Seth Masket did something important and admirable at Politico this week: He examined the historical premise for some advice being offered to President Biden by many voices and found it to be ill-founded:
“Joe Biden needs a ‘Sister Souljah Moment.’ At least, that’s according to the quickly congealing conventional wisdom in Washington. That is, Biden and Democrats are in dire danger of losing control of Congress next year, and the one thing that could save them would be by bashing someone to Biden’s left on matters of race.”
The allusion is to a speech famously made by Bill Clinton in the summer of 1992 (when he had already nailed down the Democratic presidential nomination) to a conference of the Jesse Jackson–chaired Rainbow Coalition criticizing the organization for holding a panel the previous day that included Sister Souljah. The rapper had recently made remarks related to the L.A. riots that some interpreted as promoting the killing of white people (a claim she denied).
Jackson (who had expressed pride in Souljah’s appearance at his conference) was sitting on the stage near Clinton as he spoke and understandably felt blindsided and exploited by what Clinton said. So it has gone down in legend as a “moment” when a Democratic politician pandered to swing voters (and perhaps to white racists) by conspicuously separating himself from Black political activists. And that, as Masket notes, is what some commentators want Biden to do to stem the political bleeding over controversies surrounding racial justice, including Black Lives Matter protests, the “defund the police” movement, and the alleged influence of critical race theory in public-school classrooms.
The principal trouble with the claim Biden can do wonders via a little measured race-baiting, Masket explains, is that it didn’t do Clinton much good in 1992. A lot of factors lifted him to victory that fall, but clearly it was the economy (stupid!) and the temporary withdrawal of Ross Perot from the race that were most important. There is little-to-no evidence that the Sister Souljah “moment” had any particular effect on the contest. Yet the legend persists:
“Is it possible that Clinton got some help on Election Day from his bashing of Souljah five months earlier? It’s possible, but unlikely. Campaign effects just generally don’t last that long. It was a very old story by then, and it’s hard to even discern much of an effect when the story was fresh. Polling that year shows that voters were more likely to trust Clinton on issues related to racial politics, but that was true prior to the Souljah moment, as well.
“So why is it important to interrogate this piece of political lore three decades later? Because clearly many opinion leaders take it as an article of faith that a Democratic president can make himself more popular by bashing advocates for racial justice. The evidence doesn’t really support this, but they make the argument anyway.”
I would go a step further than Masket in debunking the “Sister Souljah Moment” theory. I say this not because I have any insider information on what was going on in the Clinton campaign (or in the candidate’s mind) before he made that Rainbow Coalition speech. But I was an early Clinton supporter and later worked for the decidedly Clintonite Democratic Leadership Council, and I sure didn’t think the incident was mostly about race. Obviously, racists in the electorate probably perceived it that way, though few of them at that point in history were likely to vote for a Democratic presidential candidate. The broader perception at the time was captured by Tom Edsall’s on-site report on the speech for the Washington Post:
“Clinton’s frank remarks seemed designed to demonstrate his willingness to challenge core Democratic constituent groups and to begin to break his image in the public as a “political” person who would bend to pressure from major forces within his party …
“The power of the Perot campaign, and growing public animosity to both the Republican and the Democratic parties, has been interpreted in the Clinton campaign as a powerful message requiring the Arkansas governor to attempt to regain the status of an ‘outsider’ candidacy — a status first lost to former Massachusetts senator Paul E. Tsongas, then to former California governor Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown Jr. and most recently to Perot.”
Indeed, the idea that Clinton was triangulating against Black folks generally on race was not borne out by the reaction from, well, Black folks, other than those very close to the justifiably insulted Jackson, as Steve Kornacki later observed:
“Clinton did not suffer any discernible fallout among black voters; in fact, many black political leaders — some nursing their own grudges against Jackson — used the occasion to throw their support behind Clinton.”
That could be in part because even if you think Clinton was pushing off the left, he wasn’t exactly moving right. In the same speech in which he chastised Sister Souljah for allegedly smiling upon the hypothetical killing of white people for the sins of their race, Clinton sounded some familiar populist themes that were entirely congenial to his audience:
“The speech included repeated attacks on the Bush administration, with a well received line about Vice President Quayle — ‘I’m tired of people on trust funds telling people on food stamps how to live’ — and praise for ‘the real story of Los Angeles — that most people who live in that city did not burn, loot or riot.’”
So what would a more nuanced understanding of the “Sister Souljah Moment” tell Joe Biden?
First of all, Biden is in a vastly different position than was Clinton in 1992. There is no Ross Perot on the horizon, appealing to a huge block of swing voters temporarily estranged from both parties. When Clinton rejected Jesse Jackson’s advice to run a base-mobilization campaign, there were plenty of reasons to fear that identification of Clinton with Democratic orthodoxy would be disastrous: At the time of the Sister Souljah speech, Clinton was running third in many polls behind Perot and George H.W. Bush. And when Perot did (temporarily) withdraw from the race right after the Democratic convention (I was involved in speech preparations for that convention and remember when the word came down: No more criticisms of Perot!), he basically confirmed that Clinton had succeeded in redeeming his pledge to become “a different kind of Democrat,” as the Los Angeles Times explained:
“’When we started … there was a climate there where we could win outright,’ Perot asserted. But now, he said, ‘the Democratic Party has revitalized itself. They’ve done a brilliant job, in my opinion, in coming back.’
:Perot did not elaborate on that point. But Morton H. Meyerson, a longtime Perot confidant and campaign adviser, later cited the Democratic Party’s platform as something that ‘Ross feels good about.’
“Meyerson added: ‘The Democrats seem to be listening to the people.'”
Biden, by contrast is operating in a highly polarized climate with few swing voters and no Perot-like centrist to challenge him. He has zero reason to gamble on separating himself rhetorically from his party.
Second of all, while Clinton was dealing with decades of perceived Democratic subservience to the party’s interest and constituency groups, Biden is dealing with a conservative media environment in which nothing he says will effectively contradict assertions that he wants to defund the police, open the prison doors, impose “woke” speech codes and racial quotas on colleges and workplaces, and usher in a socialist revolution. It’s all preposterous, but Biden has already tried and failed to challenge the smears with rhetorical signals. Some hypothetical equivalent to the supposed message Clinton sent in the “Sister Souljah Moment” would mostly be heard by those who feared, not hoped, he was separating himself from his party under pressure.
And third, even if Joe Biden thought he needed to “push off” the left (as though defeating Bernie Sanders in the 2020 presidential primaries wasn’t enough “pushing off”), he should stay far away from racially inflammatory subjects. Biden would have never won the presidential nomination without the kind of staunch Black support that destroyed the potentially strong nomination campaigns of Kamala Harris and Cory Booker, even though Biden’s history on racial issues was far more problematic than Clinton’s in 1992. Besides, now and in 1992, the idea that “the left” and “Black voters” are somehow synonymous is simply wrong.
If Biden feels the need to make it clear he’s still the moderately progressive Democrat who hates racism but is by no means a socialist or especially “woke,” he should just say so, as often as possible. No “pushing off” is necessary.
Badger:
Thanks for the catch on Teddy’s middle initial. And you’re right, Jimmy’s religiosity was very off-putting to some Democrats. I remember reading a zillion years ago that there were some very non-born-again counties around the country where in 1976 Carter ran behind McGovern’s 1972 numbers, mainly because of his religion (which, of course, helped him a lot more in the South and in Southern-inflected areas of the Midwest).
ducdebrabant:
I dunno what’s in Edwards’ head, but I’ve suggested here on more than one occasion that he seems to be running a campaign aimed at the netroots and at more conventional Democrats who never much liked Bill Clinton. The almost slavish consistency of Edwards’ rhetoric of late with well-worn netroots themes is getting eery. There’s a dog whistle in every line. You’d have to guess this is Joe Trippi’s influence. Like most consultants who’ve blown an opportunity to win The Big One, he’s replaying the tapes and trying to get it right this time.
Ed Kilgore
Kennedy’s refusal to heal the rift hurt Carter in the general election, but at least he endorsed Carter. I tried and couldn’t think of a single instance when a Democrat left any doubt that he would endorse the nomineee. The only time I think it might have happened is when George Wallace was running, and Hillary is no George Corley Wallace. I know Edwards is going for slash and burn these days (and I worry about that, if Hillary is nominated), but is it really only a strategy? There must be something personal, because this is not the Edwards I remember — touchy, cantankerous, hyperbolic, divisive. He was never this hard on the Republicans when he ran with Kerry. If he’d attacked Cheney in these terms, we might have won.
You’re welcome, Ed. By the way, I think Senator Kennedy’s middle initial is “M” for “Moore”.
I didn’t vote in the general election in 1980 – I was away from home and didn’t get an absentee ballot – but I did support Carter in the primaries. I supported Anderson in the general but if the election were close, I’m pretty sure I’d have voted for Carter again.
FWIW, I do remember his religion – not his denomination but the fact that he was a “born-again Christian” – was a particular bone of contention amongst not a few of my liberal friends and acquaintances.
Getting back to the topic, I really don’t see any of the top tier or even the second tier candidates not supporting the nominee whoever it is. I don’t know enough about Gravel to speculate about him one way or another. I’m guessing Kucinich would support the party’s nominee, but he might also decide as a matter of principle that he couldn’t support a candidate who wasn’t sufficiently against the war which might leave Hillary out.
I think it’s possible to draw a parallel, however slight, to Howard Dean’s awkward exit from the 2004 contest. He always said he would support the eventual nominee, but there was a palpable feeling that the support would be reluctant if Kerry was nominated (untrue, as it turned out). Regardless, Dean maintained the clear pretense of independence:
“‘The bottom line is that we must beat George W. Bush in November, whatever it takes,’ [Dean] said.
But, he added, his organization [Democracy for America] will closely monitor the Democratic nominee and, if necessary, will be ‘letting our nominee know that we expect them to adhere to the standards that this organization has set for decency, honesty, integrity and standing up for ordinary American working people.'” (NYT, 2/18/04)
Now Joe Trippi has another candidate who is at least troubled by supporting an eventual nominee with whom he feels he has fundamental differences.
Unlike most Democratic politicians, especially the Clintons, Edwards entered politics relatively late in life and did not rely on the mainstream party apparatus to do so. And his biography is well-suited to his newfound adversarial populism; see Noam Scheiber’s article in The New Republic.
I guess this mini-episode solidifies Edwards’s outsider identity. But there is a thin line between outsider and outcast, and Edwards has branded himself with a sense of anger and disenfranchisement that goes beyond party identification. This has not been a winning Iowa caucus message in recent memory. I wonder if the Edwards campaign has any internal polling to suggest this year is much different.
Badger:
Thanks. I had forgotten about it, but Jimmy’s pursuit of EFK across the stage was indeed sadly hilarious. One of the few good things about today’s tightly stage-managed conventions is that nobody gets on the stage, or gets to speak, unless all the unity gestures are agreed to in advance.
On your broader point, there’s no doubt Jimmy had more detractors on the Left than HRC does today, though Carter’s poor overall political standing had something to do with it. But liberal defections to John Anderson probably cost Carter NY and MA in the general election.
Thanks for the comment!
Ed Kilgore
I immediately thought of Senator Kennedy and the 1980 campaign too.
Hopefully if the Democratic nomination does come down to a choice between Hillary and Edwards and Hillary does win (which is far from a foregone conclusion) we don’t get a repeat of the 1980 convention where Kennedy practically ran away every time Carter tried to get him for the traditional “Democratic unity” photo op.
By the way, Carter was hated by the more leftist faction of the party just as much – maybe even more – as Hillary is now.