I was sorry to learn of the sudden death of 2000 Democratic vice presidential nominee Joe Lieberman. But his long and stormy career did offer some important lessons about party loyalty, which I wrote about at New York:
Joe Lieberman was active in politics right up to the end. The former senator was the founding co-chair of the nonpartisan group No Labels, which is laying the groundwork for a presidential campaign on behalf of a yet-to-be-identified bipartisan “unity ticket.” Lieberman did not live to see whether No Labels will run a candidate. He died on Wednesday at 82 due to complications from a fall. But this last political venture was entirely in keeping with his long career as a self-styled politician of the pragmatic center, which often took him across party boundaries.
Lieberman’s first years in Connecticut Democratic politics as a state legislator and then state attorney general were reasonably conventional. He was known for a particular interest in civil rights and environmental protection, and his identity as an observant Orthodox Jew also drew attention. But in 1988, the Democrat used unconventional tactics in his challenge to Republican U.S. senator Lowell Weicker. Lieberman positioned himself to the incumbent’s right on selected issues, like Ronald Reagan’s military operations against Libya and Grenada. He also capitalized on longtime conservative resentment of his moderate opponent, winning prized endorsements from William F. and James Buckley, icons of the right. Lieberman won the race narrowly in an upset.
Almost immediately, Senator Lieberman became closely associated with the Democratic Leadership Council. The group of mostly moderate elected officials focused on restoring the national political viability of a party that had lost five of the six previous presidential elections; it soon produced a president in Bill Clinton. Lieberman became probably the most systematically pro-Clinton (or in the parlance of the time, “New Democrat”) member of Congress. This gave his 1998 Senate speech condemning the then-president’s behavior in the Monica Lewinsky scandal as “immoral” and “harmful” a special bite. He probably did Clinton a favor by setting the table for a reprimand that fell short of impeachment and removal, but without question, the narrative was born of Lieberman being disloyal to his party.
Perhaps it was his public scolding of Clinton that convinced Al Gore, who was struggling to separate himself from his boss’s misconduct, to lift Lieberman to the summit of his career. Gore tapped the senator to be his running mate in the 2000 election, making him the first Jewish vice-presidential candidate of a major party. He was by all accounts a disciplined and loyal running mate, at least until that moment during the Florida recount saga when he publicly disclaimed interest in challenging late-arriving overseas military ballots against the advice of the Gore campaign. You could argue plausibly that the ticket would have never been in a position to potentially win the state without Lieberman’s appeal in South Florida to Jewish voters thrilled by his nomination to become vice-president. But many Democrats bitter about the loss blamed Lieberman.
As one of the leaders of the “Clintonian” wing of his party, Lieberman was an early front-runner for the 2004 presidential nomination. A longtime supporter of efforts to topple Saddam Hussein, Lieberman had voted to authorize the 2003 invasion of Iraq, like his campaign rivals John Kerry and John Edwards and other notable senators including Hillary Clinton. Unlike most other Democrats, though, Lieberman did not back off this position when the Iraq War became a deadly quagmire. Ill-aligned with his party to an extent he did not seem to perceive, his presidential campaign quickly flamed out, but not before he gained enduring mockery for claiming “Joe-mentum” from a fifth-place finish in New Hampshire.
Returning to the Senate, Lieberman continued his increasingly lonely support for the Iraq War (alongside other heresies to liberalism, such as his support for private-school education vouchers in the District of Columbia). In 2006, Lieberman drew a wealthy primary challenger, Ned Lamont, who soon had a large antiwar following in Connecticut and nationally. As the campaign grew heated, President George W. Bush gave his Democratic war ally a deadly gift by embracing him and kissing his cheek after the State of the Union Address. This moment, memorialized as “The Kiss,” became central to the Lamont campaign’s claim that Lieberman had left his party behind, and the challenger narrowly won the primary. However, Lieberman ran against him in the general election as an independent, with significant back-channel encouragement from the Bush White House (which helped prevent any strong Republican candidacy). Lieberman won a fourth and final term in the Senate with mostly GOP and independent votes. He was publicly endorsed by Newt Gingrich and Rudy Giuliani, among others from what had been the enemy camp.
The 2006 repudiation by his party appeared to break something in Lieberman. This once-happiest of happy political warriors, incapable of holding a grudge, seemed bitter, or at the very least gravely offended, even as he remained in the Senate Democratic Caucus (albeit as formally independent). When his old friend and Iraq War ally John McCain ran for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008, Lieberman committed a partisan sin by endorsing him. His positioning between the two parties, however, still cost him dearly: McCain wanted to choose him as his running mate, before the Arizonan’s staff convinced him that Lieberman’s longtime pro-choice views and support for LGBTQ rights would lead to a convention revolt. The GOP nominee instead went with a different “high-risk, high-reward” choice: Sarah Palin.
After Barack Obama’s victory over Lieberman’s candidate, the new Democratic president needed every Democratic senator to enact the centerpiece of his agenda, the Affordable Care Act. He got Lieberman’s vote — but only after the senator, who represented many of the country’s major private-insurance companies, forced the elimination of the “public option” in the new system. It was a bitter pill for many progressives, who favored a more robust government role in health insurance than Obama had proposed.
By the time Lieberman chose to retire from the Senate in 2012, he was very near to being a man without a party, and he reflected that status by refusing to endorse either Obama or Mitt Romney that year. By then, he was already involved in the last great project of his political career, No Labels. He did, with some hesitation, endorse Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump in 2016. But his long odyssey away from the yoke of the Democratic Party had largely landed him in a nonpartisan limbo. Right up until his death, he was often the public face of No Labels, particularly after the group’s decision to sponsor a presidential ticket alienated many early supporters of its more quotidian efforts to encourage bipartisan “problem-solving” in Congress.
Some will view Lieberman as a victim of partisan polarization, and others as an anachronistic member of a pro-corporate, pro-war bipartisan elite who made polarization necessary. Personally, I will remember him as a politician who followed — sometimes courageously, sometimes foolishly — a path that made him blind to the singular extremism that one party has exhibited throughout the 21st century, a development he tried to ignore to his eventual marginalization. But for all his flaws, I have no doubt Joe Lieberman remained until his last breath committed to the task he often cited via the Hebrew term tikkun olam: repairing a broken world.
Given that the Democratic campaign has upped the early voting in its favor, then wouldn’t the exit polls show a favorable number of Bush voters on the election day itself in a number of key battleground states? Couldn’t this be used to “spin” the exit polls for the Republicans?
Did you notice the 8 point party ID registration
advantage for Democrats? That’s TWICE what it
was in 2000. Combine that with the Democracy Corps poll which showed Kerry with only 1 percent
less support among D’s than Bush has among R’s,
and with the energized left…well, I guess we’ll see.
Something that just struck me: Suppose Gallup — whose likely voter model we sneer at — were to suddenly revise its judgment on the composition of the electorate, based on Gans’ oft-repeated observations? Would its LV model then be closer to reality? My thought is, perhaps not. The Gallup voter screen would probably operate in much the same way even while opening the window a bit wider — that is to say, they’d let in more voters (getting to, say, 60%), but they’d still use the same criteria in deciding who’s more and less likely. It seems to me that young and minority voters — seemingly the basis of much of the increased turnout — would still be be at the bottom of their pyramid, and still be the ones least likely to make the cut. What if the situation this year is, the least likely voters of all join the party, and (at least potentially) seeming sure-thing voters — lifelong but disgusted Republicans — stay home? Is there any model truly apt to yield the right numbers in that situation?
Tangential observation: is it posible this situation could also create a coattail effect? Coattails are, to me, a misnamed phenomenon: they imply that a president’s numbers are so strong they drag along underdog down-ballot candidates to victory. This was certainly the case in 1964, but I’ve seen two landslide presidential re-elections since — 1972 and 1984 — where the wide margin did nothing whatever for Congressional candidates. On the other hand, I saw 1980, where Reagan got barely 50% of the national vote, but saw his party pick up 37 House seats and a slew in the Senate. It strikes that what 1964 and 1980 had in common was a disgust on the part of the losing party with its candidate, resulting in poor turnout for that party and thus an unusually tilted electorate. Is it possible we’ll get the same next Tuesday, with young and minority voters not only turning out at unexpected levels, bu representing a higher percentage of the total electorate than could otherwise be expected, because a small number of Republicans simply decide their guy’s worthless and stay home? Suddenly, every Dem candidate within range could find him/herself over the top, and the Congressional numbers could shift to a startling degree.
There’s a better way than a survey to track early voting — go to the secretaries of states themselves. You’ll find that the rates are even higher (for the states for which I can find data, double the rate of 2000 a week before election day) than the NAES suggests.
I’m glad to see Curtiz Gans quoted here. He is very reliable and a good, unbiased source for voter analysis.
All the results for higher turnout usually favor Dems. I’m glad many states have gone out of their way to make voting available on more than just one day (even if you are supposed to have a valid excuse for absentee voting in some states like VA). It only makes sense.
Gans in previous years has been a debunker of high-turnout predictions, as I recall. So it’s good to see his thoughts on this year.