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The Democratic Strategist

Political Strategy for a Permanent Democratic Majority

There is a sector of working class voters who can be persuaded to vote for Democrats in 2024 – but only if candidates understand how to win their support.

Read the memo.

The recently published book, Rust Belt Union Blues, by Lainey Newman and Theda Skocpol represents a profoundly important contribution to the debate over Democratic strategy.

Read the Memo.

The Rural Voter

The new book White Rural Rage employs a deeply misleading sensationalism to gain media attention. You should read The Rural Voter by Nicholas Jacobs and Daniel Shea instead.

Read the memo.

The American Establishment’s Betrayal of Democracy

The American Establishment’s Betrayal of Democracy The Fundamental but Generally Unacknowledged Cause of the Current Threat to America’s Democratic Institutions.

Read the Memo.

Democrats ignore the central fact about modern immigration – and it’s led them to political disaster.

Democrats ignore the central fact about modern immigration – and it’s led them to political disaster.

Read the memo.

 

The Daily Strategist

February 5, 2025

DOGE’s Disruptive Cuts ‘Impossible to Effectuate’

The following article is cross-posted from stevenrattner.com:

President-elect Trump has tapped Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy to lead the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), with the goal of cutting $2 trillion from the federal budget. (While none of the protagonists have been specific, they appear to be suggesting that the $2 trillion would be annual reductions, not cumulative savings over a number of years.) This will likely prove impossible to effectuate.

The challenge is that much of the federal government’s expenditures are off limits for cutting for one reason or another. For example, Trump has declared Social Security and Medicare off limits (although he has been conspicuously silent about Medicaid, which represents about 10% of outlays. As for defense, while some savings could probably be achieved, most experts believe the overall defense budget needs to become larger, not smaller. And of course, interest on the national debt is sacrosanct — the federal government can’t default. All of that leaves just 25% of the budget — $1.5 trillion of annual expenditures – available for cutting.

Undaunted, Musk and Ramaswamy have identified a list of government programs totaling $516 billion of annual expenditures that they believe could be eliminated without congressional approval due to a questionable legal quirk. Topping this list would be health care for veterans, which costs $119 billion a year, and the National Institutes of Health, which receives funding of $47 billion a year.

But consider the consequences. As of 2021, the most recent year for which there is complete data, the federal government provided health care to 6.2 million veterans, up from 5.4 million in 2010. That number is almost surely larger now because the bipartisan PACT act passed in 2022 expands and extends health care for veterans exposed to burn pits and other toxic substances. The PACT Act is a good example of what DOGE will be up against: It passed both houses of Congress with broad bipartisan support.

Then there’s the NIH, which conducts and funds early stage research that the private sector has historically not been willing to support. All told, the NIH is the largest public funder of biomedical research in the world and has made particularly substantial contributions to reducing death rates for cancer. While the decline in lung cancer relates principally to smoking cessation, the NIH deserves significant credit for the fall in deaths from many other forms of cancer such as colon, breast and prostate.

The DOGE leaders also talk about trimming the federal workforce; Ramaswamy has talked about cuts of 50% to 75%. Doubtless, there are cuts that can be made. But the number of civilian federal employees today is only slightly higher than when Ronald Reagan took office while the population of the U.S. has risen by 47%. Note also that the size of the civilian workforce has grown under every Republican president since Reagan while it fell precipitously during the presidency of Bill Clinton.

Nor is the pay of federal workers out of line. Back in 2011, the average civilian federal worker made about 6% more than a similarly qualified private sector employee. But political pressure has kept raises for federal workers below those awarded to private sector workers so as of 2022, the average federal worker made 8% less than his civilian counterpart.

 


What Do Trump’s Latino Gains Mean for Democrats?

Amid all the conflicting takes on how Donald Trump won the presidency after losing it in 2020, there’s a strong consensus that gains among Latino voters mattered a great deal. I examined this CW at New York:

Definite judgements about how the 2024 presidential election turned out should await voter-file based data that won’t be available for some time. But it’s pretty clear one of the biggest and most counter-intuitive shifts from 2020 was Donald Trump’s gains among Latino voters. Yes, there’s a lot of controversy over the exact size of that shift. Edison Research’s exit polls (which have drawn considerable criticism in the past for allegedly poor Latino voter samples) showed Kamala Harris winning Latinos by a spare 51 to 46 percent margin, while Edison’s major competitor, the Associated Press VoteCast, showed Harris’s margin at a somewhat more robust 55 to 43 percent. Other estimates range up to the 62 to 37 percent win claimed for Harris in the American Electorate Voter Poll.

But most takes showed sizable Republican gains from 2020, and for that matter, Trump did measurably better among Latinos in 2020 than in 2016 (Pew’s validated voter studies showed Trump winning 28 percent in 2016 and 38 percent in 2020). As Equis Research puts it, “this looks and sounds like a realignment.” And while close elections lend themselves to exaggerated focus on specific voter groups, the size and potential future magnitude of the Latino vote make it a natural source of deep concern for Democrats and optimism for Republicans. A New York Times analysis of the startling losses in vote share by Democrats in urban core areas in 2024 concluded that the most consistent pattern was significant Latino populations, which also showed major Republican gains in non-urban areas as well.

It’s important to understand that this isn’t the first time a pro-GOP Latino “wave” seemed to be developing. While there was immense controversy over the exact numbers (in part because of uniquely flawed exit polls in that particular year), George W. Bush appears to have won about 40 percent of this vote, beating Ronald Reagan’s earlier record of 37 percent in his 1984 reelection landslide. According to the more reliable exit polls in subsequent elections, the GOP share of the Latino vote dropped to 31 percent in 2008 and then to 27 percent in 2012. Some reasons for this reversal of the trend that appeared in 2004 weren’t that hard to discern: the Great Recession that appeared late in Bush’s second term hit Latino households really hard, even as Republicans retreated rapidly from Bush’s support for comprehensive immigration reform (by 2012, Republican nominee Mitt Romney was promoting policies to make life so unpleasant for undocumented immigrants that they would “self-deport”).

But it’s possible that what we are seeing now is the resumption of a slow drift towards the GOP among Latinos that was temporarily interrupted by the Great Recession and a nativist uprising among white Republicans. Whatever unhappiness Latinos felt towards Trump’s immigration views was pretty clearly offset by economic concerns, especially among younger Latino men, who broke towards Trump most sharply. As happened during the Great Recession, the economy mattered most, and the combination of inflation (especially in housing costs) with tight credit eroded already-thin Democratic loyalties. As the above-mentioned Times analysis showed, defections to Trump happened all across the landscape of the Latino electorate, not just among more traditionally Republican-prone groups as Cuban Americans or South Americans. The question as to whether this is a party accomplishment rather than a personal accomplishment by Trump is an open one; Democrats did significantly better among Latinos in down-ballot races in 2024.

A general trend towards a more politically diverse Latino voting population makes some intuitive sense. As former immigrants slowly give way to native-born citizens, particularly those who are entering the middle-class en masse, it’s logical that identification with “the party of immigrants” will decline. Latinos who embrace conservative evangelical–and especially hyper-conservative pentecostal–religious practices also has helped intensify right-leaning cultural attitudes. We may never return to the days of reliable two-to-one Democratic advantages in this community, particularly as young voters who are especially alienated from traditional party loyalties move into the electorate.

While Democrats should be worried about the future of Latino voting behavior, Republicans have no reason for complacency. It’s now Trump and the GOP who are fully responsible for economic conditions which could turn out to be much worse than vague positive memories of the first Trump administration might suggest. And while (as some polling indicates) Latino citizens may have a negative attitude towards the recent surge of migrants that has become so central to Trump’s grip on his MAGA base, it’s less clear the mass deportation regime Trump has pledged to undertake immediately is going to go over well among Latinos, even those who voted for him. A recent Pew survey showed that Latinos were significantly less supportive of a major deportation program than other voters. And if the Trump administration pursues deportation round-ups in a cruel and ham-handed way (which elements of Trump’s base would welcome as a virtue rather than as a vice), or by methods that affect Latino legal immigrants and native citizens (most likely via ethnic profiling by law enforcement officials), we could see a pretty significant Latino backlash.

In other words, while some Latino trend towards the GOP may be inevitable all things being equal, it’s hardly guaranteed and could be sharply reversed. For their part Democrats need to get more serious about Latino voter outreach (particularly among young men) and identify (and learn to explain!) an economic agenda that prioritizes the practical needs of middle-class folk from every background.

 


Political Strategy Notes

It looks like a toss-up for today’s top news story, between the capture of alleged assassin Luigi Mangione and the resignation of Christopher Wray from the helm of the F.B.I. The Mangione story has a somewhat surprising reverberation – the revelation of a shocking level of public sympathy for the man accused of the cold-blooded murder of Brian Thompson,  CEO of United Health Care, the nation’s largest health insurance company. There will be no polls showing majority support for Mangione. But people have made financial contributions totaling more than $30,000 to his defense and many more have shared their anger at private health insurers on social media. Vanessa Friedman reports in the NYT,  “Even before a suspect had been named, much was written about the killer’s elevation to folk hero status. He was cast in the role of what the historian Eric Hobsbawm called the “social bandit” — one man seeming to take a stand against an unfair system….what forensic psychologists call the “halo effect.” And there is suddenly more media coverage of the abuses of health insurance companies. Some say it arises from Mangione’s supermodel look. But there has also been an explosion of expressions of contempt for private health insurers, which may or may not morph into a more rational debate over “Medicare for all” and “public option” health care reforms, as well as the G.O.P.’s utter failure to provide any viable health care reform alternatives whatsoever, preferring as always to whine ad nauseum about Obamacare.

Many liberals are bummed by the resignation of F.B. I. director Christopher Wray, who Trump wants to replace with Kath Patel, a right-wing radical who has said he wants to transform the F.B.I. building into a “Museum of the Deep State” and launch a campaign of retribution against Trump’s political opponents. Wray, who was originally appointed by Trump during his first term, but became one of many Trump appointees who fell out of his favor, must have concluded that he would be fired anyway, so why go through an exhausting media circus to no avail. But the storm around Wray’s resignation enhances focus on Patel, who may be a red herring among Trump’s appointees, designed to distract attention from Trump’s other unqualified cabinet picks. It’s not hard to imagine Trump’s inner circle arguing in essence “let’s create a few media storms downstream so we can sneak most of our infected cows across upstream.”  It may work to some extent, or it may backfire, if some of the crazier downstream cows get confirmed and make a mess of their assignments.

The most controversial of Trump’s upstream cows, Pete Hegseth, may muddle through the confirmation process and be confirmed to head the Department of Defense, with its 800+ billion dollar budget and 3 million employees. Hegseth’s nomination may be aided by sweeteners in the form of proffered federal contracts, strategically-designed for states repped by senators who have expressed skepticism about Hegseth, as he makes the rounds in the Senate halls. To paraphrase Mencken and P. T. Barnum, nobody ever went broke betting on the lack of integrity of politicians. The Democratic worry about the appointments of RFK Jr. to HHS, Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence and Kristi Noem to head Homeland Security may prove to be needless hand-wringing. Kennedy may quit before long, forced to do so by the urgings of the pharmaceutical industry, or, who knows, he may prove to be a force for more humane health care in a reactionary Administration. He comes from a highly-political family, and may temper some of his more controversial views to accommodate political reality. Gabbard and Noem have been nominated to head agencies that have seen more relevant days, although there is no hope that Musk and Ramaswamy will recommend the termination of these impotent agencies. These two are largely symbolic appointments, and we can hope that seasoned military and intelligence officials will pay them little attention if they get confirmed. The Hegseth, Gabbard and Noem nominations reflect Trump’s obsession with mediagenic appeal and loyalty to Trump over relevant experience and qualifications.

if you are looking for a bit of good news about political appointments, read “Biden to block Trump from appointing dozens of judges as GOP seethes” by Morgan Stephens at Daily Kos. As Stephens writes, “In a move that reflects the ongoing tensions between the White House and Congress in the lame-duck session before the new administration is sworn in, President Joe Biden issued a statement saying he’d veto the bipartisan JUDGES Act. The legislation aims to address a long-standing judicial shortageand has led to a backlog of cases….The act, which had passed through the Senate with overwhelming support and was on its way to the House, would create 63 permanent judicial positions. If enacted, it would have given Donald Trump the authority to appoint 22 of those new judges when he returns to the White House—an outcome that has raised significant concerns among Democrats….“The bill would create new judgeships in states where Senators have sought to hold open existing judicial vacancies,” said the statement from the White House’s Office of Management and Budget on Tuesday. “Those efforts to hold open vacancies suggest that concerns about judicial economy and caseload are not the true motivating force behind passage of this bill now.”….The White House also sharply criticized the bill’s rushed timing. While the Senate passed the measure in August, the House didn’t take it up until after the election—giving lawmakers only a few weeks to finalize such a significant piece of legislation before the 118th Congress concluded….The fight over the JUDGES Act isn’t just about the number of judges—it’s a high-stakes battle over the ideological direction of the judiciary.” Well done, President Biden.


Are Democrats Victims of Their Own Success?

There’s an old saying that, when you point your finger at someone else, your thumb is pointing back at you. In a perverse way, it characterizes the Democratic search for scapegoats following losses to Republican presidential candidates.

“It’s the crazy progressives who tanked Democratic prospects, with their looney woke policies.” Or, “No, it’s the pandering to conservatives which makes Democrats look corrupt to working-class voters.” If you suspect that both are partly true, you may be guilty of rational analysis.

Democrats have screwed up badly on a range of “cultural” issues, implementing unpopular policies like lax enforcement of America’s borders. On the other hand, palling around with Liz Cheney did not secure the coveted 270 EVs for the Donkey Party leader.

I may be wallowing in the false equivalency fever swamp here. But really, there is rarely a one-dimensional explanation for big political changes.

One factor that gets overlooked in pundit analysis is that people expect more from Democrats, and they don’t expect much from Republicans. It’s a lot easier for Democrats to disappoint voters, than it is for Republicans to do likewise. The bar is a lot lower for Republicans. A great many of their voters expect them to do nothing, and they almost always meet these low expectations.

Nearly all of the significant social and economic reforms passed during the last century were passed and signed into law by Democrats, frequently over the opposition of Republicans. If you think this is an exaggeration, quick, name a popular legislative reform that was passed by Republicans over the opposition of Democrats. That’s why you see memes like the one below, and there are zero memes depicting ‘Great Republican Contributions to the Lives of America’s Working People.’

Yes, Democrats have recently screwed up this legacy with excessive wokism. Think of the recent presidential election as a painful and costly course correction. But it’s more likely that Democrats will learn the lesson and recalibrate than it is that Republicans will become the enduring party of American workers and their families.


Teixeira: Economic Populism – Opiate of the Democrats

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and author of major works of political analysis, is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

I never cease to be amazed at the touching faith of many Democrats in the wonder-working powers of economic populism. In the wake of Democrats’ stunning defeat by the hated Trump and his allegedly fascist party, this brand of magical thinking has risen again within the Democratic ranks. Sure, the argument goes, the party has lots of problems but there is nothing wrong that can’t be fixed by turning up the volume—way up—on an economic populist pitch. That will finally convince the lamentably unfaithful working class that their real interests lie with their old pals the Democrats.

It certainly makes sense that in our current populist era, Democrats need to be responsive to that populist mood. But it makes much less sense that an aggressive economic populism by itself is a sort of get-out-of-jail free card for a party whose brand among working-class voters has been profoundly damaged. In fact, it’s completely ridiculous, a comforting myth for Democrats who don’t want to make hard choices. Here are four reasons why Democrats should discard this magical thinking as quickly as possible and devote their energies to strategies that might actually work.

1. Economic populism cannot solve the cultural leftism problem. In a post-election YouGov survey of working-class (non-college) voters for the Progressive Policy Institute, 68 percent of these voters said Democrats have moved too far left, compared to just 47 percent who thought Republicans have moved too far right. It’s a fair surmise that working-class sentiment about the Democrats’ leftism is heavily driven by the party’s embrace of cultural leftist positions across a wide range of issues (immigration, crime, race, gender, etc.) given how unpopular these positions are among those voters.

And in a widely-noted finding from a post-election survey by the Blueprint strategy group, the third most potent reason—after too much inflation and too much illegal immigration—for voters to choose Trump over Harris in a pairwise comparison test was, “Kamala Harris is focused more on cultural issues like transgender issues rather than helping the middle class”. And among swing voters, this concern about cultural focus was the most powerful reason.

In the same poll, overwhelming majorities (67 to 77 percent) of swing voters who chose Trump thought the following characterizations of Democrats were extremely or very accurate: not tough enough on the border crisis; support immigrants more than American citizens; want to take money from hard-working Americans and give it to immigrants; want to promote transgender ideology; don’t care about securing the border; have extreme ideas about immigration; aren’t doing enough to address crime; and are too focused on identity politics.

It’s magical thinking that simply changing the subject to economics will evaporate the Democrats’ many cultural liabilities. Culture matters—a lot—and the issues to which they are connected matter. They are a hugely important part of how voters assess who is on their side and who is not; whose philosophy they can identify with and whose they can’t.

Instead, for many working-class voters to seriously consider their economic pitch, Democrats need to convince them that they are not looked down on, that their concerns are taken seriously and that their views on culturally freighted issues will not be summarily dismissed as unenlightened. That’s the threshold test for many of the working-class voters Democrats need to reach and Democrats have flunked it over and over.

That’s why changing the subject to economic populism doesn’t work and won’t work—any more than talking incessantly about MAGA extremism/fascism did in the last election. Working-class voters aren’t stupid and they can tell when you’re just changing the subject and have not really changed the underlying cultural outlook they detest. Convincing voters of the latter is much harder and more uncomfortable for Democrats. But it has to be done.

2. Economic populism will not produce a big turnout dividend. Many Democrats have looked at the 2024 election results, noticed that Harris, relative to Biden, lost more votes than Trump gained across the two elections and concluded the Democrats’ loss was really about poor turnout. Comforting solution: more economic populism please! That will, it is alleged, galvanize the higher turnout among Democratic-leaning voters needed in future elections.

But was turnout really the problem? As Nate Cohn points out, even under generous assumptions, lower relative Democratic turnout likely explains no more than a third of lower Democratic support. And critically, nonvoting attrition among 2020 Biden voters is inextricable from vote-switching to Trump. Both reflected dissatisfaction with Harris, the Democrats, and the record of Biden administration.

[L]ow turnout among traditionally Democratic-leaning groups—especially nonwhite voters—was a reflection of lower support for Ms. Harris: Millions of Democrats soured on their party and stayed home, reluctantly came back to Ms. Harris or even made the leap to Mr. Trump. And if those who stayed home had voted, it wouldn’t have been an enormous help to Ms. Harris, based on Times/Siena polling linked to validated records of who did or didn’t vote.

Clearly, the turnout problem, such as it was, was an indicator of broad dissatisfaction with Harris and her party. As noted above, that broad dissatisfaction cannot and will not be solved by sprinkling the magic elixir of economic populism onto the currently existing Democratic Party and its tarnished brand. There will be no turnout dividend separate from fixing that brand.

3. Economic populism will do nothing to fix Democrats’ governance problems. Pretty much by definition, economic populism in whatever form has little to do with making Democratic governance of states and, especially, cities any better. Democratic governance is not, to say the least, synonymous with public order, low crime, and effective and efficient administration of public services. Quite the contrary. Progressive domination of deep blue cities instead has become synonymous with poor governance across the board. Josh Barro:

I write this to you from New York City, where we are governed by Democrats and we pay the highest taxes in the country, but that doesn’t mean we receive the best government services. Our transportation agencies are black holes for money, unable to deliver on their capital plans despite repeated increases in the dedicated taxes that fund them…Half of bus riders don’t pay the fare, and MTA employees don’t try to make them. Emotionally-disturbed homeless people camp out on the transit system…even though police are all over the place (at great taxpayer expense) they don’t do much about it…The city cannot stop people from shoplifting, so most of the merchandise at Duane Reade is in locked cabinets…[S]chools remain really expensive for taxpayers even as families move away, enrollment declines, and chronic absenteeism remains elevated. Currently, we are under state court order to spend billions of our dollars to house migrants in Midtown hotels that once housed tourists and business travelers. Housing costs are insane because the city makes it very hard to build anything—and it’s really expensive to travel here, partly because so many hotels are now full of migrants, and partly because the city council literally made it illegal to build new hotels. And as a result of all of this, we are shedding population—we’re probably going to lose three more congressional districts in the next reapportionment. And where are people moving to? To Sun Belt states, mostly run by Republicans, where it is possible to build housing and grow the economy.

Ouch. No wonder Democratic-governed large metros, including and especially New York City, swung so heavily to the right in the last election. Fixing this has nothing at all to do with economic populism and everything to do with getting better at governing. That will not be easy with the array of Democratic-oriented interest groups who benefit from the current system (I’m looking at you non-profit industrial complex!) and of course the innumerable regulations that undermine efficient public services and prevent the building of needed housing and infrastructure.

Speaking of regulations, economic populism has nothing to say about the radical reform we need in the country’s regulatory and permitting structure so that, well, stuff could actually get done. As Ezra Klein points out:

The first contract to build the New York subways was awarded in 1900. Four years later—four years—the first 28 stations opened.

Compare that to now. In 2009, Democrats passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, pumping billions into high-speed rail. Fifteen years later, you cannot board a high-speed train funded by that bill anywhere in the country.

Appalling. There are innumerable other examples. How about the $42 billion allocated in the 2021 infrastructure act to provide broadband access to underserved, primarily, rural areas? Three years later, almost nothing’s been done. Or how about the $7.5 billion allocated by the IRA to build half a million EV charging stations? So far, a grand total of seven! This should be completely unacceptable.

As should the failure of the bipartisan Energy Permitting Reform Bill of 2024. The bill would have facilitated the building of renewable energy infrastructure, particularly long-distance transmission lines, as well as new fossil fuel infrastructure. But the environmental groups blocked it so we’re still stuck with the same old glacially slow and inefficient permitting regime for energy infrastructure, ensuring that the goals of the IRA, of questionable feasibility to begin with, will certainly not be met. In the immortal words of Bob Dole: “Where’s the outrage?

This is a problem that most assuredly will not be fixed by a generous dose of economic populism. Not even close.

4. Economic populism is inadequate as populism. We are certainly in a populist era and it makes sense to respond to that mood. But it does not necessarily follow that Democrats can effectively speak to that mood simply by bashing the rich (“the billionaire class”), insisting they pay their fair share, and advocating for programs aimed at middle- and working-class voters, rather than corporate priorities. Many voters, including swing voters, are certainly sympathetic to such a pitch. But what this approach leaves out is that the populist sentiments of voters go much deeper than that.

To put it bluntly, voters, particularly working-class voters, harbor deep resentment toward elites who they feel are telling them how to live their lives, even what to think and say, and incidentally are living a great deal more comfortably than they are. This is not the rich as conventionally defined by economic populism but rather the professional-dominated educated upper middle class who occupy positions of administrative and cultural power. By and large, these are Democrats in Democratic-dominated institutions. Looked at in this context, truly populist Democrats might want to say, with Pogo: “We have met the enemy and he is us.”

This is a bitter pill for most Democrats to swallow. In today’s America, they are the Establishment even if in their imaginations they are sticking it to the Man and fighting nobly for social justice. The failure to understand that they themselves are central targets of populist anger leads Democratic elites and activists to overestimate the efficacy of economic populism and interpret populism on the right as driven solely by racism, sexism, xenophobia, etc. That’s more comfortable than realizing millions of populist voters hate you. But they do.

Coming to terms with this reality—while unpleasant—will help Democrats overcome their current tendency toward magical thinking. Assuming they want to. Magical thinking may not lead to effective politics but it can be mighty comforting.


Political Strategy Notes

“The hoary phrase “loyal opposition” still means something, and that loyalty is to the country and its Constitution, not to one person,’ E. J. Dionne, Jr. writes in his column at The Washington Post. “This is where thinking about how to contain Trump should start. Resisting his most egregious policies will remain appropriate, but defending, rebuilding and renewing should be the keynotes this time….The first priority must be to minimize damage to the nation, protect constitutional rights whenever they’re threatened and safeguard the institutions of democratic government. Next, his administration should be exposed whenever it uses lovely words such as “reform” and “efficiency” to disguise the wholesale dismantling of popular and necessary programs. And Trump must be held accountable to the working-class voters who helped him win….But his choices for so many key jobs already signal that Trump 2.0 is on track to be far more extreme than the original. That should call forth more activism, not less….The national Democratic Party should play its part by backing the state parties already doing effective organizing down to the precinct level — the Wisconsin and North Carolina parties are among the standouts — and embedding such efforts elsewhere, especially in places where the party is in tatters. Writing off nearly half the states is no way to win the Senate. To create models for rejuvenation, the party should start with Iowa, Montana, Nebraska and Kansas, all of which have Senate races in 2026….And a heretical thought: As they rebuild, Democrats should acknowledge that in places where their brand is badly broken, independent candidates, particularly for the Senate, might have a better chance of building an alternative coalition to Trumpism. Senate candidate Dan Osborn lost in Nebraska this year running as a pro-worker independent, but his nearly 47 percent of the vote should be seen as a prologue, not a failure….The seeds of progress will be planted by those who respond forcefully, creatively and fearlessly to Trump’s second act.”

Irie Sentner reports that “Democratic governors (and 2028 hopefuls) gather to chart path under a Trump administration” at Politico, and writes: “Democratic governors are preparing to thread a fine line between standing up to President-elect Donald Trump’s Republican trifecta in Washington and collaborating with the incoming administration….Immediately following the election, some Democratic governors launched plans to “Trump-proof” their states, and in a memo released this week, Meghan Meehan-Draper, DGA’s executive director, wrote that Democratic governors would be the “Last Line of Defense” against the incoming GOP trifecta in the federal government….Blue-state governors have been explicit that they intend to try to block some Trump policies — efforts that will also likely raise their own profiles. Pritzker and Colorado Gov. Jared Polis are leading an organization to “back against increasing threats of autocracy and fortifying the institutions of democracy that our country and our states depend upon” — and although the privately-funded group is non-partisan, the implications are clear….But with the election loss still smarting, the event implicitly raised the question of who might have the right formula for the next one. Inslee said the governors are “focused on the election cycle for governors right now.” Still, he acknowledged that “the day after every election is the beginning” of the next one.” And with congressional politics bogged down in  partisan divisions, Democratic governors will likely have more opportunities to distinguish themselves as presidential candidates.

Some astute observations from Ilyse Hogue’s “Are Those Young Men Gone Forever?” at Democracyjournal.org: “Like their female counterparts, white men voted at margins comparable to 2020, and Black men’s support for the Democratic ticket dropped off only slightly. The biggest swings were a massive 35-point shift by Latino men toward Trump, according to CNN exit polls, and a 13-point shift to Trump by voters under 30, powered overwhelmingly by young men….How the Trump campaign pulled off this victory—by sidestepping on abortion, redefining freedom, and aggressively courting men—not only explains what just happened. It tells us a lot about the state of the MAGA coalition and where they intend to go next….Trump’s backers voted for him in spite of his position on abortion, not because of it. Support for abortion rights remains strong in this country, with men tracking only slightly behind women in how highly they rank their importance. Ballot measures strengthening abortion rights won in seven out of ten states the day Trump won the election, including in Missouri, where Trump won with over 58 percent of the vote….In state after state where the ballot measures showed up, a significant number of voters split their tickets, voting for abortion rights and for Donald Trump….The future of GOP power, Trump’s team sensed, lay elsewhere. Part of that future is a subset of Latino men and women who historically supported Democrats but are more comfortable with traditional masculinity and patriarchy….The Trump campaign deeply internalized the seismic shift going on among men under 30….Millennial and Gen Z men went into COVID experiencing declines in educational outcomes, upended social status, and high rates of depression. They emerged from quarantine to record-high inflation, a bleak jobs outlook, and a vast surplus of time banked in online forums. There they discussed a liberal culture that had embraced an identity-based hierarchy of oppression that left them at the bottom and a #MeToo movement that many felt made them guilty until proven innocent.”

A bit of election postmortem wisdom from “Why Did Trump Really Win? It’s Simple, Actually” by Michael Mechanic at Mother Jones: “But why, you might ask, would someone living on the edge vote for Republicans, whose wage-suppressing, union-busting, benefit-denying policies have only tended to make the poor and the middle class more miserable?….And why in the name of Heaven would they vote for Trump, a billionaire born with a silver spoon in his mouth who has lied and cheated his way through life? A man whose latest tax-cut plans—though some, like eliminating taxes on tips and Social Security income, can sound progressive—will be deeply regressive, giving ever more to the rich and rationalizing cuts that will hurt the poor and middle class and accelerate global climate chaos….The reason, my friends, may well be that those on the losing end of our thriving economy don’t see it as thriving. Historically, every election cycle, when reporters fan out to ask low-income voters in swing states what they are thinking, the message has been roughly the same: Presidential candidates, Democrats and Republicans, come around here every four years and talk their talk, and then they leave and forget about us when it comes to policy….Now that’s not entirely fair, because the Biden administration actually has done a good bit for working people and families of color, and has proposed all sorts of measures to make the tax code fairer and reduce the wealth gap (both the racial one and the general one)—including increasing taxes and IRS enforcement for the super-rich. But one can only get so far with a split Senate, Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema on your team, and a rival party that would just as soon throw you into a lake of fire as support your initiatives.”


When the Religious Views of Trump Nominees Are and Aren’t Fair Game

With Senate confirmation hearings of Trump’s motley crew of Cabinet-level nominees, one issue Democrats will need to confront right away is when and whether the appointees’ often-exotic religious views are an appropriate subject for discussion. I offered some simple guidelines at New York:

Amid all the hotly disputed allegations that he has a history of excessive drinking and inappropriate (or even abusive) behavior toward women, Donald Trump’s defense-secretary nominee, Pete Hegseth, has another potential problem that’s just now coming into view: His religious beliefs are a tad scary.

Early reports on Hegseth’s belligerent brand of Christianity focused on a tattoo he acquired that sported a Latin slogan associated with the medieval Crusaders (which led to him being flagged as a potential security problem by the National Guard, in which he served with distinction for over a decade). But as the New York Times reports, the tattoo is the tip of an iceberg that appears to descend into the depths of Christian nationalism:

“’Voting is a weapon, but it’s not enough,’ [Hegseth] wrote in a book, American Crusade, published in May 2020. ‘We don’t want to fight, but, like our fellow Christians one thousand years ago, we must …’

“In his book, Mr. Hegseth also offered a nod to the prospect of future violence: ‘Our American Crusade is not about literal swords, and our fight is not with guns. Yet.’”

His words aside, Hegseth has chosen to associate himself closely with Doug Wilson, an Idaho-based Christian-nationalist minister with a growing educational mission, notes the Times:

“[After moving to Tennessee two years ago] the Hegseth family joined Pilgrim Hill Reformed Fellowship, a small church opened in 2021 as part of the growing Communion of Reformed Evangelical Churches. The denomination was co-founded by Doug Wilson, a pastor based in Moscow, Idaho; his religious empire now includes a college, a classical school network, a publishing house, a podcast network, and multiple churches, among other entities …

“In his writings, Mr. Wilson has argued that slavery ‘produced in the South a genuine affection between the races,’ that homosexuality should be a crime, and that the 19th Amendment guaranteeing women the right to vote was a mistake. He has written that women should not ordinarily hold political office because ‘the Bible does say that when feminine leadership is common, it should be reckoned not as a blessing but as a curse …’

“Mr. Hegseth told [a] Christian magazine in Nashville that he was studying a book by Mr. Wilson; on a podcast Mr. Hegseth said that he would not send his children to Harvard but would send them to Mr. Wilson’s college in Idaho.”

All this Christian-nationalist smoke leads to the fiery question of whether Hegseth’s religious views are fair game for potential confirmation hearings. Would exploration of his connections with a wildly reactionary religious figure like Doug Wilson constitute the sort of “religious test … as a qualification to any office or public trust” that is explicitly banned by Article VI of the U.S. Constitution? It’s a good and important question that could come up with respect to other Trump nominees, given the MAGA movement’s cozy relationship with theocratic tendencies in both conservative-evangelical and traditionalist-Catholic communities.

Actually, the question of the boundary between a “religious test” and maintenance of church-state separation came up conspicuously during the first year of Trump’s earlier presidency in confirmation hearings for the then-obscure Russell Vought, whom Trump nominated to serve as deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget (he later became director of OMB, the position to which Trump has again nominated him for the second term). Bernie Sanders seized upon a Vought comment defending his alma mater, Wheaton College, for sanctions against a professor who said that Christians and Muslims “worship the same God.” Sanders suggested that showed Vought was an Islamophobic bigot, while Vought and his defenders (included yours truly) argued that the man’s opinion of the credentials of Muslims for eternal life had nothing to do with his duties as a prospective public servant.

This does not, to be clear, mean that religious expressions when they actually do have a bearing on secular governance should be off-limits in confirmation hearings or Senate votes. If, for example, it becomes clear that Hegseth believes his Christian faith means echoing his mentor Doug Wilson’s hostility to women serving in leadership positions anywhere or anytime, that’s a real problem and raising it does not represent a “religious test.” If this misogyny was limited to restrictions on women serving in positions of religious leadership, that would be another matter entirely.

More generally, if nominees for high executive office follow their faith in adjudging homosexuality or abortion as wicked, it’s only germane to their fitness for government offices if they insist upon imposing those views as a matter of public policy. Yes, there is a conservative point of view that considers any limitation on faith-based political activism in any arena as a violation of First Amendment religious-liberty rights. But those who think this way also tend to disregard the very idea of church-state separation as a First Amendment guarantee.

Critics of Christian nationalism in the Trump administration need to keep essential distinctions straight and avoid exploring the religious views of nominees if they are truly private articles of faith directed to matters of the spirit, not secular laws. It’s likely there will be plenty of examples of theocratic excesses among Trump nominees as Senate confirmation hearings unfold. But where potential holders of high offices respect the lines between church and state, their self-restraint commands respect as well.


How Democrats Can Win Union Member Votes in the Future

At The Pennsylvania Capital-Star, Kalena Thomhave interviews Steve Rosenthal, former political director of the AFL-CIO and current president of the Organizing Group, a political consulting firm that helps labor unions get out the vote and win campaigns. An Excerpt:

On the union vote, there was a lot of media discussion about how union members are migrating to Trump despite the Biden administration doing so much for unions. 

First off, union members voted for Harris in pretty strong numbers. Across the three blue wall states, [there was a] significant performance by union members.

In Pennsylvania, union members made up 18% of the electorate. So, almost one out of five votes cast came from union households, and they voted 52 to 47 for Harris, which is better than the Biden vote was in 2020, [when] Biden lost union households to Trump 49 to 50 in Pennsylvania. So, she actually did better.

In Wisconsin, Kamala Harris won union voters 53 to 46 — better than Clinton did in 2016 and not quite as good as Biden did in 2020, but still a nine-point margin among union voters in the state. In Michigan, Harris won [union voters] 55 to 44 — not quite as good as Biden did in 2020, but much better than Clinton in 2016.

Trump has eroded the union vote a little bit, but not in substantial numbers. The media rush to judgment before the election based on some polls suggesting that union members had abandoned the Democrats, it’s just wrong.

What are your thoughts on unions like the Teamsters not endorsing Harris?

The Teamsters, as was well reported, stayed neutral. So did the firefighters. But there were 50 unions that supported Kamala Harris.

The Teamsters released a poll that said that [nearly] 60% of their members were supporting Trump, and [indicated] that’s why they decided to stay neutral. I’ve seen a lot of union member polls over the more than 40 years I’ve been doing this work. Unions might start off with their members behind 10, 15, or 20 points.

But then you put your program into gear and communicate with your members — in this case, for example, point out that Trump supports right-to-work and that Trump ran one of the most vehemently anti-union administrations in the history of the country. And then contrast that with Harris’ record and the fact that Harris cast the deciding vote on the legislation that saved the pensions for hundreds of thousands of union members, including Teamsters.

It was inexcusable that the union didn’t take the opportunity to communicate to their members and explain to them what was at stake in this election. Because if they had done that, they would have moved those numbers. No union leader could look at these two candidates and with any degree of honesty suggest that one of them wouldn’t be better for working people.

You said that Democrats need to be doing the work in the trenches with workers. What does that look like? 

I think it is walking picket lines. I think it’s showing up at union halls. I think it’s gathering groups of working people together and sitting with them and listening to them — doing town hall meetings around your district or state and hearing what people have to say. It means standing united with working people and letting them see who’s really on their side.

Over the next couple of years, it’s going to be standing strong against what’s going to be a vicious assault on a range of worker’s rights. There are going to be attacks on [the Occupational Safety and Health Administration], overtime pay, the National Labor Relations Board, funding the Fair Labor Standards Act, and federal workers’ unions.

What has been your approach to mobilizing union and working-class voters? 

With our voter engagement program, In Union, we provide voters with a year of information — we don’t just start talking to them around the election. We give them tips on their families saving money, we provide them with information about unions on the front lines, we give them ways to hold politicians accountable and to fight back. And then we gradually get into communicating about the election itself. We never make endorsements, but we provide people with good, sound information and well-documented citations.

Read the rest of the interview right here.


No, At the Moment Democrats Don’t Need a “New DLC”

In the swirling collection of suggestions for what Democrats ought to do to stage a comeback, one in particular caught my eye for obvious reasons, and I wrote a reaction at New York.

As is the case after every disappointing election cycle, we see multiple attempts underway to steer Democrats in a better direction. Most often, they involve timeworn Democratic factional advice, ranging from the hearty perennial progressive recipe of a sharpened economic “populist” message designed to freeze or reverse the decades-long working-class drift toward the GOP, to the equally well-known centrist prescription aimed at seizing a majority of persuadable swing voters, including some Republicans.

How, exactly, Democrats are supposed to incorporate and carry out such advice is usually left a little unclear. Presumably 2028 presidential candidates will test various strategies in the primaries, which is how ideological battles in the major political parties tend to get resolved.

But at least one group of centrist Democrats are planning to organize a more gradual and less top-down party makeover, or at least a force to push back against the strategies they deem futile or counterproductive. The New York Times reported:

“Seth London, an adviser to some of the Democratic Party’s biggest donors, wrote a private memo addressed to ‘Discouraged Democrats’ arguing that the party should ‘begin with a complete rejection of race- and group-based identity politics.

“The sweeping four-page memo, obtained by The New York Times and earlier reported by Politico, was both widely forwarded and a source of controversy in Democratic circles.

“’Democrats have increasingly focused on the priorities of core party activists over the common voters we claim to represent,’ wrote Mr. London, who has spent the last three weeks working with other Democratic strategists to build what he envisions as a ‘a party within the party’ of media companies, donors and advocacy groups that support charismatic, moderate officeholders.”

When you look at the “party within the party” London proposes to build, there is a very specific model he has in mind, and it’s focused more on elected officials than the Times take on it might suggests. The model is the Democratic Leadership Council, and the structure is a “leadership committee of federal and state elected officials” determined to act as a party faction in opposing identity-politics litmus tests and advancing “common sense” policies that are attractive both to swing voters and to the entrepreneurs who are essential partners in carrying them out.

The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), where I worked as policy director for over a decade in the late 1990s and early aughts, functioned from 1985 until 2011 as the kind of centrist pressure group London seems to envision recreating. Its initial goal (other than serving as a sort of clubhouse for Democratic politicians unhappy with the national party) was to create the conditions for a Democratic return to the White House at a time when pundits spoke of a Republican “Electoral College Lock.” But once that goal was accomplished under DLC co-founder and all-around star Bill Clinton, the group focused more on state-leadership development, and on burnishing its think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute (which still exists), as an idea lab for Democrats, particularly on issues that more orthodox progressive Democrats tended to ignore (including crime, education reform, and national security). The DLC had a large if diffuse influence on all sorts of Democrats, but the group faded after a period when it was mainly known for divisive lefty-bashing, and for pro-market views on the global economy that didn’t look so good after the Great Recession and the subsequent voter backlash against globalization.

So is something like a “new DLC” a good idea right now? It’s a question worth asking, but on balance I’d say no. We are in a very different political moment than the founders of the DLC confronted. In 1985, Democrats were reeling from a presidential election in which its nominee had lost 49 states and was beaten by over 18 percentage points in the national popular vote. It was the second straight landslide loss to Ronald Reagan, viewed by Democrats at the time as a conservative extremist. But at the very same time, Democrats did relatively well down ballot. They picked up two U.S. Senate seats despite the Reagan landslide and won a House majority of 35 seats. They controlled 34 of 49 partisan governorships after this terrible election, and also controlled 66 of 98 state legislative chambers. The problem, DLC founders agreed, was that a failed national party had become detached from a still-successful state and local party, and the first step toward recovery was to rebuild the national party on the shoulders of its more successful politicians, who were far more in touch with voters than the party-committee identity-group and ideological litmus-test commissars who wielded power nationally.

While there were isolated situations (particularly in a few Senate races) where down-ballot Democrats did significantly better than Kamala Harris in 2024, there just wasn’t the sort of wholesale return to ticket-splitting that suggests the only problem is in Washington, D.C. In all the elections of the Trump era, the top of the Democratic ticket was stronger than it was in the 1980s while the bottom was weaker. There is no obvious cadre of better-connected or more successful elected officials who can lead the donkey back to victory.

The prescriptions the DLC offered Democrats back in the day are also a bit obsolete. In the most prominent DLC-published diagnosis of the party’s problems, Bill Galston and Elaine Kamarck’s The Politics of Evasion, the culprit identified was the refusal of Democratic elites to come up with credible policies on the economy and national security, leaving these urgent concerns to be dominated by the GOP. While you can argue that today’s Democrats have identified with the wrong economic policies and made some missteps in the White House regarding global threats to national security, there’s really no “evasion” going on. And for all the ancient talk of progressives only being interested in the party “base” while centrists care about “swing voters,” it’s pretty clear all Democrats hunger and thirst for all votes, but have different definitions of “swing” and “base” voters and different understandings of what makes them tick.

But the single biggest reason the time isn’t ripe for a “new DLC” goes to the heart of what Seth London seems to envision, as progressive critic David Dayen argues at The American Prospect:

“While much of the vision is laid out in vague platitudes — ‘a future-focused narrative,’ ‘rooted in hard work’ and ‘the pursuit of the American Dream’ — where he is most clear, London aligns his movement with the ‘abundance agenda,’ pushed by a series of groups favoring supply-side liberalism through removing regulatory barriers to a host of common needs, while rejecting the concept of ‘socializing’ the provision of health care and housing and education. (London has consulted for Arnold Ventures, a key funder of the abundance agenda, led by former Enron trader and hedge fund manager John Arnold.) The memo commits to ‘social insurance for those who need it,’ an unconcealed reference to means testing.”

I strongly object to the frequently heard lefty smear of the DLC as a brothel of “corporate whores,” but there’s no question its corporate funding base created a lot of perception problems for the group and for Democrats who aligned with it (even though the DLC went out of its way to defy donors on issues ranging from cap-and-trade to health care to tax cuts to “corporate welfare”). And there’s also no question their (our!) irrational exuberance about the New Economy and financial deregulation discredited key parts of what was otherwise a sensible policy portfolio. Similar problems, it must be admitted, afflicted other center-left “reform” efforts like Britain’s New Labour movement under Tony Blair, which was heavily influenced by Clinton’s New Democrats (the final and best brand for DLC Democrats, which alas, is probably not reusable).

To be very blunt about it, Democrats will not regain the White House or Congress under the conspicuous leadership of folks from Wall Street or Silicon Valley, however well-meaning they may be. You don’t have to be attracted to what passes for progressive economic “populism” these days (and generally speaking, I’m not) to recognize this is a moment in the history of the Party of the People when a focus on those very people should be paramount. Indeed, one of the DLC’s early slogans was that Democrats should represent “the values and economic aspirations of the middle class”; that’s not a bad starting point for revival.

Beyond the specific strategy chosen for that revival, it’s important to recognize that Democrats overall are in much better shape than they were in 1985. It’s as close to a scientific certainty as you can get that Republicans will lose their slippery hold on the U.S. House in 2026 and with it the governing trifecta that makes them so terrifying at present. Trump is more likely than any president in living memory to overreach and make mistakes that erode his base of support and (quite possibly) damage the living standards that were such a huge part of the problem facing Joe Biden and Kamala Harris this year. While it’s always healthy to discuss what went wrong in an electoral defeat and debate policies and political strategies, a descent into formal factional combat that London seems to contemplate is both unnecessary and counterproductive. For now, the best way to oppose Trump is to maintain a united opposition party prepared to exploit the mistakes that are sure to come.


Political Strategy Notes

Tom Vilsak on “Why Democrats Don’t Get Rural America” at Politico: “I think the challenge that we have in rural America is that we talk a lot about programs and not about vision. And I will, if you don’t mind, take you all the way back to my first race for governor in 1998. I ran and I was way behind and nobody thought I had a chance of winning. And I went out and I talked about making Iowa the food capital of the world. And I had a media guy who at the time was not well known [David Axelrod]. He and my pollster were not very happy with me for talking about the food capital. They basically said, nobody understands what it is and you should be talking specifically about class size reductions, property tax relief and expanding access to health care. I continued to talk about it. I won that race by 6.5 to 7 percent. I’m pretty sure that 7 percent were the people I was talking to who knew the vision. They didn’t quite understand what it was, but when you have a vision, it is what a leader does. A leader takes you from here to there, tells you where you’re going to go and allows you to fill in the detail….But if you want to be president of the United States, if you want to represent this country and you want to do what everybody says they wanna do which is to bring the country together and end this us-and-them thing, you’ve got to be able to reach out and reach across and be credible. But you can’t be credible if what you’re selling is a program. You’ve gotta be selling a vision and that vision has to not be what you think but based on what you know about these people, you know matters to them. And what matters to them is the ability to say to their kids: you don’t have to leave. You can come back. And you can have a good life here.”

“For years, Democrats have wrestled with declining support from non-college-educated voters, a demographic that once formed the party’s backbone,” Brianna Westbrook writes in “Why Democrats lost in 2024: Lessons from Phoenix and the working class” at The Arizona Mirror. “This trend was starkly evident in the 2024 presidential race, where turnout among working-class Democrats hit historic lows….While the party centered its campaign on social issues and climate initiatives, it failed to adequately address the economic struggles that dominate the lives of millions. The result was widespread alienation among working families, many of whom opted to sit out the election….

To win back this critical demographic, Democrats must:

  1. Focus on universal economic policies: Policies like Medicare for All, a $15 minimum wage (adjusted for inflation) and robust labor protections remain immensely popular across the political spectrum. Democrats must make these initiatives central to their platform.
  2. Challenge corporate power: A bold stance against corporate monopolies, as championed by Warren, can galvanize voters frustrated by rising costs and stagnant wages. Breaking up monopolies and regulating Wall Street should be presented not as niche issues but as critical to the everyday lives of working families.
  3. Invest in grassroots campaigning: Hernandez’s victory underscores the importance of building trust through local organizing. Rather than relying on consultants and glossy ads, Democrats should empower community leaders to engage directly with voters.
  4. Reframe the narrative: The language of class struggle, long championed by Sanders, resonates with voters who feel left behind. Democrats must articulate a clear vision of economic justice, uniting voters around shared struggles rather than dividing them with identity-focused messaging alone.”

At Brookings, John J. Dilulio writes in “The 4 working-class votes,” “If Democrats are determined to fret and sweat about where they stand with working-class voters, the exit poll data would justify them worrying—not about some pro-Trump or pro-GOP multiracial working-class coalition, but about Latino voters….Trump was a landslide winner with working-class white evangelicals, but his single biggest gain in 2024 over 2020 was among white evangelical women with college degrees….Democrats who emphasize pro-worker/pro-family policies and messages do better with voters than otherwise comparable Democrats who don’t.”….exit polls show that working-class voters, defined as voters without a college degree, split 56% for Trump to 42% for Harris. The same polls tell us that white working-class voters favored Trump over Harris by 66% to 32%, and that Trump won a larger share of working-class Black and Latino voters than he did in 2020…..The white working-class electorate consists of two distinct voting blocs: white evangelicals without college degrees and all other whites without college degrees. The latter bloc, which encompasses working-class white catholics and other non-evangelical whites without college degrees, is slightly larger than the former bloc….As I have documented elsewhere, in 2016 and 2020, Trump won a majority of white evangelical working-class voters, but he lost a majority of white non-evangelical working-class voters. He lost them again in 2024….Among Latinos, the only subgroup that did not bolt from the Democratic fold was college-educated Latino women, who favored Harris 63% to 33%, a 30-point margin identical to the one they gave Biden in 2020….But Trump’s victory in 2024, his more than 76 million votes and his swing-states sweep, is owed the most to white evangelicals. White evangelicals voted for Trump more than four to one, constituting more than a third of his 49.9% share of the popular vote….his single biggest gain in 2024 over 2020 was among white evangelical women with college degrees…. Having suffered a double-digit drop in college-educated white evangelical women’s vote between 2016 and 2020, in 2024 he turned a 6-point spread in Trump’s favor against Biden (53% to 47%) into a 50-point spread in his favor against Harris (74% to 24%)….So, in the 2024 election, a majority of white evangelicals without college degrees once again favored Trump, but majorities of blue-collar Black, Latino, and non-evangelical whites did not.”

Dilulio adds, “Still, I believe that there are at least three things one can credibly say about the 2024 presidential election results at this stage. First, as we have already established, contrary to so much of the commentary, Trump won a vast majority of white evangelical voters without college degrees, but Harris won majorities among blue-collar Blacks, Latinos, and non-evangelical whites; second, Harris did better with the electorate as a whole than has hitherto generally been acknowledged; and, third, it would seem that, other things equal, Democrats who emphasize pro-worker/pro-family policies and messages do better with voters than otherwise comparable Democrats who don’t….Despite being the first Black woman to run for president as the nominee of a major party; despite running in place of a highly unpopular first-term sitting president whose record she could neither easily run on nor run from; and despite running what many observers judged to be a tactically mistake-ridden campaign yoked to easy-to-attack anti-majority opinion positions on hot-button issues such as transgender women being allowed to compete on women’s teams in sports; Harris won more than 74.3 million votes, constituting 48.3% of the national popular vote to Trump’s 49.9%; and lost Pennsylvania by 1.7%, Wisconsin by 0.8%, and Michigan by 1.4%….So, a less than 0.8% shift her way in the national popular vote would have tied Trump’s tally, and a less than 1% shift her way in the three “blue wall” states would have added 44 electoral votes to the 226 she received and made Harris the next president…. In addition to winning working-class majorities among non-evangelical whites, Blacks, and Latinos, Harris beat Trump among union workers 57% to 41%. As I have explained elsewhere, most Americans now see the decline in private-sector unionization (from about a third of all workers in the mid-20th century to 17% in the mid-1980s to just 6% now) as bad for America; 70% of working-class Americans approve of unions; and an estimated 60 million nonunionized workers would like to have the opportunity to join a union.”