There’s been a lot of buzz about the fresh analysis of the 2024 elections by Democratic data hound David Shor, so I tried to summarize his findings and their implications at New York:
Arguments over how Trump won and Democrats lost in 2024 remain in the background of today’s political discourse: Trump fans are focused on exaggerating the size and significance of the GOP victory, and Democrats are mostly settling scores with one another. But there’s also some serious analysis of hard data underway. And this week, an election diagnosis from Blue Rose Research’s David Shor, who was interviewed by Vox’s Eric Levitz and the New York Times’ Ezra Klein, is drawing particular attention.
Shor’s findings largely confirm the conventional wisdom about how Trump won in 2024, including three main points: (1) Trump made significant gains as compared to his 2020 performance among Black, Latino, Asian American, immigrant and under-30 voters; (2) Trump did better among marginally engaged voters than did Kamala Harris, reversing an ancient assumption that Democrats would benefit from relatively high turnout; and (3) inflation was the overriding issue among persuadable voters, even as Democrats overemphasized the threat to democracy posed by Trump’s return to power.
It’s Shor’s explanation of why these trends occurred that’s most interesting. Among every Trump-trending slice of the electorate, unique pressures related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the dramatic inflation that followed undermined support for the incumbent Democratic Party. But there were some other things going on. For example, the non-white-voters trends reflected, Shor told Levitz, a delayed ideological polarization that had hit white voters decades ago:
“If we look at 2016 to 2024 trends by race and ideology, you see this clear story where white voters really did not shift at all. Kamala Harris did exactly as well as Hillary Clinton did among white conservatives, white liberals, white moderates.
“But if you look among Hispanic and Asian voters, you see these enormous double-digit declines. To highlight one example: In 2016, Democrats got 81 percent of Hispanic moderates. Fast-forward to 2024; Democrats got only 57 percent of Hispanic moderates, which is really very similar to the 51 percent that Harris got among white moderates.
“You know, white people only really started to polarize heavily on ideology in the 1990s. Now, nonwhite voters are starting to polarize on ideology the same way that white voters did.”
To put it another way, non-white voters were disproportionately loyal to the Democratic Party for many years, and that loyalty inevitably began to wear off. The intense ideological polarization of the 2024 election sped that process along, even though one might expect that Trump’s barely concealed racism and overt nativism would slow it down. Why didn’t they? Mostly, Shor suggests, because Trump-trending voters weren’t viewing or reading media coverage of the 45th president’s horrific views and conduct:
“People who are the least politically engaged swung enormously against Democrats. They’re a group that Biden either narrowly won or narrowly lost four years ago. But this time, they voted for Trump by double digits.
“And I think this is just analytically important. People have a lot of complaints about how the mainstream media covered things. But I think it’s important to note that the people who watch the news the most actually became more Democratic. And the problem was basically this large group of people who really don’t follow the news at all becoming more conservative.”
The massive impact of diverse media consumption is most evident in Shor’s analysis of the single-most-stunning finding about the 2024 results: the huge gender gap among young voters, with Trump doing exceptionally well among young men, as he explained to Klein:
“18-year-old men were 23 percentage points more likely to support Donald Trump than 18-year-old women, which is just completely unprecedented in American politics …
“If you look at zoomers, there are some really interesting ways that they’re very different in the data. They’re much more likely than previous generations to say that making money is extremely important to them. If you look at their psychographic data, they have a lot higher levels of psychometric neuroticism and anxiety than the people before them.
“If I were going to speculate, I’d say phones and social media have a lot to do with this.”
Klein suggests some very specific points of divergence between young men and young women that Shor agrees with entirely:
“It seems plausible to me that social media and online culture are splitting the media that young men and women get. If you’re a 23-year-old man interested in the Ultimate Fighting Championship and online, you’re being driven into a very intensely male online world.
“Whereas, if you’re a 23-year-old female and your interests align with what the YouTube algorithm codes, you are not entering that world. You’re actually entering the opposite world. You’re seeing Brené Brown and all these other things.”
Finally, Shor provides some definitive evidence that Democratic messaging about Trump’s anti-democratic characteristics fell on rocky ground. By an astonishing 78 percent to 18 percent margin, voters said “delivering change that improves Americans’ lives” was more important than “preserving America’s institutions.” This finding suggests that in 2024, and right now, Democrats should exploit Trump’s broken promises about the economy and other practical concerns instead of focusing on how Trump has broken those promises. This isn’t a binary choice as much as a perspective on how to talk about outrages like Elon Musk’s assault on the federal government, which negatively affects the benefits and services Americans rely on and is intended to benefit Musk’s fellow plutocrats via skewed tax cuts and paralysis of corporate oversight, as Shor told Levitz:
“Trump and Elon have really spent the first part of their term diving into the biggest weaknesses of the Republican Party — namely, they’re trying to pass tax cuts for billionaires, they’re cutting essential services and causing chaos for regular people left and right, while trying to slash social safety net programs. It’s Paul Ryan–ism on steroids.”
An astonished reaction from the Bush-Cheney team? Probably not. Unlike the Washington press corps, I credit these guys with having a brain in their head. No doubt they’re busy trying to estimate the magnitude of the spike to be generated by the Saddam Trial, and trying to figure out if they can time it to coincide with November. If not, an invasion of Syria might do the trick.
I’m wondering whether the CBS/NTY poll might be the start of the first anti-spike in the Bush presidency, brought on by angry conservatives protesting the immigration reform and trip to Mars. Time will tell.
What are we as Democrats doing to get this issue out into the debate?
Um . . . Teddie gave a nice speech the other day. You get a pat on the head, Ted!
But seriously, it sends me into the slough of despond to watch our media. I never used to be one of those conspiracy-theorist types, ranting about the “corporate media, bought and paid for,” but lately . . . you’ve just gotta wonder.
In addition to the media’s shameful performance, there’s our leading Democrats, who really did, as Dean claims, roll over for Bush on the war. They only began to make an issue of the deception after Dean started gaining traction with his anti-Iraq war message, and even then they’re in a tricky spot: they all still justify their votes, when they manifestly should have known better. Only a few Dems (Fritz Hollings comes to mind) have said flat-out, I voted for the war and I shouldn’t have because I was duped. Would that Kerry just ‘fess up.
What about the Weapons of Mass Destruction? Even those shells found by the Danes lask week and paraded as having residue of blister gas have proven negative for chemicals. Where is the backlash? Where’s the scandal? Where’s the public outcry?
Are there going to be hearings on this or what? What are we as Democrats doing to get this issue out into the debate?
Pessimism confirmed! I see that the CBS News Web site headlined this poll “Bush’s Approval Sinking,” but the NYT (much more important) had the more equivocal and therefore “objectively pro-Bush” (ha ha) “Poll Bolsters Bush on Terrorism but Finds Doubts on Economy.”
Neither the article nor the headline are really out of line (like USAT’s puff piece), because the numbers ARE equivocal. Still, the news about Bush’s approval sinking doesn’t show up until paragraph three. Buried further in the data or the graphs are two other numbers that are very negative for Bush: his historically high disapproval rating (45 percent) and the re-elect matchups showing a negative two percent against an unnnamed Dem.
The Pessimist here: But how will the press play all this? I see that NYT headlined it properly (Bush Support Sinking), but will the rest of the media follow suit? I mean, let’s not forget that Ruy pointed out USAT’s astonishginly dishonest headline and story from their poll last week: something like Bush Approval Soaring, but you had to go to their Web site and look at the raw data to find out that his approval had actually sunk 3 points.
And let’s not forget Time magazine’s wonderful cover story on Dean last week, the one about all the doubts about his electability, the one that didn’t bother to inform readers until the third-to-last paragraph that their own poll showed Dean only six points behind Bush, and running ahead of the rest of the Dem pack in one-to-one matchups.
I pretty much agree with Scout.
The thing people are learning about the Bush administration is that the good news, be it about the economy or Iraq or whatever, never stays good, whence the smaller and smaller bounces. You can be spun only so many times before you stop placing any credit in it. Bush is very close to quota with most Americans.
The Chopped Down Christmas Tree continues…
Since 9/11, Bush has had huge peaks followed by slow declines. Each one, however, peaks smaller and declines faster than the last; we may have seen the absolute last “branch” of the tree, if you will, with the Saddam Capture, and I think the Mars Initiative was an attempt to get more “bounce”. But there wasn’t, and this is a good sign. In an election year, domestic ideas are key, and Bush doesn’t have any- and with the deficit looking like it is, I think people might actually get sick of hearing “taxcuttaxcuttaxcut” as a sound domestic policy.
Great blog, by the way.
One of the indicators that it would evaporate quickly was that in the December poll (which I thought I had around here somewhere, but can’t find so figure my like of hard figures ) when respondents were asked:
SPLIT HALF – ASK EITHER 53 OR 54
53. Do you think removing Saddam Hussein from power is worth the potential loss of American life and the other costs of attacking Iraq, or not?
9/28-10/01 ’03 | Worth It 51% | Not Worth It 41% | DK/NA 8%
12/10 – 13 ’03 | Worth It 47% | Not Worth It 43% | DK/NA 10%
12/14 – 15 ’03 | Worth It 54% | Not Worth It 37% | DK/NA 9%
54. Do you think result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq or not?
9/28-10/01 ’03 | Worth It 41% | Not Worth It 53% | DK/NA 6%
12/10 – 13 ’03 | Worth It 39% | Not Worth It 54% | DK/NA 6%
12/14 – 15 ’03 | Worth It 44% | Not Worth It 49% | DK/NA 7%
When Saddam was taken out of the equation more people (nearly a majority) said – “Not Worth It”. This was right at the time of the capture. So it was clear that as Iraq returned to being about an ugly occupation in a country that seemed fairly ungrateful for their liberation, that wasn’t speeding towards democracy and less about eliminating public enemy number two – then Saddam’s capture would not provide sustaining political capital.
One of the indicators that it would evaporate quickly was that in the December poll (which I thought I had around here somewhere, but can’t find so figure my like of hard figures ) when respondents were asked:
SPLIT HALF – ASK EITHER 53 OR 54
53. Do you think removing Saddam Hussein from power is worth the potential loss of American life and the other costs of attacking Iraq, or not?
9/28-10/01 ’03 | Worth It 51% | Not Worth It 41% | DK/NA 8%
12/10 – 13 ’03 | Worth It 47% | Not Worth It 43% | DK/NA 10%
12/14 – 15 ’03 | Worth It 54% | Not Worth It 37% | DK/NA 9%
54. Do you think result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq or not?
9/28-10/01 ’03 | Worth It 41% | Not Worth It 53% | DK/NA 6%
12/10 – 13 ’03 | Worth It 39% | Not Worth It 54% | DK/NA 6%
12/14 – 15 ’03 | Worth It 44% | Not Worth It 49% | DK/NA 7%
When Saddam was taken out of the equation more people (nearly a majority) said – “Not Worth It”. This was right at the time of the capture. So it was clear that as Iraq returned to being about an ugly occupation in a country that seemed fairly ungrateful for their liberation, that wasn’t speeding towards democracy and less about eliminating public enemy number two – then Saddam’s capture would not provide sustaining political capital.