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Blogger Envy

There were not one, but two, major newspaper takes on political blogs yesterday. One graced the cover of The New York Times magazine. The other was on the op-ed pages of the LA Times. The first was by a journalist who suspects many bloggers would like to graduate to more traditional outlets for political commentary. The second was by a former blogger who fears the same thing.
Both pieces take very seriously the belief of many bloggers that they represent something truly revolutionary in political discourse, and even in politics itself. And both pieces suggest that celebrity, commercial success, and mainstream respectablility may be producing a Thermidor in that revolution wherein its leaders are being coopted by the hated establishment.
The Times’ Matthew Klam focuses on three bloggers who have already crossed the line into celebrity: TalkingPointsMemo’s Josh Marshall, Wonkette‘s Anna Marie Cox, and DailyKos‘ Markos (Kos) Molitsas, and suggests all three are at a crossroads where they must choose between street cred and fame and fortune. But I think he confuses his story by conflating two very different rationales for political blogs. Some bloggers want to do political journalism. Some view their role as movement-building and agitprop.
While Marshall is quite partisan (who isn’t this year?), he’s still basically a journalist. And his segment of the blogosphere was made possible by the conjunction of a market failure in traditional political journalism with the emergence of a new technology that provided a way around that market failure.
It’s no secret that political print journalism has been a steadily declining segment of a steadily declining industry for decades now. Radically reduced readership; competition from electronic media; ownership conglomeration; cost-driven downsizing; the collapse of commercially viable niche markets; rampant editorial cronyism: all these factors have dried up opportunities for would-be political journalists, while ossifying the profession into a self-referential universe of carreerist status and specialization, much like academia.
Josh Marshall had the choice of spending two decades struggling through old-boy networks and ownership crises to land an insecure perch in a paper or magazine, or taking advantage of a new technology to practice political journalism right now. And that’s what he does: chasing down stories, digging beneath the surface, sticking to them when other reporters lose interest. He may feel that he’s contributing to a political movement, but he’s still a journalist, and there’s nothing dishonorable about that. The fact that he’s figured out a way to support himself without sucking up to editors or attending Washington cocktail parties is an example of successful entrepreneurship, not betrayal of some blogospheric ethic.
Ms. Cox is another example of journalistic enterprise, but of a very different sort. Unlike print poltitical journalism, electronic political commentary has been expanding in recent years, but only by embracing the entertainment paradigm of television and radio media generally. Like thousands of other, less successful, bloggers, Wonkette probably watched 1,000 hours of scandal-dishers and partisan “pundits” trading insults, and thought, Hell, I can do that. Klam’s discovery that she’s now ready to graduate to television or even movies is hardly shocking. Like Marshall, she’s already doing political journalism–but it’s a kind of journalism that commands little respect and adds even less to the common weal. To put it another way, Marshall’s type of journalism carries a moral hazard of celebrity; Wonkette’s is basically about celebrity.
Kos, of course, is a blogger who’s more into movement-building and agitprop than journalism. His temptation is not to go onto the masthead of The Nation; it’s to gain real influence over real-life political institutions. Klam’s most interesting Kos anecdote involves a near-physical altercation between the fiery blogger and the executive director of the DCCC, involving the latter’s allocation of campaign dollars in House elections. If Kos were inclined to think this way, he might say his and similar blogs address a market failure in the political world itself, where the inbred clan of Democratic fundraisers and political consultants are more concerned with protecting their turf than winning elections.
To sum it all up, Josh Marshall and Kos are blogging with a purpose, and thus their efforts can and will be judged in terms of their success in meeting their purposes. And that seems to be the main complaint of retiring blogger Billman in the LA Times. For him, blogging is essentially about itself: a revolutionary culture of dissent, of “speaking truth to power,” that “made blogging such a potent alternative to the corporate-owned media.” By this measurement, actually gaining influence and power is ipso facto a betrayal of the blogosphere.
I guess you know where I come down on this. Blogging is a means, not an end. It’s open to everybody, whether or not you pass the test of subversiveness some would impose. Nobody’s forced to read anybody’s blog, and it’s not like there are limited options. And if bloggers put their work to good purpose, then good for them.


Strategy Notes:
John Belisarius

How much damage did the Swift Boat attacks really do – and what can Dems learn from them?

It would be hard to find a Democrat right now who doesn’t think that the attacks during August by the Swift Boat critics were extremely damaging to John Kerry and that a much earlier and more combative response to the accusations would have substantially reduced their impact. With reports of new smear attacks on the horizon, many democrats consider the two generalizations above as the unquestioned basis for planning the democratic response.
But, surprisingly, the evidence for both of these conclusions is not as clear as it might seem. The analyses that have advanced this view have generally said something like the following: “Well, Kerry’s poll support fell during August and the Swift Boat attacks were the biggest news story that month so the one must have caused the other”
For example, Newsweek’s summary of its most recent poll argued,
Kerry’s campaign, on the other hand, may have been hurt by the television ad campaign launched against him by Vietnam veterans who question his record. Just 45 percent of all voters view Kerry favorably (down from 53 percent in late July) and 46 percent view him unfavorably (up from 37 percent).
This direct jump from the swift boat ads to the level of Kerry’s popularity is, to put it mildly, a pretty breathtaking leap of statistical inference (and one that is probably not a good idea to try out in Stat 101). But, if you look closely, many commentators argue along pretty much the same kinds of lines.
Commentators get away with this kind of “seat of the pants” thinking because, like most people, they rely heavily on gut, instinct and experience to reach conclusions and frequently use polling data more like decoration for their ideas then as actual proof.
But if Democrats want to make serious use of public opinion data in planning their political strategy, they need to begin by examining the data in a different way, focusing on results that can actually inform choices between alternative strategies.
In the case of the swift boat ads there are three key questions a practical political strategist would want answered: how effective actually was the attack, how much of an effect did the delayed response of the Kerry campaign have, and what impact, if any, did the attacks and the controversy have on the image and reputation of Bush and the Republican party.
1. How effective were the ads?
On the first question – how successful were the attacks – it is important to distinguish between public opinion about Kerry’s participation in the anti-war movement after he returned from Vietnam and the specific challenges the Swift Boat critics raised about his military service. As noted previously, Kerry’s anti-war activities during the early 1970’s had always been certain to anger and alienate a significant number of veterans and families of men who had died in Vietnam. According to an August 23-26 poll by the Annenberg Center for Public Policy, some 60% of the veterans who were familiar with John Kerry’s anti-war statements disapproved of them.
But in regard to the specific allegations raised by the Swift Boat critics that Kerry did not actually deserve his medals, the Annenberg study found that only 24% of the sample agreed in contrast to 55% who thought Kerry did indeed deserve them. In fact, even a majority of traditionally conservative groups such as men and veterans agreed with Kerry rather then his critics on this issue. It was only among Republican partisans and in the closed conservative media environment created by talk radio and cable TV that the percentage of those who thought Kerry did not deserve his medals ever rose above 30%.
Even after the Republican convention this negative view of the ads has persisted. In a Sept 3-5 Gallup survey, only 21% of the respondents felt the ads were “generally accurate” in contrast to 40% who felt that they “distort the truth” (another 40% were either unfamiliar with the issue or had not formed an opinion)
It is unquestionably disturbing that the Fox/Talk Radio/Republican Party media machine can convince 20% of the American people of charges that are rejected by most other Americans. But, while the attacks clearly twisted media coverage of Kerry in a negative direction during August and prevented Kerry from focusing attention on “his” issues, as an attempt to actually damage John Kerry’s image and reputation with voters outside the loyal Republican base, the data from the Annenberg survey (and other polls as well) indicate that the smear campaign was essentially a failure.
2. Would a faster response by the Kerry campaign have prevented the smear from taking hold?
The Annenberg survey also calculated day by day data during mid-August which showed that the number of people who doubted that Kerry deserved his medals gradually rose from about 20% on August 10, when the advertisements had been in the news for about 6 days, up to 30% by August 18th when the Kerry campaign first forcefully responded. After that, the percentage of doubters then sank back down to about 20% by August 26th as an increasing number of eyewitnesses, documents and editorials in major newspapers appeared supporting Kerry’s version of events.
Given the 10% decline in the percentage of people who doubted Kerry’s earned his medals that occurred once the Kerry campaign and the media began firmly challenging the attacks, it would indeed appear that an earlier response might have prevented the smear from gaining traction in the first place. But, before accepting this conclusion it is necessary to consider that significant sympathy for Kerry was created by the perception that he had been the victim of a two-week long, totally one-sided attack. Had the Kerry campaign responded furiously to the charges the same day they were launched, the counterattack would almost certainly have been spun by the critics as an attempt to “hide the truth” “create a cover-up”, “bully Vietnam veterans” or “prevent an honest debate”. This accusation, in turn, would then have been used to demand that the mainstream media criticize both camps for “negative politics” rather then just the Republicans and could easily have weakened the very categorical rejection of the accusations that finally appeared in the editorial comments of major newspapers like the L.A. Times and Chicago Tribune.
This does not mean that the slow response of the Kerry campaign was the right strategy. But it does illustrate that, in responding to smears, there are often significant trade-off’s between conflicting objectives that have to be taken into consideration.
3. Did the controversy damage the Republican Party’s image and reputation?
Regarding this final issue, the Annenberg study found in late August that 46% of the respondents believed the Bush campaign was behind the ads, in contrast to 37% who did not. By the time of the Republican convention an increasing perception of the party’s behavior as generally unfair had clearly taken hold. In the September 3-5 Gallup poll noted above, a majority of 52% of the respondents felt that Republicans had “attacked John Kerry unfairly” in contrast to only 42% who did not. (The democrats, in contrast, were seen by most voters as not having attacked Bush unfairly). Similarly, 50% of the Gallup sample felt the Republicans had spent too much time criticizing the Democrats during the convention in contrast to only 39% who thought they had maintained the right balance.
Lessons for next time
There are several conclusions suggested by this data, conclusions that go beyond the currently popular view that democrats should respond to any future smear attacks as rapidly, forcefully and aggressively as possible.
First, it is probably impossible to prevent smears from taking hold within the conservative “echo chamber” of Fox and talk radio and it may be a misuse of resources to attempt to achieve that goal. The more important and achievable goal – preventing the smear from spreading beyond that audience – is probably best pursued by energetically demanding that the mainstream media fulfill their journalistic obligations by emphatically and categorically labeling false accusations as baseless on their editorial pages rather then attempting to debate the issues directly with the smear group itself.
Second, while a very rapid and aggressive response to new accusations can clearly be desirable, it must still be balanced with the need to appear fair, unruffled and unafraid of open and honest debate. A shrill or intemperate counterattack, even if launched at the earliest possible moment, can have little effect or even be counterproductive.
Finally, Republicans have significantly damaged their image and reputation among many moderates and opinion leaders by embracing an essentially dishonest, “win at any cost” approach during this campaign. This tarnished reputation is an asset democrats should energetically exploit. Not only does it reduce the appeal and legitimacy of Republicanism in general, but it makes it easier for Dems to successfully deflect future smear campaigns. Ronald Reagan’s famous response, “There you go again”, with which he portrayed Jimmy Carter’s repeated challenges to his character as tiresome evidence of unfairness, provides one model of how such a strategy can be successfully executed.


80 Years Ago in the Garden

Before undertaking the herculean effort of watching and then analyzing the Republican National Convention, I can’t resist the opportunity to flog one of my favorite political books, about a Convention held at the original Madison Square Garden 80 years ago.
Robert K. Murray’s 1976 book, The 103d Ballot, focused on the 1924 Democratic Convention in New York, which took, yes, 103 ballots to nominate a doomed ticket of John W. Davis for president and Charles Bryan (younger brother of The Commoner) for vice-president. The book has been out of print for decades, but is probably available at any decent university or big-city library. Here’s a link to a big PDF file that includes a longer take on the book and the ’24 Convention, under the title of “Unhappy Warriors.”
Today’s conventions are tightly controlled, relentlessly timed affairs aimed at conveying partisan messages through the ever-narrowing lens of network television coverage. 80 years ago, the new medium of radio offered gavel-to-gavel coverage of conventions, while most newspapers devoted massive coverage to all the speechifying. And as Murray amply demonstrated, the uncontrolled nature of the 1924 Convention, and the disastrous impressions it created, began the long, slow, uneven trend towards submerging party differences during the Big Show of party conventions.
At The Garden in 1924, Democrats were deadlocked between the rural, prohibitionist, anti-Wall Street forces that united behind William Gibbs McAdoo, and the urban, wet forces symbolized by New York’s favorite son, Al Smith. There was a frenetic and toxic platform fight on the floor about whether or not to specifically condemn the Ku Klux Klan, considered a “progressive” organization by the populists of that time. It was William Jennings Bryan’s last convention, and it helped make Franklin D. Roosevelt (already the vice-presidential candidate in 1920) a national political figure after his “Happy Warrior” speech nominating Smith.
If nothing else, Murray’s book amply shows that cultural issues did not somehow emerge in 2000 as a source of partisan identification against a “normal” background of class-based divisions. The real aberration in American political history occurred in and after 1932, when the emergency of the Great Depression enabled FDR to create the first grand coalition of low-to-middle income voters since Andrew Jackson.
Check out Murray’s book if you can, and then stock up on the caffeine to watch the latest Garden Party, if you must.


What If They Gave a Faction Fight and Nobody Came?

That’s what DR hopes!   And it just might happen, judging from reaction to the DLC’s latest jeremiad against the dread forces of Mondale-McGovernism, delivered at their “National Conversation” (or should it be lecture?) in Philadelphia.   “The DLC has saved the Democratic Party once, and we’re bound to do it again”, thundered Al From, “We can’t afford to do anything less because the stakes are so high”. 
Oh really?  Just remember, Al, you put your pants on one leg at a time, just like the rest of us, so a bit more humility might be in order.  And also remember that the DLC isn’t quite the growth stock it used to be, so rants against liberals don’t get quite the same receptive audience.  As the article by Adam Nagourney in The New York Times pointed out, none of the Democratic Presidential contenders bothered to show up at the conference this year to tout their wares, in contrast to last year, when four of them addressed the conference.  As Nagourney points out, “the council has become increasingly politically radioactive in this primary season”.  Their rants just aren’t playing well with the rest of the party and, even, apparently, with some the attendees to their own conference.  As Laura Ruderman, an attending state representative from Washington put it, referring to the intra-party bickering: “I don’t think we can be successful if we let ourselves go down that rat hole”
Amen, says DR.  Imagine if the DLC had gone to Philadelphia and actually called for party unity against the real enemy, George W. Bush and his hard right GOP.  That would also have been news (Democrats bury the hatchet!) and would actually have done some good.  But no, instead they choose to bash their fellow Democrats and get on the front pages of the nation’s newspapers telling everyone how the Democrats are sinking fast because the public thinks they’re pacifists and big government liberals.  (Did they perhaps read by mistake from Matthew Dowd’s RNC talking points about the declining Democrats?)
Don’t these people read the papers?   Haven’t they been following all Bush’s troubles in the last few weeks and his declining poll numbers—don’t they realize Democratic criticisms of Bush, including on the war and intelligence abuse, are actually having some effect?   It is no longer December, 2002 or even April, 2003—it’s July, 2003 and the incumbent President is in some real difficulty.
Let’s not help him out by fighting.  Let’s make his troubles worse by uniting.