Today’s major political story was former Iowa Gov. Tom Vilsack’s decision to pull the plug on his presidential campaign. He made it clear money was the sole reason. Contra some snarky blog posts suggesting that blogger reaction to Vilsack’s wonky if politically dangerous reference to the benefit structure for Social Security earlier this week somehow instantly did him in, it’s clear his precarious financial position was the real problem.Vilsack had a complex if not irrational political strategy all along. Step one was to utilize his popularity and political base in Iowa, whose Caucuses are showing every indication of being even more important in 2008 than in the past, to separate himself from other “lower-tier” candidates. Step two was to employ an upset win in Iowa over the big boys and girls to elevate himself to the top tier, over the barely breathing political body of anyone croaked by a loss or poor showing Iowa (most likely the perceived current Iowa front-runner, John Edwards). And step three was to become a national alternative to whoever became the post-Iowa, post-New Hampshire front-runner.But the most complicated part of the Vilsack strategy was overcoming the legendary reluctance of Iowans to give up their king- or queen-making national status in the nominating process and support a favorite son. That meant showing the flag nationally to eliminate his “mere-favorite-son” status, and also building the best field organization in Iowa of any candidate. Both measures required a lot of money, and more money than his campaign could raise, particularly after Barack Obama jumped into the race and attracted most of the tactical, good-bet funds that hadn’t already been hoovered up by HRC and others.The sad reality is that without vast personal wealth or access to powerful “bundlers” of campaign contributions, it’s pretty much impossible to run a viable presidential campaign, particularly if you are not well-known or regarded as “top-tier.” Raising tens of millions of dollars overnight at $2300 a pop (the legal limit for individual contributions) without big-time “bundlers” or a pre-established national fundraising base is pretty much impossible. Vilsack gave it a good try, beginning his official campaign before anyone else, and trying to distinguish himself from the front-runners with dramatic positions on Iraq and on energy policy. But it wasn’t enough, and he was wise to fold his tent and maintain his influence over the presidential campaign in Iowa.Who knows: Vilsack’s timing in getting out of the race may have been partially motivated by both the human and political considerations involved in letting his staff–including his small but much-praised policy staff–get on board with other campaigns. Particularly with Vilsack out, Iowa Democratic political experience, and Iowa Caucus experience, is worth its weight in gold to those campaigns who for offensive or defensive reasons need to do well in that state. And on down the road, Vilsack’s own support–determined, I strongly suspect from my own dealings with him in the past at the DLC, by honorably wonky policy considerations as much as by politics–might mean everything to a candidate whose tongue is lolling out for victory in Iowa.So while we bid farewell to Tom Vilsack’s candidacy for president, we almost certainly haven’t seen the end of his impact on the 2008 presidential campaign.
TDS Strategy Memos
Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
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Democrats Should Have Done More for Scott Colom
No result in the 2026 midterms was more surprising than Scott Colom’s senatorial win in Mississippi. But the national party could and should have done more for him, I argued at New York:
Democrat Scott Colom is going to become the next U.S. senator from Mississippi, and the first Black senator from the state since Reconstruction. Now there should be hard questions about why national Democrats did not see this result coming and didn’t do more than the very little they did to help Colom upset the evidently weak Republican incumbent Cindy Hyde-Smith.
Yes, several leading Black politicians, plus Rhode Island senator Sheldon Whitehouse, offered Colom some hands-on assistance, which drew some needed national attention. And, yes, during the final two weeks of the campaign, the national Senate Democratic PAC bought some ads and threw some money Colom’s way. But compared to what the party was committing to other Senate races, it was sofa-cushion money. Early on, Democrats targeted national spending on races their candidates eventually won easily, like Georgia and North Carolina, and later, they focused on late-breaking opportunities like Kansas and even South Carolina while spending to shore up Democratic-leaning races in Maine and Michigan. They spent heavily on Ohio and Texas nonstop. A little more in Mississippi might have eliminated any doubt about one of the most remarkable political upsets in living memory. And even a little more effort in Louisiana, where Jamie Davis came within 25,000 votes of upsetting Republican incumbent Julia Letlow, could have produced an equally shocking result. And Florida Democrats believe more national help could have lifted Senate candidate Angie Nixon and gubernatorial candidate David Jolly to victory in races that wound up being very close.
So what was the problem? Colom understandably doesn’t want to blame Chuck Schumer and his likely future colleagues in the Senate Democratic Conference. But he’s clearly annoyed with the Beltway conventional wisdom and the institutions that help define it:
In defense of the Cook analysts, they typically base their ratings on polls, electoral history, and interviews with candidates, party leaders, and journalists on the ground in the places where the races are underway. So there may be some shooting-the-messenger in Colom’s complaints about Cook, which did move his race from “Solid R” to “Likely R” (a category where upsets are considered possible). But he’s right that Cook and most of the other experts, along with the national Democratic Party, underestimated the strength of their southern wing.
Perhaps there was an unconscious racial element in this myopia, since Colom, Davis, and Nixon were all Black candidates in red states that have not elected Black statewide candidates in living memory. But it seems to be more of a regional issue. White southern Democrats like the gubernatorial candidates in Alabama (Doug Jones), Florida (Jolly), and Tennessee (Jerri Green) were also written off and came very close to huge upsets. Meanwhile, the Beltway Establishment did not underrate Georgia’s Black Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Keisha Lance Bottoms(whose race was rated a toss-up by Cook), despite her terrible fundraising disadvantage against billionaire Rick Jackson, for the simple reason that abundant polling showed her in a close race all along. So one very clear lesson of 2026 is that the national parties should do a lot more polling of states on the periphery of their vision, particularly in a “wave” election year. Even if the polling itself underestimated Democratic voting strength, as it did nationally by about 4 percent, it would have shown that a combination of strong Black turnout and swing-voter unhappiness with Donald Trump put much of the South within reach.
Party strategists, like military strategists, have a strong tendency to fight the last war, basing their calculations on what happened in the last election. There is in fact no more reliable indicator of electoral outcomes in any given place than how that place has voted in the recent past. But there was abundant evidence throughout the 2026 cycle that the GOP’s 2024 coalition was falling apart. National Democrats (and the “prognosticators” they inform) should have been more open to the fresh opportunities Trump’s intense unpopularitypresented for them. And strong “under-the-radar” candidates like Scott Colom should not have been forced to beg for attention and win an unequal fight on his own.


