Bush leads Kerry 48-43 percent among Iowa RV’s, with 3 percent for Nader and 6 percent for neither in a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted Sept. 16-19, 2004.
Kerry leads Bush 48-44, with 2 perent for Nader and 6 percent unsure in a poll of Michigan LV’s by EPIC/MRA conducted Sept. 15-19, 2004.
Bush leads Kerry 54-43 percent among Ohio LV’s, with 2 percent for Nader and 1 percent unsure, according to the Ohio Poll conducted Sept. 12-18 by the Institute for Policy Research of the University of Cincinnati.
Kerry leads Bush 51-44 among Oregon LV’s, with 5 percent unsure in a poll by Research 2000 for The Portland Tribune, et al. conducted Sept. 13-16.
TDS Strategy Memos
Latest Research from:
Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
-
February 12: 2024 Lessons for Democrats That Are Relevant Right Now
I’m on record as suggesting that Democrats not waste too much time on recriminations over 2024 while the wolf of Trump 2.0 is at the door. But there are some lessons relevant to the challenges right before them, and I tried to discuss at few at New York:
The ritualistic “struggle for the soul of the Democratic Party” that ensued after the Republican election victory of 2024 was cut somewhat short by the brutal realities of the real-life consequences of letting Donald Trump regain power with a Republican-controlled Congress and all sorts of ridiculous claims of an absolute mandate to do whatever he wanted. But, in fact, while factional finger-pointing might have been are a self-indulgent luxury an opposition party living under the MAGA gun can’t afford, there are some lessons from the election results that are important to internalize right now. Here are a few.
Mobilizing the Democratic base isn’t enough to stop Trump
For much of the 2024 campaign, a lot of observers believed that the only way Trump could win was if Democrats failed to mobilize their party base, either out of complacency or because key constituencies were disgruntled with Joe Biden (and, to a lesser extent, with Kamala Harris once she became the presidential nominee). An enormous amount of money, time, and effort went into securing maximum turnout among young, Black, and Latino voters on the theory that if fully engaged, they’d win the day. And in the end, these constituencies did turn out reasonably well (a bit less than in 2020, but more than in 2012 or 2016). Trouble was, too many of them voted for Donald Trump.
No, Trump didn’t win Black, Latino, or under-30 voters overall, but his performance in all those groups improved significantly as compared to 2020. Among Black voters (per AP Votecast, the most reputable exit poll), he doubled his percentage of the vote, from 8 percent to 16 percent. Among Latinos, his percentage rose from 35 percent to 43 percent. And among under-30 voters, his share of the vote jumped from 36 percent to 47 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP advantage in the Donkey Party’s ancient working-class constituency continued to rise, even among non-white voters; overall, Trump won 56 percent of non-college-educated voters. The Democratic base fractured more than it faltered. And there were signs (which have persisted into early 2025 polling) that defections have made the GOP the plurality party for the first time in years and one of the few times since the New Deal.
While rebuilding the base (while expanding it) remains a crucial objective for Democrats, just calling it into the streets to defy Trump’s 2025 agenda via a renewed “resistance” isn’t likely to work. Many former and wavering Democrats need to be persuaded to remain in their old party.
Trump really did win the two most essential arguments of the 2024 election, on inflation and immigration
Republicans have massive incentives to pretend that all their messages struck home, giving them an argument that they enjoy a mandate for everything they want to do. But the honest consensus from both sides of the barricade is that demands for change to address inflation and immigration were the critical Trump messages, with doubts about Joe Biden’s capacity to fulfill the office and Kamala Harris’s independence from him exacerbating both.
What we’ve learned in 2025 is that Trump has considerable public backing to do some controversial things on these issues. A 2024 poll from Third Way showed a majority of swing voters agreed that excessive government spending was the principal cause of inflation, a huge blow to Democratic hopes that rising costs could be pinned on corporations, global trends, supply-chain disruptions, or, indeed, the previous Trump administration. But this wasn’t just a campaign issue: Trump took office with some confidence that the public would support serious efforts to reduce federal spending and make government employees accountable. And the fact that (so far) his approval ratings have held up despite the chaotic nature of his efforts to slash federal payrolls is a good indication he has some wind at his back, at least initially.
If that’s true on inflation, it’s even truer on immigration, where solid majorities in multiple polls support (in theory, at least) the mass deportation of undocumented immigrants. If the administration was smart enough to limit its deportation campaign to those convicted of violent crimes, it would have overwhelming public support. But Democrats should fully accept they didn’t just lose votes on this issue in 2024: They lost an argument that persists.
That is why it is critical that Democrats point to evidence that Trump’s own agenda (particularly his tariff policies) will revive inflation that had largely been tamed by the end of the Biden administration, while focusing their immigration messaging on vast overreach, inhumane excesses, and ethnic profiling of Latinos by Team Trump in its efforts to deport immigrants.
Swing voters are not moved by constitutional or “threat to democracy” arguments
Joe Biden in his 2024 presidential campaign (and, to a slightly lesser extent, Kamala Harris as his successor) put considerable stock in playing on public concerns about the threat to democracy posed by Trump as evidenced by his conduct on January 6, 2021, and his lawless behavior generally. While these arguments found traction among voters already in his corner, there’s little evidence they mattered much at all to the voters who decided the election in Trump’s favor. Indeed, a considerable percentage of voters worried about a broken political system viewed Trump as a potential reformer as much as an insurrectionist or autocrat.
At the moment, most office-holding Democrats and (more quietly) many Republicans are aghast at how Trump has gone about pursuing his agenda early in 2025, with a blizzard of executive orders, a federal funding freeze, and a blank check issued to eccentric billionaire Elon Musk to disrupt federal agencies and intimidate federal employees. Again, Trump is drawing on long-standing public hostility toward the federal government and to the size and cost of government as a spur to inflation and a burden on taxpayers. Fighting him with alarms about his violation of legal and constitutional limitations on presidential power is unlikely to work with an electorate unmoved by Trump’s earlier scofflaw attitude. Voters must be convinced in very concrete terms that what he is doing will affect their own lives negatively. As with tariffs and the immigration policy, Trump’s tendency to overreach should provide plenty of ammunition for building a backlash to his policies.
The desire for change in an unhappy country is deep-seated
In 2024, as in 2016, Trump managed to win because unhappy voters who didn’t particularly like or trust either presidential candidate (or their parties) in the end chose to produce a change in party control of the White House and of Congress. In office, Trump and his allies will try to perpetuate as long as they can the illusion that they are still fighting for “change” against powerful interests aligned with the Democratic Party, even though it’s Republicans who control the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and also dominate the U.S. Supreme Court. The idea that Team Trump is a brave band of insurgents speaking truth to power is undermined very specifically by the fact that its chief disrupter, Musk, is the richest man in the world and the first among equals of a large band of plutocrats surrounding the president.
As the New York Times’ Nate Cohn observed during the transition to the second Trump administration, many of the same anti-incumbent tendencies that put a thumb on the scale for the GOP in 2024 will now work for the opposition:
“The president’s party has retained the White House only once since 2004, mostly because voters have been unsatisfied with the state of the country for the last 20 years. No president has sustained high approval ratings since [George W.] Bush, in the wake of Sept. 11 …
“Looking even further back, the president’s party has won only 40 percent of presidential elections from 1968 to today. With that record, perhaps it’s the winning party that really faces the toughest question post-election: How do you build public support during an era of relatively slow growth, low trust in government and low satisfaction with the state of the country?”
Based on his conduct since returning to the White House and his well-known narcissism, it’s not all that clear that the 47th president even cares about building public support as he ends his political career. That may give him the freedom of the true lame duck, but it also means Democrats can batten on his broken promises and the disappointments they will breed. The 2028 presidential candidate who may be in real trouble is the Republican who succeeds the 2024 winner.
I’d welcome the passage of the Colorado initiative this year, as it would probably ensure Kerry at least a couple of electoral votes in the state (the Denver and Boulder-based areas.) Although it would also ensure Bush a couple (Colorado Springs and Eastern CO).
But I’m reluctant, on the other hand, to embrace this system for the whole nation, especially if it were keyed to congressional districts (as in Maine and Nebraska). Gerrymandering of districts has had generally negative effects on congressional elections; we don’t need it determining the presidency as well.
in other news, race2004.net reports a poll showing that Colorado initiative might just pass.
I still don’t like it, regardless, and I’d think that Colorado voters wouldn’t want it. It should make candidates less interested in working on Colorado.
It’s also not clear what the influence would be on this year’s vote. If it passes and only, say, New Hampshire and Colorado go from Bush 2000 to Kerry, then if Kerry loses Colorado, he’s still a vote short; if he wins, it’s a tie. In contrast, if it doesn’t pass, New Hampshire and Colorado (if they’re the only shifts) give Kerry the win.
On the other hand, if Kerry holds the Gore states and takes New Hampshire and Nevada, the Colorado states that would come in a loss would put him over the top.
Weird.
Keep watching this race. It’s gonna be interesting all the way.
pempel-
I’d attribute this to chance variation. There’s not much going on there, and a 4% Bush lead is in keeping with a good number of polls.
I agree with Wilbur about Ohio. There’s NO WAY that Bush is ahead by 11%. The Ohio Poll is notoriously pro-GOP. In 2000 Bush only won by 50-49% (combined Gore-Nader) and since then the Ohio economy has declined more than almost any other state.
In live near Dayton and the normally GOP suburbs in my area have as many Kerry signs as Bush ones. I’ve lived in the same neighborhood for over four decades, and I’ve NEVER seen so many Democratic signs. Frankly, the poll showing Bush up by 2% is probably optimistic for Bush!
Unless something drastic occurs, I think Kerry will win Ohio!
Good state polls lately for Kerry-Edwards, but can anyone explain the widening national gap in favor of Bush on Rasmussen’s daily poll? The last four days show Bush moving up from 47.8% to 48.8% while Kerry’s numbers drop from 46.1% to 44.8%. Granted, small changes, but to me a worrisome trend. T.J.
The ARG polls are tremendous news for Kerry (how could polls be so different? Something wierd is going on this year). Here’s the reason they are even better than they look. For anybody who has ever done any political work in Iowa you know that this state is almost completely dependent on how you are organized on the ground – maybe more than any other state in the country. A month ago I saw an interview with somebody from the Des Moisnes register – who really knows this stuff – who said he has never seen the type of organization he’s seeing with Kerry (not the fake stuff there was with Dean, but real professional). So my take is if Kerry is with MOE he is probably ahead. You also have to believe that New Hampshire swings back to Kerry. Again, if you know anything about New England culture you know the whole “neighbor” thing runs deeper than political affiliation. It will be astounding if New Hampshire doesn’t go for Kerry in the end no matter what the polls.
Also, I live in Ohio and the organization here for Kerry is the best I have seen in my lifetime. In the Columbus area you see more K/E bumper stickers and lawn signs than B/C. Also many neighborhoods have organized so well they have their own unique signs like Upper Arlington for Kerry. I have never seen that before. I you have lived in Columbus for the last decade you would know how amazing this is.
Looking over the ARG results…first, they note a 47-46 Bush lead, across the country. They see Bush up 133-132 in states outside the margin of error. They see Kerry up 270-253 in states with any lead. Um, I keep saying this, but this race is gonna be close.
Here are the 27 states with single digit differences, starting with the most pro-Bush, ending with the most pro-Kerry:
Mississippi Bush +9
Louisiana Bush +8
Tennessee Bush +7
Arizona Bush +6
Missouri Bush +6
Virginia Bush +6
North Carolina Bush +5
Arkansas Bush +3
Iowa Bush +2
Nevada Bush +2
Ohio Bush +2
New Hampshire Bush +2
Colorado Bush +1
West Virginia tie
Wisconsin tie
Florida Kerry +1
Pennsylvania Kerry +1
Minnesota Kerry +2
Oregon Kerry +2
Maine Kerry +4
New Mexico Kerry +5
Illinois Kerry +6
Washington Kerry +7
New Jersey Kerry +8
Michigan Kerry +8
Delaware Kerry +9
Maryland Kerry +9
If you do the cut at states being within 3% one way or the other, that includes (12):
Bush 2000 states–Arkansas, Colorado, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Florida, West Virginia
Gore 2000 states–Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin
For a 4-6% difference (7):
Bush 2000 states–North Carolina, Arizona, Virginia, Missouri
Gore 2000 states–Maine (and that danged distict…), New Mexico, Illinois
For a 7-9% difference (8):
Bush 2000 states–Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi
Gore 2000 states–Washington, Michigan, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland
I’d think those first dozen states are the main battleground these days, with Maine and New Mexico added given recent polls by other organizations. That yields 7 Bush 2000 states and 7 Gore 2000 states.
But keep an eye on some of those other states to see if there is a discernible shift in the near future.
Just a heads up. The ARG list of all 50 states is now up. I’ve not looked at it yet.
http://americanresearchgroup.com/
I agree that “Shrub” probably is leading, but there’s no reason for Democrats to despair. For example, Florida and Pennsylvania recently swung back (barely) to Kerry although the Rasmussen polls admittedly did not include Nader.
—
It is fascinating to compare the four vote projection sites out there: Electoral Vote Projection Map &
Race2004.net (run by Dems) and FederalReview.com & ElectionProjection.com (both right-leaning). I would love to see a retrospective “fact check” analysis after Nov.3 to find out which methodology proved most accurate in the end. To me, the probabilistic methods favored by FederalReview.com & ElectionProjection.com seem unnecessarily complicated; I suspect Race2004.net gets it right by simply putting states in a “tossup” column if the difference is small. Nobody really knows how PA and FL will work out, for now. It would be premature for “Shrub” supporters to start gloating now, just as it was foolish of Kerry supporters to think last month’s electoral vote tally of ~300 EVs was “safe”. A lot will depend on some very close state races.
MARCU$
Is there any detail available on the Ohio poll? Not good news there. Also, I just saw a report of a poll in Colorado showing a 12% Bush lead, from Ciruli Associates. That’s very different from everything else. ARG, Zogby, Rasmussen, and the Republican POS group all have had the race at only a 1% difference.
The state polls are more evidence that Kerry is in deeper trouble than Ruy thinks.
1. Ohio is basically a swing state- so if the race is even nationally Bush should be leading by no more than 4 or 5 points. Instead Bush leads by 11 – suggesting a 6-8 pt lead for Bush.
2. Iowa should be a Democratic state. Bush’s 5 point lead suggests that he has a big lead nationally.
On the other hand, Kerry’s leads in Michigan and Oregon suggest that this is not as bad for Dems as 1984- but certainly it is comparable to 1988, where Dukakis carried a decent number of states but still not enough to make it close nationally.
Bottom line: Bush doesn’t have the double digit lead that some national polls suggest- but it isn’t dead even either. If it was, Kerry would be leading in Iowa, and Bush’s lead in Ohio would be much smaller.