Harry Enten explains “How Kamala Harris can beat Donald Trump” at CNN Politics: “Kamala Harris seems to have more appeal among voters of color and younger voters than Joe Biden did before he got out of the presidential race. Still, the 2020 results show that Harris can make up even more ground with these groups in her expected matchup against Donald Trump….Take a look at our newly published CNN/SSRS poll. Harris leads Trump among Black voters 78% to 15%. Among these same voters (the poll recontacted the same respondents), Biden was ahead by a smaller 70% to 23% in CNN polling data from April and June….The same holds to a somewhat lesser degree among Hispanic voters. Harris comes in at 47% to Trump’s 45%, while it was 50% for Trump to 41% for Biden among these same respondents in the April and June data….Voters under the age of 35 demonstrate a similar shift. It’s Harris 47% to Trump’s 43% now. In April and June, these same voters put Trump up 49% to 42% over Biden….Despite the improvement, the results should leave much to be desired for Harris. She is doing at least 5 points worse than Biden did among these same groups in the final 2020 polls….Among Black voters, Biden led Trump 84% to 9% at the end of the 2020 campaign. Even more notable is that Biden led among Hispanic voters by a 58% to 32% spread….Finally, even as Harris has become a meme favorite among young voters, Biden’s 60% to 31% advantage over Trump at the end of the 2020 campaign is massively larger than where Harris is right now….This may seem like bad news for the Harris campaign, and, in one clear way, it is. Without improving among these groups, Harris likely cannot win against the former president….The good news for Harris, though, is that she’s showing that she can make up some ground with this group relative to how Biden was doing earlier this year….As Harris continues to define herself separately from being Biden’s vice president, there’s a real chance she could carve out her own political identity that may appeal more to voters of color and young voters….A big reason Biden struggled in those Sun Belt states is that each has a significant share of either Black or Hispanic voters. By doing better with those groups, Harris may reopen the possibility of more electoral paths….If, for instance, Harris won all four Sun Belt battlegrounds mentioned above, she wouldn’t need to carry Michigan, Pennsylvania or Wisconsin….Perhaps more likely, Harris could get to 270 electoral votes by winning some mixture of northern battlegrounds and Sun Belt swing states….Harris now has a bunch of paths toward victory, while Biden’s options seemed to be closing rather quickly.”

“Florida’s ballot initiative to protect abortion is winning and has more support among voters than either Vice President Harris or Democratic Senate candidate Debbie Mucarsel-Powell, a new poll shows,” Nathaniel Weixel writes in “New poll shows Florida abortion amendment winning, outperforming Democrats” at the Hill. “According to the poll from University of North Florida’s Public Opinion Research Lab (PORL), 69 percent of respondents said they would vote for Amendment 4, which would prohibit laws from restricting or banning abortion until fetal viability. …Constitutional amendments in Florida need 60 percent of the vote to become law…. “We have yet to see campaigns on either side of this really get moving,” PORL faculty director and political science professor Michael Binder said in a statement. “Factor in the highly contested and contentious financial impact statement recently added to the ballot summary, and I would expect to see support for this amendment drop before November.”….The poll also showed an amendment to legalize recreational cannabis has enough support to pass, with 64 percent of respondents supporting it….If the presidential election were held today, 49 percent of respondents said they would vote for former President Trump, while 42 percent said Harris….Respondents were also asked about the Senate race between incumbent Sen. Rick Scott (R) and Mucarsel-Powell (D). The poll showed 47 percent said they would vote for Scott, and 43 percent said they’d support Mucarsel-Powell….The polling differences between candidates and the amendments show why abortion supporters have been trying to keep the issue separate from party politics out of fear it will sink their effort….Among backers of the abortion amendment, 53 percent identified as Republican, and 51 percent said they voted for Trump in 2020. There are almost 900,000 more registered Republican voters in Florida than Democrats.”

At Politico, Christopher Cadelago writes “Harris tripped herself up in 2019 by straying too far from what was then her political North Star: crafting an image as a tough-minded and empathetic prosecutor….In the run-up to the Democratic primaries, Harris allowed “Kamala is a cop” critiques from activists and members of her own party to get inside her head. While Harris was progressive by the standards of her era in law enforcement, she was nowhere near as permissive as today’s crop of liberal district attorneys. Still, she readily submitted to the left’s endless purity tests, and backtracked on key pieces of her record as a prosecutor and attorney general. In doing so, she undermined what Harris and her closest advisers viewed as one of her greatest strengths: her career-long commitment to pursuing justice through the legal system….The act of creating a policy platform on the fly while simultaneously trying to prove her ideological bona fides yanked her further left and outside her comfort zone. At different moments in the primary, you could almost see her calculating answers in real time during TV interviews, which had the effect of making her appear wishy-washy….Harris won’t need to worry about liberal carping about her prosecutorial background anymore. It may have been a liability in a Democratic presidential primary, but in a general election, it’s more likely to be an asset. And whereas she once struggled to articulate her views on broader issues like health care, she now can largely rely on the policy framework created under the Biden-Harris administration….One of the most serious flaws of Harris’ 2020 bid was the inability of the messenger to settle on a consistent, coherent and compelling message….Now that she’s about to be handed the Democratic nomination, Harris doesn’t need to compete for eyeballs against a massive field of serious competitors. She’s free to focus on a straightforward mission….It won’t be enough for Harris to just be the anti-Trump candidate. Her task will be laying waste to Trump while also articulating a forward-looking vision of a brighter future….Balancing those ideas and integrating them into a cohesive message won’t be easy. But Harris has already gotten started, showing a zeal for attack in her characterization of Trump as a fraudster and an abuser of women while wrapping her campaign around the theme of fighting for the middle class.”

From “Old and quite weird”: Democrats finally discover new effective attack — and Republicans hate it” by Charles R. Davis at Salon. The Democratic meme about Trump and Vance being just plain weird got a pretty good workout during the last week. As Davis explains, “President Joe Biden won in 2020 largely by promising to a return to normalcy and baseline competency. In 2024, Democrats are making a similar argument but more forcibly: They’re pointing, laughing and dismissing Trump and his circus as a total freak show to which we can’t return….“The fascists depend on fear,” as Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz put it over the weekend. “The fascists depend on us going back. But we are not afraid of weird people. We’re a little bit creeped out, but we are not afraid.”….They’re strange guys with sick obsessions, as the two-term Democratic governor and former congressman put it on MSNBC last week….“You know there’s something wrong with people when they talk about freedom — freedom to be in your bedroom, freedom to be in your exam room, freedom to tell your kids what they can read,” Walz said. “That stuff is weird. They come across as weird. They seem obsessed with this.”….Republicans, including Fox News anchors, “will take a look at Donald Trump and say he’s perfectly fine, even though he seemed unable to tell the difference between Nikki Haley and Nancy Pelosi; even though he’s rambling about electrocuting sharks and Hannibal Lecter; even though he’s clearly older and stranger than he was when America got to know him,” Buttigieg said….The Harris campaign, if anything, is leaning into what works. In a press release over the weekend, addressing a “78-year-old criminal’s Fox News appearance,” the vice president’s staff noted Trump’s failed attempt to distance himself from his ally’s hard-right Project 2025 agenda. But there was also a fact that the campaign did not want reporters to miss: the man with 34 felony convictions to his name is also “old and quite weird.” They are weird and pretty creepy, especially to younger voters, who don’t appreciate neo-fascist meddling with their reproductive rights. Democrats should rock that meme.

With so much going on in the major-candidate presidential race, it’s easy to forget there is a one-formidable indie candidate still in the game, so at New York I took a look at how the very new contest created by Kamala Harris’s replacement of Joe Biden has affected RFK Jr.:

Most of the buzz surrounding Kamala Harris’s replacement of Joe Biden as the presumptive 2024 Democratic presidential nominee has come from the revived intraparty enthusiasm she has generated and her stronger performance in general-election polls against Donald Trump. But separately from and perhaps contributing to this Democratic comeback narrative has been a notable fall in the political standing of independent presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr.

In the RealClearPolitics averages of national presidential polls that include Kennedy and other non-major-party candidates, RFK Jr. dropped from 8.7 percent before Biden withdrew from the race to 5.8 percent now. Looking at longer trends, Kennedy was at 10.3 percent in the RCP averages as recently as July 6. So it’s been a pretty steep downward drop for the former Democrat. And in terms of his personal favorability, he’s been struggling for a while. FiveThirtyEight’s averages showed RFK Jr.’s favorability ratio going underwater on May 14, and is now at 33.7 percent favorable–41.5 percent unfavorable.

A number of factors are hurting Kennedy’s candidacy. Perhaps the most obvious is the abrupt decline in the supply of “double-haters” (voters who gave both major-party candidates unfavorable ratings) from which the indie candidate naturally fed. The Times-Siena pollsters showed double-haters declining from 20 percent before Biden dropped out to 8 percent afterward. That seems to be the consequence of improvements in favorability for both Trump and Harris, squeezing Kennedy from two directions. An additional problem for Kennedy is Harris’s gains over Biden among Black, Latin, and under-30 voters, all major reservoirs of support for RFK Jr.

What’s unclear is whether the apparent reset of the presidential contest is the principal source of Kennedy’s misery or if instead (or in part) we’re just at that point in the election cycle when non-major-party candidates tend to fade. Kennedy has some additional problems that don’t directly stem from Harris’s or Trump’s standing, most notably a money shortage, as The Hill reports:

“Federal Election Commission filings show Kennedy spent nearly $1 million more than he took in last month and that the campaign is also carrying debt of approximately $3 million …

“His biggest super PAC, American Values 2024, brought in a modest $228,000 in June, according to the FEC.”

It’s unclear how deep RFK Jr.’s most important funding source, his running mate Nicole Shanahan, is willing to dig into her personal wealth to keep the campaign going. But it is clear most of the dough is going to the very difficult and intermittently successful effort to get the ticket onto general-election ballots. According to the New York Times, the Kennedy-Shanahan ticket is on the ballot in just 13 states at the moment, including just one battleground state (Michigan), though that number is sure to rise.

As for Kennedy’s strategy moving forward, it’s not very clear. His conversations with Trump during the Republican National Convention fanned Democratic fears that the wiggy anti-vaxx pol might be joining the MAGA cause. If that’s not in the cards, RFK Jr. still has his previous strategy, which focused on making the stage in the second presidential debate in September that Biden and Trump agreed to back in June. But it’s unclear if the ABC debate for September 10 is still on. And Kennedy’s lagging poll numbers (he’ll need 15 percent of registered or likely voters in four high-quality national polls, a level he hasn’t reached in a good while) mean he likely won’t make the grade even if he meets the debate’s ballot-access requirements.

In retrospect, the end of the much-loathed Biden-Trump rematch probably spelled the end of the Kennedy campaign as an ongoing enterprise. But he and his supporters can still make a difference on the margins, where close elections are often decided.

There’s always plenty of jabber about swing states the summer before a presidential election. But, really, “swing states” are often made by the trends in swing counties. Steve Kornacki explains at msnbc.com, highlighting the critical importance of two of them in Georgia and Pennsylvania:

Pass the political humility, please. Many people who live in conservative communities are hyper-sensitive to liberal arrogance. More rural conservatives than you would think share at least some liberal views. But you are probably not going to hear them say so because those who advocate liberal views frequently broadcast their political attitudes in a way that condescends to or disparages non-liberals. As a rank-and-file problem, this probably intensifies polarization between liberal and conservative voters. There is no quick fix for bridging this particular gap between ideological voting groups. That’s a long-term project. But there is a hard lesson that must be learned, and quickly, by Democratic political candidates. Leaders may not be able to do much to stop their supporters from condescending toward those who disagree with them on particular policies. A visit to any social media outlet will quickly confirm the reality of liberal to conservative disparagement at the rank-and-file level. What can and must be changed, however, is that candidates who want to win elections have to do better. They must become hyper-sensitive about not projecting liberal arrogance. It falls to Democratic presidential nominee-in-waiting Kamala Harris to set the instructive example here. She must be ever on-guard against projecting liberal condescension, not only making comments about “deplorables” or bashing conservative cultural icons, but also a whole range of lesser blunders, like cutting people off in conversation, or anything that says “I don’t have time for your nonsense,” which former prosecutors often do. Presidents Obama and Biden both did a good job of avoiding such self-set booby traps, which are the surest road to defeat. Yes, it is true that conservatives, leaders as well as rank-and-file, also often disparage liberals in equally-arrogant ways. But that is their problem, not something Democrats can do anything about. Let them hurt their own cause. But our candidates need not serve their campaigns as clueless accomplices. The key behavioral consideration is to treat all adversaries with respect, humility and courtesy, no matter how abusive they may become. MLK was the Zen master of leveraging these values to build bridges of goodwill across chasms of division. Avoid at all costs the temptation to pander to rude supporters who do otherwise.

Yes, he went there….again. “In four years, you won’t have to vote again. we’ll have it fixed…”

Thomas B. Edsall has a scary essay about “What the Trump-Vance Alliance Means for the Republican Party” air the New York Times. He quotes scholar Ariel Malka, who notes, “A notable segment of the U.S. population combines a culturally based conservative identity with some degree of affinity for left-leaning and protectionist economic policy. Trump’s brand of populism — combining anti-immigrant nationalism with worker-oriented economic appeals within a framework denouncing left-wing and globalist elites — is attractive to these citizens.” Edsall continues, “I asked Malka what share of the electorate simultaneously holds culturally conservative and economically liberal views. He replied that when measured by specific policy preferences, “a substantial segment of the population reveals a culturally conservative and at least somewhat economically left-leaning attitude combination,” citing one study showing that over a quarter of voters fit this combination….Voters holding these views, Malka noted, “were a good deal more inclined to support the Republican than the Democratic Party.” Edsall adds, “Economic attitudes, according to Malka, are more complicated. Those “high in need for security and certainty tend to show a leaning toward left economic attitudes, when they are not highly exposed to political discourse that cultivates a right versus left attitude organization. When they are highly politically engaged, however, they have tended to move their economic attitudes to the right to match their culturally based conservative identity.”

Edsall continues, “For many years,” Elizabeth Suhay, a political scientist at American University, wrote by email, “the Republican Party managed to persuade many working-class whites to support their economic agenda not only by contrasting it with Democrats’ emphasis on racial equity but also by arguing that small government, economically conservative policy rewards hard work….The persuasiveness of this message waned, however, with increasing inequality, low income growth, rural job loss, etc., creating an opening for Trump. His 2016 campaign directly addressed working-class whites’ economic concerns, even if his policies in office generally did not….With the Vance pick, we are seeing an even greater rhetorical shift toward economic populism aimed directly at working-class and rural voters, and it is likely that a second Trump term would advance more populist policy than the first….It is certainly the case that the two parties’ recent agendas have put many working-class people in a bind: The Democratic Party’s economic agenda suits them, but the Democrats’ social agenda has been far more progressive than the modal working-class person. This is true regardless of race; however, Democrats’ emphasis on affirmative action (broadly construed) will be perceived as threatening by white working-class folks for both economic and cultural reasons.” Edsall concludes, “This year, each political coalition — left and right — is fraught with contradictions. In a situation in which the vote count threatens to be close, defections of any kind, especially if they’re concentrated in the wrong places, can be extraordinarily costly.”

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter and co-author with John B. Judis of “Where Have All the Democrats Gone?,” is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

Democrats are nothing short of giddy. Biden, who looked like a sure loser, bowed out of the presidential race and was seamlessly replaced by Kamala Harris through deft and lightning-fast intraparty maneuvering. The race is reset! All is possible!

Who can blame Democrats for being a bit slap happy? They were staring into the abyss and now have a reprieve. They have a younger candidate and a more enthusiastic, unified party. Those are important and positive differences. But there are also similarities to their previous situation that are highly negative and can’t be wished away. Here’s one that I wrote about back in January:

Here is a simple truth: how working-class (noncollege) voters move will likely determine the outcome of the 2024 election. They will be the overwhelming majority of eligible voters (around two-thirds) and, even allowing for turnout patterns, only slightly less dominant among actual voters (around three-fifths). Moreover, in all six key swing states—Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin—the working-class share of the electorate, both as eligible voters and as projected 2024 voters, will be higher than the national average.

It follows that significant deterioration in working-class support could put Biden [now Harris] in a very deep hole nationally and key states. Conversely, a burgeoning advantage among working-class voters would likely put Trump in a dominant position.

This is very important to keep in mind as we are swamped by a tsunami of favorable Harris coverage in legacy and other center-left media. Where once her retail political skills were disparaged, we are told that she is now (or always has been) a consummately effective, charismatic retail politician.

Polls of course will be scrutinized for signs that the race is shifting in the Democrats’ favor and even small changes will be interpreted as signs that Trump is on the run. But in truth it will take a few weeks for the race to settle out and one should be cautious about interpreting initial results.

That said, what we have seen so far does not suggest a fundamentally altered race. Trump was ahead and is still ahead. Democrats still badly trail among working-class voters and have compressed margins among nonwhite and young voters relative to 2020. Of course, that may change in coming weeks but that is what we see now.

Looking at the running poll averages, we have the following for Trump-Harris matchups: RCP has Trump over Harris by 1.7 points (2.8 pointswith the full ballot including Kennedy/West/Stein). New York Times has Trump over Harris by 2 points and DDHQ/The Hill has Trump by 2 points. Pretty consistent.

Another approach is to compare averages of Biden vs. Trump and Harris vs. Trump. Naturally, these only overlap when Biden was the actual candidate and Harris was a notional candidate. But the data are still of interest.

Split Ticket has the most recent data on this, covering the month of July, and they do not show much difference between the candidates. Harris does slightly worse overall, with a margin against Trump .4 points worse than Biden. She does worse among men, a bit better among women; worse among seniors, better among those under 30; worse among whites and Hispanics and better among blacks and, significantly, worse among working-class voters and better among the college-educated. But the differences are generally quite small.

If you confine one’s sample of polls to those that were entirely in the field after Biden dropped out (i.e., after July 20), rather than just partially—a tiny group–there are some signs of a tightening race. But Trump is still ahead.

CNN is one of those polls and it does indeed show Harris doing better against Trump than Biden did prior to dropping out. But Trump is still ahead and, interestingly, Harris is doing no better against Trump than she did before Biden dropped out—in fact, a bit worse (3 point deficit now vs. a 2 point deficit in late June). And the internal demographics are quite similar to the earlier reading and all run far behind how Biden did in the 2020 election. Notably, her working-class deficit to Trump is 15 points, compared to Biden’s 4 point deficit in 2020.

These double digit Democratic deficits among the working class have been a regular feature of this election cycle. These deficits have been driven by worsening performance among the white working class (recall that Biden in 2020 actually did a bit better among these voters relative to Clinton in 2016) and much lower margins among nonwhiteworking-class voters. It is difficult to see how Harris prevails without strong progress on this front.

Can she do it? Sure, anything’s possible. But Democrats would be well-advised to be clear-eyed about the challenge. What Harris has to overcome is illustrated by an early July Pew poll that had a large enough sample size (N=over 9,400) to allow blacks and Hispanics to be broken down by working-class vs. college-educated. Both racial groups show strong educational polarization that is much larger than what was observed in 2020. Hispanic working-class voters in this poll preferred Trump by 3 points over Biden, compared to a 22 point margin for Biden over Trump in 2020. Among black working-class voters, Biden was leading by 47 points over Trump, compared to an 82 point lead for Biden in 2020.

A working class-oriented campaign would appear to be in order. But so far there is little indication that is what the Harris campaign has in mind. A widely-circulated memo from the campaign sees Harris’ candidacy as building on the “Biden-Harris coalition of voters” and mentions black voters, Latino voters, AANHPI voters, women voters and young voters. Working-class voters are conspicuous by their absence. The memo proposes to expand this coalition among, for example, white college-educated voters by taking advantage of the fact that:

…[Harris] has been at the forefront on the very issues that are most important to these voters—restoring women’s reproductive rights and upholding the rule of law following January 6, Donald Trump’s criminal convictions, and the Supreme Court’s immunity decision.

There is little mention of any other issues. This is despite the fact that Harris is rated far below Trump on handling issues like crime, inflation, and immigration. The latter two issues typically top voters’ list of concerns.

To the extent Harris has talked about issues other than abortion, “democracy is on the ballot,” and Trump’s character it has been to emphasize, according to Axios, that:

…she’ll pursue big—and expensive—parts of Joe Biden’s domestic agenda that never made it across the finish line…Harris is signaling that even as Democrats play defense on Biden’s mixed economic record, she’s eager to go on offense for the next four years…Her plans include pushing for nearly $2 trillion to establish universal pre-K education and improve elderly care and child care…

This seems…unwise in light of working-class voters’ inflation fears and how poorly they view Biden administration economic management. Pushing for massively increased spending is highly unlikely to win them over to your side, even if they approve of some of the end goals.

As some of the saner voices on the left have noted, Harris needs to make a serious effort to assure skeptical voters, particularly working-class voters, that she will in fact do things differently from the Biden administration on key issues where Democrats are vulnerable. David Leonhardt mentions crime, immigration, inflation, gender issues, and free speech. As Leonhardt points out:

Democrats often describe Donald Trump and other Republicans as radical….But many voters also see the Democratic Party as radical. In fact, the average American considers the Democratic Party to be further from the political mainstream than the Republican Party…

…[S]uccessful presidential candidates reassure voters that they are more moderate than their party. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Biden all did in their own ways. Even Trump did in 2016, by supporting Social Security, opposing trade deals, and endorsing same-sex marriage. The strategy works because most voters see themselves as less conservative than the Republican Party and less liberal than the Democratic Party….

[These politicians] were sending a larger message. It was the same one Clinton sent when he called himself “a new Democrat” and George W. Bush did with his talk of “compassionate conservatism.” It was also the one Trump recently tried to send by saying he opposed a national abortion ban.

All these politicians were asserting their independence from their own parties. It’s hard to get elected president without doing so.

So far there is little indication that Harris will do anything of the kind. As Politico Playbook noted: “Three sources in Harris’ orbit we spoke to said people expecting Harris to take drastically different positions [to distinguish herself from Biden] are going to end up disappointed.”

Thus, instead of a “different kind of Democrat” what voters will likely get is a younger, nonwhite, female version of the same kind of Democrat. Put another way, the Democrats seem content to remain a Brahmin Left party and see how things work out. Gulp.

It’s pretty obvious Kamala Harris’s candidacy changes the 2024 presidential race more than a little, and I wrote at New York about one avenue she has for victory that might have eluded Joe Biden:

During her brief run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2019, Kamala Harris was widely believed to be emulating Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign strategy. She treated South Carolina, the first primary state with a substantial Black electorate, as the site of her potential breakthrough. But she front-loaded resources into Iowa to prepare for that breakthrough by reassuring Black voters that she could win in the largely white jurisdiction. She had the added advantage of being from the large state of California, where the primary had just been moved up to Super Tuesday (March 3). For a thrilling moment, after her commanding performance in a June 2019 debate, Harris seemed on track to pull off this feat, threatening Joe Biden’s hold on South Carolina in the polls and surging in Iowa. But neither she nor Cory Booker, who also relied on the Obama precedent, could displace Biden as the favorite of Black voters or strike gold in the crowded Iowa field. Out of money and luck, Harris dropped out before voters voted.

Now Kamala Harris is the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee for 2024 without having to navigate any primaries. But she still faces some key strategic decisions. Joe Biden was consistently trailing Donald Trump in the polls in no small part because he was underperforming among young and non-white voters, the very heart of the much-discussed Obama coalition. Can Harris recoup some of these potential losses without sacrificing support elsewhere in the electorate? That is a question she must address at the very beginning of her general-election campaign.

There’s a chance that Harris can inject a bit of the Obama “hope and change” magic into a Democratic ticket that had previously felt like a desperate effort to defend an unpopular administration led by a low-energy incumbent, as Ron Brownstein suggests in The Atlantic:

“Polls have shown that a significant share of Americans doubt the mental capacity of Trump, who has stumbled through his own procession of verbal flubs, memory lapses, and incomprehensible tangents during stump speeches and interviews to relatively little attention in the shadow of Biden’s difficulties. Particularly if Harris picks a younger running mate, she could top a ticket that embodies the generational change that many voters indicated they were yearning for when facing a Trump-Biden rematch …

“In the best-case scenario for this line of thinking, Harris could regain ground among the younger voters and Black and Hispanic voters who have drifted away from Biden since 2020. At the same time, she could further expand Democrats’ already solid margins among college-educated women who support abortion rights.”

Team Trump seems to believe it can offset these potential gains by depicting Harris as a “California radical” and a symbol of diversity who might alienate the older white voters with whom Biden had some residual strength. Obama overcame similar race-saturated appeals in 2008, but he had a lot of help from a financial collapse and an unpopular war presided over by the party of his opponent.

Following Obama’s path has major strategic implications in terms of the battleground map. Any significant improvement over Biden’s performance among Black, Latino, and under-30 voters might put Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, and North Carolina — very nearly conceded to Trump in recent weeks — back into play. But erosion of Biden’s support among older and/or non-college-educated white voters could create potholes in his narrow Rust Belt path to victory in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

These strategic choices could definitely affect Harris’s choice of a running-mate, not just in terms of potentially picking a veep from a battleground state, but as a way of amplifying the shift produced by Biden’s withdrawal. Brownstein even thinks Harris might consider following Bill Clinton’s 1992 example of doubling down on her own strengths:

“The other option that energizes many Democrats would be for Harris to take the bold, historic option of selecting another woman: Whitmer. That would be a greater gamble, but a possible model would be 1992, when Bill Clinton chose Al Gore as his running mate; Gore was, like him, a centrist Baby Boomer southerner—rather than an older D.C. hand. ‘I love Josh Shapiro and I think he would be a great VP candidate, but I would double down’ with Whitmer, [Democratci consultant Mike] Mikus told me. ‘I don’t think you have to go with a moderate white guy. I think you can be bold [with a pick] that electrifies your base.’ I heard similar views from several consultants.”

Whitmer’s expressed disinterest in the veepstakes may take that particular option off the table, but the broader point remains: Harris does not have to — and may not be able to — simply adopt Biden’s strategy and tweak it slightly. She may be able to contemplate gains in the electorate that were unimaginable for an 81-year-old white male incumbent. But the strategic opportunity to follow Obama’s path to the White House will first depend on Harris’s ability to refocus persuadable voters on Trump’s shaky record, bad character, and extremist agenda. Biden could not do that after the debate debacle of June 27. His successor must begin taking the battle to the former president right now.

Democratic candidates and their campaign workers have an article to read, “Class, race and the chances of outgrowing poverty in America” at The Economist. Some of the observations:

A new study by Raj Chetty, of Harvard University, and colleagues provides fresh data on how America’s landscape of opportunity has shifted sharply over the past decades. Although at the national level there have been only small declines in mobility, the places and groups that have become more (or less) likely to enable children to rise up have changed a lot. The most striking finding is that, compared with the past, a child’s race is now less relevant for predicting their future and their socioeconomic class more so.

The greatest drops in mobility have been not in the places evoked in song, but on the coasts and the Great Plains, which historically provided pathways up (see maps). “Fifteen years ago, the American Dream was alive and well for white children born to low-income parents in much of the North-east and West Coast,” says Benjamin Goldman of Cornell University, one of the co-authors. “Now those areas have outcomes on par with Appalachia, the rustbelt and parts of the South-east.”

The fact that white children have become more likely to remain in poverty than before, whereas for black children the reverse is true, raises many questions. The finding comes from tracing the trajectories of 57m children born in America between 1978 and 1992 and looking at their outcomes by the age of 27. “This is really the first look with modern big data into how opportunity can change within a place over time,” says Mr Goldman. For children born into high-income families, household income increased for all races between birth cohorts. Yet among those from low-income families, earnings rose for black children and fell for white children.

A black child born to poor parents in 1992 earned $1,400 a year more than one born in 1978. A similar white child earned $2,000 less than one born in 1978. But on average, a poor white child still earned $9,500 more than a poor black child.

Convergence, not equality

This pattern has played out in virtually every county, though with big regional differences. As a result, the earnings gap between rich and poor white children (the “class gap”) grew by 27%, whereas the earnings gap between poor white and poor black children (the “race gap”) fell by 28% (see chart). The class gap did not meaningfully change for non-white people. This convergence between poor white and poor black children is as much the result of improved mobility for black children as it is of decreased mobility for white ones.

The effects echo in other outcomes too. The gap in early-adulthood mortality between rich and poor white Americans more than doubled between the 1978 and 1992 birth cohorts, while the white-black race gap for the same metric fell by 77%. Other gaps between black and white Americans, from sat uptake and rates of graduation to rates of marriage and incarceration, have narrowed similarly.

None of this means that race is no longer relevant for Americans’ chances in life. Although the reversal of the direction of travel is striking, a young black American born in 1992 to poor parents was still four percentage points more likely to remain in poverty than a poor white peer, down from a 15 percentage-point gap for those born in 1978. And while the near doubling in rates of mortality among young, lower-income white Americans is deeply alarming, mortality rates for their black counterparts have increased too, and they are still (a bit) more likely to die young.

In polarised America, where race remains a divisive topic, some are bound to misappropriate the findings. Anti-woke conservatives will claim that the data show how “white privilege” is a myth and that programmes targeting poor black children should instead invest in poor white ones. Woke warriors will argue that race remains the most important factor holding children back from upward mobility, and so dismiss concerns about left-behind white kids. Both are wrong.

Convergence has not yet brought equality. Despite improvements across America for poor black children, there is still no county where their outcomes match those of poor white ones. Yet the decline of the white working class is steep, and bound to cause grief. Telling a young white man with lower life outcomes than previous generations that he is still doing better than the average black peer is about as useful as telling a young black man that he’s doing well “for a black man”.

Another possible misconception is that social mobility is a zero-sum game: that poor white children are doing worse because poor black children are doing better. The authors tackle this by showing how in places where black children have done well, white children’s outcomes have remained stable; and in places where white children have done particularly poorly, their black peers have also not thrived.

In his previous work Mr Chetty demonstrated just how much a child’s chances of outperforming their parents depended on their race and where they grew up. One of the questions the authors were left with was how “sticky” these effects would be over time: could opportunities for the next cohorts of children change within these same places, or were they fixed? The new study’s most hopeful finding is that, far from being fixed, opportunities within a place can change significantly and rapidly. Neither history nor place is destiny.

This offers clues for policymakers. Jobs, and their role in ensuring that communities flourish, are at the heart of understanding these big shifts. Children’s outcomes are tightly correlated with those of the communities in which they grow up. The narrowing of the race gap and widening of the white class gap, write the authors, “can be explained almost entirely by the sharp fall in employment rates for low-income white parents relative to low-income black and high-income white parents”. Growing up in a thriving community is crucial for children’s future outcomes—and which communities have been thriving over the past 15 years has changed in a way that relatively disadvantages poor white families. “In the past 15 years, we’ve seen a decline in conditions in low-income white communities relative to low-income black and high-income white communities,” concludes Mr Goldman.

So the gap between upward mobility stats for African Americans and low-income whites is shrinking a bit, and that’s good for Democratic candidates to consider, when reaching out to working-class voters. When it comes to  dealing with cheap shots regarding Diversity, Equity and Inclusion programs, however, note also that less than 10 percent of Fortune 500 C.E.O.s  are women and about 1.6 percent  are African Americans, with 3.2 percent of S & P 500 C.E.O.s  identifying as Latinos. A good question for D.E.I. critics is, “So, how would you improve these statistics, or do you think it’s O.K. the way it is?”

Getting a lot of deja vu from the early Republican attacks on Kamala Harris, so I took a look at how a past Democratic nominee handled similar heat, and wrote about it at New York:

A Democratic politician from a famously liberal state who once was ranked as “the most liberal senator” runs for president. They’re pounded relentlessly by Republicans and conservative media as an elitist radical who can’t be trusted with national security or other responsibilities requiring toughness and common sense.

That’s not from today’s news, but from the candidacy of Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts in 2004. Kerry dealt with the “too liberal” label by stressing, then overstressing, his own heroic war record in Vietnam, setting himself up for an intensive smear campaign by a shadowy group calling itself Swift Boat Veterans for Truth who disputed the details of his military service. That Democrat, of course, narrowly lost to George W. Bush.

During the past week, Vice-President Kamala Harris has been thrust into the harshest spotlight imaginable as the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. Like most vice-presidents, she has not gotten a great deal of public attention in that job; all glory and honor in the White House is reserved for the president. Her brief and unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2019 had given her a national profile but not a terribly distinct identity other than as a critic of Joe Biden’s civil-rights record, then as a running mate who was acceptable to all elements of the party and fit Biden’s promise to select a woman.

What Americans do generally know about her is that she’s half-Black, half–South Asian, and from California. And it’s very clear Republicans plan to give her the John Kerry treatment, calling her “too liberal,” “extreme,” and “radical” in an effort to thwart Harris’s plan to refocus the campaign on Trump’s bad character, shaky record, and hair-raising agenda of “vengeance.” As Axios reports, there’s already a clear consensus in the GOP about how to go after the veep:

“The National Republican Senatorial Committee is urging its candidates to hit Vice-President Kamala Harris for being too liberal, at fault for the border crisis, and ‘weird,’ according to a memo obtained by Axios …

“The theme throughout: Republicans will paint Harris as a ‘radical’ progressive, pointing to an old ranking of her as the most liberal senator and reminding voters of past pledges to ban fracking, decriminalize illegal border crossings, and eliminate cash bail among other things.”

The “old ranking” in question was a one-year profile of senators from GovTrack in 2019. It was a very dubious enterprise that rated senators as “liberal” or “conservative” strictly on the basis of how many bipartisan bills they sponsored or co-sponsored; it did not factor in actual voting in the Senate or differentiate between significant or insignificant legislation. The rating was discontinued after 2019. Its deployment as a campaign weapon is highly reminiscent of the use of a National Journal rating in 2004, which labeled Kerry as the “most liberal senator.” At least in Kerry’s case, the rating was based on his voting record rather than the meaningless metric of bill co-sponsorships. But it also failed to distinguish major from minor legislation.

Harris critics will be on firmer ground in attacking specific policy positions she has taken, particularly during her presidential campaign; like nearly every other Democratic candidate in the 2020 cycle, she backed decriminalizing (but not indiscriminately allowing) border crossings. And she co-sponsored Bernie Sanders’s Medicare for All bill while later supporting Medicare expansions that did not preclude private health insurance. During her candidacy, Harris briefly supported a ban on fracking but walked that position back after joining Biden’s ticket.

To a large extent, Harris’s issues profile is right in the center of her party, and Republicans waving the “too liberal” banner may just simply excoriate positions very common among Democrats, such as support for what the Trump campaign calls the Green New Scam and federal abortion-rights legislation.

But Team Trump will also try to associate Harris with “radicalism” based explicitly on her geographical background and, more quietly, on her racial and gender identity. Republicans outside California have invested billions of dollars in typecasting the Golden State as a hellscape of crime, high taxes, overzealous regulation, rampant illegal immigration, voter fraud, and hedonistic culture. In part, that’s because San Francisco — the home of longtime GOP devil figure Nancy Pelosi and where Harris served as district attorney — has been a particular object of conservative-media wrath. Much of the plan to depict Harris as not only radical but “weird” will rely on negative stereotypes of California and the City by the Bay.

How will Harris counter these insinuations that she’s out of the mainstream politically and culturally? It’s very likely that much as Kerry responded to the “too liberal” accusation by emphasizing his record as a Navy officer, Kamala Harris will emphasize her record as a career prosecutor. As my colleague Jonathan Chait explained when Biden withdrew his candidacy and endorsed Harris, the framing of the general election as “the cop against the criminal” could not only help refocus the contest on the scofflaw former president but might “convince a few hundred thousand voters in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, and Omaha, Nebraska, that she is not too liberal.”

But just as Republicans went directly after Kerry’s military record to undermine a source of strength and perceived moderation, they will now go after Harris’s record as a prosecutor in Oakland, in San Francisco, and as attorney general of California with demagogic zeal. They will use every bit of real and manufactured evidence to suggest that like famed “rogue” California prosecutors Chesa Boudin and George Gascon, Harris is a crime abettor, rather than a crime fighter, and a radical advocate for defunding the police and emptying the prisons. It is worth noting that one of the main impresarios of the “swiftboating” of Kerry in 2004 is now Trump’s co–campaign manager Chris LaCivita.

Harris will almost certainly respond to attacks on her record with abundant evidence of her tough-but-fair approach as a prosecutor, as Reuters sums it up:

“Over more than a dozen years as San Francisco’s district attorney and then as California’s attorney general, Harris took some stances welcomed by the party’s left flank, including opposition to the death penalty and staking out a hard line during negotiations with big banks over home foreclosure abuses.

“But she rankled progressive critics with other moves, including a policy of criminally prosecuting parents of children who skipped school and rejecting a request for DNA testing from a Black man on death row who says he was wrongfully convicted of murder …

“Harris has characterized her approach as being ‘smart on crime’ and has spoken of the importance of preventing and punishing crime while also protecting the rights of defendants and curbing excesses.”

But it’s supremely important that she learn Kerry’s lesson and not overemphasize this one aspect of her background, record, and character. If the election becomes to a significant degree a debate over the complex undercurrents of criminal-justice reform in California and her role in it, Harris will sacrifice opportunities to build on her strength as an advocate for abortion rights, universal health care, accountability for financial predators, and other themes she has mastered. She’s not simply “a cop” any more than Trump is simply “a criminal.”

The battle to clearly define Kamala Harris will occur with incredible speed and intensity over the next 100 days. She needs to stay on the offensive and make sure Trump’s well-known flaws in character and outlook are front and center.

In “Harris’ big test: reclaiming swing states for Dems,” Erin Doherty writes at Axios: “Early national polls suggest Harris’ entry has given Democrats a bump in a tight race, but the presidential election is a state-by-state contest.

• Harris appears to be energizing many young and minority voters. A big question is whether she also can maintain Biden’s recent success among older voters — and stem Democrats’ losses among groups such as Latino men and whites who didn’t go to college.
• In a strategy memo released early Wednesday, Harris’ campaign argues she can. She aims to do so partly by focusing on women’s reproductive rights and contrasting Trump’s legal problems with her history as a prosecutor.
• Biden’s victory over Trump in 2020 was aided by his gains among whites who didn’t attend college, a group that helped Trump defeat Hillary Clinton in 2016, according to the Pew Research Center.

Driving the news: Larry Ceisler, a Pennsylvania-based public affairs executive, said he doesn’t expect Harris to match Biden’s numbers in rural parts of the state.

• But, he said, Harris “is going to boost turnout and support from African American voters, diverse voters and younger voters.”
• “It could be a net positive for the ticket,” Ceisler said.
• Another thing that might help in must-win Pennsylvania: Harris is considering Josh Shapiro, the state’s popular Democratic governor, as her running mate. Putting him on the ticket could alter the calculus there.

Doherty continues, “What they’re saying: In its memo, Harris’ campaign argues that she’s positioned to expand Biden’s winning coalition from 2020.

• “Her net favorability is 19 points higher than Trump’s among white, college-educated voters, and 18 points higher than Trump’s among voters over 65,” the Harris campaign writes.
• It also claims that the roughly 7% of voters who remain undecided are “disproportionately Black, Latino and under 30” — voting populations more likely to favor Harris.

By the numbers: Few polls have been released since Biden left the race Sunday and Harris jumped in.

• Reuters released a national poll Tuesday showing Harris with a 2-point lead over Trump, (44%-42%).
• The same poll the previous week had Trump with a 2-point lead, suggesting that the Democrats’ candidate switch led Trump to lose ground instead of picking up a post-convention bump.
• A new NPR/PBS News/Marist poll indicates that Harris’ entry reset the race, which the poll says is statistically tied.

Swing-state polls are done less frequently, and don’t yet reflect the historic twists and turns of the past two weeks. The latest batch showed Trump ahead in most of the six states likely to decide the election — Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.

• In a New York Times/Siena College poll — taken before Biden dropped out and the assassination attempt against Trump — Harris fared better than Biden, and was essentially tied with Trump in Pennsylvania.
• Harris also polled stronger than Biden with Black voters and younger voters.
• In Michigan, Real Clear Politics found that Trump led by about 2 points from an average of Trump-Harris polls.

Doherty quotes Ceisler on Harris again, “She’s going to have to introduce herself to the electorate — and she can’t let herself be painted as some far-left ‘woke’ activist from San Francisco, because she’s not.”

Sahil Kapur and Scott Wong share some observations regarding how “Harris’ candidacy reshapes strategies for key House and Senate races” at nbcnews.com: “For Democrats, candidates in battleground races are still planning to localize their races as much as possible. But lawmakers and party operatives are now hoping they can benefit from the wave of enthusiasm provided by Harris’ campaign in down-ballot races….Republican strategists said their priority is to craft and drive a negative portrait of Harris in the minds of voters, using some of the same issues they attacked Biden on, such as immigration, crime and inflation….“What is going to be critical important for Republicans as a whole is to quickly define Kamala Harris,” said one GOP strategist, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly, adding that the party is already evaluating new messages in the field. “We have a very short runway to take the four or five most unpopular positions she has and brand her as a supporter of those.”….Democratic strategists say their candidates will continue to run state-specific Senate campaigns and district-specific House campaigns. Many of those candidates had been overperforming Biden for months before he dropped out, and party operatives expect that to continue with Harris, whose favorability ratings are also under water in recent surveys….They’re also continuing to run against what they’re portraying as Republican extremism and out-of-touch candidates after successfully using that approach in 2022….”‘Despicable Me 4’ was a big hit this summer and the problem in the Republican Party is they’ve got a bucket full of minions running for the U.S. Senate,” said JB Poersch, the president of Senate Majority PAC, a deep-pocketed Democratic super-PAC. “Republican candidates are trapped well behind where Trump is.”

Harold Meyerson opines on “Kamala’s Strengths and Weaknesses: Today on TAP: And how she can talk to working-class voters” at The American Prospect: “….there’s not much in Harris’s history to suggest she’s the cure for the Democrats’ growing weakness among working-class voters—most particularly, the white working-class voters who’ve been trending Republican for a very long time….How, though, can she reach out to the working-class men who build buildings, drive trucks, and operate assembly lines (all alongside women, but it’s the men who’ve been moving en masse into Republican ranks)? Chris Hannan, who heads the California Building Trades Council (which represents virtually every union of construction workers in the state)….was clear on how unions like those represented in his council would campaign against Trump and, now, for Harris. “Trump had an ‘infrastructure week’ every year, which led to no increase in infrastructure construction, every year. Under Biden and Harris, we’re building more roads and bridges and rail lines, and electric car factories and semiconductor factories, with union members and union-scale wages, in California, in Arizona, and across the country,” he said. “Trump gave corporations a huge tax cut with no conditions on spending that money in the U.S.; Biden and Harris have prioritized investing in America.”….Will Harris’s strong environmentalism be an obstacle to winning a number of working-class votes? Most likely, particularly in places like Western Pennsylvania, where her opposition to fracking will surely be something that the Trump campaign will stress. “She may not do well in Western Pennsylvania outside Pittsburgh,” another labor leader told me, “but she’ll boost turnout in [heavily Black] Northern Philadelphia and Detroit, particularly if Obama campaigns alongside her there.” That labor leader is also confident that Harris will stick with the kind of pro-union appointees to whom Biden entrusted the Labor Department and the NLRB. “Democrats with centrist records, like Biden had, now understand this is good policy and good politics,” he added….I herewith offer a couple of suggestions myself that might win her more support, or at least more of a hearing, among working-class voters. As I’ve noted, Trump’s suggestion of making tips tax-free actually won’t affect most tipped workers because they don’t make enough money, even with the tips, to pay income taxes. (Indeed, according to a report released today by UC Berkeley’s Food Labor Research Center and the organization One Fair Wage, fully 66 percent of tipped restaurant workers have incomes falling beneath that threshold.) Nonetheless—and despite some speculation that Wall Street consultants would mislabel their fees as tips if such a change were made—I think Harris should adopt this proposal (saying she’s open to crossing the aisle when a decent, or even half-decent, proposal originates there) and go it one better, challenging Republicans to raise the national minimum wage from the $7.25 where it’s languished for the past 15 years, and the tipped minimum wage from its microscopic $2.13—positions I doubt the newly “pro-worker” Republicans will embrace….As well, she should emphasize the arguments that Hannan has made: that factory construction increased by 73 percent once the Inflation Reduction Act passed, that infrastructure construction stagnated under Trump and soared under Biden, and that, as vice president, she cast the deciding votes on much of the “Build, Baby, Build for a Clean, Prosperous Future” legislation that is Biden’s legacy.”

Not to rain on the big parade, but if Kamala Harris is to have even a shred of a chance to win in November, she needs some tough criticism as soon as possible to help prepare her campaign for  attacks. Michael Baharaeen steps up to meet this challenge in his post, “The Kamala Gamble” at The Liberal Patriot. As Baharaeen writes:

Joe Biden rocked American politics over the weekend with the news that he will be the first incumbent president since Lyndon Johnson in 1968 not to seek a second term. The obstacles against him—stubbornly weak polling numbers, a hostile media, defections from his own party, dried-up fundraising—ultimately proved to be too much to overcome. In his announcement, he endorsed his vice president, Kamala Harris, to be his successor.

Harris is not expected to face much serious competition for the nomination from other prominent Democrats, meaning she will likely lead the party’s ticket heading into November. But while shaking things up may offer Democrats a new lease on life, it’s far from clear that Harris is the strongest candidate to take on Trump. Democrats should consider her many vulnerabilities carefully before coronating her at their convention next month.

First, Harris has popularity issues of her own. Part of the argument for Democrats moving on from Biden was his dreary poll numbers—his approval rating had been underwater for nearly three years with no sign that it would ever bounce back. He has also consistently trailed Trump in head-to-head match-ups, which signifies a severe change from 2020, when he never trailed at all.

But Harris hasn’t fared any better than Biden. Not only has her own approval tracked very closely with Biden’s, sinking into negative territory in mid-2021, but she has also never cracked 50 percent (while Biden at least sat in the mid-50s for the first several months of his presidency). This is a good indication that Harris has been less popular than Biden from the start. And, at least in initial surveys, Harris doesn’t appear to do much better against Trump than Biden did, though there is still time for that to change. Suffice it to say, she will have to work to endear herself more to a skeptical public if she becomes the Democratic nominee.

Second, Harris has a concerning electoral track record. Her first election to a major office came in 2010. That cycle, she won a close race for California’s open attorney general seat, defeating her Republican opponent by less than one point, 46.1–45.3. Though some might be tempted to attribute this to running in a difficult midterm election, except every other California Democrat in a statewide contest significantly outperformed Harris, earning at least 50 percent of the vote and winning their races by double digits.

However, her presidential campaign was perhaps an even bigger disappointment. Despite being a media darling for much of the primary race, her campaign flamed out before the first voters had the chance to cast their ballots in the Iowa caucuses. Some observers attributed this to the lack of a coherent message or reason for her candidacy—and the fact that her campaign became beset by infighting.

Another likely reason was her desire to placate her party’s activist base. For example, rather than touting her accomplishments as a prosecutor and explaining her pragmatic vision for criminal justice, Harris ran from her record, which some on the left viewed as too punitive. She also endorsed some deeply unpopular proposals, including the decriminalization of border crossings and the Green New Deal. All this may have stemmed from the fact that Harris surrounded herself with campaign staffers who seemed to embrace the idea that “Twitter is real life,” and that what progressive voices on the platform espoused was representative of the broader public’s views.¹

If Harris wants to shed any part of her past as she looks for ways to appeal to median voters in swing states, she might consider rebuking these lefty fads in favor of a message that highlights her track record of prosecuting criminals—something that could set up a favorable contrast against Trump.

Third, although Biden will no longer be on the ticket, Harris will be forced to defend his administration, including its less popular facets. In 2021, Biden tasked Harris with the thankless job of trying to help resolve the crisis at the southern border. But far from successfully addressing the “root causes” of the problems there, they grew exponentially worse in the following years, with migrant encounters hitting a record high by the end of 2023. Recent polling has shown that voters trusted Trump over Biden to handle issues related to immigration and inflation, which are top-of-mind for many of them. Switching to that president’s second-in-command isn’t likely to immediately assuage voters’ concerns about Democrats’ ability to handle either one.

Fourth, while the latest polls have shown Harris mirroring Biden’s statistical tie against Trump nationally, this alone doesn’t leave Democrats in a particularly strong position. Consider: in 2020, when Biden defeated Trump, his national polling heading into the election was 8.4 points. Ultimately, Biden won by a more modest 4.5 points. As we know, though, presidential elections are decided not by national popular vote but the Electoral College, and Biden’s win at that level was actually extremely narrow. So simply tying Trump in the national polls still reflects a massive shift relative to 2020 and puts an Electoral College win very much within reach for him. To overcome that, Harris would need to move the needle back in the other direction and probably build a lead of at least a couple points to have a chance of winning.

Finally, in addition to issues related to herself and the Biden administration, Harris will be contending with broader problems that the Democratic Party has not fully reckoned with. For instance, survey data indicates that they have experienced substantial attrition among black and Hispanic voters, which may at least partially explain why important swing states like Arizona, Georgia, and Nevada have shifted in Trump’s favor this time around. Trump has also made more overt overtures to union voters, a longtime Democratic constituency that has shown cracks in recent years—and that could put other battlegrounds like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin in play.

Democrats have also lost ground with rural voters, working-class voters, and even some young voters, a group that hasn’t been competitive in a generation. While Biden appeared to be attracting higher levels of support among seniors, a higher-turnout bloc that has historically leaned Republican, it’s not clear that those voters would stick with another Democratic nominee.

Some of these are longer-term issues that the party has been contending with since at least the start of the Trump era. Some may be specific to this cycle: third-party candidates like Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., for example, are disproportionately attracting younger and non-white voters. There is also early evidence that Harris may perform better than Biden with some of these groups and have more success pulling them back into the fold. Still, she’ll be confronting these bigger coalitional issues with less than four months to go in the campaign.

Democrats’ best case for Harris is that she is a wild card: neither they nor Trump’s campaign know how her candidacy would shake up the race. If voters’ views of her aren’t as entrenched as they are for Biden, she might have a slightly higher ceiling. Given the opportunity to prosecute the case against Trump, she is also likely to be far stronger and more effective than Biden, which could level the playing field more in Democrats’ favor. And polls show that many Americans want someone, anyone, who isn’t Biden or Trump. Maybe all that is enough for someone like Harris to succeed.

Even so, a simple swap of candidates isn’t guaranteed to immediately put Democrats in a stronger position than they’re in today. Harris will need to distance herself from the perceived setbacks of the Biden administration, come into her own as a candidate, and develop a campaign pitch that will appeal to the handful of voters in swing states who will decide this election—all in the next three months (or less). It will still be an uphill fight, but if she can achieve these things, she might yet be able to pull out the win.