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The Democratic Strategist

Political Strategy for a Permanent Democratic Majority

Month: September 2010

GQR Report: Framing Key to Dem Midterm Performance

Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner Research has issued a new alert (executive summary here, PDF analysis here) , “Changing the Framework and Outcome in 2010,” which provides data indicating that Democratic candidates can benefit from a more sharply-focused framing of their message. According to the executive summary of the GQR web survey , which was conducted 9/1-2 among key groups of the “Rising American Electorate,” including youth, unmarried women, and minorities; and white non-college educated respondents:

Democratic congressional candidates can move these races in the final two months if they frame this election as a clear choice and battle for the middle class, against the big financial interests dominating Washington and which Republicans champion. This is a moment to refocus. With the unemployment rate going up, voters deeply frustrated and desperate, and Democrats down 7 points in the congressional vote, we need and can adopt a new formula. Our research demonstrates that Democratic messaging can beat powerful Republican messages, moving voters and closing the congressional gap by an impressive 9 points.

The survey, along with follow-up focus groups, tested tax messages “best suited for this election environment,” and found that,

…Even in the face of powerful Republican messages on debt, spending, government takeover and a failed economic recovery program, the right framework really moves voters to the Democrats, particularly the new Democratic base of young people, unmarried women, and minorities, but also the more independent and conservative white working class.

The GQR alert notes, however, that to tap “the full power of this framework,” Democratic candidates and campaigns have to address related message points effectively, including:

* You must first communicate a commitment to change Washington — within this same framework. The Democratic candidate regrets the influence of the lobbyists and fights for ending oil company tax breaks, big corporate subsidies, self-regulation and unlimited corporate campaign money. Candidates have to be reformers — focused on helping the middle class and reining in corporate power. Hearing the candidate’s determination to change Washington first increases the impact of the middle class versus Wall Street message.
* This message weakens when combined with attacks on Republicans for spending cuts bad for the middle class. We tested another set of messages that included the identical language of the “battling for the middle class, against Wall Street” message, but combined with attacks on the Republicans for supporting the Paul Ryan budget with its Medicare and Social Security cuts. While the message scores just as high, it does not effect voters in the same dramatic way. The Democrats’ net gain on the congressional vote is only 2 points, compared to 9 points for the “change Washington, pro-middle class, against Wall Street frame.” Raising spending issues complicates the story.
* Being authentically for the middle class is the key to bringing voters back. Voters think most Democratic members of Congress have “gone Washington,” backed bailouts, forgotten their promises, and cashed in. But when asked to write down one thing they want the Democratic candidate to know, most of the focus group participants wrote something about the middle class: “We need to know the facts as to how you will help the middle class — STOP — the corporate spending — walk in our shoes”; “Emphasize that you are for the middle class.”

Applied widely, the 9-point edge that emerges in the tough-minded GQR re-framing could benefit a lot of Democratic candidates — and quite possibly block the GOP takeover of congress.


Lashed to the Mast

Weeks before the November elections, leaders of the Republican Party’s increasingly dominant right wing are spending nearly as much time fretting over the potential squeamishness of their own party about implementing a radical agenda as they are ensuring they get the opportunity to enact one.
In a CNN interview yesterday, Sen. Jim DeMint, the one-time kooky loner who’s now a Very Big Dog in the GOP, said the GOP would be “dead” if it didn’t keep its promises to repeal health care reform, balance the federal budget and radically reduce spending. Remember he’s the guy who thinks Social Security and Medicare have ensnared Americans in socialism, and likes to call public schools “government schools.”
Another fringe figure who’s suddenly become very relevant, congressman Steve King of Iowa, is frantic in his fears that a Republican House would fail to shut down the government as part of a strategy to repeal health reform. Indeed, he’s asking would-be Speaker John Boehner to sign a “blood oath” to include a health reform repeal in every single appropriations bill, which would have the effect of shutting down the government, just as Republicans tried to do, unsuccesfully, in 1995, in order to impose a budget on Bill Clinton.
This is a sideshow well worth watching. People like DeMint and King are trying to lash their fellow Republicans to the mast of their ship and make them immune to the siren song of the massive popularity of the public programs and commitments they aim to attack: Medicare, Social Security, federal support for educational opportunity, environmental protection, and on and on. It’s an interesting approach on the brink of what many expect to be a big Republican electoral victory, and says a lot about the gap between what Republicans are campaigning on and how they actually intend to govern when in office.


POLITCAL SCIENCE RESEARCH – SEPTEMBER 2010

From Perspectives on Politics

 

“There’s No One as Irish as Barack O’Bama”: The Policy and Politics of American Multiracialism

Jennifer Hochschild and Vesla Mae Weaver

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

For the first time in American history, the 2000 United States census allowed individuals to choose more than one race. That new policy sets up our exploration of whether and how multiracialism is entering Americans’ understanding and practice of race. By analyzing briefly earlier cases of racial construction, we uncover three factors important to understanding if and how intensely a feedback effect for racial classification will be generated. Using this framework, we find that multiracialism has been institutionalized in the federal government, and is moving toward institutionalization in the private sector and other governmental units. In addition, the small proportion of Americans who now define themselves as multiracial is growing absolutely and relatively, and evidence suggests a continued rise. Increasing multiracial identification is made more likely by racial mixture’s growing prominence in American society–demographically, culturally, economically, and psychologically. However, the politics side of the feedback loop is complicated by the fact that identification is not identity. Traditional racial or ethnic loyalties and understandings remain strong, including among potential multiracial identifiers. Therefore, if mixed-race identification is to evolve into a multiracial identity, it may not be at the expense of existing group consciousness. Instead, we expect mixed-race identity to be contextual, fluid, and additive, so that it can be layered onto rather than substituted for traditional monoracial commitments. If the multiracial movement successfully challenges the longstanding understanding and practice of “one drop of blood” racial groups, it has the potential to change much of the politics and policy of American race relations.

 

 

How ACORN Was Framed: Political Controversy and Media Agenda Setting

 

Peter Dreier and Christopher R. Martin

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

Using the news controversy over the community group ACORN, we illustrate the way that the media help set the agenda for public debate and frame the way that debate is shaped. Opinion entrepreneurs (primarily business and conservative groups and individuals, often working through web sites) set the story in motion as early as 2006, the conservative echo chamber orchestrated an anti-ACORN campaign in 2008, the Republican presidential campaign repeated the allegations with a more prominent platform, and the mainstream media reported the allegations without investigating their veracity. As a result, the little-known community organization became the subject of great controversy in the 2008 US presidential campaign, and was recognizable by 82 percent of respondents in a national survey. We analyze 2007-2008 coverage of ACORN by 15 major news media organizations and the narrative frames of their 647 stories during that period. Voter fraud was the dominant story frame, with 55 percent of the stories analyzed using it. We demonstrate that the national news media agenda is easily permeated by a persistent media campaign by opinion entrepreneurs alleging controversy, even when there is little or no truth to the story. Conversely, local news media, working outside of elite national news media sources to verify the most essential facts of the story, were the least likely to latch onto the “voter fraud” bandwagon.

 

 

Varieties of  Obamaism: Structure, Agency, and the Obama Presidency

 

Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond S. King

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

President Obama’s record stands out among modern presidents because of the wide range between his accomplishments and the boldness of his as-yet unfulfilled promises. Obamaism is a complex phenomenon, with multiple themes and policy ends. In this paper we examine the administration’s initiatives drawing upon recent scholarship in political science to consider the political, economic and institutional constraints that Obama has faced and to assess how he has faced them. Our key theme is the importance of integrating the study of presidency and public leadership with the study of the political economy of the state. The paper argues against personalistic accounts of the Obama presidency in favor of a structured agency approach.

 

 

Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era

 

Suzanne Mettler

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

President Barack Obama came into office with a social welfare policy agenda that aimed to reconstitute what can be understood as the “submerged state”: a conglomeration of existing federal policies that incentivize and subsidize activities engaged in by private actors and individuals. By attempting to restructure the political economy involved in taxation, higher education policy, and health care, Obama ventured into a policy terrain that presents immense obstacles to reform itself and to the public’s perception of its success. Over time the submerged state has fostered the profitability of particular industries and induced them to increase their political capacity, which they have exercised in efforts to maintain the status quo. Yet the submerged state simultaneously eludes most ordinary citizens: they have little awareness of its policies or their upwardly redistributive effects, and few are cognizant of what is at stake in reform efforts. This article shows how, in each of the three policy areas, the contours and dynamics of the submerged state have shaped the possibilities for reform and the form it has taken, the politics surrounding it, and its prospects for success. While the Obama Administration won hard-fought legislative accomplishments in each area, political success will continue to depend on how well policy design, policy delivery and political communication reveal policy reforms to citizens, so that they better understand how reforms function and what has been achieved.

 

 

Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration

 

Daniel Carpenter

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

The politics of financial reform represent a genuine test case for American politics and its institutions. The Obama administration’s proposed reforms pit common (largely unorganized) interests against well-organized and wealthy minority interests. I describe how the withering and unfolding of financial reform has occurred not through open institutional opposition but through a quieter process that I call institutional strangulation. Institutional strangulation consists of much more than the stoppage of policies by aggregation of veto points as designed in the US Constitution. In the case of financial reform, it has non-constitutional veto points, including committee politics and cultural veto points (gender and professional finance), strategies of partisan intransigence, and perhaps most significantly, the bureaucratic politics of turf and reputation. These patterns can weaken common-interest reforms, especially in the broad arena of consumer protection.

 

 

The American Labor Movement in the Age of Obama: The Challenges and Opportunities of a Racialized Political Economy

 

Dorian T. Warren

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

The relative weakness of the American labor movement has broader political consequences, particularly for the ambitions of the Obama presidency. Absent a strong countervailing political constituency like organized labor, well-organized and more powerful stakeholders like business and industry groups are able to exert undue influence in American democracy, thereby frustrating attempts at political reform. I argue that it is impossible to understand the current political situation confronting the Obama administration without an account of the underlying sources of labor weakness in the U.S. In such an account two factors loom especially large. One is the role of the state in structuring labor market institutions and the rules of the game for labor-business interactions. The second is the distinctively racialized character of the U.S. political economy, which has contributed to labor market segmentation, a unique political geography, and the racial division of the U.S. working class. In our current post-industrial, post-civil rights racial and economic order, whether and how the labor movement can overcome its historical racial fragmentation will determine its possibilities for renewal and ultimately its political strength in relation to the Obama presidency. If the labor movement remains an uneven and weak regional organization hobbled by racial fragmentation, the Obama Administration’s efforts to advance its core policy agenda will lack the necessary political force to be effective.

 

 

The Road to Somewhere: Why Health Reform Happened

Or Why Political Scientists Who Write about Public Policy Shouldn’t Assume They Know How to Shape It

 

Jacob S. Hacker

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

Why did comprehensive health care reform pass in 2010? Why did it take the form it did–a form that, while undeniably ambitious, was also more limited than many advocates wanted, than health policy precedents set abroad, and than the scale of the problems it tackled? And why was this legislation, despite its limits, the subject of such vigorous and sometimes vicious attacks? These are the questions I tackle in this essay, drawing not just on recent scholarship on American politics but also on the somewhat-improbable experience that I had as an active participant in this fierce and polarized debate. My conclusions have implications not only for how political scientists should understand what happened in 2009-10, but also for how they should understand American politics. In particular, the central puzzles raised by the health reform debate suggest why students of American politics should give public policy–what government does to shape people’s lives–a more central place within their investigations. Political scientists often characterize politics as a game among undifferentiated competitors, played out largely through campaigns and elections, with policy treated mostly as an afterthought–at best, as a means of testing theories of electoral influence and legislative politics. The health care debate makes transparent the weaknesses of this approach. On a range of key matters at the core of the discipline–the role and influence of interest groups; the nature of partisan policy competition; the sources of elite polarization; the relationship between voters, activists, and elected officials; and more–the substance of public policy makes a big difference. Focusing on what government actually does has normative benefits, serving as a useful corrective to the tendency of political science to veer into discussions of matters deemed trivial by most of the world outside the academy. But more important, it has major analytical payoffs–and not merely for our understanding of the great health care debate of 2009-10.

 

 

Democracy and Distrust

A Discussion of Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust

 

Philippe C. Schmitter,  Donatella della Porta and Mark E. Warren

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

Pierre Rosanvallon is one of the most important political theorists writing in French. Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust is a book about the limits of conventional understandings of democracy. Rosanvallon argues that while most theories of democracy focus on institutionalized forms of political participation (especially elections), the vitality of democracy rests equally on forms of “counter-democracy” through which citizens dissent, protest, and exert pressure from without on the democratic state. This argument is relevant to the concerns of a broad range of political scientists, most especially students of democratic theory, electoral and party politics, social movements, social capital, and “contentious politics.” The goal of this symposium is to invite a number of political scientists who work on these issues to comment on the book from their distinctive disciplinary, methodological, and theoretical perspectives.–Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

 

 

Dreaming Blackness: Black Nationalism and African American Public Opinion. By Melanye T. Price

 

Robert Gooding-Williams

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

This is a timely, engaging, and illuminating study of Black Nationalism. The book’s “fundamental project,” Melanye T. Price writes, “is to systematically understand individual Black Nationalism adherence among African Americans in the post-Civil Rights era” (p. 60). Black Nationalism has a long history in African American politics, but with the demise of Jim Crow and the election of our first black president, we may reasonably wonder whether ordinary African American citizens are disposed to endorse it. Price’s book is important because it addresses this question head-on, defending the thesis that a renewal of Black Nationalism remains a viable possibility in post-Obama America.

 

 

Response to Robert Gooding-Williams’ review of Dreaming Blackness: Black Nationalism and African American Public Opinion

Melanye T. Price

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

In Dreaming Blackness, I had two major goals. First, I hoped to elucidate how changes in the American racial landscape have impacted African American support for black nationalism. To this end, I used a mixed methodological approach that included both statistical and qualitative analysis and allowed me to make claims based on a national cross section of African Americans and on more intimate discussions in smaller groups. Second, I wanted to ground my arguments in a robust discussion of African American political thought. This would ensure that my hypotheses and findings were resonant with a longitudinal understanding of how black nationalist ideology is characterized. Robert Gooding-Williams, with some caveats, suggests that I have accomplished these goals. I now address his two areas of concern related to evolving definitions of black nationalism and possible alternative interpretations, and I conclude by addressing our differing impressions of the future viability of this ideological option.

 

 

From Public Opinion Quarterly

Probabilistic Polling And Voting In The 2008 Presidential Election

Evidence From The American Life Panel

 

Adeline Delavande and Charles F. Manski

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

This article reports new empirical evidence on probabilistic polling, which asks persons to state in percent-chance terms the likelihood that they will vote and for whom. Before the 2008 presidential election, seven waves of probabilistic questions were administered biweekly to participants in the American Life Panel (ALP). Actual voting behavior was reported after the election. We find that responses to the verbal and probabilistic questions are well-aligned ordinally. Moreover, the probabilistic responses predict voting behavior beyond what is possible using verbal responses alone. The probabilistic responses have more predictive power in early August, and the verbal responses have more power in late October. However, throughout the sample period, one can predict voting behavior better using both types of responses than either one alone. Studying the longitudinal pattern of responses, we segment respondents into those who are consistently pro-Obama, consistently anti-Obama, and undecided/vacillators. Membership in the consistently pro- or anti-Obama group is an almost perfect predictor of actual voting behavior, while the undecided/vacillators group has more nuanced voting behavior. We find that treating the ALP as a panel improves predictive power: current and previous polling responses together provide more predictive power than do current responses alone.

 

The Effect of Question Framing and Response Options on the Relationship between Racial Attitudes and Beliefs about Genes as Causes of Behavior

Eleanor Singer, Mick P. Couper, Trivellore E. Raghunathan, Toni C. Antonucci, Margit Burmeister and John Van Hoewyk

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

Prior research suggests that the attribution of individual and group differences to genetic causes is correlated with prejudiced attitudes toward minority groups. Our study suggests that these findings may be due to the wording of the questions and to the choice of response options. Using a series of vignettes in an online survey, we find a relationship between racial attitudes and genetic attributions when respondents are asked to make causal attributions of differences between racial groups. However, when they are asked to make causal attributions for characteristics shown by individuals, no such relationship is found. The response scale used appears to make less, if any, difference in the results. These findings indicate that the way questions about genetic causation of behavior are framed makes a significant contribution to the answers obtained because it significantly changes the meaning of the questions. We argue that such framing needs to be carefully attended to, not only in posing research questions but also in discourse about genetics more generally.

 

 

The Macro Politics of a Gender Gap

Paul M. Kellstedt, David A. M. Peterson and Mark D. Ramirez

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

What explains the dynamic movement in the gender gap in public opinion toward government activism over the past 30 years? The thermostatic model of politics suggests that aggregate public opinion adjusts to liberal changes in public policy by preferring less government and to conservative changes in policy by preferring more government. Given the cross-sectional differences in policy preferences between men and women, we argue that the dynamic movement in the gender gap in policy preferences for more or less government spending is a function of asymmetrical responses by men and women to changes in public policy. We find that both men and women respond to changes in public policy by shifting their policy preferences in the same direction. But men appear more responsive to policy changes than do women. It is this asymmetrical response to changes in public policy that is responsible for the dynamics of the gender gap in policy preferences across time. Our results show that the gap increases when policy moves in a liberal direction, as men move in a conservative direction at a faster rate than women. In contrast, when policy moves to the right, the opinions of both men and women will respond by moving to the left, but the greater responsiveness among men will decrease the gap, bringing male preferences closer to the preferences of women.

 

“Sour Grapes” or Rational Voting? Voter Decision Making Among Thwarted Primary Voters in 2008

Michael Henderson, D. Sunshine Hillygus and Trevor Tompson

 

September 2010

ABSTRACT

During the 2008 presidential campaign, journalists and pundits debated the electoral consequences of the prolonged and hard-fought nomination contest between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. Previous research, typically using aggregate vote returns, has concluded that divisive primaries negatively impact the electoral prospects of the winning candidate. It is thought that supporters of the losing candidate are less likely to vote and more likely to defect because of psychological disaffection, or “sour grapes.” Using a new panel dataset that traces individual candidate preferences during the primary and general election campaigns, we are able to explicitly examine individual-level decision making in the general election conditioned on voting behavior in the primary. Although “sour grapes” had a modest effect on eventual support for the party nominee, fundamental political considerations–especially attitudes on the War in Iraq–were far better predictors of the vote decision among thwarted voters. Moreover, we find that supporters of losing Democratic candidates were far more likely to vote for Obama if they lived in a battleground state.

 

Political Parties and Value Consistency in Public Opinion Formation

Michael Bang Petersen, Rune Slothuus and Lise Togeby

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

Many have been concerned about the ability of citizens to ground their specific political preferences in more general principles. We test the longstanding intuition that political elites, and political parties in particular, can help citizens improve the quality of their political opinions–understood as the consistency between citizens’ specific opinions and their deeper political values. We integrate two major areas of research in political behavior that rarely speak together–political parties and framing–to argue that the structure of party competition frames issues by signaling what political values are at stake and hence enables citizens to take the side most consistent with their basic principles. With a unique experimental design embedded in a nationally representative survey, we find strong support for this argument. Our findings imply that low levels of value-opinion consistency are driven not only by citizens’ lack of interest in politics but also by parties failing in providing clear signals.

 

The Polls–Trends

Attitudes About The American Dream

Sandra L. Hanson and John Zogby

ABSTRACT

Results from a number of U.S. public opinion polls collected in the past two decades are used to examine trends in attitudes about the American Dream. Trends are examined in the following areas: “What is the American Dream?” “Is the American Dream achievable?” and “What is the role of government and politics in the American Dream?” Findings suggest that a majority of Americans consistently reported that the American Dream (for themselves and their family) is more about spiritual happiness than material goods. However, the size of this majority is decreasing. Most Americans continued to believe that working hard is the most important element for getting ahead in the United States. However, in some surveys, an increasing minority of Americans reported that this hard work and determination does not guarantee success. A majority of respondents believe that achieving the American Dream will be more difficult for future generations, although this majority is becoming smaller. Americans are increasingly pessimistic about the opportunity for the working class to get ahead and increasingly optimistic about the opportunity for the poor and immigrants to get ahead in the United States. Although trends show consistency in Americans blaming Blacks for their condition (not discrimination), a majority of Americans consistently support programs that make special efforts to help minorities get ahead.

 

From American Political Science Review

 

Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress

 

Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

We consider the relationship between the preferences of American voters and the preferences of the U.S. legislators who represent them. Using an Internet-based, national opinion survey in conjunction with legislator voting records from the 109th and 110th Congresses, we show that members of Congress are more extreme than their constituents, i.e., that there is a lack of congruence between American voters and members of Congress. We also show that when a congressional legislator is replaced by a new member of the opposite party, one relative extremist is replaced by an opposing extremist. We call this leapfrog representation, a form of representation that leaves moderates with a dearth of representation in Congress. We see evidence of leapfrog representation in states and House districts and in the aggregate as well: the median member of the 109th House was too conservative compared to the median American voter, yet the median of the 110th House was too liberal. Thus, the median American voter was leapfrogged when the 109th House transitioned to the 110th. Although turnover between the 109th and 110th Senates occurred at approximately the same rate as between the 109th and 110th Houses, the Senate appears to be a more moderate institution whose median member does not move as abruptly as that of the House.

 

From Politics and Society

Economic Ideas and the Political Process: Debating Tax Cuts in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962-1981

Elizabeth Popp Berman and Nicholas Pagnucco

 

September 2010

 

ABSTRACT

 

While sociologists and political scientists have become interested in the role of ideas in the political process, relatively little work looks at how ideological claims are actually deployed in political discourse. This article examines the economic claims made in two pairs of Congressional debates over tax cuts, one (in 1962 and 1964) generally associated with Keynesian economic theories, and one (in 1978 and 1981) tied to supply-side ideas. While these bills were indeed initiated by groups subscribing to different economic ideologies, subsequent debates look surprisingly similar. The bills were closer in substance than one might expect, and while their proponents came from opposite political camps, in both cases supporters focused more on supply-side than demand-side effects and emphasized tax cuts’ ability to pay for themselves through economic stimulation. The authors propose that politically acceptable economic claims may evolve more slowly than the economic theories that inspire policy entrepreneurs, and that this “discursive opportunity structure” may not only constrain the political process but may potentially shape the political effects of expert knowledge.

 

 

Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the Liberal State

 

Antje Ellermann

September 2010

ABSTRACT

This article explores the possibility of resistance under conditions of extreme state power in liberal democracies. It examines the strategies of migrants without legal status who, when threatened with one of the most awesome powers of the liberal state–expulsion–shed their legal identity in order to escape the state’s reach. Remarkably, in doing so, they often succeed in preventing the state from exercising its sovereign powers. The article argues that liberal states are uniquely constrained in their dealing with undocumented migrants. Not only are they forced to operate within the constraints of the international legal order–making repatriation contingent on the possession of identity documents–but the liberal state is also constitutionally limited in its exercise of coercion against the individual. The article concludes that it is those individuals who have the weakest claims against the liberal state that are most able to constrain its exercise of sovereignty.


Best Laid Plans

Before everyone becomes convinced that the results of the midterm elections are already carved into stone, by the zeitgeist, the “enthusiasm gap,” the economy, or the electoral map, it’s a good idea to be reminded that weird things can happen between and betwixt campaigns and election days.
Rather obviously, no one much thought Christine O’Donnell would be the Republican Senate nominee in Delaware a couple of weeks ago.
But there’s another example developing down in Georgia, where Republican gubernatorial nominee Nathan Deal’s long-simmering ethics issues about his private businesses just got considerably reinforced by his forced admission that he’s got some very large business debts that he somehow forgot to disclose on legally required state disclosures.
Deal’s trying to reassure supporters on various fronts: arguing the loans were to help out his daughter, who had stumbled into a really bad business investment; asserting he’s entirely solvent; trying a sort of Bill Clintonish “I feel your pain” message aimed at voters with financial problems; and, of course, blaming the whole incident on the godless liberal news media and his political opponents.
But a quick poll of the governor’s race taken last night by Insider Advantage indicates Deal has lost the lead he appeared to have opened up on Democratic Roy Barnes in the weeks after his nomination.
Deal may well recover and win handily. But like developments in Delaware, his latest problems are a handy reminder that for all the importance of fundamentals, money and message, the best laid plans of candidates can be blown up by the unforeseeable event.


The Pure Referendum Argument About Midterms

A lot of the discussion about the midterm elections, both here and in many quarters, has revolved around the question of whether these elections will ultimately be a referendum on the status quo or a “comparative” election based on assessments of the two parties. The default drive assumption in most MSM commentary (and the approach being promoted for obvious reasons by conservative media) is that it’s a referendum, which is of course a self-fulfilling prophecy if Democrats fail to change that perception because they think it’s inevitable.
But you probably won’t see a purer presentation of the “referendum” argument than that offered by New York Times columnist David Brooks yesterday. He’s taking this on in order to push back against some asserted belief by “my liberal friends” that America’s on the brink of repudiating the GOP because its Tea Party faction is so crazy.

The fact is, as the Tea Party has surged, so has the G.O.P. When this primary season began in early February, voters wanted Democrats to retain control of Congress by 49 percent to 37 percent, according to an Associated Press-Gfk poll. In the ensuing months, Tea Party candidates won shocking victories in states from Florida to Alaska. The most recent A.P./Gfk poll now suggests that Americans want Republicans to take over Congress by 46 percent to 43 percent.

Being David Brooks and all, the columnist is not about to suggest that Americans really are eating up the Tea Party message like ice cream. Instead, he’s driven to saying nobody out there really cares what Republicans say or do:

Right now, the Tea Party doesn’t matter. The Republicans don’t matter. The economy and the Democrats are handing the G.O.P. a great, unearned revival.

Brooks does acknowledge that at some point, the extremism of the Movement will begin to matter:

This doesn’t mean that the Tea Party influence will be positive for Republicans over the long haul. The movement carries viruses that may infect the G.O.P. in the years ahead. Its members seek traditional, conservative ends, but they use radical means. Along the way, the movement has picked up some of the worst excesses of modern American culture: a narcissistic sense of victimization, an egomaniacal belief in one’s own rightness and purity, a willingness to distort the truth so that every conflict becomes a contest of pure good versus pure evil.

Yeah. But is the apparent indifference of likely midterm voters to the Tea Party excesses and what it means for the Republican Party a matter of not caring about it, or not really knowing about it? I mean, conservative activists do not typically run around boasting that they want radical changes in the U.S. Constitution, the abolition of Social Security and Medicare, and elimination of environmental laws, and when they do go publicly wacky, like Sharron Angle and Christine O’Donnell, they do pay a price for it.
But it’s the job of Democrats–and to some extent, of journalists like Brooks–to draw attention to what today’s Republicans actually think. And suggesting that such details really doesn’t matter is not helpful.


Abortion and the Tea Party

This item is cross-posted from The New Republic.
In most of the discussions of why Mike Castle lost the Republican Senate nomination in Delaware to the wacky conservative insurgent Christine O’Donnell, commentators emphasize that Castle crossed conservatives by voting for gun control, climate-change legislation, and TARP … as well as being pro-choice. In none of the analyses I’ve read has this last factor been emphasized, or treated as anything more significant than another indicator of his “moderation.”
Ignoring abortion as an issue is an inveterate habit of the chattering classes, particularly on the progressive side of the aisle. Few people, other than celebrating right-to-lifers, have noted how much the already slim ranks of pro-choice Republicans were thinned this primary season. Aside from Castle, Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison and Lisa Murkowski, and Representative Tom Campbell, have lost in major statewide contests.
This is a persistent blind spot in political commentary. When the 2008 presidential cycle began, Rudy Guiliani was treated often as the front-runner, even though his pro-choice views meant he’d have to skip the Iowa Republican Caucuses, which are beholden to that state’s right-to-life movement. Yet Rudy’s candidacy predictably crashed and burned. When John McCain was mulling his decision about a running-mate, the betting favorites in the commentariat were pro-choice figures Joe Lieberman and Tom Ridge. This simply wasn’t going to happen, because the right-to-life movement has an implicit veto over Republican convention nominees. The proved their power by threatening a convention revolt against a pro-choice running-mate, and a chastened McCain iinstead selected the right-to-lifers’ very favorite politician, an obscure governor whom progressives knew nothing about named Sarah Palin.
I see the same dynamic in political coverage this year. We have been told repeatedly that the Tea Party movement is all about economics and fiscal issues, and other than a couple of articles about how Carly Fiorina’s pro-life position is a problem for her in the general election, I’ve seen zero discussion of abortion this year in non-conservative publications, particularly as it affects the Republican primaries.
Perhaps because the national media tend to be secular, we are persistently underestimating the role that abortion plays in right-wing politics. Yet it is key to understanding some of the zealous opposition that caused GOP primary voters to overthrow Mike Castle. Unless you are an aficionado of conservative blogs, you probably didn’t notice the deep opposition that many on the right were taking to Castle’s pro-choice views. Here’s renowned right-wing activist Ken Blackwell:

In the interests of party unity, the pro-life majority in the GOP has gone along with many a “RINO,” hoping that Republicans like Arlen Specter, Susan Collins, and Olympia Snowe could at least be relied upon to stand with us against abortion funding and in favor of originalist judges. But Mike Castle went far beyond even these liberal Republicans.

Even if, as Jon Chait suggests in his brilliant take on the O’Donnell win, many conservative voters now think of climate change legislation as a serious threat to American freedom, it is worth remembering that the RTL movement considers abortion analogous to the Holocaust, and pro-choice pols to be enablers of monstrous evil–at worst conscious advocates of genocide.
This fact should inform the way we think about this year’s right-wing groundswell, and the role of Sarah Palin in particular. How many pundits recognized that her famous Facebook post, which declared that health care reform would authorize “death panels,” contained a dog whistle to her fellow right-to-lifers? Her statement that Trig Palin would be a likely victim of said death panels was the clear tip-off; the subtext was that godless liberals, frustrated by her refusal to kill Trig in the womb, had figured out an alternative means of finishing him off. This is unfortunately standard reasoning for committed anti-abortion activists, who are enraged by politicians and pundits who refuse to take their cause seriously.
For all the endless and interminable talk about “constitutionalism” on the right, it’s rarely acknowledged that lurking in the background is wrath about Roe v. Wade. The same is true with the rage about health care reform; if you read a lot of right-wing blogs, as I do, you’d note that fear about Obamacare producing a massive expansion of publicly-funded abortion was a major motivator of right-wing opposition. House Minority Leader John Boehner knew his constituency when he made this statement just prior to the House vote on health reform:

A ‘yes’ vote for this government takeover of health care is a ‘yes’ vote for sending hard-earned tax dollars to pay for abortions.

More generally, the anger associated with the entire Tea Party movement is, I suspect, traceable among many activists to endless frustration of its desire to end the “genocide” of legalized abortion, to which the GOP “establishment” has given little more than lip service.
Perhaps I’m overestimating the power of the abortion issue, and Mike Castle lost strictly because of his votes for climate-change legislation and TARP, or because he embodied his state’s establishment. But I’m inclined to think that his pro-choice position contributed mightily to his downfall. The abortion issue didn’t go away for the right the day the Tea Party started.


Midterm Opportunities Still There

For all you fatalists out there who essentially think there’s nothing to do politically but await the inevitable Republican landslide in November, you might want to take a look at the latest CBS-New York Times poll.
While there’s plenty of gloom-and-doom in the survey about negative perceptions of the economy, the direction of the country, and political incumbents, it’s also clear the GOP has not even come close to sealing the deal on their own “solutions:”

Voters do not perceive Republicans as having better ideas and disagree with them on the biggest economic issue of the campaign — whether to extend the Bush-era tax cuts for the wealthy — a sign the party has no real advantage on key pieces of their agenda, which makes it more necessary to run as a generic alternative to the party in power.

Attitudes towards congressional Republicans are significantly more negative than of congressional Democrats and Republicans are not perceived as having any clear plan for dealing with the country’s problems. To the extent that the Tea Party Movement is branding the GOP as obsessively concerned with budget deficits and levels of taxation, it’s worth noting that in response to an open-ended question about the most important issue facing the country, only 3% cited deficits and 1% taxes. Said movement itself now has a 18/30 favorable/unfavorable rating among self-identified independents, still another indication that its views are not exactly sweeping the nation.
The quote above from the Times story on the poll includes the most important takeaway: Republicans can only win the midterms if it’s strictly a referendum on the status quo. To the extent that voters start comparing the two parties, the GOP grows weaker. And that is why Democrats should brush aside fears of looking too “negative” and make the terrible “thinking” of their Republican opponents as clear as possible.
It’s also worth remembering that even if Republicans get through the midterms without being held accountable for an agenda that is alternatively empty and crack-brained, this “pass” won’t last forever, and certainly not through the presidential cycle of 2012.


New DCORPS Analysis: Big Edge for Dems in Tax Debate

A new Democracy Corps strategy and research paper, based on a poll of LV’s conducted 8/30-9/2 by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, spotlights a promising opportunity for Democratic candidates. From the analysis:

This will be a tough election, but fortunately, the unfolding tax issue can work strongly to help Democrats and define the choice in the election…Democrats are strongly aligned with public thinking and priorities. Only 38 percent [of all respondents] favor extending the Bush tax cuts for those over $250,000 – the official position of Republican leaders and candidates. Clearly messaging around this choice – with Democrats voting for middle class tax cuts, while starting to address the deficit and protecting Social Security, contrasted with Republican candidates who still believe trickle-down economics and worsening the deficit – works for progressives.

The survey analysis notes that the tax cut debate “…noticeably moves the congressional vote to the Democrats…” Further,

Frankly, they do not have many issues where:
…There is a 17-point margin in favor of the Democratic position, 55 to 38 percent.
…The strong messages gives a disproportionate lift to the Democratic candidates – scored 13 points better than named Democratic candidates while Republican messages performed half as well.
…There is an opportunity to show seriousness on the deficit, while undermining Republicans on the issue.
…The choice re-enforces Democrats’ core values and strongest framework for the election (for the middle class versus Wall Street).
The payoff from this debate comes in a 2-point narrowing of the Republican lead in the congressional vote after hearing the debate. And for the most powerful Democratic messages, it narrows the vote by 5 points, to 45 to 47 percent.

The poll also finds “majority support for a variety of tax cut measures to protect the middle class,” including:

* Over half – 55 percent – support increasing taxes by letting some or all of the Bush-era tax cuts expire. Specifically, 42 percent say the cuts should remain in place for the middle class, but expire for those making more than $250,000. Just 38 percent say all the tax cuts should remain in place. This is not a purely base issue – by a 17-point margin, independents favor raising taxes on the wealthy.
* This message is even more popular when it is contextualized by broader economic messages. By a 10-point margin, voters are persuaded and reassured by the idea of raising taxes on the wealthiest so that revenue can be used for deficit reduction and investment in jobs.
* Majorities clearly side with extending the cuts for the middle class, at least for some time. Voters favor extending the tax cuts for the middle class for two years, as some have proposed, while a similar majority favors extending these cuts permanently. The proposals receive intense popular support from Democrats, with all proposals advocating expiration of tax cuts getting more than six-in-ten support.

Despite the Dems’ 7 points deficit in the named congressional ballot late in the campaign, the survey strongly suggests that Dems can leverage the tax debate to shift the race in a favorable direction. As the DCORPS analysis explains:

We tested eight messages – four Democratic and four Republican. The messages performed comparably – but two of the Democratic messages had a clear impact on the vote choice – enough to move the results in November.
These messages have more pull than the best Republican ones, which perform 5 points better than the vote margin for a named Republican candidate in our congressional ballot test. By contrast, the two strongest progressive arguments perform at least 10 points better than Democrats perform on the named congressional vote.
Voters are receptive to a progressive position on the economy and are willing to support a tax increase for the wealthy. These messages also help consolidate Democrats, who are eager to mobilize on behalf of strong progressive candidates. Equally important – these messages move independents. The tax frame signals Democrats’ fiscal responsibility on the deficit and creates a clearly defined choice between Republicans (who are for the wealthy, big corporations, and Wall Street) and Democrats (who are unwilling to sacrifice the already suffering middle class for the benefit of the wealthiest.)
The progressive tax frames work best among groups that Democrats should already be targeting. The Rising American Electorate, including unmarried women, minorities, and voters under the age of 30, are particularly receptive to progressive tax messages. Two-thirds of the RAE find the “economic boost” message most appealing. About six-in-ten of the RAE felt the same about investment and deficit language. The “economic boost” message also wins majority support among ideological moderates (67 percent). Democrats can gain traction among base voters with these messages, and possibly grow support among those who have not yet determined their votes.

In terms of changing voter choices in November,

…These messages have a clear impact on vote choice. We re-asked the congressional ballot and found that those who only heard the top two Democratic messages moved toward Democrats, reducing the initial 7-point deficit to just a 2-point gap, at 45 to 47 percent. Meanwhile, those who heard the less strong Democratic arguments did not shift their vote choice, as Republicans maintained a 6-point lead.

Concerning the the debate over extending middle class tax cuts while allowing a tax hike for the wealthy, the anlaysis concludes, “…It reflects good policy during these tumultuous economic times, and could prove to be good politics for those facing an uphill battle this November.”
UPDATE: Greg Sargent’s The Plum Line post in the Washington Post features highlights from his interview with Stan Greenberg regarding the DCORPS survey analysis on leveraging the tax cuts issue. Greenberg strongly urges Democrats to bring the issue to a floor vote:

“A vote will make this issue real, and bring out the clarity of the Democrats’ position,” Greenberg told me. “This is an election that’s being profoundly shaped by who’s engaged. Republicans are engaged. They are turning out in large numbers.”
“You have got to give Democrats reasons to vote,” Greenberg continued. “Things have to be at stake for Democrats to vote. This is an opportunity to make politics relevant to these voters.”
Some Dem leaders have suggested that if Republicans block such a vote in the Senate a clear enough contrast between the parties will have been drawn, making a House vote unnecessary. But Greenberg dismissed this argument, saying that Dems should hold the vote to prevent the issue from fading from the headlines.
“If this gets blocked in the Senate without a visible filibuster, and if the House does not vote, this issue goes away,” Greenberg said. “This issue is only real if you hold a vote.”
Greenberg added that a vote would convince the base that “finally, Democrats are really fighting.” He added: “Taking this to a vote sends a very clear signal that we’re serious about this issue, and that we’re taking it to the Repubicans.”
Listening, Dems?


The Whitman Spending Machine Moves Remorselessly On

In case you missed it, Calfornia Republican gubernatorial nominee Meg Whitman has officially become the heaviest-spending non-presidential political candidate in U.S. history. Calbuzz has the numbers:

To the surprise of no one, eMeg has already shattered New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s self-funding record for a U.S. political campaign – with seven weeks left to go before the November 2 election.
With her most recent $15 million check to herself, eMeg has now personally forked out $119,075,806.11, according to the ever-punctilious Jack Chang. Rounding off and discounting the couch change, this means that she has spent an average of $203,767.12 on each and every one of the 584 days since she declared her candidacy.
For those keeping score at home that works out to a 24/7 average of $8490.29 per hour, $141.50 per minute, and $2.36 per second.
Talk about in for a dime, in for a dollar.

Whitman originally said she was willing to spend up to $150 million of her own money to win this race. Looks like she’s on track to hit that mark or exceed it by November 2, particularly if her contest with Jerry Brown stays as tight as everyone expects it to be.


TDS Co-Editor William Galston: How Will We Know If Netanyahu Is Serious About Peace?

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
The other shoe has now dropped in the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. In place of the partial freeze set to expire by the end of this month, Prime Minister Netanyahu intends to adopt more limited restraints on construction in the West Bank. Ha’aretz reports that Netanyahu will be going to Sharm El Sheik tomorrow with a proposal identical to one negotiated between his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, and the Bush administration: no construction in Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem; construction in isolated settlements only in built-up areas; and construction in the large settlement blocs near, as well as within, existing perimeters. (This last provision turned out to permit thousands of new housing units in Ma’aleh Adumim, Beitar Ilit, Modi’in Ilit, and Gush Etzion.)
While Netanyahu seems to be gambling that the Palestinians won’t respond to this “back to the future” proposal by pulling out of the talks, the basis for his optimism is unclear. In the wake of the Obama administration’s call early in 2009 for a complete freeze, the Israeli government eventually adopted the partial freeze now set to expire in less than three weeks. It took nearly a year of negotiations brokered by George Mitchell and Tony Blair before the Palestinians were willing to join face-to-face talks on that basis. The Palestinians have repeatedly said that they can accept nothing less, and that if the Israelis retrench further, Abbas and his team will quit the talks. At this point, there’s no reason not to take them at their word. After all, they were more reluctant than were the Israelis to return to direct talks in the first place.
So what’s the way forward? In recent months, Israeli officials have indicated privately their hope that if the Palestinians receive concessions in other areas–such as checkpoints and other restrictive security measures–that improve daily life on the West Bank, the freeze issue can be sidestepped. No doubt they will explore the viability of such an approach behind the scenes.
The other possibility is a somewhat grander bargain. At the cabinet meeting preceding the latest announcement, Netanyahu reportedly remarked, “We are saying that the solution is two states for two peoples. To my regret, I am still not hearing the phrase ‘two states for two peoples’ from the Palestinians. I am hearing them say ‘two states,’ but I am not hearing them recognize two states for two peoples.” This raises an intriguing possibility. Suppose the Prime Minister were to challenge President Abbas: “You want a wider freeze? Well, there’s something I’d like from you–namely, a recognition of the ‘two states for two peoples’ principle as the basis for further negotiations. Your need and my need rise or fall together.”
The objections to this strategy are obvious. First, the Palestinians might well reject it. True, but so what? If they did, Israel at least would be on the record as having shown flexibility on a matter of core concern. Second, whatever its fate, any offer along those lines might well spark an Israeli cabinet crisis. It probably would. But at some point Netanyahu will have to acknowledge that if he truly wants peace, he’ll need a different coalition–namely, the one that should have formed two years ago. Otherwise put: The decision that the current coalition must be preserved at all costs would represent the clearest possible evidence that this round of negotiations isn’t serious.
Well, speaking as an American Jew and as a sincere friend of Israel, I hope it is serious. If the negotiations end without result, I want it to be clear to the United States (and to those portions of the world that have kept an open mind) that the failure was not Israel’s fault. “A decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind” was more than a throwaway phrase in 1776, and it still is.