After reading a few days worth of carping about Joe Biden’s performance, I decided enough’s enough and responded at New York:
Joe Biden has been president of the United States for 43 days. He inherited power from a predecessor who was trying to overturn the 2020 election results via insurrection just two weeks before Inaugural Day, and whose appointees refused the kind of routine transition cooperation other administrations took for granted. His party has a four-vote margin of control in the House, and only controls the Senate via the vice presidential tie-breaking vote (along with a power-sharing arrangement with Republicans). Democratic control of the Senate was not assured until the wee hours of January 6 when the results of the Georgia runoff were clear. Biden took office in the midst of a COVID-19 winter surge, a national crisis over vaccine distribution, and flagging economic indicators.
Biden named all his major appointees well before taking office, and as recommended by every expert, pushed for early confirmation of his national security team, which he quickly secured. After some preliminary discussions with Republicans that demonstrated no real possibility of GOP support for anything like the emergency $1.9 trillion COVID-19 relief and stimulus package he had promised, and noting the votes weren’t there in the Senate for significant filibuster reform, Biden took the only avenue open to him. He instructed his congressional allies to pursue the budget reconciliation vehicle to enact his COVID package, with the goal of enacting it by mid-March, when federal supplemental unemployment insurance would run out. Going the reconciliation route meant exposing the package to scrutiny by the Senate parliamentarian, It also virtually guaranteed total opposition from congressional Republicans, which in turn meant Senate Democratic unanimity would be essential.
The House passed the massive and complex reconciliation bill on February 27, right on schedule, with just two Democratic defections, around the same time as the Senate parliamentarian, to no one’s great surprise, deemed a $15 minimum wage provision (already opposed by two Senate Democrats) out of bounds for reconciliation. The Senate is moving ahead with a modified reconciliation bill, and the confirmation of Biden’s Cabinet is chugging ahead slowly but steadily. Like every recent president, he’s had to withdraw at least one nominee – in his case Neera Tanden for the Office of Management and Budget, though the administration’s pick for deputy OMB director is winning bipartisan praise and may be substituted smoothly for Tanden.
Add in his efforts to goose vaccine distribution — which has more than doubled since he took office — and any fair assessment of Biden’s first 43 days should be very positive. But the man is currently being beset by criticism from multiple directions. Republicans, of course, have united in denouncing Biden’s refusal to surrender his agenda in order to secure bipartisan “unity” as a sign that he’s indeed the radical socialist – or perhaps the stooge of radical socialists – that Donald Trump always said he was. Progressives are incensed by what happened on the minimum wage, though it was very predictable. And media critics are treating his confirmation record as a rolling disaster rather than a mild annoyance, given the context of a federal executive branch that was all but running itself for much of the last four years.
To be clear, I found fault with Biden’s presidential candidacy early and often. I didn’t vote for him in California’s 2020 primary. I worried a lot about Biden’s fetish for bipartisanship. I support a $15 minimum wage, and as a former Senate employee, have minimal respect for the upper chamber’s self-important traditions. But c’mon: what, specifically, is the alternative path he could have pursued the last 43 days? Republican criticism is not worthy of any serious attention: the GOP is playing the same old tapes it recorded in 2009 when Barack Obama (and his sidekick Biden) spent far too much time chasing Republican senators around Washington in search of compromises they never intended to make. While they are entitled to oppose Biden’s agenda, they are not entitled to kill it.
Progressive criticism of Biden feels formulaic. Years and years of investment in the rhetoric of the eternal “fight” and the belief that outrage shapes outcomes in politics and government have led to the habit of seeing anything other than total subscription to the left’s views as a sell-out. Yes, Kamala Harris could theoretically overrule the Senate parliamentarian on the minimum wage issue, but to what end? So long as Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema oppose the $15 minimum wage, any Harris power play could easily be countered by a successful Republican amendment to strike the language in question, and perhaps other items as well. And if the idea is to play chicken with dissident Democrats over the fate of the entire reconciliation bill, is a $15 minimum wage really worth risking a $1.9 trillion package absolutely stuffed with subsidies for struggling low-income Americans? Are Fight for 15 hardliners perhaps conflating ends and means here?
Media carping about Biden’s legislative record so far is frankly just ridiculous. Presumably writing about the obscure and complicated details of reconciliation bills is hard and unexciting work that readers may find uninteresting, while treating Tanden’s travails as an existential crisis for the Biden administration provides drama, but isn’t at all true. The reality is that Biden’s Cabinet nominees are rolling through the Senate with strong confirmation votes (all but one received at least 64 votes), despite a steadily more partisan atmosphere for confirmations in recent presidencies. The COVID-19 bill is actually getting through Congress at a breakneck pace despite its unprecedented size and complexity. Trump’s first reconciliation bill (which was principally aimed at repealing Obamacare) didn’t pass the House until May 4, 2017, and never got through the Senate. Yes, Obama got a stimulus bill through Congress in February 2009, but it was less than half the size, much simpler, and more to the point, there were 59 Senate Democrats in office when it passed, which meant he didn’t even have to use reconciliation.
There’s really no exact precedent for Biden’s situation, particularly given the atmosphere of partisanship in Washington and the whole country right now, and the narrow window he and his party possess – in terms of political capital and time – to get important things done. He should not be judged on any one legislative provision or any one Cabinet nomination. So far the wins far outweigh the losses and omissions. Give the 46th president a break.
Schaller’s article is certainly provocative and his numbers are indeed “interesting.” In fact, one might say that this article shows the same attention to fact as his previous work. This is, after all, the same writer who stated on page 168 of his book “Whistling Past Dixe” that Mike Easley of North Carolina would face a tough re-election in 2008. Certainly true when one considers that re-election is impossible when Easley is term-limited from running again.
One of the interesting things about this article is that (different from his previous work) Schaller has expanded his target from the South (generally) and southern white males (particularly) to white males (generally). Of course, he does seem to make the assumption that most of “the down-home, blue-collar, white male voter” are Southern (or rural: he talks about Hillary Clinton dropping her G’s when speaking to southern or rural audiences).
Schaller does seem to still have his obsession with NASCAR — perhaps its a Schallersque code word for “southern.” I live in Charlotte, North Carolina (arguably the heart of NASCAR). I have never gone to a NASCAR race and have absolutely no interest in ever going to one.I do know this: the NASCAR marketing people equal or surpass any political demographic analysts around. That’s why I find it interesting that NASCAR moving from southern tracks to Schaller’s precious west and north.
In the Salon article, Schaller discusses Bob Graham’s sponsorship of a NASCAR team and its lack of effectiveness. He doesn’t mention Mark Warner’s NASCAR sponsorship in his governor’s race (although he does talk about it in other writings). He tries to have it both ways: NASCAR is the symbol of why Graham failed, but didn’t have anything to do with Warner’s success.
He doesn’t look at the difference in the nature of the races. Nobody knew who Mark Warner was. The use of NASCAR introduced him to Virginia’s voters as somebody who respected their history and didn’t mock who they are. Bob Graham was a known entity: NASCAR didn’t bring him anything.
But back to Schaller’s numbers (and I am going to accept his figures). Schaller says that 25% of Kerry’s vote in 2004 came from white males. Evidently because this percentage is significantly smaller than the percentage of white males who make up the total voters — paying attention to the total group is obviously a waste of time to Schaller.
But let us be honest here, Schaller is citing a crappy presidential campaign that failed to mobilize and convince a signifcant segment of voters. For that alone, Schaller believes the Democratic party should just ignore that segment in the future? Is it just me or is this muzzy minded in the extreme?
Schaller may have a point when it comes to presidential elections. The nature of the electoral college makes presidential electoral math significantly different from other races. Schaller — like most college professors — seems to think that presidential elections are all that matter.
He also seems to think (like a preponderance of Democrats) that policies are what motivates voters. And like most liberals he thinks that those policies should be driven top down. This leads to his assumption that going after the white male vote (southern or not) will result in the party endorsing policies that will alienate other groups(blacks, women, union members, etc) or at least impede efforts to grow party support among these groups.
The problem with Schaller’s views is that they are dead wrong. Schaller’s philosophy is the view of political elites (=policy wonks). While it is true that there are voters who vote based on a candiate’s stand on health care or civil rights or the death penalty, most voters make (1) their decision on whether to vote and (2) who to vote for based on their perception of the value a political candidate (or — more often — a political party) brings to them. These perceptions often are significantly different from those of the party elites.
Working on county or district levels, we find when we go out and actually canvass (not just lit drop) how different these perceptions are. We have worked with county party organizations — some in so-called bright red areas — to bring true constituent/party service to those voters who have not been voting. This has encouraged turnout and overwhelming support for Democrats. In other cases, we have successfuly switched voters that have been voting Republican because of wedge issues. How? By getting personal and showing them that Democrats understand the problems in their lives and will work to solve them.
The result has been signficant turn arounds in these areas and the turn arounds have included getting the votes of white, southern male (often rural) Democrats — and doing it without sacrificing the votes of other groups. This has helped the Democratic party take over county commissions, city council, mayor’s offices and legislatures.
These are the numbers that we find interesting. And we think that Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid would agree with us. There are 29 southern white male members of the House of Representatives and three southern white male members of the Senate. Pelosi wouldn’t have been elected nor Reid Majority Leader without these men.
A lesson for those interested in a “Democratic Strategy” can be found in the 2006 election of one of those House members. Heath Shuler won not through support of conservatives or liberals, men or women, Caucasians or African-Americans. Heath Shuler won because Democrats in the North Carolina 11th District finally had enough of Charles Taylor and worked together — papering over significant disagreements on policy issues — to get out the vote for Shuer and maintain discipline to win.
We would think that consideration of a successful Democratic strategy might start there than with the provocation of “So Long, White Boy.”
Carl D. Clark
Jennifer Gullette
Southern Political Information Network
http://www.southernpolitics.net
Is it really necessary to note that the day after a presidential election the winner must spend the next four years actually attempting to run the country and that, for that task, winning a narrow victory on a sociologically polarized basis (the educated, minorities, single women etc. on the one hand, and a white-based “heartland” coalition on the other) is a recipe for political polarization and cultural conflict of Clinton impeachment-era dimentions (anyone remember the Militia movement of the 1990’s?).
It’s one thing to get stuck in a situation like that against one’s will, and quite another to positively seek and invite it. Mercenary “gun for hire” political consultants may not give a crap what happens the day after an election – to them, winning is indeed everything. But for anyone who visualizes their goal as achieving an enduring and stable democratic majority, throwing all the joe six-pack’s and their wives off the boat is downright nuts. Even if we didn’t need a decent chunk of their votes to win the election, which is highly dubious, we need a substantial number of them on our side to effectively govern.
Michael Moore made the same observation 10 years ago and it’s just as silly now as it was then.
The only reason to write off the white men who do vote Democrat is if you can gain more votes someplace else by doing so. As the article pointed out, 90+% African Americans already vote Democrat so we’re not likely to gain ground there. When it comes to other demographics, I’d be interested in hearing what issue (besided illegal immigration) people feel there is a real trade off and real ground to be gained by sacrificing the votes of white men and the votes of other groups.
More importantly, as 2000 taught us, the Presidential election is about the Electoral College and most of the non-white electorate lives in the proverbial “blue states” while the “red” and “purple” states are more heavilly white. Granted, population trends tell us that the Latino/Latina vote is growing quickly in the Southwest, but is gaining a better chance at winning Arizona and New Mexico really worth guaranteeing yourself loses in so much of the rest of the country?
I’m not arguing that Democrats should focus all their attention on the white male vote, I just think we should cautious around talk of ignoring any constituency.