Until recently, Democrats’ biggest concern about the 2024 youth vote was that millennial and Gen-Z voters were so disappointed with our octogenarian president that they might not turn out in great enough numbers to reelect Joe Biden. Young voters were, after all, the largest and most rapidly growing segment of the Democratic base in the last election. But now public-opinion surveys are beginning to unveil a far more terrifying possibility: Donald Trump could carry the youth vote next year. And even if that threat is exaggerated or reversible, it’s increasingly clear that “the kids” may be swing voters, not unenthusiastic Democratic base voters who can be frightened into turning out by the prospect of Trump’s return.
NBC News reports it’s a polling trend that cannot be ignored or dismissed:
“The latest national NBC News poll finds President Joe Biden trailing former President Donald Trump among young voters ages 18 to 34 — with Trump getting support from 46% of these young voters and Biden getting 42%. …
“CNN’s recent national poll had Trump ahead of Biden by 1 point among voters ages 18 to 34.
“Quinnipiac University had Biden ahead by 9 points in that subgroup.
“The national Fox News poll had Biden up 7 points among that age group.
“And the recent New York Times/Siena College battleground state polling had Biden ahead by just 1 point among voters ages 18 to 34.”
According to Pew’s validated voters analysis (which is a lot more precise than exit polls), Biden won under-30 voters by a 59 percent to 35 percent margin in 2020. Biden actually won the next age cohort, voters 30 to 49 years old, by a 55 percent to 43 percent margin. In 2016, Pew reports, Hillary Clinton won under-30 voters by a 58 percent to 28 percent margin, and voters 30 to 44 by 51 percent to 40 percent.
So one baby-boomer Democrat and one silent-generation Democrat kicked Trump’s butt among younger voters, despite the fact that both of them had their butts kicked among younger primary voters by Bernie Sanders. It’s these sort of numbers that led to a lot of optimistic talk about younger-generation voters finally building the durable Democratic majority that had eluded the party for so many years.
What’s gone wrong?
For one thing, it’s important to note that yesterday’s younger voters aren’t today’s, as Nate Silver reminds us:
“Fully a third of voters in the age 18-29 bracket in the 2020 election (everyone aged 26 or older) will have aged out of it by 2024, as will two-thirds of the age 18-to-29 voters from the 2016 election and all of them from 2012. So if you’re inclined to think something like “gee, did all those young voters who backed the Obama-Biden ticket in 2012 really turn on Biden now?”, stop doing that. Those voters are now in the 30-to-41 age bracket instead.”
But even within relatively recent groups of young voters, there are plenty of micro- and macro-level explanations available for changing allegiances. Young voters share the national unhappiness with the performance of the economy; many are particularly afflicted by high basic-living costs and higher interest rates that make buying a home or even a car unusually difficult. Some of them are angry at Biden for his inability (mostly thanks to the U.S. Supreme Court) to cancel student-loan debts. And most notoriously, young voters are least likely to share Biden’s strong identification with Israel in its ongoing war with Hamas (a new NBC poll shows 70 percent of 18-to-34-year-old voters disapprove of Biden’s handling of the war).
More generally, intergenerational trust issues are inevitably reflected in perceptions of the president who is turning 81 this week, as youth-vote expert John Della Volpe recently explained:
“Today many young people see wars, problems and mistakes originating from the older generations in top positions of power and trickling down to harm those most vulnerable and least equipped to protect themselves. This is the fabric that connects so many young people today, regardless of ideology. This new generation of empowered voters is therefore asking across a host of issues: If not now, then when is the time for a new approach?”
All of these factors help explain why younger voters have soured on Uncle Joe and might be open to independent or minor-party candidates (e.g., Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Cornel West, Jill Stein, or a possible No Labels candidate). But they don’t cast as much light on why these same voters might ultimately cast a ballot for Donald Trump.
Trump is less than four years younger than Biden and is about as un-hip an oldster as one can imagine. He’s responsible for the destruction of federal abortion rights, a deeply unpopular development among youth voters (post-election surveys in 2022 showed abortion was the No. 1 issue among under-30 voters; 72 percent of them favored keeping abortion legal in all or most cases). His reputation for racism, sexism, and xenophobia ought to make him anathema to voters for whom the slogan “Make America Great Again” doesn’t have much personal resonance. And indeed, young voters have some serious issues with the 45th president, even beyond the subject of abortion. In the recent New York Times–Siena battleground state poll that showed Trump and Biden about even among under-30 voters, fully 64 percent of these same voters opposed “making it harder for migrants at the southern border to seek asylum in the United States,” a signature Trump position if ever there was one.
At the same time, under-30 voters in the Times-Siena survey said they trusted Trump more on the Israel-Hamas conflict than Biden by a robust 49 percent to 39 percent margin. The 45th president, needless to say, has never shown any sympathy for the Palestinian plight. And despite the ups and downs in his personal relationship to Bibi Netanyahu, he was as close an ally to Israel’s Likud Party as you could imagine (among other things, Trump reversed a long-standing U.S. position treating Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank as a violation of international law and also moved the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a gesture of great contempt toward Palestinian statehood). His major policy response to the present war has been to propose a revival of the Muslim travel ban the courts prevented him from implementing during his first term.
But perceptions often differ sharply from reality. Sixty-two percent of 18-to-29-year-old and 61 percent of 40-to-44-year-old voters said they trusted Trump more than Biden on the economy in the Times-Siena survey. It’s unclear whether these voters have the sort of hazy positive memories of the economy under Trump that older cohorts seem to be experiencing or if they instead simply find the status quo intolerable.
In any event, the estrangement of young voters provides the most urgent evidence of all that Team Biden and its party need to remind voters aggressively about Trump’s full-spectrum unfitness for another term in the White House. Aside from his deeply reactionary position on abortion and other cultural issues, and his savage attitude toward immigrants, Trump’s economic-policy history shows him prioritizing tax cuts for higher earners and exhibiting hostility to student-loan-debt relief (which he has called “very unfair to the millions and millions of people who paid their debt through hard work and diligence”). Smoking out the 45th president on what “Trumponomics” might mean for young and nonwhite Americans should become at least as central to the Biden reelection strategy as improving the reputation of “Bidenomics.” And without question, Democrats who may be divided on the Israel-Hamas war should stop fighting each other long enough to make it clear that Republicans (including Trump) would lead cheers for the permanent Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank while agitating for war with Iran.
There’s no world in which Donald Trump should be the preferred presidential candidate of young voters. But it will require serious work by Team Biden not only to turn these voters against the embodiment of their worst nightmares but to get them involved in the effort to keep him away from power.
If we are going to compare Bush’s share of the vote between 2000 and 2004 then surely we have make some adjustments for the Nader vote? Bush’s share of the 2-party vote was 49.7% in 2000. His increased share, 2000-04, was therefore about 1.2 – 1.3%. In five of the eleven states where there was a same-sex marriage (and civil union etc) ballot, Bush lost ground and in two further states his gain was less than 1.2%. In the four remaining states, he made gains.
There is, therefore, no pattern here and any discussion must remain purely speculative.
Why do people do *this*? Doe it *make* the word more special? Is it a new writing *convention*?
Inquiring *minds* want to know.
As for the correlation vel non, who knows? Without breaking down each state, comparing a lot of data from this time to last time in the that state, and then applying some sound thinking, it is not possible to KNOW. It’s easy to look at some numbers and speculate.
I’ve looked at stats from both sides now, and like clouds, they can be whatever you see in them.
If the gay issue kept someone from switching from Bush to the Dem, or if the gay issue made someone vote for Bush who otherwise might have stayed at home, how will we know that?
This whole process is a little like losing the World Series in 7 games by one run, and then trying to figure out what went wrong by studying every AT BAT the team had.
Gay marriage referenda were no identical. Some included bans on civil unions (Ohio, for example). The average gain for Bush in referendum states versus non refernedum should, but does not, reflect the difference. Also, is there any way of judging whether the pro rederenda voters were reacting to gay marriage or to the Massachusetts judges?
The title of the article (“Did Gay Marriage Referenda Help Bush Get Re-elected?”) is very clear. The question is whether the *presence of the referenda* on the ballot helped Bush. The article gives pretty strong evidence that Bush did better in states without the gay marriage referenda, in terms of increasing the number of people who voted for him over the number who voted for him in 2000.
It may be true that the gay marriage issue may have mobilized lots of voters, but that is not the question that Abramowitz was looking at. No doubt that war in Iraq also mobilized lots of voters, as did the lose of jobs, etc. etc. Lots of issues helped to get more people out to vote, from all sides. You can’t tell from looking at the number of voters, or even the increase since 2000, why more people showed up to vote.
But, it is significant that the increase was greater in states without gay marriage referenda. The war is an issue for everyone, so is health care, jobs, the environment, etc. etc. And so is the gay marriage issue. But what was not the same for everyone was whether the gay marriage issue was on the ballot!
The question Abramowitz was asking was whether that difference in 11 states attracted more voters to the polls in those states. His evidence is not definitive, but it is certainly suggestive and interesting.
When I was younger and we would lose an election, my head would just about explode. Four years seemed so long until the next presidential election.
By my mid thirties, I had gotten to the point where I realized that coming out of the loss was the best time to mobilize for next time.
In 1984, we took a beating, and not just the presidency, but we started in 1985 with a plan to get Senators elected, and to build a base for a centrist candidate. The DLC was part of that effort, and it served an important role in vetting Clinton, Robb, Gephardt, Gore, and others.
In 1993, after we got the WH, we weren’t ready for the Gingrich shenanigans, we didn’t see their scheme coming, and we got submarined in ’94. We’ve been playing defense since.
We need to steal that page and retake the House. Then we can impeach the lot of them.
I though the argument was that these “wedge” issues helped mobilize voters and get more people out to the polls. Is there any evidence that conservatives in these states voted in any higher numbers than they would have otherwise?
This is getting silly. So why DID people vote for this man? I think we just need to admit the election was stolen since nothing is panning out of all this that makes any sense.
Here’s my problem with a lot of the analysis out there discounting various causes of a Bush win. I’m probably completely wrong and off base but here goes.
The Democrats invested millions in GOTV. Tens of millions. Perhaps hundreds of millions. And, coincidentally perhaps, John Kerry got more votes than Reagan ever did. More than any other Presidential candidate ever had before. Except Bush got even more.
When I see people making percentage comparisons saying that Bush’s margin in a state moved only slightly, that doesn’t say to me, “X didn’t help make Bush the winner.” It says to me, “Damn, the GOP GOTV efforts increased the Bush turnout even more than the Democrats increased theirs – whatever they did WORKED VERY WELL.”
While one single factor such as a specific traditional marriage amendment might be dismissed in a vacuum, fact is that gay marriage and Massachusetts’ stance on it was used to leverage people out of the pews and into the voting booths on November 2.
The GOP turned out 8 million more voters in 2004 than they did in 2000; the Democrats, 4 million. How does the 4 million turnout gap fit into this?
I think that this article clearly says what the task needs to be for the next 2 years. The Democratic party needs to dedicate itself to regaining control of state legislatures AND the US Senate.
On the Minnesota state level this translates into:
First goal, defeat Gov Pawlenty next election. He is beatable. He was not able to deliver MN for Bush. Also he saw significant erosion in the Repub state house caucus in spite of 8 visits to MN by Bush. I think Sen. Dean Johnson has the right combination of skills to pull this off.
Second goal for MN is to work on identifying the weakest Republican Congressman. (Either Kennedy or Gutknecht.) Identifying a strong DFL candidate for each district and start the campaign NOW to unseat one or both of them. I think that Patty Wetterling can beat Kennedy next time. An email campaign to her will probably persuade her to run again.
Third Goal, Regain the state House and maintain control of the State senate in 2006. Redistricting after 2010 is the reason. I think that the DFL should seriously consider proposing a nonpartisan redistricting system similar to Iowa. I think that having truly competitive electoral districts statewide is to our long term benefit. Also the DFL should work for adoption of Instant Runoff Voting for the next election. (Think of Green voters to the left and Independence Party voters to the center). These outlying voters are more likely to second choice the DFL under IRV.
Fourth, Maintain Daytons Senatorial seat in 2006. A strong 2006 gubernatorial candidate will help.
Fifth, identify a strong DFL candidate to run against Coleman in 2008.
Sixth, work on bringing the Independence party voters back towards DFL alignment. The DFL and Independence party voters represent an electoral majority in MN. IRV would help with this process. This has a strong historical parallel to the unification between the Democratic party and the Farm Labor party in the forties. Of course this also means that the DFL is going to have to find a way to declare peace with each other on the hot button social issues such as gay and abortion rights that the republicans used against us this past election. These social issues are election success killers for greater Minnesota DFL candidates.
I think that each of these goals is doable if we remember that our first priority is to win elections.
—– Original Message —–
From: Debra Hogenson
Sent: Saturday, November 06, 2004 11:33 AM
To: 1st CD discussion
Subject: [1CD_DFL_discuss] No Surrender
November 5, 2004
OP-ED COLUMNIST
No Surrender
By PAUL KRUGMAN
President Bush isn’t a conservative. He’s a radical – the leader of a
coalition that deeply dislikes America as it is. Part of that coalition
wants to tear down the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt, eviscerating Social
Security and, eventually, Medicare. Another part wants to break down the
barriers between church and state. And thanks to a heavy turnout by
evangelical Christians, Mr. Bush has four more years to advance that
radical agenda.
Democrats are now, understandably, engaged in self-examination. But
while it’s O.K. to think things over, those who abhor the direction Mr.
Bush is taking the country must maintain their intensity; they must not
succumb to defeatism.
This election did not prove the Republicans unbeatable. Mr. Bush did not
win in a landslide. Without the fading but still potent aura of 9/11,
when the nation was ready to rally around any leader, he wouldn’t have
won at all. And future events will almost surely offer opportunities for
a Democratic comeback.
I don’t hope for more and worse scandals and failures during Mr. Bush’s
second term, but I do expect them. The resurgence of Al Qaeda, the
debacle in Iraq, the explosion of the budget deficit and the failure to
create jobs weren’t things that just happened to occur on Mr. Bush’s
watch. They were the consequences of bad policies made by people who let
ideology trump reality.
Those people still have Mr. Bush’s ear, and his election victory will
only give them the confidence to make even bigger mistakes.
So what should the Democrats do?
One faction of the party is already calling for the Democrats to blur
the differences between themselves and the Republicans. Or at least
that’s what I think Al From of the Democratic Leadership Council means
when he says, “We’ve got to close the cultural gap.” But that’s a losing
proposition.
Yes, Democrats need to make it clear that they support personal virtue,
that they value fidelity, responsibility, honesty and faith. This
shouldn’t be a hard case to make: Democrats are as likely as Republicans
to be faithful spouses and good parents, and Republicans are as likely
as Democrats to be adulterers, gamblers or drug abusers. Massachusetts
has the lowest divorce rate in the country; blue states, on average,
have lower rates of out-of-wedlock births than red states.
But Democrats are not going to get the support of people whose votes are
motivated, above all, by their opposition to abortion and gay rights
(and, in the background, opposition to minority rights). All they will
do if they try to cater to intolerance is alienate their own base.
Does this mean that the Democrats are condemned to permanent minority
status? No. The religious right – not to be confused with religious
Americans in general – isn’t a majority, or even a dominant minority.
It’s just one bloc of voters, whom the Republican Party has learned to
mobilize with wedge issues like this year’s polarizing debate over gay
marriage.
Rather than catering to voters who will never support them, the
Democrats – who are doing pretty well at getting the votes of moderates
and independents – need to become equally effective at mobilizing their
own base.
In fact, they have made good strides, showing much more unity and
intensity than anyone thought possible a year ago. But for the lingering
aura of 9/11, they would have won.
What they need to do now is develop a political program aimed at
maintaining and increasing the intensity. That means setting some
realistic but critical goals for the next year.
Democrats shouldn’t cave in to Mr. Bush when he tries to appoint highly
partisan judges – even when the effort to block a bad appointment fails,
it will show supporters that the party stands for something. They should
gear up for a bid to retake the Senate or at least make a major dent in
the Republican lead. They should keep the pressure on Mr. Bush when he
makes terrible policy decisions, which he will.
It’s all right to take a few weeks to think it over. (Heads up to
readers: I’ll be starting a long-planned break next week, to work on a
economics textbook. I’ll be back in January.) But Democrats mustn’t give
up the fight. What’s at stake isn’t just the fate of their party, but
the fate of America as we know it.
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
This strikes me, with all due respect, as using statistics to cover up unpleasant facts. In Ohio, it was more than improving a lead on a percentage basis (in fact, Bush’s lead shrunk), it was also about getting voters to show up. The “gay marriage” referendum there made the difference in a state that should have gone John Kerry, and would have put him in the White House.