There are many theories about what drove the 2004 election results and some of the more fanciful (exurbs, fast-growing counties, evangelicals, Hispanics, values voters) have been critiqued on this site. Now, with the release of the raw data from the 2004 NEP exit poll, it is possible to do some closer analysis of trends that really were of high salience. One such trend was the movement of white working class voters away from the Democratic ticket.
Here some findings from an initial pass through the NEP national data:
1. In 2000, Gore lost white working class (defined as whites with less than a four year college degree) voters by 17 points; this year, Kerry lost them by 23 points, a swing of 6 points against the Democrats. In contrast, Gore lost college-educated whites by 9 points and Kerry lost them by 10 points–not much change.
Therefore, white working class voters were responsible for almost all of Bush’s increased margin among whites as a whole (which went from 12 to 17 points). And Bush’s increased margin among whites, of course, was primarily responsible for his re-election.
2. Almost all of the white working class movement toward Bush was among white working class women, rather than white working class men. Bush won white working class men by almost identical margins in the two elections (29 points in 2000 and by 30 points in 2004). But he substantially widened his margin among white working class women, going from a 7 lead in ’00 to an 18 point lead in ’04. That 11 point swing against the Democrats among white working class women is arguably arguably the most important single fact about the 2004 election.
3. Looking at married versus single white working class women, both groups appear to have swung substantially against the Democrats. Single white working class women (38 percent of white working class women) went Democratic by 15 points in 2000, but only by 2 points in 2004. Married white working class women (62 percent of white working class women) gave Bush a 15 margin in 2000 and more than doubled that margin, to 31 points, in 2004. Since married white working class women are the bulk of this group and had a slightly larger pro-Republican shift, they are responsible for most of the shift toward Bush among white working class women, but their single counterparts clearly made an important contribution as well.
4. But why did these shifts against the Democrats among the white working class occur? That’s a topic that deserves a lengthy discussion, but here are some data to ponder from the NEP poll:
Among white working class voters, 66 percent said they trusted Bush to handle terrorism, compared to just 35 percent who said the same about Kerry. That’s pretty bad, but check this out: 55 percent of these voters said they trusted Bush to handle the economy and only 39 percent said the same about Kerry. Guess that Kerry message about the economy didn’t quite get through to the white working class!
It’s also interesting to note that there wasn’t much of a difference in these sentiments among men and women in the white working class: 55 percent of white working class women said they trusted Bush to handle the economy and 40 percent said they trusted Kerry, while 56 percent of white working class men said they trusted Bush on the economy and 37 percent said they trusted Kerry.
That’s something to ponder. Not only were white working class women alarmed about terrorism, but they were also, in contrast to previous elections, no more likely to find the Democratic economic message compelling than their male counterparts.

Well, President Bush threw down the gauntlet in his Tuesday State of the Union speech on his plan to privatize Social Security. Ready or not, here he comes!
So far, response to his initiative has been underwhelming and members of his own party are edging away from it, even as Democrats continue to hold firm against it. A good part of the reason may be seen in recent polls which continue to show the proposal performing weakly once its basic provisions are made clear. Republican politicians are understandably nervous about being associated with a loser and Democratic politicians see little reason to defect when public opinion clearly backs them.
Three new polls provide more evidence of just how difficult the public opinion climate is for Bush. The first is a Westhill Partners poll released by The Hotline this week. Among the key findings are the following:
1. Bush receives a 34 percent approval rating on handling Social Security, with 52 percent disapproval. And among independents, his rating is markedly worse: a mere 23 percent approval and 59 percent disapproval.
2. A question on the seriousness of the problems with Social Security yields just 18 percent saying the system needs to be completely rebuilt (12 percent among independents), with 33 percent saying major changes are needed and 43 percent calling for only minor changes.
3. By 61-29 (66-21 among independents), voters say that keeping Social Security as a program with a guaranteed monthly benefit is more important than letting younger workers decide for themselves how some of their Social Security contributions are invested, with varying benefit levels depending on the success of their investments.
4. By 61-24 (66-16 among independents), voters say Bush’s November election victory does not mean the American people support his ideas on Social Security.
5. By 54-42 (61-33 among independents), voters say they would not be likely to invest a portion of their Social Security taxes in the stock market if they were allowed to do so.
6. By 50-33 (53-25 among independents), voters say they “disapprove of proposals to incorporate personal accounts into the Social Security program”. (Interestingly, despite the Republicans’ now-religious belief that saying “personal accounts” rather than “private accounts” somehow makes these accounts much more attractive, the half-sample that was asked this same question with private accounts substituted for personal accounts actually had a slightly less disapproving reaction.)
The second poll showing tough sledding for Bush on Social Security was conducted by Roper Public Affairs for AARP, Rock the Vote and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. The poll is particularly useful for showing how soft support for private accounts is among younger adults (18-39). When supporters of private accounts (based on a question that simply describes the accounts and mentions none of the associated costs and tradeoffs) were asked a series of followups, here is what the poll found.
1. Sixty-one percent of the public (53 percent of younger adults) oppose such accounts if stock market fluctuations could result in decreased money in retirement.
2. Sixty-three percent of the public (57 percent of younger adults) oppose such accounts if they mean a lower guaranteed benefit in retirement.
3. Sixty-eight percent of the public (63 percent of younger adults) oppose such accounts mean massive new federal debt in order to pay current benefits.
4. And 69 percent of the public (65 percent of younger adults) oppose private accounts if they would result in cuts for guaranteed benefits for everyone, not just people who choose to have such an account.
5. In addition, 53 percent of younger adults believe private accounts paid for by Social Security money will hurt Social Security, not help it and 75 percent of younger adults agree both that Social Security should be protected as a guaranteed benefit, not privatized and that it isn’t fair to saddle our children with additional Social Security debt by taking money out of Social Security for private accounts.
The final poll with bad news for the Bush plan is the new Newsweek poll, conducted entirely after Bush’s SOTU address. Here are some of the key findings:
1. Just 12 percent of the public would support cutting Social Security benefits to retirees to keep Social Security financially solvent.
2. In a completely unaided question, that simply refers to “the changes to Social Security proposed by the President”, 36 percent say they oppose these changes, compared to 26 percent who favor them.
3. By 44-40, the public doesn’t think allowing one-third of the Social Security payroll tax to be diverted into individual savings accounts will result in a better deal for retirees than the current system.
No doubt about it, Bush has quite a sales job on his hands. Unfortunately for him, the more details of his plan that come out, the more the public seems likely to be reminded of what they don’t like about it. In other words, as the data above show, his plan is only popular on the level of vague generality–anything specific and the public starts bailing out. That’s a tough dynamic for a president–any president–to overcome.

The Center for American Progress, an institution I am (ahem) close to, has a new blog, Think Progress. It is really quite excellent: well-written, informative and handsomely-formatted. Check it out.

It looks all but certain that Howard Dean will be the next chair of the DNC. But what does it all mean? Some of the press persist in seeing his apparently successful candidacy as a victory for the party’s liberals. But that’s not really what it’s about at all. Ryan Lizze of TNR has by far the best piece explaining the significance of Dean’s triumph. Here’s the conclusion of his article:

Dean’s apparent victory–aides to Roemer and Fowler insist they’ll stay in the race, but the rest of the field had dropped out or had plans to drop out by the time The New Republic went to press–proves that a process he sparked in the primaries hasn’t faded. Back then, he splintered the party roughly into a reform wing and an establishment wing. That divide was only temporarily papered over during the general election. In his plan for the DNC, Dean declares that he will “make Democrats the party of reform,” and reform happens to be a hot word among Democrats these days. The emboldened DNC members talk about reform when they call for Washington Democrats to cede power and help rebuild their state parties. In the pro-Dean blogosphere, the coolest thing to do is to declare oneself “a reform Democrat.” What the Deaniacs mean by that is anyone’s guess, but they speak in apocalyptic terms. “We need revolution. We need total upheaval,” Joyce Nowak, a 60-year-old MyDD blogger told me at one DNC meeting. Chris Bowers, another MyDD blogger, declared, “I can barely believe it. It looks like we finally won something. Outside becomes inside.”
But reform is also the new buzzword in the party’s idea factories and among its elite as well. Much of the Democratic Leadership Council’s recent advice for the party is to retake the mantle of political reform from Republicans using issues like redistricting, ethics, and electoral reform. Similarly, Carville tells anyone who will listen that Democrats must embrace the label of reform. But they are not talking about party-wide revolution. (Carville, after all, was appalled by the open process of the DNC chair’s race.) They are talking about issues Democrats can use to defeat Republicans. Dean’s first hurdle as chairman will be to erase the cartoon image of him that is seared into the minds of most Americans. But, beyond that monumental task, Dean will somehow have to mend the insider-outsider cleavage in the Democratic Party, a cleavage that he, perhaps more than anyone else, is responsible for creating–and which finally brought him to power.

We shall see if Dean is up to the task.

I have been critical of Edison/Mitofsky (E/M) for a number of things connected with the 2004 NEP exit poll, but I can’t criticize them for not making their datasets easily available. They have allowed the University of Michigan’s Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) to make all their data immediately available with full documentation as part of ICPSR’s FastTrack data program. That you means that you, Jane and John Q. Public, can now download each and every state dataset, as well as the national dataset, with copious accompanying documentation, simply by visiting this FTP file directory set up by ICPSR. Once downloaded, you can then fool around with them to your heart’s content. Have you been wondering how working class whites nationally or in Ohio (or any other state) voted in 2004? Now you can find out.
Here are a few things to note about these data, before you follow the link to the FTP site and start downloading.
1. If you are expecting to find multiple weight variables that will allow you to recreate the exit poll data as it looked in various stages of the data collection and weighting process (so that, for example, you could create datasets that would match up to the crosstabs published on the New Zealand website, Scoop), you will be disappointed. There is one and only one weighting variable provided that incorporates all the various sequential adjustments to the data–for non-response bias, for oversampling, for changing turnout patterrns and, of course, to match the final reported election outcome. Therefore, these data will not allow you to replicate and pick apart the adjustments made to the data at different times on and shortly after election day.
2. To really get much out of these data, you need to have and know how to use a statistical package such as SPSS. Then you can take the datafiles and analyze them in much more detail than has been made available in crosstabular form on the web and in newspapers. For those who use SPSS, things are particularly easy since E/M provides fully-labelled and documented SPSS files for all states and nationally that are ready to go with no data preparation steps necessary.
But if you don’t use SPSS or something similar, there’s not much here for you beyond the set of final crosstabs that E/M provided to the NEP and clients. These crosstabs have already been widely circulated on the web and provide no new information.
3. In the _ALL directory, E/M provide a datafile that combines the data from all 51 state surveys and even includes a weight that adjusts each survey to represent the portion of the vote cast by each state. Nice! That means you can easily use this combined datafile to create alternative estimates to those generated by national datafile. Speaking as someone who has manually combined state datafiles to make an aggregated file in the past, I particularly appreciate this feature.
4. Documentation for the state datafiles is an improvement over past releases of exit poll data. For example, a map is provided for each state that shows the counties included in each region or “geocode” sampled within that state. And coding for all variables is clearly and thoroughly explained.
So hats off to E/M for providing easy and user-friendly access to their data. I know some will not be satisfied with the release of these data (for example, because of the provision of only one weight variable) and I myself still have many questions about how the polls were conducted and how and why the now-notorious problems with these polls arose. But let’s give credit where credit’s due: E/M and the NEP are providing a valuable resource about the 2004 election for free to all who are interested. Let’s go out there and use it.

I’d be the first to admit that not everything Andy Stern says is correct or even makes sense. He frequently overstates his case and is even more frequently impolitic in how he states that case.
But, on some level, my reaction to these problems is: so what? As Matt Bai’s fascinating portrait of Stern in the New York Times magazine demonstrates, he is indisputably the labor leader least afraid to confront the crisis of the union movement in the US and the stark necessity for American unions to either change or die. It is equally indisputable that John Sweeney, whatever his other merits, shares much of the fundamental conservatism of the traditional union movement and, left to his own devices, would move only sluggishly to confront these challenges.
That’s what makes Andy Stern and what he’s trying to do so great. Right or wrong, his proposals (vastly increase the resources devoted to organizing by redirecting AFL-CIO dues and consolidate the existing 58 AFL-CIO unions down to about 15 to increase bargaining power are the chief ones–more detail can be found on the SEIU website) to reform the labor movement are on the scale needed to start to deal with labor’s problems. Smaller scale proposals just aren’t adequate to deal with the structural forces labor needs to overcome and the longterm trends they have to reverse. Like many, I have been very afraid that labor would simply fiddle at the margins of its longterm decline and therefore continue to sink slowly into the sunset. But Stern’s willingness to rock the boat gives me hope.
As fine as Bai’s article is, one thing it fails to do is give you a very good guide to somewhat confusing pattern of shifting alliances within the labor movement as the debates Stern and others have initiated have come to the fore. Fortunately, Chris Hayes provides a crisp guide to these shifting alliances and what they actually mean in this useful article in Q&A format in In These Times. Check it out and by all means follow the debate within the labor movement closely, if you aren’t already. Something important is going on here. It deserves our full attention.

The Pew Research Center has just released a useful little study, “Social Security Polling: Cross-Currents in Opinion about Private Accounts“. The study looks at a number of different types of questions that have been asked recently about private accounts and the President’s Social Security proposal and compares how results differ on a given type of question, depending on question wording. Here are some of the findings, which should probably come as no big surprise to those who have been reading my posts and/or closely following recent polling on the issue.
1. Polls show that the public thinks Social Security faces major problems, but does not believe it is in a “crisis”. Moreover, the public is less likely to believe Social Security system needs a complete overhaul or major change than that the health or education systems need such change.
2. Questions which do not mention the risks or tradeoffs involved in setting up private accounts generally get a more positive response than those that do.
3. Among questions that simply mention the general idea of private accounts, those that associate the idea with Bush and/or do not specify that only some of workers’ contributions could go into private accounts get the most negative response. (Note: recent DCorps and Hart Research/AFL-CIO results indicate that support for the general idea, both with and without specific reference to Bush, may have declined in the short time since the questions quoted in the Pew study were asked.)
4. Among questions that do refer to the tradeoffs of private accounts, questions that allude directly to risk and, particularly, the cut in guaranteed benefits that accompany these accounts get the most negatives response.
5. Finally, questions that query initial supporters of the general idea whether they would support private accounts if it meant a reduction in guaranteed benefits yield the most negative results of all: a hardcore of support for private accounts in the 22-23 percent range.
There you have it. These varying results suggest that private accounts will not have an easy time of it unless the public forgets that Bush is pushing the accounts and never connects these accounts to risk and a reduction in guaranteed benefits. Such a know-nothing public no longer seems likely on this hotly-debated issue.

The latest Democracy Corps poll (see also the useful accompanying charts) provides a wide range of data indicating that the public, while they may have granted Bush a second term, remains distinctly unenthusiastic about his agenda.
In terms of right direction/wrong track, just 42 percent think we’re going in the right direction, compared to 51 percent who think we’re off on the wrong track. And 50 percent want the country to go in a significantly different direction than Bush’s direction, compared to 46 percent who want to continue in Bush’s direction.
In terms of assessing the direction of the economy, only 39 percent agree “the economy is doing well, creating jobs, rising incomes, growing stock values and home ownership and moving in the right direction, while 59 percent say “the economy is not good for the middle class and working people. Jobs are scarce, incomes stagnant, and benefits being cut back”. Two different questions on whether “the middle class dream is very much alive in America” yield negative judgments, 50-48 when paired against a general statement about people having less chance to be middle class and middle class living standards declining and 60-39 when paired against a statement that emphasized the contrast between people at the top thriving and others having less chance to be middle class.
In terms of the direction of US foreign policy, 55 percent now say that “America’s security depends on building strong ties with other nations” rather than “bottom line, America’s security depends on its own military strength” (41 percent). That 14 point gap in favor of building strong ties is up from just a 3 point gap right before November’s election. And by 55-40, voters now say the war in Iraq was not worth the cost in US lives and dollars–consistent with other recent polls that have been showing increasingly negative views on whether the war with Iraq has been worthwhile.
As for the focal point of Bush’s second term program–his proposal to transform Social Security by creating a system of private accounts within the system–the poll finds 44-41 opposition to his proposal when presented in unaided fashion (“As you may know, George Bush recently presented his proposal to reform Social Security. Overall, do you favor or oppose his proposal to reform Social Security?”. And when presented in an aided fashion that includes a simple description (“As you may know, President Bush has proposed a plan to strengthen Social Security by allowing workers to establish personal accounts to invest a portion of their Social Security contributions in the stock market. Do you favor or oppose Bush’s proposal?”), opposition is even higher (52-39). In addition, by 53-40, people say they are more worried about politicians changing Social Security to make it less secure in the future than about politicians failing to change Social Security so that it will be secure in the future.
The poll also includes an extensive battery of items that asks respondents which party they associate more with a wide variety of characteristics. The Democrats’ advantages aren’t terribly surprising. They are favored over the Republicans on: for the middle class (+21); equality (+19), a better life for middle class America (+17); cares about people (+16); putting the public interest first (+13); fairness (+11) and a number of other areas including being 24 points less likely to be associated with greed.
Republicans’ associational advantages are also generally predictable: strength (+27); protecting America against any threat (+25); and respecting religious faith (+15), for example. But it should give Democrats pause that the GOP’s top associational advantage is not any of these but rather “know what they stand for” (+28). The GOP also has an 11 point advantage on optimism and a 10 point advantage on prosperity. These GOP advantages illustrate the following uncomfortable political truism for the Democrats. They will not be able to generate that much political progress from the indisputable fact that the public, in many important ways, is not with the Bush program if they cannot convey to the public what Democrats stand for and what their vision for the future is.
This point is amplified by considering some of the more contested areas, where Democrats have only slight advantages or disadvantages vis a vis the Republicans: reform and change (+5); opportunity (+3); improving America (+3); new ideas for addressing the country’s problems (+3); trustworthy (+1); for families (tie); shares your values (-1); future-oriented (-1); and individuals making the most of their talents (-4). Democrats need to move many of these associations decisively in their direction and that can likely only be done by clarifying for the public what Democrats stand for and where they propose to take the country.

You might summarize the key difference in political practice between Democrats and Republicans as follows: Democrats take majority positions and build minority support; Republicans take minority positions and build majority support. Or, to put it a bit more precisely; Democrats generally hold majority positions but emphasize minority aspects of those positions which leads to minority support; Republicans generally hold minority positions, but emphasize majority aspects of those positions which helps them build majority support.
Paul Starr provides some examples of this dynamic in his important op-ed in Wednesday’s New York Times, “Winning Cases, Losing Voters“. Starr dwells in particular on three social issues that have caused difficulties for Democrats: gay rights; abortion rights; and affirmative action.

Rebuilding a national political majority will mean distinguishing between positions that contribute to a majority and those that detract from it. As last year’s disastrous crusade for gay marriage illustrated, Democrats cannot allow their constituencies to draw them into political terrain that can’t be defended at election time. Dissatisfied with compromise legislation on civil unions and partner benefits, gay organizations thought they could get from judges, beginning with those on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, what the electorate was not yet ready to give. The result: bans on same-sex marriage passing in 11 states and an energized conservative voting base.
Public support for abortion rights is far greater than for gay marriage, but compromise may be equally imperative – especially if a reshaped Supreme Court reverses Roe v. Wade by finding that there is no constitutional right to abortion and throws the issue back to the states. Some savvy Democrats are already thinking along these lines, as Hillary Clinton showed this week when she urged liberals to find “common ground” with those who have misgivings about abortion.
And if a new Supreme Court overturns affirmative-action laws, Democrats will need to pursue equality in ways that avoid treating whites and blacks differently. Some liberals have long been calling for an emphasis on “race neutral” economic policies to recover support among working-class and middle-income white voters. Legal and political necessity may now drive all Democrats in that direction.

In each of these areas–gay rights, abortion rights and affirmative action–Democrats hold a general view that has strong public support (pro-tolerance and anti-discrimination, keeping abortion safe and legal and promoting opportunity for the disadvantaged). These are majority positions. But gay marriage, no restrictions on abortion and racial preferences are not and Democrats have suffered, as Starr points out, from becoming more identified with those minority views than with the broad majority positions the public supports.
This dynamic is a big problem and it prevents Democrats from realizing the potentially big political payoff from the fact that independent voters, as the new Pew Research Center study shows, are now generally much closer to Democrats than Republicans on a wide range of issues. But Democrats’ insistence on leading with their chin on many issues has allowed the GOP to escape serious punishment from these voters. (In 2004, for example, Kerry carried independent voters by only a single point, despite the trend just alluded to; if Kerry had carried these voters by 5 points or more, it would have been a different election with a different result.)
The Democrats’ goal should be to have these voters punish the GOP severely for their minority positions on many of these same issues. To do this, Democrats need to practice the basic approach recommended by Starr above: “Rebuilding a national political majority will mean distinguishing between positions that contribute to a majority and those that detract from it.”
Easy to say, harder to do. But very, very necessary.

Edison/Mitofsky released their massively-detailed evaluation of the 2004 NEP exit poll last week. As Mark Blumental of Mystery Pollster observes, there is much useful data in the report, even if much of it is presented in fairly arcane fashion.
Among other things we learn the following:
1. There was, in fact, more error in this exit poll than in previous exit polls and data are presented on WPE (within-precinct error) that pretty much clinch the case. The increased level of error meant that, after the exit poll data were initially processed and corrected, they had to be further weighted, to a greater degree than in previous exit polls, to correspond to the actual election outcome. Hence the Kerry 51-48 popular vote win in the initial exit poll data that became a 51-48 popular vote defeat upon final weighting.
2. There seem to have been serious problems with inexperienced and poorly-trained interviewers, who were not able to administer the questionnaires in the fashion intended by Edison/Mitofsky.
3. There seem to have been serious sampling problems (“clustering effects”) with the national exit poll that, for example, contributed to the 44 percent support figure for Bush among Hispanic respondents, which Edison/Mitofsky appears to be backing away from.
The problem with all these admissions and the copious data in the Edison/Mitofsky report is that nowhere to they really make much of a stab at answering the underlying questions that are raised by the report’s findings.
1. If there was higher error than normal, why was that? What makes this election different and will the next election be even more different? If Kerry voters were more willing to be interviewed (or Bush voters less willing), which appears to be Edison/Mitofksy’s primary rationale for the high error level, why was this and why would this kind of behavior be particularly common in this election? And how does this square with the lack of variation in response rates across precincts that voted heavily for Kerry, heavily for Bush and inbetween? (See Mystery Pollster’s good discussion of this issue.)
2. If so many interviewers did so poorly, why was that? Did Edison/Mitofsky do an exceptionally poor job of selecting and training interviewers and, if so, why was that? Or is exit polling just getting harder to do, so interviewers that might have been adequate 4-8 years ago are not adequate today?
3. If the sampling problems were so serious, why was that? Were they worse than in previous years and, if so, why? Did Edison/Mitofsky do a poor job of dealing with these problems or was there nothing they could have done? Should we have been using aggregated state data instead of the national data for relatively small demographic groups all along like they imply we should with this year’s data? Or, again, is there something about the way the country’s changing that’s making always-exising sampling problems of the exit polls worse?
I don’t know the answers to these questions. But I think they deserve answers, hopefully sooner rather than later, while there’s still time to restore faith in an exit polling system that is now faced with widespread skepticism.