The word a couple of weeks ago was that DC GOPers were less than thrilled at CA Gov. Arnold Schwarzennegar’s redistricting reform ballot initiative, on grounds that the current system nationally is helping keep Republicans in charge, and they’d just as soon leave things as they are.Well, the odds of letting sleeping dogs lie on this subject just went way down, as Republican legislators in my poor home state of Georgia started a re-redistricting of Congressional Districts aimed at zapping a couple of Democratic incumbents. Their model, of course, is the Great Texas Power Grab of 2003, the re-redistricting engineered by Tom DeLay which ultimately produced a net gain of five House seats for the GOP, reversing what would have otherwise been a loss of seats in 2004 (Republicans in Colorado tried the same stunt, but were overruled by the courts citing a state constitutional provision limiting redistricting to once a decade). But in a way, the Georgia gambit is worse. In Texas, the fig-leaf justifications for the Power Grab were that (a) the Dem majority in the House delegation did not reflect recent partisan results in statewide elections, and (b) the map they were throwing out was drawn by judges, not legislators. In Georgia, (a) the current 7-6 GOP advantage in House districts is a pretty fair reflection of recent election results, and (b) the map they are throwing out was duly drawn by the legislature, signed by the Governor, pre-cleared by the Bush Justice Department, and upheld by the courts. In other words, the Georgia Republicans are undertaking this outrage, well, because they can. The new GOPer map is apparently aimed at snuffing two white Democratic House members, Jim Marshall, who represents a central-west central GA district, and John Barrow, who just beat a Republican incumbent to represent the Athens-Augusta-Savannah district. They aren’t going after the state’s four African-American House Members (John Lewis, Cynthia McKinney, David Scott, and Sanford Bishop) because that would raise an unmistakable Voting Right Act issue. But in any event, the GA Power Grab may wind up biting the national GOP in the butt. News of the latest Power Grab led (according to the subscription-only Roll Call newspaper) House Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer to put in a few phone calls to Democrats in the three states where their party has taken over total control of the executive and legislative branches since the regular redistricting cycle prior to 2002: Illinois, New Mexico, and Louisiana. Illinois is a potentially ripe target for a retaliatory re-redistricting, since GOPers hold nine seats, and because the new chairman of the DCCC, Rahm Emanuel, is from that state. Moreover, one of the Illinois Republicans who could find himself in sudden trouble is a guy named Dennis Hastert. Personally, I hate all this re-redistricting crap, and the whole system of partisan and incumbent-protection gerrymandering that has reduced the People’s House of Congress to a vast rotten borough where politicians choose voters rather than the other way around. But if Republicans continue to game the system, they can’t complain if Democrats retaliate where they can, and maybe the whole spectacle can build support for a truly national drive for comprehensive redistricting reform. Maybe those Georgia Republican jokers will smell the coffee and call off the dogs before their own party’s House speaker finds himself hunted as well.
TDS Strategy Memos
Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
-
Democrats Should Have Done More for Scott Colom
No result in the 2026 midterms was more surprising than Scott Colom’s senatorial win in Mississippi. But the national party could and should have done more for him, I argued at New York:
Democrat Scott Colom is going to become the next U.S. senator from Mississippi, and the first Black senator from the state since Reconstruction. Now there should be hard questions about why national Democrats did not see this result coming and didn’t do more than the very little they did to help Colom upset the evidently weak Republican incumbent Cindy Hyde-Smith.
Yes, several leading Black politicians, plus Rhode Island senator Sheldon Whitehouse, offered Colom some hands-on assistance, which drew some needed national attention. And, yes, during the final two weeks of the campaign, the national Senate Democratic PAC bought some ads and threw some money Colom’s way. But compared to what the party was committing to other Senate races, it was sofa-cushion money. Early on, Democrats targeted national spending on races their candidates eventually won easily, like Georgia and North Carolina, and later, they focused on late-breaking opportunities like Kansas and even South Carolina while spending to shore up Democratic-leaning races in Maine and Michigan. They spent heavily on Ohio and Texas nonstop. A little more in Mississippi might have eliminated any doubt about one of the most remarkable political upsets in living memory. And even a little more effort in Louisiana, where Jamie Davis came within 25,000 votes of upsetting Republican incumbent Julia Letlow, could have produced an equally shocking result. And Florida Democrats believe more national help could have lifted Senate candidate Angie Nixon and gubernatorial candidate David Jolly to victory in races that wound up being very close.
So what was the problem? Colom understandably doesn’t want to blame Chuck Schumer and his likely future colleagues in the Senate Democratic Conference. But he’s clearly annoyed with the Beltway conventional wisdom and the institutions that help define it:
In defense of the Cook analysts, they typically base their ratings on polls, electoral history, and interviews with candidates, party leaders, and journalists on the ground in the places where the races are underway. So there may be some shooting-the-messenger in Colom’s complaints about Cook, which did move his race from “Solid R” to “Likely R” (a category where upsets are considered possible). But he’s right that Cook and most of the other experts, along with the national Democratic Party, underestimated the strength of their southern wing.
Perhaps there was an unconscious racial element in this myopia, since Colom, Davis, and Nixon were all Black candidates in red states that have not elected Black statewide candidates in living memory. But it seems to be more of a regional issue. White southern Democrats like the gubernatorial candidates in Alabama (Doug Jones), Florida (Jolly), and Tennessee (Jerri Green) were also written off and came very close to huge upsets. Meanwhile, the Beltway Establishment did not underrate Georgia’s Black Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Keisha Lance Bottoms(whose race was rated a toss-up by Cook), despite her terrible fundraising disadvantage against billionaire Rick Jackson, for the simple reason that abundant polling showed her in a close race all along. So one very clear lesson of 2026 is that the national parties should do a lot more polling of states on the periphery of their vision, particularly in a “wave” election year. Even if the polling itself underestimated Democratic voting strength, as it did nationally by about 4 percent, it would have shown that a combination of strong Black turnout and swing-voter unhappiness with Donald Trump put much of the South within reach.
Party strategists, like military strategists, have a strong tendency to fight the last war, basing their calculations on what happened in the last election. There is in fact no more reliable indicator of electoral outcomes in any given place than how that place has voted in the recent past. But there was abundant evidence throughout the 2026 cycle that the GOP’s 2024 coalition was falling apart. National Democrats (and the “prognosticators” they inform) should have been more open to the fresh opportunities Trump’s intense unpopularitypresented for them. And strong “under-the-radar” candidates like Scott Colom should not have been forced to beg for attention and win an unequal fight on his own.


