John Kerry leads George Bush among LV’s in: in FL +1; PA +6; OR +9 and WA +7. He trails Bush in: AR -5 and NC -3 (stat. tie), according to SurveyUSA Polls conducted 10/15-17.
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Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
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July 21: Don’t Dismiss the Power of Inflation Politics
All the talk of renewed inflation brought back some terrible memories for me, and I wrote about them at New York:
When I was a freshman college debater at Emory University in the fall of 1970, the national debate topic was not Vietnam, but the desirability of wage and price controls. Little did we know that just months ahead a Republican president would impose a wage-price freeze, long the anti-inflationary prescription of the left wing of the Democratic Party. But the surprise known in financial circles as the “Nixon shock,” nearly a half-century ago (on August 15, 1971) showed how pervasive the fear of inflation — running at just over 5 percent in 1970 — had become.
That’s ancient history now, even to those of us who remember the double-digit inflation of the late 1970s, and the particularly horrid scourge of “stagflation” (high inflation and unemployment simultaneously). Inflation seems to have been tamed by wise monetary policies. The periodic warnings from 21st-century conservatives that low interest rates and federal budget deficits would create inflation didn’t much bother me. It was like hearing an old priest chant a forgotten litany in a lost language — just one among many ritualistic arguments for the tight credit and reactionary social policies these people favored instinctively as a sort of class self-defense posture.
The current surge in consumer prices doesn’t necessarily change that picture; the current post-pandemic (we hope) economic environment was sure to produce a spike in wages and prices that cannot be projected into a future where something approaching normalcy will surely return (though the real-estate bubble is indeed troubling). But now I am beginning to hear echoes of the inflation panics of the not-so-distant past, which make me tremble.Like Tim Noah, I suspect there may be a generational lapse in understanding the politics of inflation:
“I don’t care to be condescended to by a bunch of Gen Xers and Millennials about my ’70s-bred fear of inflation. It feels too much like the condescension we Boomers directed toward Depression babies whenever they warned us that we were playing with fire in deregulating the financial markets. Poor dears, we thought, traumatized for life by the 1929 crash and one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.
“The Depression babies turned out to be right, of course.”
Noah makes it clear he’s not arguing inflation per se is bad for the economy. It is, however, bad for progressive politics, and not just because “stagflation” probably killed the Carter presidency and ushered in the Reagan era far more than the Iranian hostage crisis or other better-remembered Democratic foibles. The deflationary economic strategies of the 1980s weren’t called “austerity,” but rather a corrective for undisciplined policies that fed wage and price spirals which in turned hammered the value of savings, the living standards of those on fixed incomes, and the political case for federal domestic spending.
Most lethally for progressivism, the conservative supply-side tax-cutting when combined with inflationary fears can create enormous pressure for public disinvestment and the shredding of safety nets (which is why reactionaries happily labeled the intended result “starving the beast”). We are still living with some of the long-term consequences of anti-inflationary backlash. As Noah points out, California’s Proposition 13 ballot initiative in 1978 and similar “tax revolts” were a by-product of price spirals that boosted tax assessments on property and income alike.
But sometimes lost in an examination of the right’s exploitation of inflation fears is the abiding fact that the left has no clear prescription for dealing with it, either, other than by denying its existence or significance (sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly). Ironically, that was made most evident by the supposedly illiberal Richard Nixon’s surprising use of the great liberal instrument for taming inflation.
The veteran ex-conservative economic and political analyst Bruce Bartlett has penned an exceptional explainer on the background and consequences of the “Nixon shock,” particularly its international dimensions, and the role played by Treasury Secretary John Connally, who like his boss and ally Nixon was more focused on short-term politics than on long-term economic realities. What’s clear is that Nixon was convinced a recession induced by the Eisenhower administration and its Federal Reserve Board appointees designed to kill inflationary pressures also killed his 1960 presidential candidacy. As prices spiked in 1970, he was terrified the same thing could happen in 1972.
Nixon had inherited (and temporarily extended) an income-tax surcharge from LBJ that was designed to pay for the skyrocketing costs of the Vietnam War, but its effects were limited. So with his signature televised bombshell reveal (the one he deployed a month earlier to announce his trip to China), amid great secrecy, Nixon rolled out a combo platter of initiatives to fight inflation and international economic instability. They included a suspension of fixed currency exchange rates and the convertibility of the dollar to gold (to head off a raid on gold supplies triggered by a British demand for a major conversion); an import surcharge (to prevent a worsening of the trade balance); and most significantly for most Americans, a 90-day freeze on wages and prices to be followed by an indefinite period of controls by federal panels.
As political theater, Nixon’s speech announcing a “new economic policy” was, well, Nixonian. He began with dessert: an assortment of tax breaks and job-creation incentives balanced by mostly unspecified spending cuts; only then did he mention the wage-price freeze. After promising to “break the vicious circle of spiraling prices and costs,” Nixon moved on to his international proposals, which he downplayed as “very technical,” while assuring viewers that “if you are among the overwhelming majority of Americans who buy American-made products in America, your dollar will be worth just as much tomorrow as it is today.”
Nixon’s wage and price controls were initially very popular (as polls had told the White House they would be) and did indeed hold down inflation through the reelection year of 1972, when Nixon won his famous landslide reelection over poor George McGovern, in part by goosing federal appropriations to create a mini-boom. By then the administration had moved on to a more discretionary system for regulating wage and price increases, which generated rumors of employers currying favor with generous donations to CREEP (the Committee to Reelect the President), the notoriously corrupt operation heavily complicit in the Watergate scandals that brought down the Nixon presidency. Between the suppressed and eventually unleashed inflationary pressures and the oil-price shock Nixon’s international economic policies helped create, the country paid a very high economic price for the brief respite from inflation the wage-price freeze earned him. He sowed the wind with even greater inflation, and his successors Gerald Ford (whose feckless “Whip Inflation Now” campaign was widely mocked) and Jimmy Carter reaped the whirlwind.
Before you dismiss these events from 50 years ago as irrelevant, consider how much Nixon’s short-sighted approach sounds like something President Donald Trump might have done if inflation had became a political problem during his tenure (or in, God help us, a future term). Indeed, any president mulling Nixon’s choice of recession-inducing fiscal or monetary policies might be tempted to resort to the easy-to-understand, if dangerous, strategy of wage and price controls in which the pain is mostly back-loaded, particularly in or near an election year. Old folks remember how it preceded Nixon’s landslide 1972 win, followed by a decade of economic pain and multiple decades of political misery for progressives.
The MN numbers sure sound like they match on the Lawn sign war!
Since this is a thread on state data, I thought it would be helpful to have some pre/post debate apple-to-apple comparisons of state polling data. So…I went to race2004.net for a list of state polling data. Before examining the data, I selected surveys dated their from 9/15 to 9/30 as pre-debate, surveys dated 10/10 or later as post-debate. I found 36 polls across 22 states that were represented in both time periods. In 25 of those polls, Kerry gained. Another 6 showed no change. Another 5 showed Bush gaining. The median change was a 2% Kerry gain. The average change was 2.44% toward Kerry. I don’t know that this tells us where things stand in the electoral college right now, but it sure does suggest that Kerry gained some ground with the debates. Here’s the list, from largest Kerry gain to largest Bush gain:
Ohio, Ohio Poll, Kerry +11
Oregon, SUSA, Kerry +10
Iowa, Rasmussen, Kerry +7
South Carolina, SUSA, Kerry +7
New York, SUSA, Kerry +7
New Jersey, Rasmussen, Kerry +6
New Jersey, Strategic Vision (R), Kerry +5
Georgia, SUSA, Kerry +5
Michigan, Rasmussen, Kerry +4
Arkansas, SUSA, Kerry +4
Ohio, Strategic Vision (R), Kerry +4
Pennsylvania, Rasmussen, Kerry +4
New Jersey, Quinnipiac, Kerry +4
New Hampshire, Research 2000, Kerry +4
Alabama, Rasmussen, Kerry +3
Iowa, Strategic Vision (R), Kerry +2
Wisconsin, Strategic Vision (R), Kerry +2
Michigan, Strategic Vision (R), Kerry +2
Pennsylvania, Strategic Vision (R), Kerry +2
Rhode Island, SUSA, Kerry +2
Illinois, Rasmussen, Kerry +2
South Dakota, Rasmusen, Kerry +2
Washington, SUSA, Kerry +2
Minnesota, Strategic Vision (R), Kerry +1
Arkansas, Rasmussen, Kerry +1
Minnesota, Rasmussen, no change
Wisconsin, Rasmussen, no change
Ohio, Rasmussen, no change
Florida, Rasmussen, no change
Pennsylvania, Quinipiac, no change
New Jersey, FD Univ, no change
Oregon, Research 2000, Bush +1
Arkansas, Zogby, Bush +2
Texas, SUSA, Bush +2
Oklahoma, Wilson Res (R), Bush +5
California, Rasmussen, Bush +5
Could Ruy or someone else on the site comment on the WaPo and Rasmussen aggregate “swing state” poll numbers? These have been looking good, but I’ve never seen anything that discusses whether an aggregate result among a group of swing states really tells you anything useful about the EV outcome for those states would be.
No to mention that the Newark Star Ledger has Kerry up by +13 in God’s Country, and the CBS poll, which has the horserace tied, shows the prez approval at only 44%. Surely, if the latter is close to being right, Bush is in big trouble.
Anyone have a quote for Zogby calling a Kerry win ?
I just read that Zogby went out on a limb and predicted that Kerry was going to be the 44th president. He said that there is more to polling than statistics:
‘Polling can be uncertain only if you rely on statistics alone,’ is Mr Zogby’s riposte. ‘That’s why an effective pollster has to rely on culture, history and sociology. I repeat, polling is the study of human behaviour, not simply a sampling of people’s preferences.’
That may well explain his success. His big test will come on Nov 2. In Singapore last Friday, he flatly predicted that Mr Kerry would become the 44th President of the United States.
I sure hope he’s right. It’s comforting to know that he was one of the 2 polls to get it right in 2000.
Hg
I still say that the Kerry campaign must stop Dukakissing on the Bai article like they did on the flipflop spin. My guess is that, with the same performance in the debates, if he had prodded the press on the flipflop issue along the lines of Chait’s article in the 10/18 New Republic SIX MONTHS ago, and dismissed it as a mere spin in the ways I’ve suggested since, and put forward an NYU+ length speech to counter Bush’s monday blowout in NJ on terror, and challenged the Bai spin, and the media that have magnified its already distorted portrayal, he would be running consistently ahead by 4-5 points in the polls, and pulling along Democrats into the House and Senate too. In an honest election, where the Clarke interview with Michael Moore in Fahrenheit 9/11, where he points out 9/12 Bush was only interested in Iraq ACROSS THE COUNTRY — the Republicans would be in trouble in both Houses of Congress and would have a 92 type futile race for the White House. But that’s not the agenda.
In another thread I noted that it is probably appropriate for pollsters to assume a higher Republican turnout (as a percentage of registered Republicans) than Democratic turnout (as a percentage of registered Democrats). I was surprised that a few posters chose to attack this observation (some quite forcefully). This I believe is a well-documented phenomenon of American politics. It stems from the fact that Republicans tend to be more affluent, more focused on politics, have better access to the polls, etc. Some asked for statistics backing this up, so I went and looked up turnout statistics for some California counties. Obviously this is not a rigorous analysis, but what I found does indicate that Republicans turnout in greater percentages than Democrats. And I’ve read in many places that this is true nationally – I’ll provide cites as they turn up. Some people on this blog just don’t like to hear this apparently, and seem to suggest as a point of contention that I’m saying Republicans turn out in greater total numbers – I’m not. The advantage in Democratic party id partially or totally offsets the higher Republican turnout percentage to some extent. As an example, here’s results from Contra Costa county, which is heavily democratic and went for Al Gore in 2000:
Registration & Turnout
Democratic
Completed Precincts: 907 of 907
Reg/Turnout Percentage
Democratic Registration 223,155
PRECINCT REGISTRATION 223,155
PRECINCT BALLOTS CAST 99,416 44.6%
ABSENTEE BALLOTS CAST 37,480 16.8%
TOTAL BALLOTS CAST 136,896 61.3%
Registration & Turnout
Republican
Completed Precincts: 907 of 907
Reg/Turnout Percentage
Republican Registration 153,790
PRECINCT REGISTRATION 153,790
PRECINCT BALLOTS CAST 71,717 46.6%
ABSENTEE BALLOTS CAST 32,706 21.3%
TOTAL BALLOTS CAST 104,423 67.9%
Notice that Gore carried the county by ~31,000 votes, despite a registration advantage of 70,000. The reason for the narrower gap was the much higher Republican percentage turnout (68% R vs 61% D). If this is indeed indicative of national turnout habits, and I believe it is, then it is appropriate for Gallup to weight registered Democrats for 8% less turnout than registered Republicans. Alan asserts this is “totally unrealistic” – I disagree.
In my opinion, the big flaw in the Gallup polls is not the turnout weighting, but rather their insistence on oversampling registered Republicans. There just doesn’t seem to be a good reason for this. Their assertion that party id is fungible isn’t borne out by exit polls from the past several presidential elections. To gain an accurate sampling of the electorate, they should weight for best-known state or national party id distribution, as Zogby does, and also for expected party percentage turnout.
I think the NC poll is the most impressive. We’ll see how is really turns out though.
SUSA has the best record of any polling firm over the past 10 years.
I have to say, though, that I don’t place much trust in SUSA polls. These were the same people, after all, who called Maryland and New Jersey close in 2000, where Gore then went on to win by 15 points.
Although this isn’t the only poll I’ve seen with Kerry leading in Florida, so I’m inclined to believe he’s genuinely ahead.