As the conventional wisdom settles in about the 2004 election, it is, as always, subject to challenge in many important ways.
Alan Abramowitz does some important spadework on this conventional wisdom in his slide show, “God, Guns and Gays: Testing the Conventional Wisdom About the 2004 Election“. I think you’ll enjoy it and find it a source of much useful (and some surprising) data.
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Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
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March 28: RIP Joe Lieberman, a Democrat Who Lost His Way
I was sorry to learn of the sudden death of 2000 Democratic vice presidential nominee Joe Lieberman. But his long and stormy career did offer some important lessons about party loyalty, which I wrote about at New York:
Joe Lieberman was active in politics right up to the end. The former senator was the founding co-chair of the nonpartisan group No Labels, which is laying the groundwork for a presidential campaign on behalf of a yet-to-be-identified bipartisan “unity ticket.” Lieberman did not live to see whether No Labels will run a candidate. He died on Wednesday at 82 due to complications from a fall. But this last political venture was entirely in keeping with his long career as a self-styled politician of the pragmatic center, which often took him across party boundaries.
Lieberman’s first years in Connecticut Democratic politics as a state legislator and then state attorney general were reasonably conventional. He was known for a particular interest in civil rights and environmental protection, and his identity as an observant Orthodox Jew also drew attention. But in 1988, the Democrat used unconventional tactics in his challenge to Republican U.S. senator Lowell Weicker. Lieberman positioned himself to the incumbent’s right on selected issues, like Ronald Reagan’s military operations against Libya and Grenada. He also capitalized on longtime conservative resentment of his moderate opponent, winning prized endorsements from William F. and James Buckley, icons of the right. Lieberman won the race narrowly in an upset.
Almost immediately, Senator Lieberman became closely associated with the Democratic Leadership Council. The group of mostly moderate elected officials focused on restoring the national political viability of a party that had lost five of the six previous presidential elections; it soon produced a president in Bill Clinton. Lieberman became probably the most systematically pro-Clinton (or in the parlance of the time, “New Democrat”) member of Congress. This gave his 1998 Senate speech condemning the then-president’s behavior in the Monica Lewinsky scandal as “immoral” and “harmful” a special bite. He probably did Clinton a favor by setting the table for a reprimand that fell short of impeachment and removal, but without question, the narrative was born of Lieberman being disloyal to his party.
Perhaps it was his public scolding of Clinton that convinced Al Gore, who was struggling to separate himself from his boss’s misconduct, to lift Lieberman to the summit of his career. Gore tapped the senator to be his running mate in the 2000 election, making him the first Jewish vice-presidential candidate of a major party. He was by all accounts a disciplined and loyal running mate, at least until that moment during the Florida recount saga when he publicly disclaimed interest in challenging late-arriving overseas military ballots against the advice of the Gore campaign. You could argue plausibly that the ticket would have never been in a position to potentially win the state without Lieberman’s appeal in South Florida to Jewish voters thrilled by his nomination to become vice-president. But many Democrats bitter about the loss blamed Lieberman.
As one of the leaders of the “Clintonian” wing of his party, Lieberman was an early front-runner for the 2004 presidential nomination. A longtime supporter of efforts to topple Saddam Hussein, Lieberman had voted to authorize the 2003 invasion of Iraq, like his campaign rivals John Kerry and John Edwards and other notable senators including Hillary Clinton. Unlike most other Democrats, though, Lieberman did not back off this position when the Iraq War became a deadly quagmire. Ill-aligned with his party to an extent he did not seem to perceive, his presidential campaign quickly flamed out, but not before he gained enduring mockery for claiming “Joe-mentum” from a fifth-place finish in New Hampshire.
Returning to the Senate, Lieberman continued his increasingly lonely support for the Iraq War (alongside other heresies to liberalism, such as his support for private-school education vouchers in the District of Columbia). In 2006, Lieberman drew a wealthy primary challenger, Ned Lamont, who soon had a large antiwar following in Connecticut and nationally. As the campaign grew heated, President George W. Bush gave his Democratic war ally a deadly gift by embracing him and kissing his cheek after the State of the Union Address. This moment, memorialized as “The Kiss,” became central to the Lamont campaign’s claim that Lieberman had left his party behind, and the challenger narrowly won the primary. However, Lieberman ran against him in the general election as an independent, with significant back-channel encouragement from the Bush White House (which helped prevent any strong Republican candidacy). Lieberman won a fourth and final term in the Senate with mostly GOP and independent votes. He was publicly endorsed by Newt Gingrich and Rudy Giuliani, among others from what had been the enemy camp.
The 2006 repudiation by his party appeared to break something in Lieberman. This once-happiest of happy political warriors, incapable of holding a grudge, seemed bitter, or at the very least gravely offended, even as he remained in the Senate Democratic Caucus (albeit as formally independent). When his old friend and Iraq War ally John McCain ran for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008, Lieberman committed a partisan sin by endorsing him. His positioning between the two parties, however, still cost him dearly: McCain wanted to choose him as his running mate, before the Arizonan’s staff convinced him that Lieberman’s longtime pro-choice views and support for LGBTQ rights would lead to a convention revolt. The GOP nominee instead went with a different “high-risk, high-reward” choice: Sarah Palin.
After Barack Obama’s victory over Lieberman’s candidate, the new Democratic president needed every Democratic senator to enact the centerpiece of his agenda, the Affordable Care Act. He got Lieberman’s vote — but only after the senator, who represented many of the country’s major private-insurance companies, forced the elimination of the “public option” in the new system. It was a bitter pill for many progressives, who favored a more robust government role in health insurance than Obama had proposed.
By the time Lieberman chose to retire from the Senate in 2012, he was very near to being a man without a party, and he reflected that status by refusing to endorse either Obama or Mitt Romney that year. By then, he was already involved in the last great project of his political career, No Labels. He did, with some hesitation, endorse Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump in 2016. But his long odyssey away from the yoke of the Democratic Party had largely landed him in a nonpartisan limbo. Right up until his death, he was often the public face of No Labels, particularly after the group’s decision to sponsor a presidential ticket alienated many early supporters of its more quotidian efforts to encourage bipartisan “problem-solving” in Congress.
Some will view Lieberman as a victim of partisan polarization, and others as an anachronistic member of a pro-corporate, pro-war bipartisan elite who made polarization necessary. Personally, I will remember him as a politician who followed — sometimes courageously, sometimes foolishly — a path that made him blind to the singular extremism that one party has exhibited throughout the 21st century, a development he tried to ignore to his eventual marginalization. But for all his flaws, I have no doubt Joe Lieberman remained until his last breath committed to the task he often cited via the Hebrew term tikkun olam: repairing a broken world.
Can someone explain why in slide #37 there are only 37% Gore voters from 2000 but 43% Bush voters?
Am I to understand that tons more people who voted for Gore in 2000 failed to come out than who voted for Bush? Why would that be?
There are moderate Democrats in the red states but they lose due to straight ticket voting – just look at the Senate elections this year, where moderate Dems got clobbered everywhere but Colorado.
Exit poll and other pre-election polling have a limited usefulness this time because they didn’t seem to correlate very well with the election itself. To use this data to try to understand why Kerry lost is probably not wise until we have a better understanding of why these polls didn’t match the outcome.
My personal theory is that there was an unusually large contingent of Bush backers who just weren’t willing to talk to pollsters– who they probably consider part of the “leftist media conspiracy”. In the same way that African-American candidates have often gotten fewer votes than polls indicated they would, I think voters who were anti-gay specifically or anti-tolerance more generally showed up to vote but not to talk to strangers. If that was the case– and it’s basically unprovable, probably– the exit polls would have to be adjusted.
Jay Bradfield, you’re exactly right.
They also beat us with discipline we lack. We’re always too busy making sure everyone gets to speak their mind. We wouldn’t want anyone to feel disenfranchised.
Organizing the left for Democratic theme issues is next to impossible, because complaining about THEIR issue always transcends winning the presidency or congress. As someone once said, it’s like moving frogs in a wheel barrow.
Conservatives love order, so they love a good, firm chain of command, where orders come down and are followed. Meanwhile, liberals are still arguing about which T-shirt makes the appropriate statement with this outfit.
Liberals are too busy crying about whatever it is that makes them unhappy at the moment to work on finding the middle. Not content to be minority status in all branches of federal and state government, they seek to turn the course further left.
I am a former conservative Republican red-stater turned progressive. The reason we don’t see fusion politicians in the red states is because of the effectiveness of the Inside the beltway conservative movement. I am sadly beginning to realize there is no equivalent progressive movement.
The conservative movement goes out of its way to get all of its candidates to tow the line on conservative issues. So you might have social conservative mid-westerners who is tempermentally opposed to free trade, as are his constituents but because of the working of the conservative network of think tanks, lobbyists, donors, and activists this guy will eventually change his tune on free trade. Maybe it’s because he is convinced by the rationales offered in a Heritage Backgrounder, maybe it’s because right-wing activists show how he can still win while be free trade, or maybe a wealthy conservative donor had a chat with him about his political future. Either way the conservative movement takes care of itself, its agenda, and its members. Progressive don’t. Progressives lose.
Dobson is a guru for the “family” devotees within the evangelics, but his role is no different in the Bush campaign than Limbaugh’s: He’s there to excite and motivate the base, and he does.
The people who listen to Dobson and Limbaugh and watch Fox News, are the same people. At least there is large overlap. Find someone who likes Dobson but doesn’t like Limbaugh.
Whatever his message, Kerry did a poor job of communicating it. Bush was just terrible in the campaign, and only because Kerry was hopelessly worse did Bush prevail.
alan abramovitz’s show claims that the the GOP have an effective lock on the senate and the house for the forseeable future, although he seems more optimistic about the dems regaining the presidency in 2008.
what puzzles me why the GOP has such a great advantage in the senate house, if “cultural issues” are so paramount. one would think that the senate and house candidates — from both parties — would more closely reflect the people that reside in their districts, which would effectively “level the playing field” with regard to cultural issues. why, then, aren’t there more democratic senators and representatives from the blue states? the only answer i have is that even for house and senate races, democratic candidates end up taking the views of the national party on issues such as gay rights and abortion, which puts them at odds with most of their consituents, even if they more closely “connect” with their voters on other, less crucial issues.
but this brings to mind another question: why do democratic candidates from red states persist in reflecting the the national party on cultural/wedge issues? why have we not seen the emergence of red state politicians (from either party) that would seek to more closely align themselves with red state voters by wedding cultural conservatism (opposition to gay rights, abortion) with economic liberalism (higher minimum wage, national health insurance)?
the fact that we’ve not seen “fusion politicians” such as these makes me wonder if there’s a flaw in thomas franks’ analysis in “what’s the matter with kansas?” maybe, contrary to what he says, the midwest picks the GOP as much for its economic program as its cultural program, although i’m hopelessly mystified as to why. or maybe there’s some coupling between the GOP’s cultural and economic programs that we blue staters simply can’t grasp.
Do not be distracted by continued verbal self-flgulation. The election was stolen and unless we ALL focus on the false result of this election, we are going to remin fractured and out of power. Evangelists are passionate but they are not stupid. They did not give Bush this election. Voter fraud did.
My understanding is that the Gay Marriage issue resonated with Dr. James Dobson whose radio show reaches a reputed 7,000,000 listeners. By “closing the deal” with Dobson and earning his endorsement, Bush probably picked up a fair number of his devotees who may or may not care much about gay marriage. My take is that the Republican Gay Marriage strategy was to influence those who can influence others. Then frighten the masses with wolves. It might be interesting to try to find out what portion of the population sought advice/were given advice from someone they trust and how this advice affected their vote.
So, the economy was a push, the morals issue was a wash, Kerry should have offered a clear opposing plan for Iraq, and for fighting terrorism. And he should never have switched his message from Iraq and foreign policy. Kerry kicked Bush’s butt in the first debate about foreign policy he had Bush rocked, but failed to knock him out. Joe Biden was right, hammer away on Iraq and offer a clear plan. The future doesn’t look too bright in the congress either.