I’m on record as suggesting that Democrats not waste too much time on recriminations over 2024 while the wolf of Trump 2.0 is at the door. But there are some lessons relevant to the challenges right before them, and I tried to discuss at few at New York:
The ritualistic “struggle for the soul of the Democratic Party” that ensued after the Republican election victory of 2024 was cut somewhat short by the brutal realities of the real-life consequences of letting Donald Trump regain power with a Republican-controlled Congress and all sorts of ridiculous claims of an absolute mandate to do whatever he wanted. But, in fact, while factional finger-pointing might have been are a self-indulgent luxury an opposition party living under the MAGA gun can’t afford, there are some lessons from the election results that are important to internalize right now. Here are a few.
For much of the 2024 campaign, a lot of observers believed that the only way Trump could win was if Democrats failed to mobilize their party base, either out of complacency or because key constituencies were disgruntled with Joe Biden (and, to a lesser extent, with Kamala Harris once she became the presidential nominee). An enormous amount of money, time, and effort went into securing maximum turnout among young, Black, and Latino voters on the theory that if fully engaged, they’d win the day. And in the end, these constituencies did turn out reasonably well (a bit less than in 2020, but more than in 2012 or 2016). Trouble was, too many of them voted for Donald Trump.
No, Trump didn’t win Black, Latino, or under-30 voters overall, but his performance in all those groups improved significantly as compared to 2020. Among Black voters (per AP Votecast, the most reputable exit poll), he doubled his percentage of the vote, from 8 percent to 16 percent. Among Latinos, his percentage rose from 35 percent to 43 percent. And among under-30 voters, his share of the vote jumped from 36 percent to 47 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP advantage in the Donkey Party’s ancient working-class constituency continued to rise, even among non-white voters; overall, Trump won 56 percent of non-college-educated voters. The Democratic base fractured more than it faltered. And there were signs (which have persisted into early 2025 polling) that defections have made the GOP the plurality party for the first time in years and one of the few times since the New Deal.
While rebuilding the base (while expanding it) remains a crucial objective for Democrats, just calling it into the streets to defy Trump’s 2025 agenda via a renewed “resistance” isn’t likely to work. Many former and wavering Democrats need to be persuaded to remain in their old party.
Republicans have massive incentives to pretend that all their messages struck home, giving them an argument that they enjoy a mandate for everything they want to do. But the honest consensus from both sides of the barricade is that demands for change to address inflation and immigration were the critical Trump messages, with doubts about Joe Biden’s capacity to fulfill the office and Kamala Harris’s independence from him exacerbating both.
What we’ve learned in 2025 is that Trump has considerable public backing to do some controversial things on these issues. A 2024 poll from Third Way showed a majority of swing voters agreed that excessive government spending was the principal cause of inflation, a huge blow to Democratic hopes that rising costs could be pinned on corporations, global trends, supply-chain disruptions, or, indeed, the previous Trump administration. But this wasn’t just a campaign issue: Trump took office with some confidence that the public would support serious efforts to reduce federal spending and make government employees accountable. And the fact that (so far) his approval ratings have held up despite the chaotic nature of his efforts to slash federal payrolls is a good indication he has some wind at his back, at least initially.
If that’s true on inflation, it’s even truer on immigration, where solid majorities in multiple polls support (in theory, at least) the mass deportation of undocumented immigrants. If the administration was smart enough to limit its deportation campaign to those convicted of violent crimes, it would have overwhelming public support. But Democrats should fully accept they didn’t just lose votes on this issue in 2024: They lost an argument that persists.
That is why it is critical that Democrats point to evidence that Trump’s own agenda (particularly his tariff policies) will revive inflation that had largely been tamed by the end of the Biden administration, while focusing their immigration messaging on vast overreach, inhumane excesses, and ethnic profiling of Latinos by Team Trump in its efforts to deport immigrants.
Joe Biden in his 2024 presidential campaign (and, to a slightly lesser extent, Kamala Harris as his successor) put considerable stock in playing on public concerns about the threat to democracy posed by Trump as evidenced by his conduct on January 6, 2021, and his lawless behavior generally. While these arguments found traction among voters already in his corner, there’s little evidence they mattered much at all to the voters who decided the election in Trump’s favor. Indeed, a considerable percentage of voters worried about a broken political system viewed Trump as a potential reformer as much as an insurrectionist or autocrat.
At the moment, most office-holding Democrats and (more quietly) many Republicans are aghast at how Trump has gone about pursuing his agenda early in 2025, with a blizzard of executive orders, a federal funding freeze, and a blank check issued to eccentric billionaire Elon Musk to disrupt federal agencies and intimidate federal employees. Again, Trump is drawing on long-standing public hostility toward the federal government and to the size and cost of government as a spur to inflation and a burden on taxpayers. Fighting him with alarms about his violation of legal and constitutional limitations on presidential power is unlikely to work with an electorate unmoved by Trump’s earlier scofflaw attitude. Voters must be convinced in very concrete terms that what he is doing will affect their own lives negatively. As with tariffs and the immigration policy, Trump’s tendency to overreach should provide plenty of ammunition for building a backlash to his policies.
In 2024, as in 2016, Trump managed to win because unhappy voters who didn’t particularly like or trust either presidential candidate (or their parties) in the end chose to produce a change in party control of the White House and of Congress. In office, Trump and his allies will try to perpetuate as long as they can the illusion that they are still fighting for “change” against powerful interests aligned with the Democratic Party, even though it’s Republicans who control the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and also dominate the U.S. Supreme Court. The idea that Team Trump is a brave band of insurgents speaking truth to power is undermined very specifically by the fact that its chief disrupter, Musk, is the richest man in the world and the first among equals of a large band of plutocrats surrounding the president.
As the New York Times’ Nate Cohn observed during the transition to the second Trump administration, many of the same anti-incumbent tendencies that put a thumb on the scale for the GOP in 2024 will now work for the opposition:
“The president’s party has retained the White House only once since 2004, mostly because voters have been unsatisfied with the state of the country for the last 20 years. No president has sustained high approval ratings since [George W.] Bush, in the wake of Sept. 11 …
“Looking even further back, the president’s party has won only 40 percent of presidential elections from 1968 to today. With that record, perhaps it’s the winning party that really faces the toughest question post-election: How do you build public support during an era of relatively slow growth, low trust in government and low satisfaction with the state of the country?”
Based on his conduct since returning to the White House and his well-known narcissism, it’s not all that clear that the 47th president even cares about building public support as he ends his political career. That may give him the freedom of the true lame duck, but it also means Democrats can batten on his broken promises and the disappointments they will breed. The 2028 presidential candidate who may be in real trouble is the Republican who succeeds the 2024 winner.
I beleive that the only Americans the terrorists want
at this time is Gorge W. and crew (Cheney,Ashcroft,
Romsfield) If we get them out of office in November
we will have a chance of getting our country back at least to a low security threat level. We have not, nore will we ever be totally free from the threat of terrorists plotting against us. But the ones that are really hated by the terrorists groups of today are listed above.
If the American people put them back in office in Nov.2004, then we are all in a lot of trouble. I Pray America is Smarter than That.
By the way, I think WaPo columnist Jim Hoagland explains (without recognizing it himself-) the problem with”Shrub’s” claim about being the only candidate who is “serious” about the War on Terrorism. It is no longer credible… Sure, there has been lots of resolute firebrand rhetoric and swagger since 9/11, but the actual DEEDS betray the convinction. If the terror war really is about the survival of western civilization, shouldn’t this Administration have been a little more reluctant to push for tax cuts for the rich etc. while favoring less divisive politics at home in the name of bipartisan unity against the Great Enemy abroad?
—
Heck — Churchill reportedly made concessions to Labour left and right in the late 1930s. What, exactly, did the Republicans do in 2001-03? Things like suggesting moderate NC Senator Max Cleland was in cahoots with Osama and Saddam for insisting that civil servants working for the Homeland Security department have the same workplace rights as other civil servants! The GOP has consistently tried to use the War on Terror to advance partisan goals at home, and that is probably who Democrats and independents no longer believe the Administration’s arguments about Iraqi WMDs, the Saddam/Osama connection, prison torture etc..
MARCU$
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35558-2004Jul7.html
[…]
“The lengthening period since Sept. 11 has created a sense of virtual emergency. President Bush mobilized the armed forces to fight the war on terrorism.”
“But he has not mobilized society on a similar war footing at home. He has not conscripted soldiers or factories and other national economic resources as most wartime presidents have. He leaves the impression that the nation does not need to devote all its resources to confronting an immediate, specific threat of destruction, whatever his rhetoric.”
Another encouraging statistic from the PoolKatz blog. It seems the much-anticipated “Bush bounce” is now over!
http://www.pollkatz.homestead.com/files/pollkatzmainGRAPHICS_8911_image001.gif
There was indeed a positive bump the size of a molehill in “Shrub’s” approval ratings in early June. Fortunately the Chimp seems to be back in 40-45% territory again, though, if you check the last data points on the graph. Hooray…
MARCU$
From my perspective, a major terrorist attack on US soil between now and the election would be the final nail in W’s coffin: about the only thing he has going for him (apart from “nice guy”) is that he has thus far protected us from another attack. When/if one comes, he will have proven himself to be a miserable failure yet again.
I do think that Kerry has an important reason to continue to “pile on” to his national security creds. ONLY an significant national security event, such as an episode of terrorism or the capture of Osama, would stand much chance to change Bush’s poor prospects in the upcoming election.
I suppose it’s way to late in the game to weigh in on this point (not that it makes much diff anyway), but this would be all the more reason for Kerry to select Wes Clark as a VP candidate. If nothing major happens between now and the election, Kerry will have a great chance to win with virtually ANY VP; but if national security is kicked out of its current stasis, only a very strong Dem national security team will do well against Bush and Cheney.
I think that a terrorist attack now will have a net negative effect for Bush. People will not think of him as the light in the storm, the steadfast commander, etc etc etc. Rather they will think “strike three” or possibly “two”, if they don’t count the Iraq Attack as a calamity for our soldiers and the country. The problem for Bush will be, should such an attack take place, that he will necessarily have to argue that he’s the one who can prevent the next attack. This isn’t going to be a position of strength, not even to the most willing suspender of disbelief.
I don’t know about the questions concerning al Qaeda’s positions on Bush or the election. It seems to me that al Qaeda is not really too concerned about American electoral politics. Al Qaeda is focused on rejecting and ousting Western/American culture and influence from Muslim countries. Bush, because of his religiosity and shallowness, has become an icon more to his backers here than to his enemies elsewhere, I think. The fact is that al Qaeda will continue its attacks on American interests and operations in Iraq and elsewhere no matter who is elected here.
I just saw a wonderful poll result on today’s Gallup homepage: Can Kerry and Bush Handle the Responsibility of being Commander in Chief?
Bush
Yes 61%
No 35%
Kerry
Yes 61%
No 30%
A critical confidence barrier met and exceeded!
Now watch to see if Kerry gets convincingly ahead after the looming Democratic Convention!
I remember how completely most people had written off Kerry back when Dean was surging and got Al Gore’s endorsement. He wasn’t even 2nd by most people’s calculations — behind Clarke as well.
This game is played in such a way that you can’t tell luck from strategy from the outside, and they will never tell you which it is. In either case, Kerry’s best shot is clearly to build up now, then go for shock-and-awe after the convention.
With one caveat: “don’t attack an opponent who is committing suicide.” By all evidence the Kerry folk seem to understand this. And boy I can’t figure out how those Bushies stand upright after shooting themselves in the foot so many times.
Marcus, you wrote:
“On the other hand, local Iraqi insurgents may well think a Kerry presidency would be more likely to pull out simply because there would be a perceived mandate for ending an increasingly unpopular occupation. I think this group would be more likely to ramp up the violence in Iraq rather than taking the fight to America soil, though.”
Much to the frustration of many who want him to, I haven’t heard Kerry give a date for pulling the troops. Nothing he has said so far suggests that if he wins it is, as of now, a mandate for removing our troops.
Personally, I can readily understand why he would take this stance at this point, from the standpoint of what is the right thing to do. How can either Kerry or Bush know enough, so early after the transfer, how things are likely to play out and therefore how we should think about the question of troop deployments and withdrawal?
And though I’m very much not a political pro, it also seems to me to be the politically smart thing for Kerry to do at this time. If he differs with a decision or course of action on Iraq he can, if he wants to and feels he can do so in good conscience, choose to do so later in the campaign when more is known about how the transfer is going–and, not incidentally, when the Administration will have less time to react before the election.
I think he has much fatter and lower risk foreign policy targets to shoot at now–the conduct and results of the effort against al qaeda, the pre and earlier postwar conduct of the war in Iraq including the Abu Ghraib fiasco, the overextension and mismanagement of our troop commitments, the treatment of our troops by their civilian leaders, and probably North Korea come readily to mind.
Of course the terrorists would say a terrorist attack would hurt Bush!
Remember John Kerry has a secret line to Osama and they’re in cahoots!
This question is a bit more complicated than it seems. I think Al Qaeda almost certainly would prefer to have a “good enemy” (=someone who offends Arab sensibilities, who proves they are right by invading Islamic countries because of WMDs and alleged connections that just didn’t exist). After all, Osama bin L. would be in much greater trouble now if “Shrub” had focused all efforts on waging a reasonably popular and relatively non-controversial war against him in Afghanistan…
On the other hand, local Iraqi insurgents may well think a Kerry presidency would be more likely to pull out simply because there would be a perceived mandate for ending an increasingly unpopular occupation. I think this group would be more likely to ramp up the violence in Iraq rather than taking the fight to America soil, though.
MARCU$
My answers:
1) Unclear. How the public would respond I would think is inevitably a great unknown. I am wondering to what extent mainstream media will voice and discuss these kinds of concerns that I think many Americans privately share. It could be that the more these concerns are discussed the more ready the public will be if there are attacks near or at election time, and the more likely swing voters will be able to think through in advance what is going on and how they will respond.
2) Who can know how they think about this? Al qaeda certainly has demonstrated a highly sophisticated ability to exploit security vulnerabilities of the US. I dunno–have they hired an unemployed pollster or political consultant to advise them on how to play the election here? Have they assigned someone to monitor and report on the political blog scene? My guess is they would think they’d have nothing to lose if Bush is trailing late.
3) Of course. This one is a no-brainer. Kerry would actually represent a serious threat to them because he is by far the candidate in the race with the greatest potential to effectively rally the international community to combat al qaeda.
4) Probability of them trying it? High. Probability of success to me should be high–I mean, how can we cover absolutely every possibility here? But we’ve got some exceptional people down the food chain who are going to be giving body and soul to trying to stop them between now and then. It would be foolish either to discount the possibility of successful terrorist attacks or successful efforts to thwart them.
Speaking of Kerry, I am hoping that his low profile in the media of late is entirely deliberate, that what is going on is that the campaign is getting all its ducks in a row for a great convention and fall ad and ground campaign. Fence-sitting indies I know perceive him to be almost in hiding of late–they are clearly wanting and expecting to hear from him and a little confused (and unimpressed) as to why they aren’t hearing much from him of late. Which may make it easier for him to get their attention at the convention and from here on out. Let’s hope.
1. Not sure – probaly depends on the attack. Large scale helps Bush, small scale probably hurts.
2. Helps
3. How could they not? – he has been almost a total pawn of theirs. Even they probably could not have wished for an internationally unpopular war in the middle east that significantly increased recruits.
I think they will certainly try. However, the incompetence of Bush and his administration has not yet spread to all of the career service people whose job it is to protect us — so we have a decent shot of preventing it.
OK, three hypothetical questions:
1. Would a major terrorist event on U.S. Soil help or hurt Bush?
2. Which answer would “the terrorists” give?
3. Do the terrorists want Bush to remain in office?
From the answers above, what is the probability of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil between now and November?