John Kerry can make major gains among key demographic groups of discontented white voters: women blue and pink collar workers; rural voters; those under age 30; and senior women, according to a study of post-Labor Day polls by Democracy Corps reported 9/28. The study also identified other demographic groups Kerry should target for significant gains.
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Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
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May 22: Voters May Be Alienated, But They’re Still Engaged
There were a number of interesting takeaways from the latest detailed 2024 election analysis, but I focused on the very big picture at New York:
Researchers are just now gaining access to complete data on what actually happened in the 2024 elections via voter files and Census materials.
The progressive data firm Catalist just issued its report on 2024, and much of what it tells us is a familiar story by now:
“Overall, we find that the Democratic Kamala Harris / Tim Walz ticket retained key parts of the Biden 2020 coalition, but at lower levels among a specific, interconnected set of subgroups, including young voters, men, voters of color, less frequent voters, urban voters, and voters living outside the major battleground states. No single demographic characteristic explains all the dynamics of the election; rather we find that the election is best explained as a combination of related factors. Importantly, an overarching connection among these groups is that they are less likely to have cast ballots in previous elections and are generally less engaged in the political process.
“While these groups tilted toward Donald Trump and JD Vance, Harris retained support among more consistent voters, particularly in battleground states. Together, these dynamics allowed the Trump / Vance ticket to secure a narrow popular vote plurality and a sweep of the major swing states.”
The details, of course, are still interesting, particularly when Catalist gets down into the demographic weeds:
“Over the past several general elections, Democratic support has continued to erode among voters of color. Drops from 2020 to 2024 were highest among Latino voters (9 points in support), lowest among Black voters (3 points), and 4 points for Asian and Pacific Islander groups (AAPI) … As with other demographic groups, support drops were concentrated among the younger cohorts of voters, particularly young men. For instance, support among young Black men dropped from 85% to 75% and support among young Latino men dropped from 63% to 47%.”
But sometimes important data points emerge only when you look at them from 30,000 feet. Given all that we know about the erosion of public trust in institutions, steadily negative perceptions of the direction of the country, a long-term trend away from partisan self-identification, and the savage and alienating tone of contemporary political discourse, you’d guess that voter participation would be sliding into a deep ditch. But it isn’t:
“The 2024 election was a continuation of incredibly high turnout following Trump’s surprising victory in 2016, particularly in the battleground states. Since the start of Trump’s first term, voters have remained highly engaged in the political process.
“According to data from the United States Election Lab compiled by University of Florida political scientist Michael McDonald … voter turnout spiked from 60% in 2016 to 66% in 2020 — the highest voter turnout in over a century, higher than any election since women’s suffrage and the Civil Rights era. Turnout dropped to 64% in 2024, but this drop was concentrated in non-competitive states, with some battleground states exceeding their 2020 turnout.”
So in a country where so many citizens seem to hate politics, voting is occurring (in relative terms) at historically high levels. Catalist doesn’t go into the possible explanations, but three come to mind right away.
First, despite recent Republican efforts to go back to a system dominated by in-person voting on Election Day, convenience-voting opportunities have steadily spread with voting by mail and/or in-person early voting available nearly everywhere, increasingly without conditions. In most jurisdictions, registering to vote has gotten easier in the 21st century, though, again, recent Republican initiatives to require documentary proof of citizenship and promote frequent “purges” of voter rolls definitely threaten to reverse that trend.
Second, competitive elections tend to produce higher voter turnout, particularly at a time of partisan and ideological polarization, when the stakes associated with winning or losing are heightened. Six of the seven most recent presidential elections have been very close either in the popular vote or the Electoral College or both. Control of either the House (2006, 2010, 2018, and 2022) or Senate (2002, 2006, 2014, and 2020) has changed in every midterm election of the 21st century. This level of instability over such an extended period of time is unusual and arguably galvanizing.
Third, the amount of money going into voter mobilization and persuasion in national election cycles has been steadily rising. The campaign-finance tracking site OpenSecrets has shown that in inflation-adjusted dollars, total spending has nearly tripled between 2000 and 2024 in both presidential and midterm elections. 2020 was actually the most expensive election ever with $7.7 billion (again, in inflation-adjusted dollars) going into the Trump-Biden race and $10.6 billion devoted to congressional campaigns. The slightly lower number for 2024 may have been attributable to the incredibly intensive targeting of resources on the seven battleground states, where, overall, as Catalist showed, turnout actually went up a bit from 2020.
These three factors do not, of course, take into account the much-discussed possibility that Donald Trump and his radicalized party are responsible for excited or fearful hordes of Americans going to the polls. But while voting patterns in Trump-era midterms are a bit different from those in the presidential elections when his name has been on the ballot, turnout has been elevated in the midterms, too. Indeed, the leap from a national turnout rate of 37 percent in 2014 to 50 percent in 2018 (dropping only a bit to 46 percent in 2022) remains one of the largest and most astonishing jumps in voter engagement in living memory.
Will these patterns change when (presumably) Trump leaves the scene in 2028? Nobody knows. But the anecdotal impression that Americans have grown tired of politics, and even government, during the Trump years hasn’t translated into unwillingness to vote.
I think Bush is ahead, but only by a couple of points. The country wants change, but isn’t sold on Kerry. Remember, it was only on election day 1980 that a race that was truly to close to call suddenly became a landslide for Reagan. In hte Carter/Reagan race the only pollster who got it right was President Carter’s polster Pat Caddell
Jazz
I don’t know who will win this one, but if Zogby shows Kerry ahead in a couple of weeks or more, you’d better listen to Aretha Franklin and give the Zogster r-e-s-p-e-c-t.
Find out what it means to me and roughly half the electorate.
He’s got the track record. Gallup does not.
From another jazz fan.
Another thing. Although I haven’t been too optimistic about Kerry’s chances in the past, some things have given me pause lately. The debates: Kerry’s expectations have been so lowered for these debates he can’t but exceed them. It looks like he’ll “win” no matter what happens, unless he spontaneously combusts. Secondly, Bush’s numbers seem to have mostly topped around 47%-48%. It’s almost as if he can’t get much higher. Kerry’s lower numbers may simply be a function of a de-energized base. If the debates re-energize them, his numbers will come roaring back.
Yeah, Zogby has a new poll out – Kerry has all the momentum now.
DanF, if proves they’re counting too many Republicans and not enough Dems.
I noticed something interesting about the 9/27 WaPo poll that gives Bush a 7 point lead:
Poll results by region
Bush and Cheney
East 44%
Midwest 58%
South 55%
West 41%
All 51%
Kerry and Edwards
East 51%
Midwest 35%
South 41%
West 53%
All 44%
So, if we are to believe this, Kerry leads large in the east and the west – the most populous regions of the country. The south is split very close to the “All”, so the only place that is lopsided is the Midwest. The LEAST populate region of the country. If we look at the most populated midwest states, it’s close in Ohio, but it’s a Kerry blow out in Illinois. It’s close in Michigan (but still solid Kerry lead). So what to make of this? People who live in populated regions DON’T talk to polsters.
And remember, people who live in populated regions are overwhelmingly Democrats.
Zogby just released a poll among under-30 males that does not look good for Bush. Sounds like another ripe target for Dems.
http://zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=871
To anyone and everyone who’s getting down about our chances or who’s worried, let me remind you:
Back in December 2003, Dean was said to be inevitable, and everybody had written off Kerry as the “dead man walking,” with no chance of winning.
But then, he and Edwards (also written off) clobber both of the suposed “leading” candidates in Iowa (Dean and Gephardt). When they say Kerry closes the deal they mean it.
Man, I can’t wait to see all the pollsters and talking heads who wrote off Kerry eat crow like they did last year.
Re:
“New Study Targets Key Groups for Kerry Gains”
To this non-statistician and Kerry supporter this doesn’t sound very rosy for Dems. Am I missing something?