By Alan Abramowitz
An analysis of the results of last week’s election indicates that the presence of gay marriage referenda on the ballot had no effect on the outcome of the presidential election at the state level.
There was a very strong correlation between President Bush’s share of the vote in 2000 and his share of the vote in 2004 across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The president consistently ran a few percentage points ahead of his showing in 2000, but he did not improve on his 2000 performance any more in states with gay marriage referenda than in other states. In 11 states with gay marriage referenda on the ballot, the president increased his share of the vote from an average of 55.4 percent in 2000 to an average of 58.0 percent in 2004–an improvement of 2.6 percentage points. However, in the rest of the country the president increased his share of the vote from an average of 48.1 percent in 2000 to an average of 51.0 percent in 2004–an improvement of 2.9 percentage points.
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Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
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February 3: Trump Draws Nikki Haley as First Challenger
The long-awaited first Republican challenger to Donald Trump for 2024 is apparently arriving shortly, and I wrote about her at New York:
Ever since Donald Trump formally announced a 2024 presidential comeback bid last November, the big question has been when, exactly, one of the large number of potential Republican rivals would jump into the turbulent waters with him. There were credible reports that potential candidates were afraid to draw Trump’s concentrated fire. But now the Charleston Post & Courier reports that Nikki Haley, the former South Carolina governor and Trump’s ambassador to the United Nations, will take the plunge on February 15.
The timing of the Haley announcement is odd, coming right after a show of force by Trump in South Carolina. At his January 28 event in Columbia, he demonstrated his support from the state’s Republican governor, lieutenant governor, treasurer, senior U.S. senator, and three U.S. House members. Perhaps Haley is just playing catch-up or is concerned about preempting a rival presidential bid by the junior U.S. senator from South Carolina, Tim Scott (whom she appointed to the Senate). The Dispatch’s David Drucker believes she actually relishes the prospect of a one-on-one fight with Trump in the early going:
“What better way to distinguish herself versus Trump, DeSantis, and anyone else, than by becoming the second declared candidate in the primary? The contrast is stark. Republican voters can choose between a white, male, soon-to-be 77-year-old defeated former president who has led the GOP to three consecutive electoral disappointments, or a nonwhite woman in her early 50s, born of immigrant parents, with conservative bona fides on most critical issues that are unassailable.”
Being the first official Trump challenger will definitely provide priceless advertising for Haley’s on-paper credentials. In addition to the qualities Drucker mentions, Haley has checked the foreign-policy-qualifications box via her service at the U.N., something Ron DeSantis can’t match. She has shown excellent political instincts over her lengthy career (she got massive positive publicity for removing the Confederate flag from the South Carolina State House grounds long after it had become a low-risk endeavor). Most of all, she has excelled in the essential Republican art of staying on good terms with Trump without looking like his toady.
Indeed, Haley’s odd relationship with Trump may soon be in a bright spotlight. She has offended him on multiple occasions, first by endorsing “L’il Marco” Rubio in 2016 while criticizing Trump, then by unsubtly letting it be known while serving in his administration that she was an independent player, then by harshly attacking his conduct on January 6. You can add to her sins against the 45th president that she is now breaking a promise to back him in 2024 if he ran. Yet he’s never gone medieval on her, and he seems strangely affectionate toward her even now, according to the Post & Courier:
“During his weekend campaign swing that included a stop at the S.C. Statehouse, Trump told national reporters he recently received a phone call from Haley. Trump said Haley told him ‘she’d like to consider’ a 2024 run of her own.
“’I talked to her for a little while. I said, “Look, you know, go by your heart if you want to run,'” Trump told reporters, adding that he would welcome the competition.
“’She called me and said she’d like to consider it, and I said you should do it.’
“Trump then reportedly told Haley, ‘Go by your heart if you want to run.’”
It’s possible this last comment from Trump should be translated as “Go ahead! Make my day!,” suggesting that he is prepared to tear her a new one in the weeks and months ahead. Or maybe he’s simply not that worried about Haley compared to the bigger threat posed by DeSantis.
So what kind of threat to either of these men is Haley ’24? Yes, she is the sort of candidate that might have been thought up by central casting. Originally, she was a politician from the hard-core, Jim DeMint-Mark Sanford wing of the South Carolina GOP who fit the Tea Party mood like a glove. But then she gradually made herself into a national-media icon of what post-Trump Republicanism might look and sound like. To conservatives of every hue, she’s unimpeachable on cultural issues, unobjectionable on foreign policy, and especially distinguished in the evergreen hobby of union-hating (she anticipated DeSantis’s attacks on perfidious corporations back in 2014 by telling potential investors in her state that they could take their “union jobs” elsewhere).
Haley’s ultimate problem as a presidential candidate is that she’s from a crucial early primary state. As Tom Harkin (whose presidential candidacy in 1992 took Iowa right off the table) could tell her, you don’t get much credit for winning your home state. But if she loses South Carolina, her candidacy will be dead as a mackerel.
Haley’s other big challenge is to overcome the perception that she’s really running for vice-president. She has been regularly featured on veep lists for Trump (even back in the 2020 cycle, when there were reports that the then-president wanted to dump Mike Pence in favor of her). And there’s not much question that Republicans need help with women voters, having placed a woman on their national ticket only once. And maybe that is her goal, or at least an acceptable consolation prize; despite years of being treated as a Republican star, Haley is only 51. But she’d better not wind up looking too weak in her home state, or the largely superficial image she has built as a political world-beater could vanish like a rare snowfall in the Carolina sun.
If we are going to compare Bush’s share of the vote between 2000 and 2004 then surely we have make some adjustments for the Nader vote? Bush’s share of the 2-party vote was 49.7% in 2000. His increased share, 2000-04, was therefore about 1.2 – 1.3%. In five of the eleven states where there was a same-sex marriage (and civil union etc) ballot, Bush lost ground and in two further states his gain was less than 1.2%. In the four remaining states, he made gains.
There is, therefore, no pattern here and any discussion must remain purely speculative.
Why do people do *this*? Doe it *make* the word more special? Is it a new writing *convention*?
Inquiring *minds* want to know.
As for the correlation vel non, who knows? Without breaking down each state, comparing a lot of data from this time to last time in the that state, and then applying some sound thinking, it is not possible to KNOW. It’s easy to look at some numbers and speculate.
I’ve looked at stats from both sides now, and like clouds, they can be whatever you see in them.
If the gay issue kept someone from switching from Bush to the Dem, or if the gay issue made someone vote for Bush who otherwise might have stayed at home, how will we know that?
This whole process is a little like losing the World Series in 7 games by one run, and then trying to figure out what went wrong by studying every AT BAT the team had.
Gay marriage referenda were no identical. Some included bans on civil unions (Ohio, for example). The average gain for Bush in referendum states versus non refernedum should, but does not, reflect the difference. Also, is there any way of judging whether the pro rederenda voters were reacting to gay marriage or to the Massachusetts judges?
The title of the article (“Did Gay Marriage Referenda Help Bush Get Re-elected?”) is very clear. The question is whether the *presence of the referenda* on the ballot helped Bush. The article gives pretty strong evidence that Bush did better in states without the gay marriage referenda, in terms of increasing the number of people who voted for him over the number who voted for him in 2000.
It may be true that the gay marriage issue may have mobilized lots of voters, but that is not the question that Abramowitz was looking at. No doubt that war in Iraq also mobilized lots of voters, as did the lose of jobs, etc. etc. Lots of issues helped to get more people out to vote, from all sides. You can’t tell from looking at the number of voters, or even the increase since 2000, why more people showed up to vote.
But, it is significant that the increase was greater in states without gay marriage referenda. The war is an issue for everyone, so is health care, jobs, the environment, etc. etc. And so is the gay marriage issue. But what was not the same for everyone was whether the gay marriage issue was on the ballot!
The question Abramowitz was asking was whether that difference in 11 states attracted more voters to the polls in those states. His evidence is not definitive, but it is certainly suggestive and interesting.
When I was younger and we would lose an election, my head would just about explode. Four years seemed so long until the next presidential election.
By my mid thirties, I had gotten to the point where I realized that coming out of the loss was the best time to mobilize for next time.
In 1984, we took a beating, and not just the presidency, but we started in 1985 with a plan to get Senators elected, and to build a base for a centrist candidate. The DLC was part of that effort, and it served an important role in vetting Clinton, Robb, Gephardt, Gore, and others.
In 1993, after we got the WH, we weren’t ready for the Gingrich shenanigans, we didn’t see their scheme coming, and we got submarined in ’94. We’ve been playing defense since.
We need to steal that page and retake the House. Then we can impeach the lot of them.
I though the argument was that these “wedge” issues helped mobilize voters and get more people out to the polls. Is there any evidence that conservatives in these states voted in any higher numbers than they would have otherwise?
This is getting silly. So why DID people vote for this man? I think we just need to admit the election was stolen since nothing is panning out of all this that makes any sense.
Here’s my problem with a lot of the analysis out there discounting various causes of a Bush win. I’m probably completely wrong and off base but here goes.
The Democrats invested millions in GOTV. Tens of millions. Perhaps hundreds of millions. And, coincidentally perhaps, John Kerry got more votes than Reagan ever did. More than any other Presidential candidate ever had before. Except Bush got even more.
When I see people making percentage comparisons saying that Bush’s margin in a state moved only slightly, that doesn’t say to me, “X didn’t help make Bush the winner.” It says to me, “Damn, the GOP GOTV efforts increased the Bush turnout even more than the Democrats increased theirs – whatever they did WORKED VERY WELL.”
While one single factor such as a specific traditional marriage amendment might be dismissed in a vacuum, fact is that gay marriage and Massachusetts’ stance on it was used to leverage people out of the pews and into the voting booths on November 2.
The GOP turned out 8 million more voters in 2004 than they did in 2000; the Democrats, 4 million. How does the 4 million turnout gap fit into this?
I think that this article clearly says what the task needs to be for the next 2 years. The Democratic party needs to dedicate itself to regaining control of state legislatures AND the US Senate.
On the Minnesota state level this translates into:
First goal, defeat Gov Pawlenty next election. He is beatable. He was not able to deliver MN for Bush. Also he saw significant erosion in the Repub state house caucus in spite of 8 visits to MN by Bush. I think Sen. Dean Johnson has the right combination of skills to pull this off.
Second goal for MN is to work on identifying the weakest Republican Congressman. (Either Kennedy or Gutknecht.) Identifying a strong DFL candidate for each district and start the campaign NOW to unseat one or both of them. I think that Patty Wetterling can beat Kennedy next time. An email campaign to her will probably persuade her to run again.
Third Goal, Regain the state House and maintain control of the State senate in 2006. Redistricting after 2010 is the reason. I think that the DFL should seriously consider proposing a nonpartisan redistricting system similar to Iowa. I think that having truly competitive electoral districts statewide is to our long term benefit. Also the DFL should work for adoption of Instant Runoff Voting for the next election. (Think of Green voters to the left and Independence Party voters to the center). These outlying voters are more likely to second choice the DFL under IRV.
Fourth, Maintain Daytons Senatorial seat in 2006. A strong 2006 gubernatorial candidate will help.
Fifth, identify a strong DFL candidate to run against Coleman in 2008.
Sixth, work on bringing the Independence party voters back towards DFL alignment. The DFL and Independence party voters represent an electoral majority in MN. IRV would help with this process. This has a strong historical parallel to the unification between the Democratic party and the Farm Labor party in the forties. Of course this also means that the DFL is going to have to find a way to declare peace with each other on the hot button social issues such as gay and abortion rights that the republicans used against us this past election. These social issues are election success killers for greater Minnesota DFL candidates.
I think that each of these goals is doable if we remember that our first priority is to win elections.
—– Original Message —–
From: Debra Hogenson
Sent: Saturday, November 06, 2004 11:33 AM
To: 1st CD discussion
Subject: [1CD_DFL_discuss] No Surrender
November 5, 2004
OP-ED COLUMNIST
No Surrender
By PAUL KRUGMAN
President Bush isn’t a conservative. He’s a radical – the leader of a
coalition that deeply dislikes America as it is. Part of that coalition
wants to tear down the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt, eviscerating Social
Security and, eventually, Medicare. Another part wants to break down the
barriers between church and state. And thanks to a heavy turnout by
evangelical Christians, Mr. Bush has four more years to advance that
radical agenda.
Democrats are now, understandably, engaged in self-examination. But
while it’s O.K. to think things over, those who abhor the direction Mr.
Bush is taking the country must maintain their intensity; they must not
succumb to defeatism.
This election did not prove the Republicans unbeatable. Mr. Bush did not
win in a landslide. Without the fading but still potent aura of 9/11,
when the nation was ready to rally around any leader, he wouldn’t have
won at all. And future events will almost surely offer opportunities for
a Democratic comeback.
I don’t hope for more and worse scandals and failures during Mr. Bush’s
second term, but I do expect them. The resurgence of Al Qaeda, the
debacle in Iraq, the explosion of the budget deficit and the failure to
create jobs weren’t things that just happened to occur on Mr. Bush’s
watch. They were the consequences of bad policies made by people who let
ideology trump reality.
Those people still have Mr. Bush’s ear, and his election victory will
only give them the confidence to make even bigger mistakes.
So what should the Democrats do?
One faction of the party is already calling for the Democrats to blur
the differences between themselves and the Republicans. Or at least
that’s what I think Al From of the Democratic Leadership Council means
when he says, “We’ve got to close the cultural gap.” But that’s a losing
proposition.
Yes, Democrats need to make it clear that they support personal virtue,
that they value fidelity, responsibility, honesty and faith. This
shouldn’t be a hard case to make: Democrats are as likely as Republicans
to be faithful spouses and good parents, and Republicans are as likely
as Democrats to be adulterers, gamblers or drug abusers. Massachusetts
has the lowest divorce rate in the country; blue states, on average,
have lower rates of out-of-wedlock births than red states.
But Democrats are not going to get the support of people whose votes are
motivated, above all, by their opposition to abortion and gay rights
(and, in the background, opposition to minority rights). All they will
do if they try to cater to intolerance is alienate their own base.
Does this mean that the Democrats are condemned to permanent minority
status? No. The religious right – not to be confused with religious
Americans in general – isn’t a majority, or even a dominant minority.
It’s just one bloc of voters, whom the Republican Party has learned to
mobilize with wedge issues like this year’s polarizing debate over gay
marriage.
Rather than catering to voters who will never support them, the
Democrats – who are doing pretty well at getting the votes of moderates
and independents – need to become equally effective at mobilizing their
own base.
In fact, they have made good strides, showing much more unity and
intensity than anyone thought possible a year ago. But for the lingering
aura of 9/11, they would have won.
What they need to do now is develop a political program aimed at
maintaining and increasing the intensity. That means setting some
realistic but critical goals for the next year.
Democrats shouldn’t cave in to Mr. Bush when he tries to appoint highly
partisan judges – even when the effort to block a bad appointment fails,
it will show supporters that the party stands for something. They should
gear up for a bid to retake the Senate or at least make a major dent in
the Republican lead. They should keep the pressure on Mr. Bush when he
makes terrible policy decisions, which he will.
It’s all right to take a few weeks to think it over. (Heads up to
readers: I’ll be starting a long-planned break next week, to work on a
economics textbook. I’ll be back in January.) But Democrats mustn’t give
up the fight. What’s at stake isn’t just the fate of their party, but
the fate of America as we know it.
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
This strikes me, with all due respect, as using statistics to cover up unpleasant facts. In Ohio, it was more than improving a lead on a percentage basis (in fact, Bush’s lead shrunk), it was also about getting voters to show up. The “gay marriage” referendum there made the difference in a state that should have gone John Kerry, and would have put him in the White House.