A new Morning Call/Muhlenberg College poll has Kerry up by 5 in Pennsylvania among RVs (48-43). The poll shows PA voters turning against the Iraq war, undoubtedly a factor in Kerry’s current lead.
Speaking of swing states, here’s some useful weekend reading. First, check out a new feature on The American Prospect website, “Purple People Watch“, which they say they will post weekly. It’s a roundup of political developments, polls, etc., from the swing, sometimes termed “purple”, states. It looks like it should be quite useful, though it seems oddly hard to find on their website. I also noticed that, in a state or two, the poll they cite is not actually the latest one. Still, a very useful feature and I recommend it.
And, if you haven’t already, you should scoot over to the DLC’s website and check out Mark Gersh’s article on “The New Battleground“. Gersh, the data guru to countless Democrats, has an interesting take on which of the swing states are most truly in play and, commendably, figures into his assessments how a given state has changed demographically since the last election. I don’t agree with everything he says, but it’s food for thought in all cases.
TDS Strategy Memos
Latest Research from:
Editor’s Corner
By Ed Kilgore
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February 12: 2024 Lessons for Democrats That Are Relevant Right Now
I’m on record as suggesting that Democrats not waste too much time on recriminations over 2024 while the wolf of Trump 2.0 is at the door. But there are some lessons relevant to the challenges right before them, and I tried to discuss at few at New York:
The ritualistic “struggle for the soul of the Democratic Party” that ensued after the Republican election victory of 2024 was cut somewhat short by the brutal realities of the real-life consequences of letting Donald Trump regain power with a Republican-controlled Congress and all sorts of ridiculous claims of an absolute mandate to do whatever he wanted. But, in fact, while factional finger-pointing might have been are a self-indulgent luxury an opposition party living under the MAGA gun can’t afford, there are some lessons from the election results that are important to internalize right now. Here are a few.
Mobilizing the Democratic base isn’t enough to stop Trump
For much of the 2024 campaign, a lot of observers believed that the only way Trump could win was if Democrats failed to mobilize their party base, either out of complacency or because key constituencies were disgruntled with Joe Biden (and, to a lesser extent, with Kamala Harris once she became the presidential nominee). An enormous amount of money, time, and effort went into securing maximum turnout among young, Black, and Latino voters on the theory that if fully engaged, they’d win the day. And in the end, these constituencies did turn out reasonably well (a bit less than in 2020, but more than in 2012 or 2016). Trouble was, too many of them voted for Donald Trump.
No, Trump didn’t win Black, Latino, or under-30 voters overall, but his performance in all those groups improved significantly as compared to 2020. Among Black voters (per AP Votecast, the most reputable exit poll), he doubled his percentage of the vote, from 8 percent to 16 percent. Among Latinos, his percentage rose from 35 percent to 43 percent. And among under-30 voters, his share of the vote jumped from 36 percent to 47 percent. Meanwhile, the GOP advantage in the Donkey Party’s ancient working-class constituency continued to rise, even among non-white voters; overall, Trump won 56 percent of non-college-educated voters. The Democratic base fractured more than it faltered. And there were signs (which have persisted into early 2025 polling) that defections have made the GOP the plurality party for the first time in years and one of the few times since the New Deal.
While rebuilding the base (while expanding it) remains a crucial objective for Democrats, just calling it into the streets to defy Trump’s 2025 agenda via a renewed “resistance” isn’t likely to work. Many former and wavering Democrats need to be persuaded to remain in their old party.
Trump really did win the two most essential arguments of the 2024 election, on inflation and immigration
Republicans have massive incentives to pretend that all their messages struck home, giving them an argument that they enjoy a mandate for everything they want to do. But the honest consensus from both sides of the barricade is that demands for change to address inflation and immigration were the critical Trump messages, with doubts about Joe Biden’s capacity to fulfill the office and Kamala Harris’s independence from him exacerbating both.
What we’ve learned in 2025 is that Trump has considerable public backing to do some controversial things on these issues. A 2024 poll from Third Way showed a majority of swing voters agreed that excessive government spending was the principal cause of inflation, a huge blow to Democratic hopes that rising costs could be pinned on corporations, global trends, supply-chain disruptions, or, indeed, the previous Trump administration. But this wasn’t just a campaign issue: Trump took office with some confidence that the public would support serious efforts to reduce federal spending and make government employees accountable. And the fact that (so far) his approval ratings have held up despite the chaotic nature of his efforts to slash federal payrolls is a good indication he has some wind at his back, at least initially.
If that’s true on inflation, it’s even truer on immigration, where solid majorities in multiple polls support (in theory, at least) the mass deportation of undocumented immigrants. If the administration was smart enough to limit its deportation campaign to those convicted of violent crimes, it would have overwhelming public support. But Democrats should fully accept they didn’t just lose votes on this issue in 2024: They lost an argument that persists.
That is why it is critical that Democrats point to evidence that Trump’s own agenda (particularly his tariff policies) will revive inflation that had largely been tamed by the end of the Biden administration, while focusing their immigration messaging on vast overreach, inhumane excesses, and ethnic profiling of Latinos by Team Trump in its efforts to deport immigrants.
Swing voters are not moved by constitutional or “threat to democracy” arguments
Joe Biden in his 2024 presidential campaign (and, to a slightly lesser extent, Kamala Harris as his successor) put considerable stock in playing on public concerns about the threat to democracy posed by Trump as evidenced by his conduct on January 6, 2021, and his lawless behavior generally. While these arguments found traction among voters already in his corner, there’s little evidence they mattered much at all to the voters who decided the election in Trump’s favor. Indeed, a considerable percentage of voters worried about a broken political system viewed Trump as a potential reformer as much as an insurrectionist or autocrat.
At the moment, most office-holding Democrats and (more quietly) many Republicans are aghast at how Trump has gone about pursuing his agenda early in 2025, with a blizzard of executive orders, a federal funding freeze, and a blank check issued to eccentric billionaire Elon Musk to disrupt federal agencies and intimidate federal employees. Again, Trump is drawing on long-standing public hostility toward the federal government and to the size and cost of government as a spur to inflation and a burden on taxpayers. Fighting him with alarms about his violation of legal and constitutional limitations on presidential power is unlikely to work with an electorate unmoved by Trump’s earlier scofflaw attitude. Voters must be convinced in very concrete terms that what he is doing will affect their own lives negatively. As with tariffs and the immigration policy, Trump’s tendency to overreach should provide plenty of ammunition for building a backlash to his policies.
The desire for change in an unhappy country is deep-seated
In 2024, as in 2016, Trump managed to win because unhappy voters who didn’t particularly like or trust either presidential candidate (or their parties) in the end chose to produce a change in party control of the White House and of Congress. In office, Trump and his allies will try to perpetuate as long as they can the illusion that they are still fighting for “change” against powerful interests aligned with the Democratic Party, even though it’s Republicans who control the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and also dominate the U.S. Supreme Court. The idea that Team Trump is a brave band of insurgents speaking truth to power is undermined very specifically by the fact that its chief disrupter, Musk, is the richest man in the world and the first among equals of a large band of plutocrats surrounding the president.
As the New York Times’ Nate Cohn observed during the transition to the second Trump administration, many of the same anti-incumbent tendencies that put a thumb on the scale for the GOP in 2024 will now work for the opposition:
“The president’s party has retained the White House only once since 2004, mostly because voters have been unsatisfied with the state of the country for the last 20 years. No president has sustained high approval ratings since [George W.] Bush, in the wake of Sept. 11 …
“Looking even further back, the president’s party has won only 40 percent of presidential elections from 1968 to today. With that record, perhaps it’s the winning party that really faces the toughest question post-election: How do you build public support during an era of relatively slow growth, low trust in government and low satisfaction with the state of the country?”
Based on his conduct since returning to the White House and his well-known narcissism, it’s not all that clear that the 47th president even cares about building public support as he ends his political career. That may give him the freedom of the true lame duck, but it also means Democrats can batten on his broken promises and the disappointments they will breed. The 2028 presidential candidate who may be in real trouble is the Republican who succeeds the 2024 winner.
Andrew Sullivan is gloating about this FoxNews poll which claims Kerry is trailing “Shrub” in the battleground states by 37% – 43%
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120492,00.html
Ruy doesn’t normally comment on reader feedback, but I would appreciate his views on this subject.
MARCU$
I’m just finishing a trip to southern Arizona. While Tucson and the southwest corner of AZ are the most Democratic parts of the state, I’m encouraged by some of the conversations I had with Democrats and Republicans.
A few things to note:
* McCain swallowed his pride in ’00 and supported Bush. But in ’04 many Republicans here are not happy about the treatment that McCain has received from the Rovians. That could turn into a backlash.
* I talked with several Republicans who were disillusioned with the war. These would probably fall into the group of voters who sit out the election.
* For what it’s worth, many of the MPs in the Abu Ghraib scandal were trained in southern AZ and people here aren’t happy about that. My guess is that there’s some defensiveness and embarrassment, but over time it will be an even worse issue for Bush here.
I’m pretty optimistic about AZ.
–Dan
I think his analysis of Ohio has missed one point. As chronicled in the NY Times magazine article (The Multilevel Marketing of the President), the president’s campaign committee has a massive GOTV operation going on here. This operation is targeting the exurbs that Gersh mentions as susceptable to GOTV efforts.
The moribund Ohio Dem party has no chance of mounting an effort to counterbalance this in the urban areas much less in the rural southeast. Kerry’s campaign HQ in Columbus wasn’t fully staffed as of a month ago (I don’t know about now.)
Statewide polls continue to show Ohio to be tight. The election here will almost certainly be decided by turnout. On this score, Bush’s GOTV efforts could neutralize his negative poll numbers here.
Shorter version: Kerry needs to get off his arse and organize Ohio.
Mr. Gersh’s article also seems a pretty dated in one respect. He says Bush’s approval rating hovers around 50 percent. In the last several weeks, his approval rating has ranged from 42-48 percent; that’s not “around 50 percent.” BTW, the only poll that shows Bush’s approval higher than 46 percent is Fox, which has it at 48.
I agree with Patrick. Illinois is among the ten states most likely to go Democratic in November. So are California and New Jersey, recent outlier polls to the contrary notwithstanding. Various organizations including Gallup and Faux News have identified a group of 15 to 17 battleground states. Illinois, California, and New Jersey are not on any of their lists. I can’t believe that Bush will put resources into any of them.
The most contentious thing I saw in that article was labeling IL as a “leaner.”
If you look at the primaries this year, the election results in 2000 and 2002, IL is as much a gimme as most of New England when it comes to state-wide elections.