In 2000, Bush lost the popular vote by about half a million votes. In 2004, Bush won the popular vote by 3.5 million votes. That’s a shift in Bush’s direction of 4 million net votes.
Where did this shift in margin–these 4 million votes–come from?
It is possible to answer this question by comparing Bush’s margin in individual states in 2000 with his margins in those same states in this election. This analysis shows the following:
1. About half of Bush’s gains came from the solid red states–those states that gave Bush a margin of 6 or more points in 2000. And about half of these gains in the solid red states (a quarter of Bush’s total gains) came in just four specific states: Texas, Oklahoma, Alabama and Georgia.
2. About a third of Bush’s gains came from the solid blue states–those states Gore carried by 6 points or more in 2000. (In these states, Bush gained by reducing his deficits relative to 2000). And about three-quarters of Bush’s gains in these solid blue states came from just three states: New York, New Jersey and California.
3. About a fifth of Bush’s gains came from the “purple states”–those states that were decided in 2000 by less than 6 points (which includes almost all of the 2004 swing states). And almost all of Bush’s gains in this group of states come from just two states: Florida and Tennessee.
Coming soon: analysis of the county-level vote.

By Alan Abramowitz
An analysis of the results of last week’s election indicates that the presence of gay marriage referenda on the ballot had no effect on the outcome of the presidential election at the state level.
There was a very strong correlation between President Bush’s share of the vote in 2000 and his share of the vote in 2004 across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The president consistently ran a few percentage points ahead of his showing in 2000, but he did not improve on his 2000 performance any more in states with gay marriage referenda than in other states. In 11 states with gay marriage referenda on the ballot, the president increased his share of the vote from an average of 55.4 percent in 2000 to an average of 58.0 percent in 2004–an improvement of 2.6 percentage points. However, in the rest of the country the president increased his share of the vote from an average of 48.1 percent in 2000 to an average of 51.0 percent in 2004–an improvement of 2.9 percentage points.

Political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson have an excellent article, “Popular Fiction” on The New Republic website today demolishing the absurd claim that Bush’s narrow election victory constitutes some sort of mandate for his conservative economic and social policies.
Here are some excerpts from the article:

No sooner had the red and blue ink dried on the maps of election commentators than triumphant Republicans began talking about their clear mandate for an ambitious domestic agenda. The people have spoken, Republicans proclaimed, and what they have said is that they favor the conservative agenda on taxes, Social Security, health care, gay marriage, and abortion. The administration, their humble servant, has a solemn duty to execute their wishes. And so President Bush has promised to move forward with ambitious but still only vaguely outlined plans for Social Security privatization, tax simplification, and restrictions on lawsuits. “I have political capital and I intend to spend it,” he declared.
….Although many pundits are saying that Bush trounced Kerry, the election was in fact exceedingly close by historical standards. In October, the American Political Science Association released the predictions of seven leading models of presidential elections. As an incumbent president running at a time of decent economic growth, Bush’s average predicted vote was around 54 percent, meaning he significantly underperformed historical expectations.
….[E]verything we know about American opinion suggests that Bush is out of step with the public on all the issues he is now putting at the top of his “to do” list. During the election campaign, polls found that most Americans continue to be highly skeptical of the Republican tax-cut agenda and convinced that they have not benefited from it. In the final debate, Bush had to resort to the fudge of pointing out that the majority of his tax cuts went to “low- and middle-income Americans”–and while they did, the majority of benefits from his tax cuts did not.
….Against the backdrop of September 11, the Republican strategy worked well enough to gain a narrow victory. Yet winning narrowly on a campaign of mud and fear, and a strategy of hard-nosed partisan gerrymandering, does not a popular mandate for the conservative policy agenda make. Republicans like to compare the current president with Ronald Reagan. But in 1980, Reagan made clearly specified tax cuts the centerpiece of his campaign. And when he won a decisive victory, he could credibly claim a mandate to implement his pledge. That is simply not the case today.

I recommend you read the whole thing. You’ll be glad you did.

By Alan Abramowitz
There has been considerable speculation since last Tuesday that President Bush’s victory in the presidential election was largely due to improved turnout and support for the president among strongly religious voters. This speculation has been reinforced by the finding in the national exit polls that 22 percent of voters cited “moral values” as the most important issue in the election and the adoption by overwhelming margins of constitutional amendments banning gay marriage in 11 states. But the evidence from the 2000 and 2004 national exit polls does not support this theory. First, there was almost no difference in reported frequency of church attendance between the voters in 2000 and the voters in 2004. Among voters in the 2000 election, 14 percent reported attending church services more than weekly, 28 percent reported attending every week, 14 percent reported attending a few times a month, 28 percent reported attending a few times a year, and 14 percent reported never attending services. Among voters in the 2004 election, 16 percent reported attending services more than weekly, 26 percent reported attending every week, 14 percent reported attending a few times a month, 28 percent reported attending a few times a year, and 15 percent reported never attending services. While the percentage attending more than weekly rose by 2 points, the percentage attending every week dropped by 2 points and the percentage never attending rose by 1 point.
More importantly, between 2000 and 2004, President Bush’s largest gains occurred among less religious voters, not among more religious voters. Among those attending services more than weekly and those attending every week, support for Bush rose by 1 percent, from 63 percent in 2000 to 64 percent in 2004. However, among those attending services a few times a month, support for Bush rose by 4 points, from 46 percent to 50 percent, among those attending only a few times a year, support for Bush rose by 3 points, from 42 percent to 45 percent, and among those never attending services, support for Bush rose by 4 points, from 32 percent to 36 percent.
Bottom line: the President made gains across the board among voters, regardless of their degree of religious commitment but he made his largest gains among less religious voters.

By Alan Abramowitz
For the past two days The New York Times, among other publications, has been reporting that this year’s voter turnout was higher than in any presidential election since 1968 and may even have exceeded the turnout in that election. Citing figures provided by Curtis Gans of the Center for the Study of the American Electorate, the Times reported that 59.5 percent of the voting age population turned out this year. This would be a truly remarkable achievement, if it were true. Unfortunately, it isn’t. According to an October 24, 2004 press release from the U.S. Census Bureau, the current estimate of the voting age population of the United States is 217.8 million. Thus far, approximately 116 million votes have been tallied in the 2004 presidential election. That amounts to 53.3 percent of the current U.S. voting age population. In addition, an unknown number of late absentee and provisional ballots have not yet been counted. According to Mr. Gans, these could bring the final total of votes close to 120 million, although that seems overly optimistic.
Even if we accept this figure, however, that would only amount to 55 percent of the voting age population, not close to the level of turnout in the 1968 presidential election. Moreover, there are several reasons why it is highly unlikely that voter turnout in the United States will match the turnout levels of the 1960s any time in the near future. First, we have added 18-20 year-olds to the electorate and, even with an increase in turnout this year, the rate of turnout of this age group is far lower than that of those 21 and older. Second, the U.S. population today includes a much larger proportion of non-citizens who are ineligble to vote. During the 1960s, only about 2 percent of the voting age population consisted of non-citizens. Today, that figure is approximately 9 percent. When 2004 turnout is calculated as a proportion of the voting age citizen population, in fact, it was somewhere between 58 and 60 percent. But that is not what the Times and other media outlets have been reporting. The level of voter turnout in the 2004 election was very impressive compared with that of recent presidential elections, but as a proportion of the voting age population it was not nearly as high as that of the 1960s.

I collaborated on an article with John Judis and Marisa Katz, “30 Years War: How Bush Went Back to the 1970s“, which has just appeared in The New Republic. Here are some excerpt from the article, but I think you’ll be interested in reading the whole thing.

George W. Bush’s victory shows that the political strategy that conservative Republicans developed in the late 1970s is still viable. Bush won a large swath of states and voters that were once dependably Democratic by identifying Republicans as the party of social conservatism and national security. Massachusetts Senator John Kerry rallied a powerful coalition of minorities and college-educated professionals based in postindustrial metropolitan areas like Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles. In the future, this coalition may triumph on its own. But, in this election, Democratic successes in the Northeast, upper Midwest, and West could not make up for Republican successes in the South, the border states, the Southwest, and the Great Plains. Fittingly, the election was decided in Ohio–a state that combines the metropolitan North and the small-town South.
…Bush recreated the Reagan-era coalition by combining Brooks Brothers and Wal-Mart, the upper class and the lower middle class. He won wealthy voters–those who make over $200,000–by 63 to 35 percent. But he also won voters who had not completed college by 53 to 47 percent. If minorities, who voted predominately for Kerry, are excluded, Bush’s margin among working voters was even higher. He reached these voters, who made up the bulk of his support, through opposition to gay marriage and abortion and through patriotic appeal as the commander-in-chief in a war against terrorism that seamlessly unites Osama bin Laden with Saddam Hussein. According to the Los Angeles Times, Bush’s voters accorded the most importance to “moral/ethical values” and “terrorism/homeland security” in deciding their vote.
Kerry’s Democratic coalition, by contrast, was composed of low-income minorities and upscale, college-educated professionals–two groups that, not coincidentally, were the least likely to accept the president’s contention that the Iraq war was part of the war on terrorism. In national exit polls, Kerry got about 70 percent of the nonwhite vote. He tied Bush among voters with college degrees and bested him by 55 to 44 percent among voters who had engaged in postgraduate study. Kerry’s voters, as one might expect, cared most about jobs and the war in Iraq. Luckily for Bush, however, voters without degrees still outnumber those with them. In Colorado, Kerry won voters with college degrees by 50 to 48 percent and those with postgraduate study by 55 to 43 percent. But Bush, by winning voters without degrees by 58 to 41 percent, was able to carry the state fairly easily.
….Kerry won not just big cities, but most of the large metropolitan areas dominated by professionals and immigrants. Kerry did very well in the West, Northeast, and parts of the Midwest because of the growth of high-tech metro areas. Oregon, Washington, Minnesota, and New Hampshire are now solidly in the Democratic fold. Illinois, New York, and California have become as thoroughly Democratic as Massachusetts. But, outside these states, Kerry’s support among urban voters failed to carry the day. In North Carolina, Kerry actually did better than Al Gore in the state’s key metro areas–Gore lost Charlotte’s Mecklenburg County in 2000, but Kerry won it 52 to 48 percent. Nevertheless, Bush again won the state by about 13 percent, because he slaughtered Kerry outside Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham, winning 64 percent in the Greensboro area, 60 percent in the rural, small-town east, and 59 percent in the mountain west.
…Bush was also fortunate in his opponent. John Kerry was an able debater, and his experience in Vietnam and on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee partially neutralized arguments that would have been made against other Democrats like former Vermont Governor Howard Dean. But Kerry, an aloof New Englander, operated at a distinct disadvantage among white, working-class voters. Unlike Bill Clinton, he had trouble convincing voters that he “felt their pain.” In interviews conducted on the eve of the election, we asked white, working-class Bush supporters in Martinsburg, West Virginia, what they thought of Clinton. Even those who praised Bush for his “family values” said they had voted for Clinton and thought he was an “excellent president.” But it wasn’t Clinton’s politics they preferred; it was Clinton himself, despite the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Gore had exactly the same problem with these voters in 2000. The Democrats need to find a candidate that can talk to both PhDs and tractor-trailer drivers.
If they do this, the Democrats will be able to win presidential elections. Kerry, after all, came very close to winning this time despite his inadequacy as a candidate. Democrats showed that they can hold their own in states like Colorado (where Democrat Ken Salazar was elected to the Senate), Arizona, Nevada, and Virginia. In many of these states, demography is on the Democrats’ side. Colorado is going to become more like California and less like Utah or Montana, and Virginia is going to become more like New Jersey and less like South Carolina. The future of Ohio is Franklin County, not Butler County. Democrats also showed that they can compete in raising money without relying on corporate contributions and that the Internet is an important vehicle for organizing.

By Alan Abramowitz
Democrats can’t win by mobilizing the base alone–they need a candidate and a message with broader, at least slightly broader, appeal. Still, Kerry did not do badly for a Massachusetts liberal. This was no 1984 or even 1988. Only a 3 point margin in the popular vote and with another 150,000 votes in Ohio, Kerry would have won the electoral vote. (That’s kind of a scary thought though. The electoral college could really misfire pretty badly, much worse than in 2000, and in either direction.)
2008 really should be a better chance for Dems to win the White House if we have a strong candidate and a strong message. Here’s why–the time for change factor kicks in for us. And it’s pretty big. Since WW II there have been 7 presidential elections in which a party had held the White House for just one term. The incumbent party’s candidate won 6 out of 7 (only Carter lost) with an average popular vote margin of 11.6 percent. There have been 8 elections in which a party had held the White House for two terms or more. The incumbent party’s candidate won only 2 and lost 6 with an average popular vote margin of -0.9 percent. This pattern goes all the way back to the beginning of the 20th century and the “time for change” factor has a significant effect on the outcomes of presidential elections even when you control for the incumbent president’s popularity and the state of the economy–there is about a 5 point penalty if you’ve held the White House for 8 years or longer. Add that 5 points to Kerry’s 2004 total, and you win easily.

Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution participated in an online chat on The Washington Post website yesterday, where he answered questions about Tuesday’s election results–many of them on the minds, I would imagine, of those who visit this site. All Mann’s answers are lucid and perceptive; I strongly recommend you checkout the transcript of his chat as an aid to your reflections on the election.

By Alan Abramowitz
The exit polls missed the mark very badly last night (before they were reweighted to correspond to the actual results). The national exit poll consistently showed Kerry leading by 3 points–just the reverse of the actual vote. The Ohio exit poll had Kerry up by 4 and the Florida exit poll had it tied.
What happened? Some combination of bad precinct samples, resopnse bias, or failing to accurately account for early and absentee votes must have been at work. Whatever it was, it was a major problem. In 2000, the national exit poll also overestimated Gore’s vote, but not by nearly as big a margin.
Why did Kerry lose the popular vote? Basically this was a rerun of 2000. Almost every state, and every big state, went the same way it did in 2000. It looks like the only switches were New Hampshire for Kerry and probably Iowa and New Mexico for Bush, although those are not certain (and, in fact, New Hampshire is also extremely close). But Kerry got killed in the South and that appears to have also dragged down several Democratic Senate candidates.
I think that Democrats need to think very hard about the lessons of this election, regardless of what happens in Ohio with the provisional ballots. We lost the popular vote and probably the election to a Republican incumbent with a horrible record. It is going to be very difficult to win a presidential election unless the Democratic candidate can do significantly better in the southern and border states. More thoughts to come later.

The exit poll results, both national and state, cited in my previous post have now been substantially revised and do not look particularly favorable to Kerry. While some of the patterns discussed previously remain, others have changed fairly dramatically. Much more discussion to follow, of course, but way too tired to pursue it now.