One of the least appreciated tasks in governing is simply getting started after an initial election. Candidates must stop grinding their teeth and think seriously about the office they have been lusting for. Campaign promises and rhetoric have to be reviewed for relevance to objective reality. Loyal and hard-working campaign staff have to be considered in terms of their qualifications for the very different work of an actual public office. And most of all, there’s the delicate process of “transition,” of actually shifting responsibility and essential knowledge from a sometimes-hostile lame duck to the new kid on the block. I’ve heard stories of new regimes landing on the beach to find locks changed, computer operating systems deleted, even light bulbs removed.
And in election years when there is a lot of turnover, this whole process of transition absorbs an amazing amount of time and creates an equally amazing amount of inefficiency. This is particularly true in executive branch transitions, which affect the most jobs and services. Twenty-seven states have just elected new governors; in eighteen of those states, a change in party control occurred.
In some places government will be put on automatic pilot during the transition period, but given the fragile state of most state governments and their budgets, a lot of damage is going to be inflicted in terms of bad government between now and the time that new state administrations get up and running next year and begin shedding campaign staff and campaign illusions.
It’s a shame incumbent governors can’t just come out and say on the campaign trail: “You know, I may not be the greatest executive who’s ever worn shoes, but if you elect my opponent, he’s going to spend two or three months admiring himself in the mirror, two or three more months trying to find his own butt with two hands, and two or three more months after that getting played for a sucker by legislators, agency heads, and his own staff. Stick with the devil you know, folks.”
They can’t, of course, and in “wrong track” eras like our own, experience is generally not a highly rated quality. But as we sort through the results of this election cycle and begin thinking about the next, it’s important to acknowledge for a moment the confusion and disarray that’s occurring all over the country wherever winners and losers are settling up.

You know, it’s hard to become the least accurate pollster of gubernatorial and Senate races in the most pro-Republican election year in decades because you exhibit a pro-Republican bias. But that’s what Rasmussen Reports managed to accomplish in 2010. Nate Silver has the damning facts:

The 105 polls released in Senate and gubernatorial races by Rasmussen Reports and its subsidiary, Pulse Opinion Research, missed the final margin between the candidates by 5.8 points, a considerably higher figure than that achieved by most other pollsters. Some 13 of its polls missed by 10 or more points, including one in the Hawaii Senate race that missed the final margin between the candidates by 40 points, the largest error ever recorded in a general election in FiveThirtyEight’s database, which includes all polls conducted since 1998.
Moreover, Rasmussen’s polls were quite biased, overestimating the standing of the Republican candidate by almost 4 points on average. In just 12 cases, Rasmussen’s polls overestimated the margin for the Democrat by 3 or more points. But it did so for the Republican candidate in 55 cases — that is, in more than half of the polls that it issued.
Rasmussen’s polls have come under heavy criticism throughout this election cycle, including from FiveThirtyEight. We have critiqued the firm for its cavalier attitude toward polling convention. Rasmussen, for instance, generally conducts all of its interviews during a single, 4-hour window; speaks with the first person it reaches on the phone rather than using a random selection process; does not call cellphones; does not call back respondents whom it misses initially; and uses a computer script rather than live interviewers to conduct its surveys. These are cost-saving measures which contribute to very low response rates and may lead to biased samples.
Rasmussen also weights their surveys based on preordained assumptions about the party identification of voters in each state, a relatively unusual practice that many polling firms consider dubious since party identification (unlike characteristics like age and gender) is often quite fluid.

FWIW, Quinnipiac and Survey USA had the best record of accuracy in Nate’s analysis. But the ubiquity of Rasmussen polls, particularly if you include surveys done by its subsidiary for Fox, was a regular feature in the ebb and flow of the 2010 cycle. The firm certainly hasn’t done itself any favors in terms of its future credibility.

Earlier this year I complained about the tendency of pundits to take some poll of likely voter in an upcoming election and use it to complain that “the American people” want this or that or have decided this or that. This is done, of course, to depict any politician (say, Barack Obama) or political party (say, the Democratic Party) that is out of step with a select subset of the population as defiantly opposing the Popular Will, and perhaps representing alien influences–as opposed, of course, to the Courage of Conviction and Conservative Principles that other politicians are credited with when they swing against the tide of published polls.
But the same issue comes up after elections, which, while infinitely more authoritative than polls and bearing vast real-life consequences, should not be confused with some sort of universal plebiscite on this or that issue, or even on how the next election will go.
Hendrik Hertzberg of The New Yorker made the crucial distinction amidst the expansive spin of the post-election chattering classes:

With the votes tallied, the spin began: a procession of confident assertions about what “the American people”–meaning, in practical terms, the slice of the scaled-down midterm electorate that went one way in 2008 and the other in 2010–were “trying to say.”…
As for “the American people” themselves, it seems clear enough that their rejection of the Democrats was, above all, an expression of angry anxiety about the ongoing economic firestorm. Though ignited and fanned by an out-of-control financial industry and its (mostly) conservative political and intellectual enablers, the fire has burned hottest since the 2008 Democratic sweep. By the time the flames reached their height, the arsonists had slunk off, and only the firemen were left for people to take out their ire on. The result is a kind of political cognitive dissonance. Frightened by joblessness, “the American people” rewarded the party that not only opposed the stimulus but also blocked the extension of unemployment benefits. Alarmed by a ballooning national debt, they rewarded the party that not only transformed budget surpluses into budget deficits but also proposes to inflate the debt by hundreds of billions with a permanent tax cut for the least needy two per cent. Frustrated by what they see as inaction, they rewarded the party that not only fought every effort to mitigate the crisis but also forced the watering down of whatever it couldn’t block.

Hertzberg’s interpretation of the muddled intent of the midterm electorate (which acted as authorized agents for “the American people,” but are not the same thing) is his own version of events and their background, which doesn’t spring automatically from the results. But the same is true of the confident Republican argument that their party has some sort of mandate to do things that weren’t made manifest by any exit polls or any clear-cut point of debate in campaigns across the country. So next time you hear somewhat pontificate about what “the American people” are demanding–and particularly if elements of those purported demands, such as more tax cuts for the wealthy or big changes in Social Security and Medicare, are items the public clearly hasn’t supported up until now–then it’s time to challenge the spin and mock the spinner.
Republicans have won their midterm victory, but overstating it into a precise mandate, given the circumstances, is very curious, all the more since Republicans can’t seem to make up their own minds whether “deficits don’t matter” as the most recent Republican vice president famously said, or have instead instantly become the most important thing of all.

I tend to side with the viewpoint that ads don’t matter so much in creating a wave election, or in the overall outcome of congressional elections. Sure, ads can make a big difference in individual races, as many believe LBJ’s “daisy chain” ad did in 1964. But when you are looking at the aggregate result of races for 435 House seats and one-third of Senate seats, larger forces, like economic insecurity, are going to determine which party comes out on top. Ads can stress or understate economic fears, but not too many voters are going to let ads change their perceptions of the economic realities they are experiencing.
Still, it’s instructive to look at effective ads – as well as those that boomeranged, and how they may have helped decide individual elections. One example of the latter was Christine O’Donnell’s widely-ridiculed “I’m not a Witch” ad, although she was probably doomed before it came out. A better example was Democratic senatorial candidate Jack Conway’s “Aqua Buddha” ad in his campaign against Rand Paul. Writing in the Louisville Courier-Journal, Brandeis Professor Russell L. Weaver observed,

…The evidence started coming in as soon as Conway’s more sensational ads began running….According to Real Clear Politics, a nonpartisan group that lists election polls, the electorate started moving decisively away from Conway shortly after he began his most outrageous attack ads. What had been a close race (a 4 percent differential in favor of Paul, but one that was within the margin of error) quickly expanded to eight points, then to twelve points, and then 15 points. Ultimately, Paul won by 12 points.
Interestingly, during this period, overall support for Conway dropped, and the percentage of people who viewed him negatively rose significantly. While it is possible that future candidates will interpret this election as simply a wave election, and conclude that Conway had no chance with or without the attack ads, I’m hoping that they will see the election as illustrating the potential perils of negative advertising. One wonders what would have happened in this race had Conway taken the high road and run positive advertising that emphasized his record.

I had to eat some crow on this one, having written that Conway could have been the Dems’ best shot at a pick-up. Conway may well have lost even without the ad — Dems got trounced across the board in KY, with a couple of exceptions. In stark contrast to his better speeches, Conway’s ad was so ill-conceived and poorly executed that it even elicited expressions of disgust from some liberals and iced the election for Paul.
Conway should have known better. There was the example of Democrat Kay Hagan’s victory in NC’s ’08 senate race, which some observers attributed to incumbent Republican Elizabeth Dole’s “Godless” ad attempting to link Hagan to an atheist group. Hagan, a Sunday school teacher, responded brilliantly.
Conway’s real point was to take Paul to task for mocking Christianity when he was a college student, a dubious idea at best. It was easily spun to sound like Conway was disparaging Paul’s faith, and the tone was nasty enough to backfire on Conway. Plus, the ad was visually ugly and the buzz may have left many swing voters with an unsavory image they associated more with Conway than Paul.
James Vega had a more promising idea — to make Paul explain his ardent reverence for Ayn Rand, a militant atheist philosopher who mocked religion, as a way of demonstrating Paul’s hypocrisy. This would be more effectively revealed by reporters or a non-campaign source. While attacking an opponent’s religion is clearly a loser, exposing hypocrisy as a character flaw is fair enough game, if done carefully.
Ridicule can be an effective campaign tactic, but there are limits. Conway’s experience reaffirms the warning that calling attention to an opponent’s religion is a dicey proposition at best, and blasting a candidate for long-ago college pranks makes the attacker look petty and desperate. Sharp ridicule should come from a source that is not affiliated with a candidate. The Republicans know this, and let the shadowy groups empowered by the Citizens United decision do their dirtier work.
No doubt there were many other ads besides the ‘witch’ and ‘Aqua Buddha’ ads, which backfired, particularly in lower-profile races. Rep. Alan Grayson’s ‘Taliban Dan’ ad, for example, was instrumental in his defeat, according to Charlie Cook.
The 2010 campaigns included attack ads that served their sponsors extremely-well, none with a bigger prize at stake than Jerry Brown’s much-applauded ad revealing eMeg parroting the same failed policy cliches – almost verbatim – as Governor Schwartzenegger. Brown probably would have won without the ad, but it generated great anti-Whitman buzz, and his numbers trended significantly upward after the ad debut. The firm that made it will get plenty of work from Democratic candidates in the next election. Conversely, it appears that Democratic Governor-elect John Hickenlooper’s clever anti-attack ad scored well with pro-civility voters in his close race in CO.
Campaigns will continue to pour millions of dollars into political ads, well-aware that they don’t always work. But Democrats should do so knowing that the sounder strategy is to use ads to gradually promote a candidate’s visibility, name recognition and credibility, and to build a strong case against the adversary, rather than stake everything on one hideous attack ad.

William Saletan has a perspective-stretcher at Slate.com that might get a more receptive reading as a year-ender, but also makes a point worth considering, post-mid terms. As Saletan writes in “Pelosi’s Triumph: Democrats didn’t lose the battle of 2010. They won it,”

…In the national exit poll, voters were split on health care. Unemployment is at nearly 10 percent. Democrats lost a lot of seats that were never really theirs, and those who voted against the bill lost at a higher rate than did those who voted for it. But if health care did cost the party its majority, so what? The bill was more important than the election.
I realize that sounds crazy. We’ve become so obsessed with who wins or loses in politics that we’ve forgotten what the winning and losing are about. Partisans fixate on punishing their enemies in the next campaign. Reporters, in the name of objectivity, refuse to judge anything but the Election Day score card. Politicians rationalize their self-preservation by imagining themselves as dynasty builders. They think this is the big picture.
They’re wrong. The big picture isn’t about winning or keeping power. It’s about using it.

Saletan quotes former Bush speechwriter David Frum to bring it home:

Legislative majorities come and go. This healthcare bill is forever. A win in November is very poor compensation for this debacle now. … No illusions please: This bill will not be repealed. Even if Republicans scored a 1994 style landslide in November, how many votes could we muster to re-open the “doughnut hole” and charge seniors more for prescription drugs? How many votes to re-allow insurers to rescind policies when they discover a pre-existing condition? How many votes to banish 25 year olds from their parents’ insurance coverage?

Saletan concedes that there will undoubtedly be amendments to the HCR law. He may be understating the case. Boehner and his minions may try to sabotage it, and with some success — but not without a price.
Saletan adds, “Most bills aren’t more important than elections. This one was.” He predicts, optimistically,

A party that loses a House seat can win it back two years later, as Republicans just proved. But a party that loses a legislative fight against a middle-class health care entitlement never restores the old order. Pretty soon, Republicans will be claiming the program as their own. Indeed, one of their favorite arguments against this year’s health care bill was that it would cut funding for Medicare. Now they’re pledging to rescind those cuts. In 30 years, they’ll be accusing Democrats of defunding Obamacare.

As for Speaker Pelosi’s legacy:

…By the thinnest of margins, they rammed a bill through. They weren’t going to get another opportunity for a very long time. It cost them their majority, and it was worth it…And that’s not counting financial regulation, economic stimulus, college lending reform, and all the other bills that became law under Pelosi. So spare me the tears and gloating about her so-called failure. If John Boehner is speaker of the House for the next 20 years, he’ll be lucky to match her achievements.

Not to diminish the consequences of the electoral rout Dems have just experienced and the challenges that lie ahead in rebuilding a congressional majority. Those for whom electioneering is the end goal of politics will not find much comfort in Saletan’s take. But under the leadership of Speaker Pelosi, as much, if not more than President Obama, House Democrats have enacted reforms that will save countless lives and make American society better for millions. As time passes the 2010 mid terms will be viewed in context as a political skirmish, but it’s likely that the 2010 HCR law will go down in history as a landmark reform.

In monographs for the Brookings Institution and the Center for American Progress, and in separate articles for The New Republic, TDS Co-Editors William Galston and Ruy Teixeira offer distinctive takes on what happened on November 2, with equally distinctive suggestion about what Democrats need to do to regain the electoral strength they displayed in 2006 and 2008.
In explaining the decline in Democratic fortunes for Brookings, Galston places great emphasis on the conflict between the public-sector activism that Democrats pursued–partly to implement their longstanding agenda, partly to deal with the economic emergency–and profound public mistrust in the institutions of government, which was only made worse by the economic situation and how the White House and congressional leaders dealt with it. And this, says Galston, exposed a fundamental ambiguity about perceptions of the President himself which was one a political strength, but then became a weakness:

Some expected him to be a liberal stalwart, leading the charge for single-payer health insurance and the fight against big corporations; others assumed that his evident desire to transcend the red-blue divide pointed to a post-partisan presidential agenda implemented through bipartisan congressional cooperation. It would have been difficult to satisfy both wings of his coalition, and he didn’t. As he tacked back and forth during the first two years of his presidency, he ended up disappointing both.
There was a further difficulty. While Obama’s agenda required a significant expansion of the scope, power, and cost of the federal government, public trust in that government stood near a record low throughout his campaign, a reality his election did nothing to alter. A majority of the people chose to place their confidence in Obama the man but not in the institutions through which he would have to enact and implement his agenda. Although he was warned just days after his victory that the public’s mistrust of government would limit its tolerance for bold initiatives, he refused to trim his sails, in effect assuming that his personal credibility would outweigh the public’s doubts about the competence and integrity of the government he led.[iii] As events proved, that was a significant misjudgment.

Obama’s efforts to negotiate these difficult straits, says Galston, only made matters worse, as key elements of the electorate came to accept Republican complaints about various administration initiatives:

Once elected, Obama in fact had not one but two agendas–the agenda of choice on which he had run for president and the agenda of necessity that the economic and financial collapse had forced upon him. The issue he then faced was whether the latter would require him to trim or delay the former, a question he answered in the negative. Denying any conflict between these agendas, he opted to pursue both simultaneously. A major health care initiative was piled on top of the financial rescue plan and the stimulus package, exacerbating the public’s sticker shock. And initiatives such as climate change legislation and comprehensive immigration reform remained in play long after it should have been clear that they stood no serious chance of enactment while pervasive economic distress dominated the political landscape.

In his TNR piece, Galston looks at the political mechanics of how the House was lost, and suggests that a strong rightward shift in ideology among independents since 2006, and a general decline in the percentage of Americans who perceive themselves as moderate, are not just factors that explain 2010 but represent a fundamental challenge to the Democratic Party:

According to the Pew Research Center, conservatives as a share of total Independents rose from 29 percent in 2006 to 36 percent in 2010. Gallup finds exactly the same thing: The conservative share rose from 28 percent to 36 percent while moderates declined from 46 percent to 41 percent.
This shift is part of a broader trend: Over the past two decades, moderates have trended down as share of the total electorate while conservatives have gone up. … Unless the long-term decline of moderates and rise of conservatives is reversed during the next two years, the ideological balance of the electorate in 2012 could look a lot like it did this year.

With his CAP colleague John Halpin, Teixeira has developed a take that focuses more on the structural background of the 2010 elections than on a narrative of what Obama and congressional Democrats did right or wrong over the last two years. As they succinctly put it in their TNR piece:

Why did the Democrats decisively lose this election? It’s not really a mystery. The 2010 midterms were shaped by three fundamental factors: the poor state of the economy, the abnormally conservative composition of the midterm electorate, and the large number of vulnerable seats in conservative-leaning areas.

Laying it out in greater detail for CAP, Teixeira and Halpin put it this way:

Independent voters, white working-class voters, seniors, and men broke heavily against the Democrats due to the economy. Turnout levels were also unusually low among young and minority voters and unusually high among seniors, whites, and conservatives, thus contributing to a massively skewed midterm electorate. The Democrats therefore faced a predictable, and arguably unavoidable, convergence of forces. Incumbent Democrats suffered a genuine backlash of voter discontent due to a weak economy with considerable concerns about job creation, deep skepticism among independents, poor turnout among key base groups, and strong enthusiasm among energized conservatives.

They go through these factors in some detail, and have this to say about the many conflicting theories circulating among the chattering classes:

Political commentators are notoriously prone to overinterpreting election results and extrapolating singular causes for victories and losses from a multitude of possible factors. These interpretations usually underlie some desire to influence ideological debates and power struggles or to shape media stories about the election. And 2010 is no different….
Years of political science research show fairly conclusively that structural issues explain most of the variance in election results. Context, candidates, and politics matter, of course. But progressives should examine the basics if they want to understand why 2010 happened as it did: the poor condition of the economy; a conservative-leaning midterm electorate; and a Democratic Party with many marginal seats to lose. Strategic and policy decisions certainly made some difference in the magnitude of losses, but in a horrible economy it’s difficult to escape the reality that Democrats were poised to lose a significant number of seats no matter what they did.

Given their widely varying takes on the election, it’s not surprising that Galston and Teixeira have different advice for Democrats going forward, with Galston expressing optimism about a more limited and less partisan agenda along the lines of President Clinton’s approach after 1994, while Teixeira and Halpin suggest a reengagement with those elements of the electorate that stayed home in 2010 but tend to vote in presidential elections. But they agree completely that positive action and positive results on the economy are a must.

In the next several weeks two things are certain to occur:

• Dems will engage in a robust and often bitter debate about the strategic lessons of the elections
• The mainstream media will build this into a “Dems in disarray” narrative that will have major negative consequences for Democratic morale, mobilization and public image.

The problem is particularly acute this year because Democrats are now facing a Republican Party even more extreme and radicalized than the one that emerged after the mid-term elections of 1994. The conservative advances in this election will encourage conservatives and Republicans to immediately launch a broad and intense attack, not only on the administration, but also on the network of individuals, groups and institutions that support Democratic officeholders, candidates and causes. Unions, environmental groups, think-tanks, social cause organizations and foundations will all find themselves directly in the cross-hairs.
During this critical period, the “Dems in disarray” narrative and perception will significantly weaken Democrats ability to resist this assault. As a result, it is urgent that Democrats seriously try to agree upon certain basic understandings about how to maintain the maximum degree of unity and cohesion as a political coalition and community while still engaging in a robust internal debate about the meaning and lessons of the election.
On the one hand, long Democratic tradition and culture insures that advocates for the major strategic perspectives within the Democratic Party will all energetically argue for their interpretation of the election results. In the coming weeks several hundred articles and several thousand web commentaries, comments, posts and discussion threads will debate these assertions in intense detail.
On the central issue of Obama’s performance, the vast majority of these analyses will fall into one of the following six categories:

1. Obama is basically doing as well as is realistically possible in the circumstances – his unpopularity is an inevitable side-effect of his trying to pass controversial legislation in an adverse economic environment.
2. Obama has made substantial mistakes on various issues, but overall he still deserves support.
3. Obama adopted too radical an agenda. He should have embraced more moderate, centrist positions then those he chose.
4. Obama allowed himself to be caricatured as more radical than he and his programs actually are. He needs to substantially revise his rhetoric and behavior.
5. Obama was too cautious and timid in embracing a coherent progressive program. He needed to take a significantly more forceful and indeed radical stance in a number of different areas, the economy in particular.
6. Obama allowed himself to be dragged down into Washington’s permanent culture of corruption, a culture that embraces not only the White House but all of Congress and the political system. Democrats cannot achieve meaningful change without fundamentally reforming the entire system.

Whatever their choice among the six views above, analysts will also argue that five other specific issues also profoundly affected the election outcome (1) “structural” factors like the normal, more conservative demographic slant of off-year election voters and the unusual number of Democrats who were running for re-election from basically Republican districts (2) the bad economy (3) the exceptional “inside” view voters had of the “sausage making” for the health Care bill (4) the huge and unprecedented partisan role of Fox and the right-wing media (5) the massive surge of secret campaign contributions .
Yet, despite the inevitable outpouring of articles and commentaries on all these subjects, few Democrats will really expect any serious shifts in thinking to occur. Realistically, there are always enough ambiguities in election results to provide some support for any of the major points of view within the Democratic coalition and, as a result, the major intra-Democratic strategic perspectives have all been stable and enduring features of the Democratic Party’s ideological landscape for the last half-century. The truth is that all Democrats know perfectly well that in the next three or four months none of the six major viewpoints noted above is going to suddenly and magically disappear as a result of any new data or analysis that emerges from the intra-Democratic debate about this election.
As a result, there are two basic points of agreement on which Dems from all the major intra-party factions ought to be able to agree:

1. All of the major perspectives within the Democratic Party have a legitimate place and role in today’s Democratic coalition. While various elements of both the centrist and progressive wings of the party may sincerely believe that in the long run a smaller but more ideologically united party would ultimately be preferable, the present moment categorically demands a basic level of Democratic unity from every element of the coalition.
2. To successfully defend the Democratic Party and its allied institutions against the very powerful conservative offensive that will come after the election, advocates of all major perspectives must proudly and explicitly assert that there are basic values and core areas of agreement unite them with all other Democrats and that they are prepared to present a solid and united front against the external threat posed by Republican extremism.

This can be asserted — to the mainstream media and the country as a whole — as follows:
Disagreements among Democrats are arguments within a coalition and a community. We are all powerfully united by our profound opposition and deep sense of outrage at the socially irresponsible and politically extremist agenda that has been adopted by the Republican Party and we proudly stand together against it. We are united by our deep and profound belief that — As James Carville so eloquently expressed it in 1996 — “We’re right, you’re wrong”.
Do not mistake our diversity for disunity. Do not mistake our debates for division. Whatever our internal disagreements, they pale beside our common rejection of the extremist world-view that has permeated the Republican Party. We Democrats have a wide range of views within our coalition, but we stand together as one united political party in our dreams for a better future and our readiness to join together as one to confront and withstand conservative attack.
This should be a common ground for all Democrats. Dems from all sectors of the party and points of view should consistently express it, particularly when dealing with the mainstream media. Dems cannot stop the mainstream media from pushing the Dems in disarray” narrative but they can all energetically and forcefully push back against it at every opportunity.
Ed Kilgore
James Vega
J.P. Green

Last night’s returns contained a few surprises, but for the most part, were only surprising to people who hadn’t been paying much attention, and to those conservative commentators who had been predicting a Republican takeover of the Senate and House gains in the neighborhood of 80-100 seats. It was indeed a Republican “wave” election, but not what you’d rightly call a tsunami.
When it’s all said and done (projections of outstanding votes are very favorable to Michael Bennet of CO and Patty Murray of WA), it’s likely that Democrats will retain a 53-47 margin in the Senate, which means Republicans will not be in a position to tempt Ben Nelson or Joe Lieberman to “flip” and give them control. Had things gone a little differently in the very close Senate races in PA or IL, the margin could have gone even higher, but Democrats aren’t complaining.
It appears Republican gains in the House will wind up at around 64 or 65 seats. Looking quickly at the casualties, it appears the vast majority were either veterans in heavily Republican territory or Class of 2006-2008 “Democratic wave” members. Six wins were in southern open districts that were all but conceded months ago. There were virtually no out-of-the-blue upsets; as Nate Silver put it early this morning, it was a very “orderly wave.”
But Republicans did seem to enjoy some luck at the margins. They won the national House popular vote by between 6% and 7% (which means the final Gallup generic poll, predicting a 15-point margin, was indeed an outlier, along with Rasmussen, which predicted a 12-point margin). This margin would in theory normally produce a gain of about 55 seats. The excess peformance will be attributed to superior Republican vote “efficiency,” which is another way of saying that the advantage they obtained during the last round of redistricting endured to the end.
Speaking of redistricting, the worst news of the night for Democrats was in state legislative races. Republicans appear to have gained control of 15 state legislative chambers. In conjunction with gubernatorial wins, they obtained control of the redistricting process in several big states which will lose House seats (alway an opportunity for gerrymandering mischief), including Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania.
Overall, governorships went about as expected (though several have yet to be resolved, including CT, which had a lot of polling place irregularites), with Republicans likely to control 29 or 30. If Rick Scott’s lead in Florida holds up, that will be a bitter defeat fr Democrats, though the impact might be mitigated somewhat by the simultaneous passage of a initiative creating an independent redistricting commission. Democrats were hit hard in the Rust Belt, where several long-serving term-limited Democratic incumbents had become so unpopular that the entire ticket suffered (i.e., PA, MI and WI). The national wave almost certainly extinguished several well-fought Democratic gubernatorial candidacies, including those of Ted Strickland in OH and Vincent Sheheen in SC.
Finally, something must be said about the electorate that produced these results. According to national exit polls, 2010 voters broke almost evenly in terms of their 2008 presidential votes; indeed, given the normal tendency of voters to “misremember” past ballots as being in favor of the winner, this may have been an electorate that would have made John McCain president by a significant margin. Voters under 30 dropped from 18% of the electorate to 11%; African-Americans from 13% to 10%, and Hispanics from 9% to 8%. Meanwhile, voters over 65, the one age category carried by John McCain, increased from 16% of the electorate to 23%.
These are all normal midterm numbers. But because of the unusual alignment of voters by age and race in 2008, they produced a very different outcome, independently of any changes in public opinion. Indeed, sorting out the “structural” from the “discretionary” factors in 2008-2010 trends will be one of the most important tasks of post-election analysis, since the 2012 electorate will be much closer to that of 2008. That’s also true of the factor we will hear most about in post-election talk: the “swing” of independents from favoring Obama decisively in 2008 to favoring Republicans decisively this year. Are these the same people (short answer: not as much as you’d think), or a significantly different group of voters who happened to self-identify as independents and turned out to vote?
We’ll also hear far, far more than is useful about the radical changes the White House needs to make in order to put the president in position to be re-elected in 2012. An even more pertinent question is how Republicans will deal with their electoral windfall, particularly given the realities of the much less favorable electorate they will face in 2012. When given the rather limited choice of supporting, as the “highest priority” for Congress, either “cutting taxes, reducing the budget deficit, or spending to create jobs,” exit polls show 18% wanting to cut taxes and 39% wanting to reduce the deficit. The newly empowered GOP, of course, is committed to both courses of action, which are incompatible without deeply unpopular spending cuts. And this fiscal problem is completely independent of the other furies unleashed by conservatives over the last two years, including a determination to deregulate corporations, turn back the clock on abortion and GLBT rights, and demonize the president (a demand of the “base” they will be in a position to indulge through their new perches in House committees).
Some analysts will make much of the defeat of several Tea Party champions yesterday, notably Christine O’Donnell, Sharron Angle, Ken Buck (if Bennet’s lead holds up) and perhaps, around Thanksgiving time, of Joe Miller. But put aside individuals candidates. Just as the Tea Party Movement represents the radicalization of the GOP’s conservative base, the Tea Party Movement itself has radicalized the Republican Party beyond the point of turning back. No “grownups” are going to rescue that party from the Class of 2010 and the now-invincible belief of conservatives that they won by moving hard right. So we may have to wait until 2012 to understand the true legacy of this election. This wave definitely has an undertow.

It appears that the GOP leadership is already a tad delusional about the dimensions of the political leverage they gained on Tuesday, at least judging by the comments of Speaker-in-waiting John Boehner, who is quoted in today’s New York Times thusly:

I believe that the health care bill that was enacted by the current Congress will kill jobs in America, ruin the best health-care system in the world and bankrupt our country…That means that we have to do everything we can to try to repeal this bill, and replace it with common-sense reforms that will bring down the cost of health insurance.

Never mind the legislative obstacles to repealing HCR just yet. Boehner has a ways to go before he can claim support from the public, as TDS Co-Editor Ruy Teixeira explains in his latest ‘Public Opinion Snapshot’:

…Claiming a mandate doesn’t make it so. Consider these results from two recent polls…A mid-October AP-GfK poll asked respondents what they would prefer Congress to do about the new health care law. Contrary to the conservative story line, 57 percent wanted to either leave the law as is (18 percent) or change it so it does more to change the health care system (39 percent). On the other side, 41 percent wanted the law changed so that it does less to change the health care system (9 percent) or completely repealed (32 percent).
In a late October CBS News/New York Times poll respondents were first asked if they favored repeal of health care reform: 45 percent said no and 41 percent said yes. Those favoring repeal were then asked whether they would still support repeal if that meant “insurance companies were no longer required to cover people with existing medical conditions or prior illnesses.” That query reduced the pro-repeal contingent to just 25 percent.

As Teixeira says, “That’s not exactly a mandate for appeal.” You can’t blame Boehner for feeling a smidge triumphalist today. But the public has a different take on the repeal thing. Earth to Boehner.