Props to Markos and the New York Times’ Carl Hulsey for noting something in the just-enacted Democratic House rules package that I missed: the retention of Newt Gingrich’s one good idea–term limits on committee chairmen.Neither of them get into the grittiest problem with this idea: the understandable reluctance of African-American chairs to give up their newfound power in the same seniority system that was used for so very long to obstruct and delay civil rights, and to marginalize and even humiliate minority Members.And by explaining the term limits issue strictly in terms of Caucus and leadership discipline, Markos and Hulsey also miss another well-identified problem with Perpetual Chairmanships: the tendency of Perpetual Chairmen to get trapped in the Iron Triangle uniting the executive-branch programs they supposedly oversee, the special-interest and advocacy groups that exist to defend and/or expand those programs (most of whom are avid campaign contributors), and their own professional committee staffs, who are typically cycling through the other sides of the triangle.According to Hulsey, Speaker Pelosi has privately indicated that the term-limits decision could be reversed later on. Let’s hope that’s not the case. There are other ways to ensure that minority voices in the House Caucus are heard; for one thing, “term-limited” committee and subcommittee chairs can be moved to equally influential perches. In any event, it will certainly be hard for this Democratic Congress to pose as a vehicle for “reform” if it backtracks on one of the most ancient and well-abused privileges of the Old Order.
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Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
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September 11: Great Debate for Harris, But Don’t Expect An Immediate Bounce
In my usual role of discouraging irrational exuberance (or if you prefer, offering a buzzkill), I issued a warning at New York about the need to cool jets despite the outcome of the September 10 debate:
It’s hard to recall a presidential-candidate debate so intensely anticipated as the September 10 encounter between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, who are locked in a very close race as early voting commences. Now that it’s over, with Harris by near-universal assent being adjudged the winner, many excited Democrats are expecting this “consequential” debate to produce a tangible, perhaps even decisive, advantage for their candidate (particularly since the win was capped with the long-awaited Taylor Swift endorsement of Harris). They should cool their jets.
For one thing, it will take the more reliable pollsters days or even weeks to go into the field and assess the effect, if any, of this event on a contest that’s not just a face-off between candidates but a battle between two deeply rooted and evenly matched party coalitions. Yes, Harris won the CNN “snap poll” of debate viewers: 63 percent thought she won, and 37 percent said Trump won (the latter number showing the reluctance of Trump fans even the most obvious setback for their hero). That’s nearly as large as the margin (67 percent to 33 percent) by which Trump defeated Biden in the CNN snap poll following the June 27 debate. That debate ultimately drove the sitting president of the United States right out of his own reelection campaign. Shouldn’t Harris’ debate win have similarly dramatic consequences?
In a word: no. It’s hard to remember this now, but the June 27 debate did not have any sort of immediate dramatic effect on the Trump-Biden polls. The day of the debate Trump led Biden by a hair (0.2 percent) in the FiveThirtyEight national polling averages; on July 14 he led by a slightly thicker hair (1.9 percent). The debate chased Biden from the race not because he was losing so badly, but because it exacerbated a well-known and central candidate weakness that would make further losses down the road likely and recovery all but impossible. And this calamity occurred just early enough that there was time for Democrats to take drastic but essential action.
Nothing like this is going to happen to Trump. For one thing, his debate performance against Harris, while intermittently shocking, wasn’t at all out of character; his failure was a matter of degree. For another, to the extent there are Republican fears about Trump’s fitness for office or electability, they were crushed many months ago when the former president routed 11 primary opponents. Everyone still in the GOP has bent the knee to the warrior king, he’s overcome far bigger problems in the past, and it’s too late to do anything about it anyway, even if Republicans had a replacement candidate with Harris’s qualifications.
The debate will likely do two important things for Harris. First, it should revive the enthusiasm and sense of momentum that has characterized her candidacy since its launch. This isn’t just a matter of “vibes” but is instead an impetus for previously tuned-out Democratic-leaning voters to reengage with this election, which could have a big impact on turnout. Second, it will address the concerns of many Kamala-curious swing voters about her suitability to serve as president and reflect mainstream values and policy inclinations. That will remain a work in progress given her inherently tricky but essential strategy of offering unhappy voters a change from the status quo even as she remains a heartbeat from the presidency.
This represents very good news for the Democratic ticket, but Team Harris should manage expectations, much as Barack Obama and others did during the DNC when so many excited supporters wanted to believe the wave of “joy” would sweep away all obstacles. She didn’t get a convention bounce and may not get a debate bounce, which means this could remain a dead-even race in which Donald Trump will retain advantages (probably in the Electoral College, possibly in popular support that is stronger than the polls can capture) no matter how foolish or deranged he looked on the stage in Philadelphia.