This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
As if things weren’t bad enough for Democrats, something I didn’t believe possible six months ago has happened: The Senate is now in play. You don’t believe it, dear reader? Let’s look at the numbers.
To retain control, Democrats need at least 50 seats. They start with 45 seats that are safe or not up for election this year, and there are three more races (NY, CT, and OR) that they are likely to win, for a total of 48. (The comparable number for Republicans is 41.) That leaves 11 seats in play. Here they are, along with the most recent survey results:
CA Fiorina (R) 47, Boxer (D) 45
CO Buck (R) 48, Bennet (D) 39
FL Rubio (R) 36, Crist (I) 34, Meek (D) 15
IL Giannoulias (D) 40, Kirk (R) 39
KY Paul (R) 43, Conway (D) 43
MO Blunt (R) 48, Carnahan (D) 43
NV Angle (R) 48, Reid (D) 41
OH Portman (R) 43, Fisher (D) 39
PA Toomey (R) 45, Sestak (D) 39
WA Murray (D) 47, Rossi (R) 47
WI Feingold (D) 45, Johnson (R) 43
Apply whatever discount you want to individual surveys of varying quality and provenance; the overall picture is pretty clear. A few things stand out:
· Barbara Boxer is really in trouble, and it’s part of a larger California story: The most recent survey had Meg Whitman up seven over Jerry Brown in the gubernatorial contest.
· Patty Murray and Russ Feingold are fighting for their political lives.
· Colorado has been moving away from the Democratic Party since early in the Obama administration, and intra-party squabbling over the Senate nomination has increased the odds against Bennet.
· The surge some expected toward Harry Reid after the Republicans nominated an “out-of-the-mainstream” candidate has not yet materialized.
· Illinois’s “deep-blue” status may not be enough to counteract the effects of a weak Democratic nominee.
There are some elections years (1980, 1986, and 2006 come to mind) when most of the close races tip in the same direction, producing a shift of control. 2010 could be another.
It’s entirely possible that when the dust settles this November, Republicans will have hit the trifecta–President Obama’s former seat, Vice President Biden’s former seat, plus the Senate majority leader’s seat.
For much of the past year the Tea Party has preoccupied pundits, who consider it to be the locus of energy in the conservative movement and the source of the “enthusiasm gap” between Republicans and Democrats heading into the fall election. In this context, which might turn several blue states red in a low-turnout midterm, it would be a delicious irony if Democrats manage to hold on to the Senate by defeating the Tea Party’s iconic candidate in deep-red Kentucky. Stay tuned.

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
I’ve just received the top-line numbers of Democracy Corps’ most recent poll. From a Democratic standpoint, there’s hardly any good news. Here are the essential findings among likely voters:
· right track/wrong track: 31/61
· the economy: has bottomed out and is starting to improve (40); is at the bottom and is not yet getting any better (22); has not yet bottomed out and will still get worse (34)
· Obama approval/disapproval: 45/51
· Obama shares/doesn’t share your values: 46/51
· Obama is/isn’t on your side: 45/52
· Obama is/isn’t too liberal: 57/38
· Obama is/isn’t a big spender: 61/34
· Obama is/isn’t a socialist: 55/39
· Obama has/doesn’t have realistic solutions to the country’s problems: 43/55
· Mean Republican/Democratic Party ratings: 46.0/43.3
· Mean Congressional Republican/Democrat ratings: 43/4/40.7
· Generic Republican/Democratic Congressional support in November: 48/42
As if all this weren’t bad enough for Democrats, the survey reveals that they’ve lost control of the narrative. For example:
“The best way to improve our economy and create jobs is to invest more to put people to work, develop new industries, and help businesses grow in expanding, new areas.”
OR
“The best way to improve our economy and create jobs is to cut government spending and cut taxes so businesses can prosper and the private sector can start creating jobs.”
FIRST STATEMENT: 43
SECOND STATEMENT: 50
I doubt that anything that will happen between now and election day (or anything Democrats can say) will substantially alter these views; history suggests that by now, they’re too entrenched. And Obama’s ratings, though higher than those of congressional Democrats, are hardly robust. It’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that in this year’s contested races, Democrats who can’t win based on local issues or opposition research will probably lose.

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic
In his session with the press after an Oval Office discussion with Prime Minister Netanyahu. President Obama said, “We expect … proximity talks to lead to direct talks, and I believe that the government of Israel is prepared to engage in such … talks.” Indeed it is, without further ado and without preconditions. But it takes two to tango, and the Palestinians have steadfastly refused to initiate such talks unless Israel agrees to a complete settlement freeze in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Responding to the meeting, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said that “Netanyahu must decide if he wants peace or settlements. He cannot have both.” Last year this was Obama’s view as well. As he said in his Cairo speech, “The U.S. does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.” For his part, Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of Yisrael Beitenu, which controls 15 vital seats in Netanyahu’s coalition, has declared unequivocally that the current partial freeze will not be extended when it expires in November; the settlements will grow. Several smaller right-wing coalition partners have said the same thing.
For the reasons stated in my column last week, I do not think that the prospects of replacing the current Israeli coalition with one more forthcoming on the settlement issue is likely to succeed. Arithmetically, Likud, Kadima, and Labor would produce a solid 68 votes in the 120-seat Knesset. But there’s a problem: even if Netanyahu wanted to bring his Likud party into such a coalition, he probably couldn’t. There’s no evidence that a majority of Likud MK’s would go along, and splitting Likud would destroy Netanyahu’s political base. There’s an outside chance that Shas, which represents Sephardic Orthodoxy, could be bribed with yet more state funds for its educational and social institutions. (It has worked before.) But recent developments within Shas have brought it closer to the pro-settler camp, and there are other obstacles as well.
There’s one remaining possibility, articulated today by my Brookings colleague (and former U.S. ambassador to Israel) Martin Indyk after his trip to Jerusalem and Ramallah last week: Obama’s perceived even-handedness has emboldened Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, to move into direct negotiations and to try to strike a final deal with Israel. If Indyk is right, substantial Israeli concession on West Bank security issues would give him the “fig leaf” needed to make direct negotiations possible, even if settlement activity continues.
Indyk has a thousand times more experience in these matters that I do, and I very much hope that he’s right. But somehow I doubt it. The settlements are as visceral for the Palestinians as they are for pro-settler Israelis, and I find it hard to believe that Abbas could so easily set aside or explain away his previous position. If Netanyahu is serious about squaring this circle, he’ll probably have to put his cards on the table and answer some questions about the shape of a final settlement, including borders, Jerusalem, and mutual security. Whether he could do this without blowing up his coalition is anyone’s guess. And I haven’t even mentioned Hamas or questioned the willingness of either party to enter an agreement that doesn’t include it. My best guess: it will take some brave steps on both sides and skillful U.S. diplomacy plus an ample helping of luck to avert a crisis this fall. I am not optimistic.

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
The just-released report from the Pew Research Center, “How the Great Recession Has Changed Life in America,” is probably the most searching investigation of this question produced so far. Although some of the top-line findings have circulated widely, some of the less-noticed details are just as significant. Taken as a whole, the report suggests that the Great Recession will have a more-than-transitory effect on the outlook and psychology of most Americans, with significant consequences for our economy and society. Some key items:
•Not surprisingly, nearly half of all homeowners report a decline in the value of their homes during the recession. What is surprising is how long they think it will take for prices to recover: about half estimate three to five years; about 40 percent expect it will take six years or longer. And because homes constitute the dominant part of middle class households’ net worth, this helps explain why these families think it will be quite some time before their overall financial condition returns to its pre-recession peak. Forty percent estimate three to five years, 13 percent six to ten years, and 10 percent longer than ten years (or never).
•While it is true, as Stephen Rose has recently argued, that the net worth of U.S. households increased during recent decades despite record levels of debt accumulation, it is also true that upper-income households captured most of the gains. The Federal Reserve conducts a triennial survey of family finances, of which the most recent was completed at the end of 2007. From 1998 to 2007, the median net worth of all families increased by a modest $29 thousand, from $91 to $120 thousand. But mean net worth increased by almost $197 thousand, demonstrating the concentration of gains at the top. From other sources we know that overall household net worth declined by nearly 20 percent during the current recession, erasing the decade of modest gains for households at the median. And the Pew report provides evidence that middle-class families were hit harder than those in the upper tier. Among the top 20 percent, almost as many households report being better off as worse off since the onset of the recession. Among middle-class households, 45 percent report being worse off, versus only 21 percent who say they are better off.
•We already knew that long-term unemployment is the worst it has been since the end of the Great Depression. But the Pew report dramatizes just how bad it is. During what was previously the worst recession since the 1930s (1981-82), the median duration of unemployment peaked at 12.3 weeks. In May of this year, the median duration was almost twice as high: 23.2 weeks. Today, 46 percent of all unemployed workers have been out of work for more than six months, versus 26 percent at the height of the Reagan recession.
•The effects of the Great Recession on the labor market extend beyond unemployment. In 1999, the share of the working-age population that is working (the “employment rate”) peaked above 64 percent. In 2007, just before the current downturn, it stood at 63.3 percent. By this May, it had declined by a stunning 4.8 percent points, to 58.5 percent. (By contrast, the Reagan-era recession produced a decline of 2.9 percent points.) Today’s employment rate stands where it was in 1985, erasing a quarter-century of gains.
•While this recession has been bad for everyone, it has been a catastrophe for men. In the fourth quarter of 2007, male and female unemployment rates were almost identical, at a bit under 5 percent. By the end of 2009, the rate for women was 8.7 percent-but for men it was 11.2 percent. (In the male-dominated construction sector, the unemployment rate surged from 7 percent to 20 percent.)
•Most of the jobs lost during the current recession aren’t coming back. Fifty-two percent of currently unemployed workers lost their jobs for reasons other than temporary layoffs–a far higher share than in any other postwar downturn. This is not a cyclical downturn in the labor market. Returning to full unemployment will require many millions of new jobs in companies and even sectors that do not yet exist.
•More than six in ten Americans report having cut back on spending since the recession began, and many expect this to continue after it ends. Pew finds similar patterns of behavior and expectation in the areas of borrowing and saving as well. It’s easy to forget that as recently as 1970 through 1985, household savings averaged 10 percent of disposable income. In the next two decades, the savings rate decline to almost zero before increasing modestly to about 4 percent by 2009. There’s a good reason to believe that this number will continue to increase: only 23 percent of workers say that they are very confident that they’ll have enough income and assets for retirement, versus 32 percent who report little or no confidence.
•Among workers ages 50 to 61 who are currently employed, 60 percent say that they may have to delay retirement, as do even more–69 percent–of workers in this age group with incomes between $30 and $75 thousand. Young adults are already experiencing great difficulty finding jobs and starting careers; in a sluggish labor market, later retirements could make a tough situation even worse.
Despite all this, Americans remain congenitally optimistic: 62 percent expect their financial situation to improve over the next year; 61 percent believe that the damage the recession has inflicted on the economy will turn out to be temporary rather than permanent; 63 percent endorse the proposition that, “America will always continue to be prosperous and make economic progress.”
But there are signs of doubt as well. As recently as 2002, 61 percent thought their children’s standard of living would be better than their own; only 10 percent thought it would be worse. Today, the optimists’ share has declined to 45 percent, while pessimists now constitute fully 26 percent of the population. And doubt tends to reinforce caution. We don’t have enough evidence to conclude that the Great Recession will generate the kind of long-lasting risk aversion that characterized the Depression-era generation throughout their lives. But we do have reason to believe that for some time to come, what Keynes famously called “animal spirits” will remain subdued, which suggests that we’re in for a slow recovery and historically high levels of unemployment for much of this decade. If the Pew report is on target, the “new normal” will be more than a slogan.

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
I visit Israel at least once a year, so I have an opportunity to observe changes in the country’s concerns. Never before have I sensed such a mood of foreboding, which has been triggered by two issues above all–the looming impasse in relations with the United States and a possible military confrontation with Iran.
In response to American pressure that began shortly after President Obama took office, the Netanyahu government agree last November to a temporary and partial freeze on construction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, which averted an immediate crisis. The freeze expires in September, however, and it will not be renewed. As I write, the central committee of the Likud Party is meeting to consider a resolution supporting renewed construction in all parts of the country. Netanyahu has signaled that he will not oppose the resolution, which its proponents describe as a way of pinning him down and removing all ambiguity about Israel’s future course. The Prime Minister is scheduled to visit the United States in early July and to meet with President Obama. In the face of an Israeli stance that will torpedo the current proximity talks in the fall, what will the president say to him? If Netanyahu leaves Washington without a clear sense of the U.S. stance, he and everyone else will interpret it as a signal that he can stay the course at minimal price.
There are persistent rumors here that the Obama administration hopes to bring down the current Israeli government and replace it with a more tractable coalition. Don’t hold your breath. The potential new coalition member–the Kadima Party headed by Tsipi Livni–will not join unless Netanyahu fundamentally alters his stance in the negotiations with the Palestinian. Headed by Avigdor Lieberman, the hardline forces in the current coalition will not accept Kadima unless it accepts a tough government platform including the transfer of Israeli Arab villages to a new Palestinian state in return for the incorporation of major West Bank settlements into Israel. Netanyahu’s stated position is that he will accept Kadima as an addition to the coalition but not as a replacement for Lieberman and Company. To bring about a new coalition without the hardliners, the Obama administration would have to threaten Israel with measures at least as tough as the ones George H. W. Bush and James Baker implemented two decades ago against the Shamir government, risking a huge domestic political backlash.
Looking farther east, most Israelis–including many who are very dovish vis-a-vis the Palestinians–believe that only military force can prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power in the near future, and they cannot understand why the United States resists this conclusion. According to Ha’aretz, eyewitnesses on the ground support a recent report from the Times of London that Saudi Arabia has agreed to open its airspace to Israeli aircraft “as part of preparations for a possible attack on Iran.” (Israel refused to comment on this report, which the Saudis of course have denied.)
A few months ago I participated in a day-long exercise, organized by the Brookings Institution, simulating the aftermath of a surprise Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The outcome wasn’t pretty–a forceful Iranian attack on American allies throughout the region and a serious rift in relations between Israel and the United States. The Israeli team hoped that the United States would back them with military measures against Iran that the American team refused to initiate.
In both these areas, the Obama administration has been playing for time. But the sand in the hourglass is running down quickly. Some time this fall, an administration headed toward a midterm election with a faltering economy and negative developments in two war zones may confront a genuine Middle East crisis. We can only hope that its contingency plans are in place and that they’re better than BP’s.

The presidency of the United States is a very powerful office when it comes to foreign relations and other responsibilities that do not require congressional action. But once Congress–and particularly the filibuster-controlled Senate–gets into the act, the president’s power often fails him. Matt Yglesias uses the inability of the administration to get a relatively noncontroversial tax extension bill through the Senate to make this point:

The administration and Harry Reid’s office tried quite hard to get the votes together, but they just couldn’t. Not because they don’t have any leverage or the offices they inhabit are powerless, but because whatever leverage the White House has doesn’t change the fact that if a Senator really and truly wants to vote against cloture on a bill nobody can force him to do otherwise.
Now of course it’s true that there’s more Obama could have done. He could have gone really nuclear on this topic, but he didn’t. He left some tools in the toolbox, left some arrows in the quiver. And you can say the same about his advocacy for a “level playing field” public option and his advocacy for the Employee Free Choice Act and his advocacy for carbon pricing and his advocacy for a truly independent consumer financial protection agency and his advocacy for the full version of his stimulus bill and his advocacy for DOMA repeal and one or two dozen other things. But that’s actually the point. The White House’s failure to engage in a maximum, 100 percent push for each item on the Obama agenda doesn’t demonstrate that it’s a White House that’s time and again betrayed progressive values. It demonstrates that even though in each case you can always do more, you tend to decide to leave some arrows in the quiver because there are so many legislative fights and you can’t just be going nuclear thirty times a year.

Matt’s argument is aimed at progressives who think that Obama simply doesn’t care enough about their priorities to fight for them. But it’s also food for thought for pundits who are forever acting as though the president’s inability to wave a wand and work magic–say, on an oil spill–represents some terrible sign of personal weakness.

Tunku Varadarajan of The Daily Beast, a conservative analyst, has a nicely succinct take on the President’s dismissal of Gen. Stanley McChrystal:

Obama has reason to be delighted with himself right now: He has sacked a recalcitrant big-mouth; he has entrusted said big-mouth’s job to a certified hero and military star; and he’s taken that star out of contention for 2012, making his own re-election that much more likely, given the headless turkey that is currently the GOP.

You don’t have to buy into the dubious idea of a 2012 Petraeus presidential candidacy to see the move as a political masterstroke, if only because conservative idolatry of Petraeus means this is one move that the Right cannot attack.

Every once in a while you’ll get a statement of such unvarnished honesty from a politician that it takes your breath away. Check out this excerpt from a Politico interview with Sen. Lindsey Graham about his recent backtracking on climate change, which has unraveled many months of negotiations and placed any and all Senate action in question:

The two-term senator explained that the idea of increasing offshore drilling “resonated with people” back home. Once the BP spill took that possibility off the table, Graham figured he’d be foolish to jump on board with climate change legislation without getting his biggest ask.
“The problem is, the people I did business with, climate change is a religion to them,” Graham said. “This has been a business deal for me. They heaped praise on me when I was advancing their agenda. And now I’m re-evaluating and reassessing what I can and will do, and all of a sudden, I’ve become the bad guy. Well, I’m the same guy.”
“I think people somehow misread that I somehow woke up one morning with a message from God to go save the planet,” he said. “That never motivated me. What motivated me was an opening, a vacuum. You had EPA regulations coming. I’m a big nuclear power advocate. I saw the ability to put together a deal that would be unique and different.”

Now it’s not every day that a U.S. Senator boasts about his own cynicism, proudly identifies himself as an agent for a particular industry, and then mocks people with motives that aren’t so crass. But you have to appreciate that to a guy like Graham, letting anyone back home in South Carolina Republican circles think that he might just have a sincere interest in dealing with global climate change would be potentially fatal. Cutting a deal for the nuclear industry back home is acceptable; caring about the planet is not.

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
Earth to House Democrats: It’s time to push the panic button. But don’t take my word for it; consider the evidence.
Exhibit A: One of the country’s savviest political scientists, Emory’s Alan Abramowitz, has just published an analysis that says the GOP will pick up 39 seats in the House this November. On the good news side for Democrats, Abramowitz finds more safe seats this year than in 1994 (145 versus 114) and fewer that are marginal (42 versus 55) or that lean Republican (69 versus 87). And there are only 15 open seats this year in Republican-leaning districts, versus 24 in 1994. On this basis he concludes that a Republican tide as strong as it was in 1994 would yield fewer losses for Democrats, but still enough to lose their majority by the narrowest of margins.
Exhibit B: Another of the country’s most experienced survey researchers, Stan Greenberg, who’s hardly unsympathetic to the Democratic cause, has just come out with the most discouraging survey Democrats have seen since, well, his 1994 surveys. He surveyed 1,200 likely voters in the 60 most competitive Democrat-held districts and ten most competitive Republican-held districts. In Tier 1 (the 30 most vulnerable Democratic districts), Democrats trailed by 48 to 39 overall. In Tier 2 (the 30 next most vulnerable districts), they trailed by 47 to 45. And in the contestable Republican districts, they trailed 53 to 39.
A closer look at the data helps explain these results. In the 70 battleground districts, likely voters are much more likely to believe that the country is on the wrong track than are voters nationally. Fully 49 percent in Tier 1 and 46 percent in Tier 2 self-identify as conservatives, and Obama’s approval stands at only 40 percent in both tiers. By 59 to 35 in Tier 1 and 56 to 39 in Tier 2, voters endorse the proposition that “President Obama’s economic policies have run up a record federal deficit while failing to end the recession or slow the record pace of job losses.” (They still blame Bush more than Obama for the state of the economy, however.) In the 60 Democratic districts, only 37 percent of Democrats say that they are very enthusiastic about voting in this year’s election, versus 62 percent for Republicans. While a surge among independents boosted Democrats in 2006 and 2008, this year that key group is breaking for Republicans 50 to 29 in Tier 1 and 51 to 34 in Tier 2. And most discouraging of all for Democrats: Greenberg tested a number of different themes and arguments Democrats might use against Republicans this fall, and not one worked well enough to turn the tide.
Exhibit C: In a survey out earlier this week, Gallup researchers looked at the voters’ broad assessment of the major political parties. They asked (as they have done from time to time), “In general, do you think the political views of the Democratic Party are too conservative, too liberal, or about right?” In 2008, 50 percent said “about right” versus 39 percent “too liberal.” Today, the reverse is the case: 49 percent say “too liberal” and only 38 percent “about right.” During that same period, the share of the electorate assessing Republicans as too conservative has fallen from 43 to 40 percent, while the share seeing them as about right has risen from 38 to 41 percent. Among independents, the share seeing Democrats as too liberal has risen from 40 to 52 percent, versus a decrease from 43 to only 33 percent seeing them as about right.
Democrats must face the fact that much of the legislation that seems both necessary and proper to them looks quite different to the portion of the electorate that holds the balance of political power. And they must face a choice as well–between (to be blunt) the politics of conviction and the politics of self-preservation. They can continue on as they have been going since January 2009, or they can adopt a concerted strategy designed to take the edge off public anger and reduce their losses. They can spend the summer arguing about matters like immigration, climate change, and the war in Afghanistan, all of which are valid and important but way down on the public’s list of the most urgent problems–or they can refocus on jobs and the economy, reinforcing the “Recovery Summer” theme the White House unveiled on Thursday.
It’s too late to enact legislation that will actually affect the economy’s performance between now and November, but it may not be too late for Democrats to better align their agenda with the public’s economic concerns. And they could get lucky: The four remaining employment reports between now and the election might show accelerating job creation in the private sector and a more rapid decline in unemployment than we have seen thus far. That would give embattled incumbents the chance to argue–more credibly than they can now–that we’re on the right track and shouldn’t turn back.
On the other hand, it’s entirely possible that none of this matters now, that the voters likely to turn out this fall have already concluded that with one-party control of the legislative and executive branches, Democrats will continue to take the country further to the left than the majority of the electorate would like. If so, Democrats should probably prepare themselves for the two words they dread the most–“Speaker Boehner.”

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
Are the basic premises of our current policy in Afghanistan fatally flawed?
The fact that I feel compelled to pose this question so soon after the completion of President Obama’s painstaking review reflects the mounting evidence that the results of that policy have fallen far short of expectations.
Let’s begin at the beginning, with Marja. The holy trinity of modern counterinsurgency is clear, hold, and build. Coalition forces are stalled at step one. After the initial military thrust, many Taliban fighters, including mid-level commanders, swooped back in to the area to intimidate local inhabitants who might otherwise be inclined to cooperate with the coalition and Afghan government. Many other Afghanis sympathize with the core Taliban message that we intend to occupy their country for the long-term with the aim of imposing alien cultural, religious, and political values. It is hard to see what will tip this stalemate in our favor, even harder to see how we can hand over governance and security function to the Afghans in Marja any time soon. Brigadier General Frederick Hodges, one of the leading commanders in southern Afghanistan, puts it this way: “You’ve got to have the governance part ready to go. We talked about doing that in Marja but didn’t realize how hard it was to do. Ultimately, it’s up to the Afghans to step forward.” It’s clear that Hodges is not holding his breath.
The next shoe to drop was Kandahar. Ever since this Taliban stronghold was identified as a key target, the tension between the U.S. and Afghan governments on this issue has been palpable–so much so that the coalition is now hesitant to call what it has in mind an “offensive.” Just last week, we learned that the operation scheduled to begin in the spring would fall even farther behind schedule. As The New York Times reports, “The Afghan government has not produced the civilian leadership and trained security forces it was to contribute to the effort, U.S. officials said, and the support from Kandaharis that the United States was counting on Karzai to deliver has not materialized.” Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, has been admirably frank about a core difficulty: the residents of Kandahar are far from sure that they want the protection we claim to be offering them.
On to Kabul, where President Karzai has reportedly lost faith in the coalition’s ability (and that of his own government) to defeat the Taliban and is secretly maneuvering to strike a separate deal with them. If these reports are correct–and Susan Rice, our UN ambassador, disputed them on Sunday (though, notably, she offered no new evidence in support of her assertion that Karzai remains a committed partner)–two events appear to be fueling his growing disenchantment: senior American officials’ claims that his reelection lacked legitimacy, and President Obama’s December announcement that he intended to begin reducing the number of American troops by July 2011.
One might be tempted to chalk up the extent of our difficulties in Afghanistan to tendentious reporting. I was skeptical myself–that is, until I stumbled across a stunning NATO/ISAF report completed in March. This report summarizes the results of an in-depth survey conducted in nine of the 16 districts in Kandahar Province to which researchers could safely gain access. Here are some of the findings:
· Security is viewed everywhere as a major problem. When asked to name the top dangers experienced while traveling on the roads, far more respondents named Afghan National Army and Police checkpoints than roadside bombs, Taliban checkpoints, or criminals. And the Taliban were rated better than ISAF convoys and checkpoints as well.
· Corruption is viewed as a widespread problem and is experienced by respondents on a regular basis. In fact, 84 percent say that corruption is the main reason for the current conflict. Corruption erodes confidence in the Afghan government, and fully two-thirds of respondents believe that this corruption forces them to seek alternatives to government services and authority. Chillingly, 53 percent regard the Taliban as “incorruptible.”
· The residents of Kandahar overwhelmingly prefer a process of reconciliation to the prospect of continued conflict. Ninety-four percent say that it is better to negotiate with the Taliban than to fight with them, and they see grounds for believing that these negotiations will succeed. Eighty-five percent regard the Taliban as “our Afghan brothers” (a phrase President Karzai repeated word for word in his address to the recent jirga), and 81 percent say that the Taliban would lay down their arms if given jobs.
Our military commanders in Afghanistan talk incessantly about the need to “shape” the political context in a given area before beginning activities with a significant military component–but if their own research is correct, our chances of “shaping” Kandahar any time soon range from slim to none. Based on General McChrystal’s own logic, then, we cannot proceed there because a key requirement for success is not fulfilled. And if we can’t prevail in Kandahar, then we’re stuck with the Taliban as a long-term military presence and political force in Afghanistan.
And finally, on to Pakistan. Despite skeptical reports from our own intelligence services, U.S. government officials have taken recently to praising the authorities in Islamabad for their stepped-up cooperation in the fight against the Taliban. But a report from the London School of Economics made public over the past weekend questions the basis for this optimism. Based on interviews with nine current Taliban field commanders and ten former senior Taliban officials as well as dozens of Afghan leaders, the report argues that relations between the Taliban and the Pakistani intelligence (the ISI) are dense and ongoing. One senior southern Taliban leader said: “Every group commander knows the reality–which is obvious to all of us–that the ISI is behind the Taliban, they formed and are supporting the Taliban. … Everyone sees the sun in the sky but cannot say it is the sun.”
Worse, the report offers credible though not conclusive evidence that Pakistani President Zadari has been personally involved in the release of numerous Taliban prisoners from Pakistani jails, reportedly telling them that they had been arrested only because of American pressure. Surveying the evidence, Matt Waldman, the report’s author, concludes that “Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of astonishing magnitude” and that “without a change in Pakistani behaviour it will be difficult if not impossible for international forces and the Afghan government to make progress against the insurgency.”

Read more…