011 legislative agenda.
First is the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the “Tea Party” class of GOP “young turks” — who want to go for broke to destroy the New Deal and impose their social agenda — and those elements of the Party whose highest concern is winning general elections.
More “moderate” Republicans like Olympia Snowe and Dick Lugar are terrified of being defeated in primaries by Tea Party insurgents who are eager to take advantage of any deviation from ultra-right orthodoxy. But they know very well that purist right wing positions like ending Medicare and privatizing Social Security are the kiss of death in general elections.
Last week, Newt Gingrich became the poster boy for the corrosive effect of this conflict, as the nation watched him pleading for forgiveness from the right for his characterization of Paul Ryan’s Republican budget as “extremist right wing social engineering.” Even though Gingrich himself remains a hard core right wing ideologue, he has had an experience many of the Tea Party newcomers have not: he knows what it’s like to lose.
Gingrich is smart enough to know that it’s one thing to prevent people from achieving their aspirations — it’s quite another to take something away that they already have — that they’ve already paid for — like Medicare and Social Security. He can read the polls that show almost 80% of the electorate wants Congress to keep its hands off Medicare and Social Security. And almost as many oppose cutting or restructuring Medicaid. Remember that Medicaid not only provides health care for the working poor, and children, but also provides nursing home care — and home care that lets seniors and the disabled stay in their own homes instead of institutions.
Of course it’s not just Gingrich that is caught in the vise between primaries dominated by well-organized right wing ideologues and a general electorate that has no use for candidates who want to abolish Medicare or defund Planned Parenthood. The entire Republican presidential field will have to cope with this virtually unsolvable conundrum every day during the upcoming primary season.
The same difficulty faces GOP Senate challengers and House incumbents. Sixty one D battles for House seats will be fought in districts won by Barack Obama in 2008 — and fourteen were won by Obama in 2008 and John Kerry in 2004. In the 2010 elections, seniors voted Republican by 21%. Now that the Republican leadership and Ryan’s “young guns” have rounded up all but four members of the GOP House caucus and got them — incredibly — to cast a public vote to abolish Medicare — don’t expect seniors to flock to their cause again in 2012.
And in case the Republicans didn’t notice, it’s not just seniors who strongly oppose abolishing Medicare. All of those 45- to 50-year-olds who would be most directly affected and have paid their Medicare taxes all of these years aren’t too happy either.
Before this year is done, many Republican office holders and candidates will feel as though they’re on a political rack. On the one side they will find themselves and their colleagues pilloried at town meetings for voting to abolish Medicare. On the other, they will watch those who are bold enough to distance themselves from the Republican budget “Koolaid,” smacked back into line by Tea Party zealots.
This of course will be great news for Democrats in 2012. Many Republicans are taking the path of the least short-term pain in order to avoid humiliation in a primary. They are refusing to distance themselves from Ryan’s politically radioactive proposals. And of course candidates like Gingrich who try to head for a radioactive free zone — and then have to reverse themselves — look as though they have cast their principles to the winds. In politics, appearing to flip flop — to have no core commitment to values — is often the most toxic quality of all. Remember, Republicans beat John Kerry by — erroneously — convincing many swing voters that he was a “flip flopper.”
Already we’ve seen the power of the Medicare issue to drive swing seniors into the Democratic column. In the Special election for heavily Republican New York’s 26th Congressional District, Democrat Kathy Huchel has actually surged ahead of Republican Jane Corwin in last-minute polling — mainly on the strength of the Medicare issue.
But the Medicare issue doesn’t just move swing seniors. The Republican Budget — coupled with President Obama’s response — has drawn clear lines between the Democratic and Republican visions for our society. That clear distinction has already reinvigorated the Democratic Party base and will serve to rally Democratic turnout in 2012.
Paul Ryan has given Democrats the gift that will keep on giving right through November, 2012.
But the second great conflict in the Republican Party will have an impact in just a few months. That’s the conflict between the real base of the GOP — Wall Street and America’s corporate elite — and the Tea Party bomb throwers who are willing to risk allowing America to default on its debts to advance their ideological goals.
Now don’t get me wrong — much of the Wall Street/corporate CEO crowd would love to abolish Medicare and force draconian cuts in the Federal budget so they could have yet another round of tax cuts and free themselves of “meddlesome” government “regulation.” They would love to be freed to devise exotic trading schemes, sell worthless mortgage securities, decertify unions and slash middle class salaries, defund public education and all of the rest.
But they’re not interested in risking the collapse of the economy, and the markets to get it. They are smart enough to prefer the billions they have in their hot hands, to the risk that their portfolios will plummet in value once again as they did in 2008. And that is exactly what might happen if their erstwhile Tea Party allies force House Speaker John Boehner to play chicken with the nation’s debt limit in order to pressure the Democrats to scrap big portions of the New Deal.
Wall Street is terrified by guys like Illinois’ Republican Congressman Joe Walsh who said that default wouldn’t be so bad — that we should be thinking “outside of the box.” Or Congressman Devin Nunes who thinks that a default would benefit America by forcing politicians to go through a “period of crisis”. These “default deniers” just scare the bejezus out of the investor/CEO class.
But Boehner has a whole flock of these folks in his caucus, and before the default battle is over he may look like a pancake — squeezed by Wall Street on the one side, and by his Tea Party crew on the other.
It is likely that whatever deal to avoid default ultimately emerges from the Biden talks, will ultimately pass with more Democratic than Republicans votes in both houses. That means that the deal cannot contain poison pill proposals that are completely unacceptable to most mainstream Democrats. But that, in turn, may very well be unacceptable to the right-wing ideologues who see the debt-ceiling vote as their one chance to make big changes in the federal budget.
If Boehner allows a vote on such a proposal — and it does indeed pass with more Democrats than Republicans — he is afraid there may be a mutiny and he may no longer swing the big House gavel when the smoke clears.
This kind of division massively weakens the Republican’s bargaining position. As the prospect of default barrels toward us, looming larger and larger in the weeks ahead, the pressure from the Wall Street/CEO gang will grown unbearable.
The fact of the matter is that the Party’s big dogs will not allow Boehner to pull the plug on the grenade that sends the economy back into a major recession and causes markets to plummet. And of course, if they did, the political consequences for the GOP in 2012 would be catastrophic.
Had the Republicans simply continued to scream about deficits (as hypocritical as that may seem) they would have had a much stronger hand. Instead they handed Democrats a politically iconic example of exactly what the world would be like if they had their way — abolishing Medicare.
Now the Party’s candidates and its legislative leadership are divided, confused and in disarray.
In this situation, Democrats and Progressives need to remember one important axiom: when you’ve got them on the run, that’s the time to chase them.
In his latest ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’ at the Center for American Progress web pages, TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira reports on the good news for Dems regarding Ohio voter attitudes towards the GOP’s legislation stripping public worker collective bargaining rights:
A new Quinnipiac University poll of Ohio registered voters documents this opposition. According to the poll, Ohio voters oppose limiting collective bargaining rights for public employees (51-38), do not believe limiting collective bargaining for public employees is necessary to balance the state budget (52-38), oppose banning public employee strikes (58-35), and oppose banning public employee bargaining over health insurance plans (54-38).
And it’s not just about attitudes. Ohio voters are ready for action, reports Teixeira: “Ohio voters also favor repealing the whole law through a referendum (54-36)…Conservatives should get it through their heads that voters don’t support taking rights away from workers, whether they’re in the public or private sectors.”
Democratic strategist Donna Brazile’s USA Today article “GOP’s 2012 Game Plan Is to Keep Voters Home” merits a read from Democratic leaders, campaign workers and, come to think of it, rank and file voters who don’t want to find themselves disenfranchised on election day. Here’s an excerpt:
…From coast to coast, the GOP is engaged in what appears to be a coordinated, expensive effort to block voters from the polls….The motivation is political — a cynical effort to restrict voting by traditionally Democratic-leaning Americans. In more than 30 states, GOP legislators are on the move, from a sweeping rewrite of Florida’s election laws to new rules for photo identification in Ohio, Wisconsin, North Carolina and more than 20 other states.
As a result, 11% of Americans –21 million citizens of voting age who lack proper photo identification — could be turned away on Election Day. And these people tend to be most highly concentrated among people of color, the poor, the young and the old.
Brazile details some the obstructions being thrown up by Republican-controlled legislatures across the nation, including restricting early voting, fines for voter registration drives and dubious photo i.d. requirements. “What the GOP is attempting to do,” concludes Brazile,” is change the rules of the game, leaving only their players on the field.”
Republicans have engaged in ‘ballot security’ campaigns and other voter suppression activities for decades. But it appears that the effort is now more widespread and deeply-entrenched than ever. Brazile’s warning should be heard and heeded by Democratic organizers, coast to coast.
TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira’s latest Public Opinion Snapshot reports on yet another poll indicating strong public distaste for GOP tax policy and budget cuts. As Teixeira says, “From town meetings with constituents to surveys of public opinion, the public is speaking up loudly to oppose cuts in Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security and to support taxing the rich.” Teixeira adds:
The latest evidence comes from an early May Quinnipiac University poll. In that poll, 72 percent of the public opposed cutting Social Security to reduce the budget deficit, 70 percent opposed cutting Medicare, and 57 percent opposed cutting Medicaid, even after being told that 60 percent of the federal budget comes from defense, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.
The poll is equally-clear about the kind of taxes they support, explains Teixeira: “On the other hand, the public does support–by an overwhelming 69-28 margin–taxing the rich to reduce the budget deficit.”
Could it be any clearer? The public strongly opposes conservative tax and budget policies — and that’s good news for Dems.
by Drew Lieberman and Andrew Baumann, Senior Associates Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research
With gas prices hovering around $4 a gallon, the big oil companies and their Republican defenders in Congress have reason to be nervous. As big oil fights to cling to the nearly $5 billion in taxpayer-funded subsidies they receive each year, the American electorate has had enough. Our recent survey (see note 1) shows that American voters:
Lay the blame for high gas prices squarely at the feet of Big Oil. A 52 percent outright majority say the oil companies are most to blame for the recent increase in gas prices, a finding confirmed by a recent CNN/Opinion Research survey (see note 2) that shows 61 percent of American adults say the oil companies deserve a great deal of blame for the recent increase in gas prices, the highest percentage of any entity tested.
Strongly support ending oil company subsidies. The CNN/Opinion Research poll shows 77 percent believe the oil companies as a whole are making too much profit, three and half times the 22 percent who say they are making a reasonable profit. By a 73 to 20 percent margin in our survey, voters favor eliminating the $5 billion in subsidies and tax loopholes for oil companies each year, with 57 percent strongly favoring this proposal, the highest level of strong support among any proposal to lower gas prices.
Do not buy the oil companies’ defensive claims that ending their tax breaks will cause more hardship at the pump. While Congressional Republicans continue to defend Big Oil, voters reject the premise that ending the subsidies will cause gas prices to go up. Sixty-nine percent believe “we should end the billions in government subsidies for oil companies because we shouldn’t use taxpayer money to give handouts to oil companies already making huge profits,” while just 22 percent agree with the statement “we should keep tax breaks for oil companies because if we raise taxes on American energy producers that would just cause gas prices to increase further, hurting regular Americans.”
Note 1. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research conducted a national survey of 1,000 likely 2012 voters (833 landline, 167 cell) between March 16 and 20, 2011. The margin of error for the survey (overall) at the 95 percent confidence interval is approximately ± 3.1 percentage points.
Note 2. Interviews with 1,034 adult Americans conducted by telephone by Opinion Research Corporation on April 29-May 1, 2011. The margin of sampling error for results based on the total sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points.
Chuck Todd, Mark Murray, Domenico Montanaro, and Ali Weinberg have an interesting post up at MSNBC’s First Read. They report on a new survey pollster Peter Hart calls “fortifying and frightening” for President Obama’s reelection prospects, which should help illuminate his reelection strategy.
The good news for the president and for Dems hoping to ride his coattails:
NBC co-pollster Peter Hart (D) perhaps best sums up our latest NBC survey after bin Laden’s death…The president’s foreign-policy and Afghanistan handlings have hit all-time highs, while his leadership, decision-making, and commander-in-chief ratings have all increased.
…The NBC poll’s table of presidential attributes gives us a good idea on what has changed for Obama since bin Laden’s death and what hasn’t. The biggest increases: being firm and decisive (an 11-point jump from last December), having the ability to handle a crisis (11 points), being a good commander-in-chief (10 points), and uniting the country (10 points).
…Among suburban women — always a key demographic group — 55% now approve of the president’s job, and 50% say they will probably vote for him in 2012.
The not so good numbers address, as the authors note “His economic handling — attributed largely to the high gas prices — has reached an all-time low….a reminder of just how potent the issue of gas prices are right now.”
Overall, however, President Obama’s prospects are modestly encouraging, according to the poll.
…Obama’s job approval stands at 52% (a three-point increase from April) and his generic re-elect stands at 45% (up two points from last month; more interestingly, though, the “definite” vote for the Republican went DOWN eight points). As co-pollster Bill McInturff adds, these numbers underscore the “tremendous anchor the economy is to the president’s job standing.” Bottom line: The president acquired SOME political capital, but not as much as history suggests…
The post notes that Obama has 43 percent approval with ‘Independents,’ and the authors cite Hart’s belief that weak support among Indies is a serious problem for Obama. But nowadays it’s more of a catch-all category composed of disparate voters across the political spectrum. It’s all but impossible to formulate a unified strategy targeting ‘Independent’ voters. Still, it’s a number Obama wants to see increase between now and November 2012, perhaps by targeting segments of the category (e.g. youth, environmentalists, self-employed).
Of course the hope is that Obama’s high marks for strong leadership in the wake of the bin Laden raid will become generalized and supported by improving economic statistics. Polls can be helpful in formulating strategy at particular political junctures, but the numbers the President — and Dems — most want to see as 2012 approaches are declining gas prices and a lower unemployment rate.
In his current ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’ at the Center for American Progress Web Pages, TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira reports on The Pew Research Center study, “Beyond Red vs. Blue: The Political Typology.” Teixeira finds significant common ground on two key issues in particular among Americans of varying self-described political beliefs. Teixeira explains that the study,
…segments the public into nine groups: eight politically active groups and one inactive group (bystanders) composed entirely of nonvoters. Of the eight active groups, two are described as “mostly Republican” (staunch conservatives and Main Street Republicans), three as “mostly Democratic” (new coalition Democrats, hard-pressed Democrats, and solid liberals), and three as “mostly independent” (libertarians, disaffecteds, and postmoderns). In reality, however, postmoderns lean strongly Democratic, while libertarians and disaffecteds lean strongly Republican. So there are really four active Democratic and four active Republican groups.
With respect to alternative energy, Teixeira find broad support:
…Overall, the public prioritizes developing alternative energy over expanding oil, coal, and natural gas by a 63-29 margin. And, as shown in the chart below, seven of Pew’s eight active typology groups support this position, including a whopping 40-point margin among the Main Street Republican group. Only the staunch conservatives (9 percent of the public) dissent from the rest.
On providing a apth to citizenship for illegal immigrants, Teixeira cites even braoder agreement among the public:
Similarly, the public as a whole supports a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants currently in the United States by 72-24. And again, seven of eight active typology groups endorse this position, including Main Street Republicans by 19 points, libertarians by 34 points, and disaffecteds by 36 points. Only the staunch conservatives dissent, and even here there are as many supporting as opposing the position (49-49).
Despite the vociferous objections of far-right ideologues, it appears that providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants and developing alternative energy are two progressive ideas that win support across the political spectrum.
Latest Research from:
tds-wwc-roundtable
