washington, dc

The Democratic Strategist

Political Strategy for a Permanent Democratic Majority

Ed Kilgore

July 26: The Obama Coalition Revisited

It’s pretty obvious Kamala Harris’s candidacy changes the 2024 presidential race more than a little, and I wrote at New York about one avenue she has for victory that might have eluded Joe Biden:

During her brief run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2019, Kamala Harris was widely believed to be emulating Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign strategy. She treated South Carolina, the first primary state with a substantial Black electorate, as the site of her potential breakthrough. But she front-loaded resources into Iowa to prepare for that breakthrough by reassuring Black voters that she could win in the largely white jurisdiction. She had the added advantage of being from the large state of California, where the primary had just been moved up to Super Tuesday (March 3). For a thrilling moment, after her commanding performance in a June 2019 debate, Harris seemed on track to pull off this feat, threatening Joe Biden’s hold on South Carolina in the polls and surging in Iowa. But neither she nor Cory Booker, who also relied on the Obama precedent, could displace Biden as the favorite of Black voters or strike gold in the crowded Iowa field. Out of money and luck, Harris dropped out before voters voted.

Now Kamala Harris is the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee for 2024 without having to navigate any primaries. But she still faces some key strategic decisions. Joe Biden was consistently trailing Donald Trump in the polls in no small part because he was underperforming among young and non-white voters, the very heart of the much-discussed Obama coalition. Can Harris recoup some of these potential losses without sacrificing support elsewhere in the electorate? That is a question she must address at the very beginning of her general-election campaign.

There’s a chance that Harris can inject a bit of the Obama “hope and change” magic into a Democratic ticket that had previously felt like a desperate effort to defend an unpopular administration led by a low-energy incumbent, as Ron Brownstein suggests in The Atlantic:

“Polls have shown that a significant share of Americans doubt the mental capacity of Trump, who has stumbled through his own procession of verbal flubs, memory lapses, and incomprehensible tangents during stump speeches and interviews to relatively little attention in the shadow of Biden’s difficulties. Particularly if Harris picks a younger running mate, she could top a ticket that embodies the generational change that many voters indicated they were yearning for when facing a Trump-Biden rematch …

“In the best-case scenario for this line of thinking, Harris could regain ground among the younger voters and Black and Hispanic voters who have drifted away from Biden since 2020. At the same time, she could further expand Democrats’ already solid margins among college-educated women who support abortion rights.”

Team Trump seems to believe it can offset these potential gains by depicting Harris as a “California radical” and a symbol of diversity who might alienate the older white voters with whom Biden had some residual strength. Obama overcame similar race-saturated appeals in 2008, but he had a lot of help from a financial collapse and an unpopular war presided over by the party of his opponent.

Following Obama’s path has major strategic implications in terms of the battleground map. Any significant improvement over Biden’s performance among Black, Latino, and under-30 voters might put Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, and North Carolina — very nearly conceded to Trump in recent weeks — back into play. But erosion of Biden’s support among older and/or non-college-educated white voters could create potholes in his narrow Rust Belt path to victory in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

These strategic choices could definitely affect Harris’s choice of a running-mate, not just in terms of potentially picking a veep from a battleground state, but as a way of amplifying the shift produced by Biden’s withdrawal. Brownstein even thinks Harris might consider following Bill Clinton’s 1992 example of doubling down on her own strengths:

“The other option that energizes many Democrats would be for Harris to take the bold, historic option of selecting another woman: Whitmer. That would be a greater gamble, but a possible model would be 1992, when Bill Clinton chose Al Gore as his running mate; Gore was, like him, a centrist Baby Boomer southerner—rather than an older D.C. hand. ‘I love Josh Shapiro and I think he would be a great VP candidate, but I would double down’ with Whitmer, [Democratci consultant Mike] Mikus told me. ‘I don’t think you have to go with a moderate white guy. I think you can be bold [with a pick] that electrifies your base.’ I heard similar views from several consultants.”

Whitmer’s expressed disinterest in the veepstakes may take that particular option off the table, but the broader point remains: Harris does not have to — and may not be able to — simply adopt Biden’s strategy and tweak it slightly. She may be able to contemplate gains in the electorate that were unimaginable for an 81-year-old white male incumbent. But the strategic opportunity to follow Obama’s path to the White House will first depend on Harris’s ability to refocus persuadable voters on Trump’s shaky record, bad character, and extremist agenda. Biden could not do that after the debate debacle of June 27. His successor must begin taking the battle to the former president right now.


The Obama Coalition Revisited

It’s pretty obvious Kamala Harris’s candidacy changes the 2024 presidential race more than a little, and I wrote at New York about one avenue she has for victory that might have eluded Joe Biden:

During her brief run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2019, Kamala Harris was widely believed to be emulating Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign strategy. She treated South Carolina, the first primary state with a substantial Black electorate, as the site of her potential breakthrough. But she front-loaded resources into Iowa to prepare for that breakthrough by reassuring Black voters that she could win in the largely white jurisdiction. She had the added advantage of being from the large state of California, where the primary had just been moved up to Super Tuesday (March 3). For a thrilling moment, after her commanding performance in a June 2019 debate, Harris seemed on track to pull off this feat, threatening Joe Biden’s hold on South Carolina in the polls and surging in Iowa. But neither she nor Cory Booker, who also relied on the Obama precedent, could displace Biden as the favorite of Black voters or strike gold in the crowded Iowa field. Out of money and luck, Harris dropped out before voters voted.

Now Kamala Harris is the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee for 2024 without having to navigate any primaries. But she still faces some key strategic decisions. Joe Biden was consistently trailing Donald Trump in the polls in no small part because he was underperforming among young and non-white voters, the very heart of the much-discussed Obama coalition. Can Harris recoup some of these potential losses without sacrificing support elsewhere in the electorate? That is a question she must address at the very beginning of her general-election campaign.

There’s a chance that Harris can inject a bit of the Obama “hope and change” magic into a Democratic ticket that had previously felt like a desperate effort to defend an unpopular administration led by a low-energy incumbent, as Ron Brownstein suggests in The Atlantic:

“Polls have shown that a significant share of Americans doubt the mental capacity of Trump, who has stumbled through his own procession of verbal flubs, memory lapses, and incomprehensible tangents during stump speeches and interviews to relatively little attention in the shadow of Biden’s difficulties. Particularly if Harris picks a younger running mate, she could top a ticket that embodies the generational change that many voters indicated they were yearning for when facing a Trump-Biden rematch …

“In the best-case scenario for this line of thinking, Harris could regain ground among the younger voters and Black and Hispanic voters who have drifted away from Biden since 2020. At the same time, she could further expand Democrats’ already solid margins among college-educated women who support abortion rights.”

Team Trump seems to believe it can offset these potential gains by depicting Harris as a “California radical” and a symbol of diversity who might alienate the older white voters with whom Biden had some residual strength. Obama overcame similar race-saturated appeals in 2008, but he had a lot of help from a financial collapse and an unpopular war presided over by the party of his opponent.

Following Obama’s path has major strategic implications in terms of the battleground map. Any significant improvement over Biden’s performance among Black, Latino, and under-30 voters might put Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, and North Carolina — very nearly conceded to Trump in recent weeks — back into play. But erosion of Biden’s support among older and/or non-college-educated white voters could create potholes in his narrow Rust Belt path to victory in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

These strategic choices could definitely affect Harris’s choice of a running-mate, not just in terms of potentially picking a veep from a battleground state, but as a way of amplifying the shift produced by Biden’s withdrawal. Brownstein even thinks Harris might consider following Bill Clinton’s 1992 example of doubling down on her own strengths:

“The other option that energizes many Democrats would be for Harris to take the bold, historic option of selecting another woman: Whitmer. That would be a greater gamble, but a possible model would be 1992, when Bill Clinton chose Al Gore as his running mate; Gore was, like him, a centrist Baby Boomer southerner—rather than an older D.C. hand. ‘I love Josh Shapiro and I think he would be a great VP candidate, but I would double down’ with Whitmer, [Democratci consultant Mike] Mikus told me. ‘I don’t think you have to go with a moderate white guy. I think you can be bold [with a pick] that electrifies your base.’ I heard similar views from several consultants.”

Whitmer’s expressed disinterest in the veepstakes may take that particular option off the table, but the broader point remains: Harris does not have to — and may not be able to — simply adopt Biden’s strategy and tweak it slightly. She may be able to contemplate gains in the electorate that were unimaginable for an 81-year-old white male incumbent. But the strategic opportunity to follow Obama’s path to the White House will first depend on Harris’s ability to refocus persuadable voters on Trump’s shaky record, bad character, and extremist agenda. Biden could not do that after the debate debacle of June 27. His successor must begin taking the battle to the former president right now.


July 25: How Harris Should and Shouldn’t Deal With the “Too Liberal” Charge

Getting a lot of deja vu from the early Republican attacks on Kamala Harris, so I took a look at how a past Democratic nominee handled similar heat, and wrote about it at New York:

A Democratic politician from a famously liberal state who once was ranked as “the most liberal senator” runs for president. They’re pounded relentlessly by Republicans and conservative media as an elitist radical who can’t be trusted with national security or other responsibilities requiring toughness and common sense.

That’s not from today’s news, but from the candidacy of Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts in 2004. Kerry dealt with the “too liberal” label by stressing, then overstressing, his own heroic war record in Vietnam, setting himself up for an intensive smear campaign by a shadowy group calling itself Swift Boat Veterans for Truth who disputed the details of his military service. That Democrat, of course, narrowly lost to George W. Bush.

During the past week, Vice-President Kamala Harris has been thrust into the harshest spotlight imaginable as the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. Like most vice-presidents, she has not gotten a great deal of public attention in that job; all glory and honor in the White House is reserved for the president. Her brief and unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2019 had given her a national profile but not a terribly distinct identity other than as a critic of Joe Biden’s civil-rights record, then as a running mate who was acceptable to all elements of the party and fit Biden’s promise to select a woman.

What Americans do generally know about her is that she’s half-Black, half–South Asian, and from California. And it’s very clear Republicans plan to give her the John Kerry treatment, calling her “too liberal,” “extreme,” and “radical” in an effort to thwart Harris’s plan to refocus the campaign on Trump’s bad character, shaky record, and hair-raising agenda of “vengeance.” As Axios reports, there’s already a clear consensus in the GOP about how to go after the veep:

“The National Republican Senatorial Committee is urging its candidates to hit Vice-President Kamala Harris for being too liberal, at fault for the border crisis, and ‘weird,’ according to a memo obtained by Axios …

“The theme throughout: Republicans will paint Harris as a ‘radical’ progressive, pointing to an old ranking of her as the most liberal senator and reminding voters of past pledges to ban fracking, decriminalize illegal border crossings, and eliminate cash bail among other things.”

The “old ranking” in question was a one-year profile of senators from GovTrack in 2019. It was a very dubious enterprise that rated senators as “liberal” or “conservative” strictly on the basis of how many bipartisan bills they sponsored or co-sponsored; it did not factor in actual voting in the Senate or differentiate between significant or insignificant legislation. The rating was discontinued after 2019. Its deployment as a campaign weapon is highly reminiscent of the use of a National Journal rating in 2004, which labeled Kerry as the “most liberal senator.” At least in Kerry’s case, the rating was based on his voting record rather than the meaningless metric of bill co-sponsorships. But it also failed to distinguish major from minor legislation.

Harris critics will be on firmer ground in attacking specific policy positions she has taken, particularly during her presidential campaign; like nearly every other Democratic candidate in the 2020 cycle, she backed decriminalizing (but not indiscriminately allowing) border crossings. And she co-sponsored Bernie Sanders’s Medicare for All bill while later supporting Medicare expansions that did not preclude private health insurance. During her candidacy, Harris briefly supported a ban on fracking but walked that position back after joining Biden’s ticket.

To a large extent, Harris’s issues profile is right in the center of her party, and Republicans waving the “too liberal” banner may just simply excoriate positions very common among Democrats, such as support for what the Trump campaign calls the Green New Scam and federal abortion-rights legislation.

But Team Trump will also try to associate Harris with “radicalism” based explicitly on her geographical background and, more quietly, on her racial and gender identity. Republicans outside California have invested billions of dollars in typecasting the Golden State as a hellscape of crime, high taxes, overzealous regulation, rampant illegal immigration, voter fraud, and hedonistic culture. In part, that’s because San Francisco — the home of longtime GOP devil figure Nancy Pelosi and where Harris served as district attorney — has been a particular object of conservative-media wrath. Much of the plan to depict Harris as not only radical but “weird” will rely on negative stereotypes of California and the City by the Bay.

How will Harris counter these insinuations that she’s out of the mainstream politically and culturally? It’s very likely that much as Kerry responded to the “too liberal” accusation by emphasizing his record as a Navy officer, Kamala Harris will emphasize her record as a career prosecutor. As my colleague Jonathan Chait explained when Biden withdrew his candidacy and endorsed Harris, the framing of the general election as “the cop against the criminal” could not only help refocus the contest on the scofflaw former president but might “convince a few hundred thousand voters in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, and Omaha, Nebraska, that she is not too liberal.”

But just as Republicans went directly after Kerry’s military record to undermine a source of strength and perceived moderation, they will now go after Harris’s record as a prosecutor in Oakland, in San Francisco, and as attorney general of California with demagogic zeal. They will use every bit of real and manufactured evidence to suggest that like famed “rogue” California prosecutors Chesa Boudin and George Gascon, Harris is a crime abettor, rather than a crime fighter, and a radical advocate for defunding the police and emptying the prisons. It is worth noting that one of the main impresarios of the “swiftboating” of Kerry in 2004 is now Trump’s co–campaign manager Chris LaCivita.

Harris will almost certainly respond to attacks on her record with abundant evidence of her tough-but-fair approach as a prosecutor, as Reuters sums it up:

“Over more than a dozen years as San Francisco’s district attorney and then as California’s attorney general, Harris took some stances welcomed by the party’s left flank, including opposition to the death penalty and staking out a hard line during negotiations with big banks over home foreclosure abuses.

“But she rankled progressive critics with other moves, including a policy of criminally prosecuting parents of children who skipped school and rejecting a request for DNA testing from a Black man on death row who says he was wrongfully convicted of murder …

“Harris has characterized her approach as being ‘smart on crime’ and has spoken of the importance of preventing and punishing crime while also protecting the rights of defendants and curbing excesses.”

But it’s supremely important that she learn Kerry’s lesson and not overemphasize this one aspect of her background, record, and character. If the election becomes to a significant degree a debate over the complex undercurrents of criminal-justice reform in California and her role in it, Harris will sacrifice opportunities to build on her strength as an advocate for abortion rights, universal health care, accountability for financial predators, and other themes she has mastered. She’s not simply “a cop” any more than Trump is simply “a criminal.”

The battle to clearly define Kamala Harris will occur with incredible speed and intensity over the next 100 days. She needs to stay on the offensive and make sure Trump’s well-known flaws in character and outlook are front and center.


How Harris Should and Shouldn’t Deal With the “Too Liberal” Charge

Getting a lot of deja vu from the early Republican attacks on Kamala Harris, so I took a look at how a past Democratic nominee handled similar heat, and wrote about it at New York:

A Democratic politician from a famously liberal state who once was ranked as “the most liberal senator” runs for president. They’re pounded relentlessly by Republicans and conservative media as an elitist radical who can’t be trusted with national security or other responsibilities requiring toughness and common sense.

That’s not from today’s news, but from the candidacy of Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts in 2004. Kerry dealt with the “too liberal” label by stressing, then overstressing, his own heroic war record in Vietnam, setting himself up for an intensive smear campaign by a shadowy group calling itself Swift Boat Veterans for Truth who disputed the details of his military service. That Democrat, of course, narrowly lost to George W. Bush.

During the past week, Vice-President Kamala Harris has been thrust into the harshest spotlight imaginable as the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. Like most vice-presidents, she has not gotten a great deal of public attention in that job; all glory and honor in the White House is reserved for the president. Her brief and unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2019 had given her a national profile but not a terribly distinct identity other than as a critic of Joe Biden’s civil-rights record, then as a running mate who was acceptable to all elements of the party and fit Biden’s promise to select a woman.

What Americans do generally know about her is that she’s half-Black, half–South Asian, and from California. And it’s very clear Republicans plan to give her the John Kerry treatment, calling her “too liberal,” “extreme,” and “radical” in an effort to thwart Harris’s plan to refocus the campaign on Trump’s bad character, shaky record, and hair-raising agenda of “vengeance.” As Axios reports, there’s already a clear consensus in the GOP about how to go after the veep:

“The National Republican Senatorial Committee is urging its candidates to hit Vice-President Kamala Harris for being too liberal, at fault for the border crisis, and ‘weird,’ according to a memo obtained by Axios …

“The theme throughout: Republicans will paint Harris as a ‘radical’ progressive, pointing to an old ranking of her as the most liberal senator and reminding voters of past pledges to ban fracking, decriminalize illegal border crossings, and eliminate cash bail among other things.”

The “old ranking” in question was a one-year profile of senators from GovTrack in 2019. It was a very dubious enterprise that rated senators as “liberal” or “conservative” strictly on the basis of how many bipartisan bills they sponsored or co-sponsored; it did not factor in actual voting in the Senate or differentiate between significant or insignificant legislation. The rating was discontinued after 2019. Its deployment as a campaign weapon is highly reminiscent of the use of a National Journal rating in 2004, which labeled Kerry as the “most liberal senator.” At least in Kerry’s case, the rating was based on his voting record rather than the meaningless metric of bill co-sponsorships. But it also failed to distinguish major from minor legislation.

Harris critics will be on firmer ground in attacking specific policy positions she has taken, particularly during her presidential campaign; like nearly every other Democratic candidate in the 2020 cycle, she backed decriminalizing (but not indiscriminately allowing) border crossings. And she co-sponsored Bernie Sanders’s Medicare for All bill while later supporting Medicare expansions that did not preclude private health insurance. During her candidacy, Harris briefly supported a ban on fracking but walked that position back after joining Biden’s ticket.

To a large extent, Harris’s issues profile is right in the center of her party, and Republicans waving the “too liberal” banner may just simply excoriate positions very common among Democrats, such as support for what the Trump campaign calls the Green New Scam and federal abortion-rights legislation.

But Team Trump will also try to associate Harris with “radicalism” based explicitly on her geographical background and, more quietly, on her racial and gender identity. Republicans outside California have invested billions of dollars in typecasting the Golden State as a hellscape of crime, high taxes, overzealous regulation, rampant illegal immigration, voter fraud, and hedonistic culture. In part, that’s because San Francisco — the home of longtime GOP devil figure Nancy Pelosi and where Harris served as district attorney — has been a particular object of conservative-media wrath. Much of the plan to depict Harris as not only radical but “weird” will rely on negative stereotypes of California and the City by the Bay.

How will Harris counter these insinuations that she’s out of the mainstream politically and culturally? It’s very likely that much as Kerry responded to the “too liberal” accusation by emphasizing his record as a Navy officer, Kamala Harris will emphasize her record as a career prosecutor. As my colleague Jonathan Chait explained when Biden withdrew his candidacy and endorsed Harris, the framing of the general election as “the cop against the criminal” could not only help refocus the contest on the scofflaw former president but might “convince a few hundred thousand voters in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, and Omaha, Nebraska, that she is not too liberal.”

But just as Republicans went directly after Kerry’s military record to undermine a source of strength and perceived moderation, they will now go after Harris’s record as a prosecutor in Oakland, in San Francisco, and as attorney general of California with demagogic zeal. They will use every bit of real and manufactured evidence to suggest that like famed “rogue” California prosecutors Chesa Boudin and George Gascon, Harris is a crime abettor, rather than a crime fighter, and a radical advocate for defunding the police and emptying the prisons. It is worth noting that one of the main impresarios of the “swiftboating” of Kerry in 2004 is now Trump’s co–campaign manager Chris LaCivita.

Harris will almost certainly respond to attacks on her record with abundant evidence of her tough-but-fair approach as a prosecutor, as Reuters sums it up:

“Over more than a dozen years as San Francisco’s district attorney and then as California’s attorney general, Harris took some stances welcomed by the party’s left flank, including opposition to the death penalty and staking out a hard line during negotiations with big banks over home foreclosure abuses.

“But she rankled progressive critics with other moves, including a policy of criminally prosecuting parents of children who skipped school and rejecting a request for DNA testing from a Black man on death row who says he was wrongfully convicted of murder …

“Harris has characterized her approach as being ‘smart on crime’ and has spoken of the importance of preventing and punishing crime while also protecting the rights of defendants and curbing excesses.”

But it’s supremely important that she learn Kerry’s lesson and not overemphasize this one aspect of her background, record, and character. If the election becomes to a significant degree a debate over the complex undercurrents of criminal-justice reform in California and her role in it, Harris will sacrifice opportunities to build on her strength as an advocate for abortion rights, universal health care, accountability for financial predators, and other themes she has mastered. She’s not simply “a cop” any more than Trump is simply “a criminal.”

The battle to clearly define Kamala Harris will occur with incredible speed and intensity over the next 100 days. She needs to stay on the offensive and make sure Trump’s well-known flaws in character and outlook are front and center.

 


July 20: What Biden Should Say If He “Steps Aside”

In all the talk about whether Joe Biden should “step aside,” there hasn’t been enough discussion of the rationale he should present if he does so. So I offered one at New York:

The Democratic Party’s semi-public bickering over what to do with Joe Biden needs to come to an end very soon, lest it turn into a horrific party-rending conflict or a de facto surrender to Donald Trump. While he can technically be pushed out of the nomination, it would be nightmarishly difficult to do so given his virtually unopposed performance in the primaries and the lack of precedent for anything like a forced defenestration of a sitting president. It would also express disloyalty to a brave and dedicated leader. But Biden has already lost the united, confident party he needed to make a comeback. He’s trailing in the polls right now. And even more importantly, his own conduct and fitness for office will command center stage for the rest of the general-election campaign, which is precisely what he cannot afford given his poor job-approval ratings and the sour mood of the electorate.

So Joe needs to go of his own accord, and it needs to happen quickly before Republican and Biden-loyalist claims of a “coup” become all too credible. But it’s obviously a humiliating exercise. So if Biden comes to realize the futility of going forward, what can this proud and stubborn man say that will make him something other than an object of derision or pity?

I have a simple answer: He can tell the truth.

The truth is that Biden’s firm commitment to the pursuit of a second term, despite his advanced age and increased frailty, hardened into inflexible determination when Trump made his own decision to launch an initially unlikely comeback. When Biden took office, Trump was a disgraced insurrectionist whose very defenders in his second impeachment trial mostly denounced his conduct, even as they urged acquittal on technical grounds. The 46th president was in a position to serve one distinguished “transitional” term and retire with a wary eye on his fellow retiree festering in anger and self-righteousness in Mar-a-Lago. But as Trump slowly recovered and eventually reemerged as a more dominant figure than ever in a MAGA-fied Republican Party, Biden became convinced that as the only politician ever to defeat Donald Trump, he had the responsibility to do it again and the ability to remind voters why they rejected the 45th president in 2020.

As this strange election year ripened, Biden had a perfectly plausible strategy for victory based on keeping a steady public focus on Trump’s lawless conduct (including actual crimes), his erratic record, and extremist intentions for a perilous second term. The polls were close and Biden wasn’t very popular, but these surveys also showed a durable majority of the electorate that really didn’t want to return Trump to power, particularly as economic conditions improved and the consequences of Trump’s Supreme Court appointments grew more shockingly apparent each day.

Then came the June 27 debate, and suddenly Biden lost the ability to make the election about Trump. He needs to look into a camera and say just that, and conclude that just as the threat posed by Trump motivated him to run for a second term, the threat posed by Trump now requires that he withdraw so that a successor can make the case he can’t make as he’s become the object of endless speculation about his age and cognitive abilities. Biden does not need to resign the presidency, since his grounds for withdrawing his candidacy are about perceptions and politics rather than any underlying incapacity. Biden would be withdrawing as a weakened candidate, not as a failed president.

For this withdrawal to represent a stabilizing event for his administration and his party, it’s critical that Biden not equivocate or complain, and that he show his mastery of the situation by clearly passing the torch to the vice-president he chose four years ago. For all the talk of an “open convention” being exciting (for pundits) and energizing (for the winner), the last thing Democrats need right now is uncertainty. No matter what the polls show and how badly his old friends want him to succeed, it’s the prospect of 100 days of terror every time Biden makes unscripted remarks that is feeding both elite and rank-and-file sentiment that a change at the top of the ticket is necessary. The fear and confusion needs to end now, and Biden effectively made his choice of a successor when he made Kamala Harris his governing partner. The president needs to reassert his agency now, not look like he is abandoning his party and his country to the winds of fate.

A straightforward and honest admission of why Biden 2024 is coming to an end could go a very long way toward enabling Harris and other Democrats to shift the nation’s gaze back to the ranting old man whose acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention showed that he has not mellowed or moderated at all. Of course Biden wants to solidify and extend his legacy over the next four years. But right now, the clear and present danger is that it will be extinguished altogether. He alone can address that threat, not as a candidate, but as a president and a patriot who recognizes his duty.


What Biden Should Say If He “Steps Aside”

In all the talk about whether Joe Biden should “step aside,” there hasn’t been enough discussion of the rationale he should present if he does so. So I offered one at New York:

The Democratic Party’s semi-public bickering over what to do with Joe Biden needs to come to an end very soon, lest it turn into a horrific party-rending conflict or a de facto surrender to Donald Trump. While he can technically be pushed out of the nomination, it would be nightmarishly difficult to do so given his virtually unopposed performance in the primaries and the lack of precedent for anything like a forced defenestration of a sitting president. It would also express disloyalty to a brave and dedicated leader. But Biden has already lost the united, confident party he needed to make a comeback. He’s trailing in the polls right now. And even more importantly, his own conduct and fitness for office will command center stage for the rest of the general-election campaign, which is precisely what he cannot afford given his poor job-approval ratings and the sour mood of the electorate.

So Joe needs to go of his own accord, and it needs to happen quickly before Republican and Biden-loyalist claims of a “coup” become all too credible. But it’s obviously a humiliating exercise. So if Biden comes to realize the futility of going forward, what can this proud and stubborn man say that will make him something other than an object of derision or pity?

I have a simple answer: He can tell the truth.

The truth is that Biden’s firm commitment to the pursuit of a second term, despite his advanced age and increased frailty, hardened into inflexible determination when Trump made his own decision to launch an initially unlikely comeback. When Biden took office, Trump was a disgraced insurrectionist whose very defenders in his second impeachment trial mostly denounced his conduct, even as they urged acquittal on technical grounds. The 46th president was in a position to serve one distinguished “transitional” term and retire with a wary eye on his fellow retiree festering in anger and self-righteousness in Mar-a-Lago. But as Trump slowly recovered and eventually reemerged as a more dominant figure than ever in a MAGA-fied Republican Party, Biden became convinced that as the only politician ever to defeat Donald Trump, he had the responsibility to do it again and the ability to remind voters why they rejected the 45th president in 2020.

As this strange election year ripened, Biden had a perfectly plausible strategy for victory based on keeping a steady public focus on Trump’s lawless conduct (including actual crimes), his erratic record, and extremist intentions for a perilous second term. The polls were close and Biden wasn’t very popular, but these surveys also showed a durable majority of the electorate that really didn’t want to return Trump to power, particularly as economic conditions improved and the consequences of Trump’s Supreme Court appointments grew more shockingly apparent each day.

Then came the June 27 debate, and suddenly Biden lost the ability to make the election about Trump. He needs to look into a camera and say just that, and conclude that just as the threat posed by Trump motivated him to run for a second term, the threat posed by Trump now requires that he withdraw so that a successor can make the case he can’t make as he’s become the object of endless speculation about his age and cognitive abilities. Biden does not need to resign the presidency, since his grounds for withdrawing his candidacy are about perceptions and politics rather than any underlying incapacity. Biden would be withdrawing as a weakened candidate, not as a failed president.

For this withdrawal to represent a stabilizing event for his administration and his party, it’s critical that Biden not equivocate or complain, and that he show his mastery of the situation by clearly passing the torch to the vice-president he chose four years ago. For all the talk of an “open convention” being exciting (for pundits) and energizing (for the winner), the last thing Democrats need right now is uncertainty. No matter what the polls show and how badly his old friends want him to succeed, it’s the prospect of 100 days of terror every time Biden makes unscripted remarks that is feeding both elite and rank-and-file sentiment that a change at the top of the ticket is necessary. The fear and confusion needs to end now, and Biden effectively made his choice of a successor when he made Kamala Harris his governing partner. The president needs to reassert his agency now, not look like he is abandoning his party and his country to the winds of fate.

A straightforward and honest admission of why Biden 2024 is coming to an end could go a very long way toward enabling Harris and other Democrats to shift the nation’s gaze back to the ranting old man whose acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention showed that he has not mellowed or moderated at all. Of course Biden wants to solidify and extend his legacy over the next four years. But right now, the clear and present danger is that it will be extinguished altogether. He alone can address that threat, not as a candidate, but as a president and a patriot who recognizes his duty.


July 19: Giving Up on the White House to Save the U.S. House Is a Bad Idea

Plenty of good and bad ideas are popping up in this summer of Democratic anxiety, but it’s one of the latter I tried to knock down at New York:

Coming out of the agonizing intra-Democratic debate about Joe Biden’s fitness to beat Donald Trump is a sort of plan B scheme. Donors, we are told, are considering shifting resources to an effort to flip control of the House (just four seats away) in order to block a Trump-led Republican trifecta and a bacchanalia of authoritarian extremism next year. The reigning assumption is that absent a presidential win (which provides the tie-breaking vote in the Senate), maintaining Democratic control of the upper chamber will be almost impossible, since Republicans are sure to flip West Virginia, and all the other competitive races are on Democratic turf. So making Hakeem Jeffries House Speaker offers the best return on investment and perhaps relief from the agony of watching Biden like a hawk every time he’s on-camera.

It’s an interesting strategy but not terribly promising from a historical point of view. The last time House control flipped in a presidential-election year was in 1952, when Republicans benefited from a presidential landslide. The last six times House control has flipped (in 1954, 1994, 2006, 2010, 2018, and 2022), it’s happened in midterm elections featuring a very common backlash against the president’s party. You know how often a party has lost the White House and flipped the U.S. House in the same election? Zero times. There were times when Senate races (with their highly eccentric landscapes thanks to only one-third of seats being up in any one election) moved in a very different direction from the presidential election. But the House has always been harnessed to White House results in fundamental and even predictable ways, as political scientist David Faris points out:

“Political scientist Robert Erikson found in 2016 that for ‘every percentage point that a presidential candidate gains in the two-party vote, their party’s down-ballot candidates gain almost half a point themselves.’ A 1990 study by James E. Campbell and Joe A. Sumners found that for every 10 points that a presidential candidate gains in a state, it boosts that party’s Senate contender by 2 points, and its House hopefuls by 4. This basic logic is a large part of why the past five presidents brought congressional majorities into office with them when they were elected to their first term.”

And most of this historical record, mind you, was forged in the bygone era of relatively nonideological major parties that made ticket-splitting immensely more common. House Democrats entered the 2024 cycle optimistic about making gains since 16 Republicans are in districts carried by Biden in 2020 while only five Democrats are in Trump ’20 districts. But as J. Miles Coleman of Sabato’s Crystal Ball observes, an even Biden-Trump race in the national popular vote would turn six Democratic-held House districts red. A 3.3 percent Trump advantage in the national popular vote (his margin in the polling averages Coleman was using) would turn 19 Democratic-held House districts red.

Flipping the House if Biden loses decisively is hard to imagine. Even now, with polls showing a close presidential race, all of the major House prognosticators give Republicans a slight advantage (Cook Political Report, for example, shows the GOP favored in 210 races and Democrats favored in 203, with 22 toss-ups, half of them currently controlled by each party). The congressional generic ballot, polling that estimates the House national popular vote, is dead even (on average, Democrats lead by 0.5 percent in FiveThirtyEight, Republicans by 0.3 percent in RealClearPolitics). This will be an uphill fight for Democrats in the best of circumstances. And it should be remembered that Biden’s party lost 13 net House seats in 2020 even as he won the White House.

History, current analysis, and common sense indicate that abandoning the presidential ticket to focus on House races as though they are isolated contests is a fool’s errand for Democrats. Whether it’s Biden, Kamala Harris, or some improbable fantasy candidate heading the ticket, the presidential race needs to stay highly competitive if Democrats want to make House gains. If Trump rides back into the White House with a solid win, his toady Mike Johnson will almost certainly be there to help him turn his scary plans into legislation.


Giving Up on the White House to Save the U.S. House Is a Bad Idea

Plenty of good and bad ideas are popping up in this summer of Democratic anxiety, but it’s one of the latter I tried to knock down at New York:

Coming out of the agonizing intra-Democratic debate about Joe Biden’s fitness to beat Donald Trump is a sort of plan B scheme. Donors, we are told, are considering shifting resources to an effort to flip control of the House (just four seats away) in order to block a Trump-led Republican trifecta and a bacchanalia of authoritarian extremism next year. The reigning assumption is that absent a presidential win (which provides the tie-breaking vote in the Senate), maintaining Democratic control of the upper chamber will be almost impossible, since Republicans are sure to flip West Virginia, and all the other competitive races are on Democratic turf. So making Hakeem Jeffries House Speaker offers the best return on investment and perhaps relief from the agony of watching Biden like a hawk every time he’s on-camera.

It’s an interesting strategy but not terribly promising from a historical point of view. The last time House control flipped in a presidential-election year was in 1952, when Republicans benefited from a presidential landslide. The last six times House control has flipped (in 1954, 1994, 2006, 2010, 2018, and 2022), it’s happened in midterm elections featuring a very common backlash against the president’s party. You know how often a party has lost the White House and flipped the U.S. House in the same election? Zero times. There were times when Senate races (with their highly eccentric landscapes thanks to only one-third of seats being up in any one election) moved in a very different direction from the presidential election. But the House has always been harnessed to White House results in fundamental and even predictable ways, as political scientist David Faris points out:

“Political scientist Robert Erikson found in 2016 that for ‘every percentage point that a presidential candidate gains in the two-party vote, their party’s down-ballot candidates gain almost half a point themselves.’ A 1990 study by James E. Campbell and Joe A. Sumners found that for every 10 points that a presidential candidate gains in a state, it boosts that party’s Senate contender by 2 points, and its House hopefuls by 4. This basic logic is a large part of why the past five presidents brought congressional majorities into office with them when they were elected to their first term.”

And most of this historical record, mind you, was forged in the bygone era of relatively nonideological major parties that made ticket-splitting immensely more common. House Democrats entered the 2024 cycle optimistic about making gains since 16 Republicans are in districts carried by Biden in 2020 while only five Democrats are in Trump ’20 districts. But as J. Miles Coleman of Sabato’s Crystal Ball observes, an even Biden-Trump race in the national popular vote would turn six Democratic-held House districts red. A 3.3 percent Trump advantage in the national popular vote (his margin in the polling averages Coleman was using) would turn 19 Democratic-held House districts red.

Flipping the House if Biden loses decisively is hard to imagine. Even now, with polls showing a close presidential race, all of the major House prognosticators give Republicans a slight advantage (Cook Political Report, for example, shows the GOP favored in 210 races and Democrats favored in 203, with 22 toss-ups, half of them currently controlled by each party). The congressional generic ballot, polling that estimates the House national popular vote, is dead even (on average, Democrats lead by 0.5 percent in FiveThirtyEight, Republicans by 0.3 percent in RealClearPolitics). This will be an uphill fight for Democrats in the best of circumstances. And it should be remembered that Biden’s party lost 13 net House seats in 2020 even as he won the White House.

History, current analysis, and common sense indicate that abandoning the presidential ticket to focus on House races as though they are isolated contests is a fool’s errand for Democrats. Whether it’s Biden, Kamala Harris, or some improbable fantasy candidate heading the ticket, the presidential race needs to stay highly competitive if Democrats want to make House gains. If Trump rides back into the White House with a solid win, his toady Mike Johnson will almost certainly be there to help him turn his scary plans into legislation.


July 11: If Biden “Steps Aside” and Harris Steps Up, There Should Be No Falloff in Support

At New York I discussed and tried to resolve one source of anxiety about a potential alternative ticket:

One very central dynamic in the recent saga of Democratic anxiety over Joe Biden’s chances against Donald Trump, given the weaknesses he displayed in his first 2024 debate, has been the role of his understudy, Vice-President Kamala Harris. My colleague Gabriel Debenedetti explained the problem nearly two years ago as the “Kamala Harris conundrum”:

“Top party donors have privately worried to close Obama allies that they’re skeptical of Harris’s prospects as a presidential candidate, citing the implosion of her 2020 campaign and her struggles as VP. Jockeying from other potential competitors, like frenemy Gavin Newsom, suggests that few would defer to her if Biden retired. Yet Harris’s strength among the party’s most influential voters nonetheless puts her in clear pole position.”

The perception that Harris is too unpopular to pick up the party banner if Biden dropped it, but too well-positioned to be pushed aside without huge collateral damage, was a major part of the mindset of political observers when evaluating Democratic options after the debate. But now fresher evidence of Harris’s public standing shows she’s just as viable as many of the candidates floated in fantasy scenarios about an “open convention,” “mini-primary,” or smoke-filled room that would sweep away both parts of the Biden-Harris ticket.

For a good while now, Harris’s job-approval numbers have been converging with Biden’s after trailing them initially. These indicate dismal popularity among voters generally, but not in a way that makes her an unacceptable replacement candidate should she be pressed into service in an emergency. As of now, her job-approval ratio in the FiveThirtyEight averages is 37.1 percent approve to 51.2 percent disapprove. Biden’s is 37.4 percent approve to 56.8 percent disapprove. In the favorability ratios tracked by RealClearPolitics, Harris is at 38.3 favorable to 54.6 percent unfavorable, while Biden is at 39.4 percent favorable to 56.9 percent unfavorable. There’s just not a great deal of difference other than slightly lower disapproval/unfavorable numbers for the veep.

On the crucial measurement of viability as a general-election candidate against Trump, there wasn’t much credible polling prior to the post-debate crisis. An Emerson survey in February 2024 showed Harris trailing Trump by 3 percent (43 percent to 46 percent), which was a better showing than Gavin Newsom (down ten points, 36 percent to 46 percent) or Gretchen Whitmer (down 12 points, 33 percent to 45 percent).

After the debate, though, there was a sudden cascade of polling matching Democratic alternatives against Trump, and while Harris’s strength varied, she consistently did as well as or better than the fantasy alternatives. The first cookie on the plate was a one-day June 28 survey from Data for Progress, which showed virtually indistinguishable polling against Trump by Biden, Harris, Cory BookerPete ButtigiegAmy KlobucharGavin NewsomJ.B. PritzkerJosh Shapiro, and Gretchen Whitmer. All of them trailed Trump by 2 to 3 percent among likely voters.

Then two national polls released on July 2 showed Harris doing better than other feasible Biden alternatives. Reuters/Ipsos (which showed Biden and Trump tied) had Harris within a point of Trump, while Newsom trailed by three points, Andy Beshear by four, Whitmer by five, and Pritzker by six points. Similarly, CNN showed Harris trailing Trump by just two points; Pete Buttigieg trailing by four points; and Gavin Newsom and Gretchen Whitmer trailing him by five points.

Emerson came back with a new poll on July 9 that wasn’t as sunny as some for Democrats generally (every tested name trailed Trump, with Biden down by three points). But again, Harris (down by six points) did better than Newsom (down eight points); Buttigieg and Whitmer (down ten points); and Shapiro (down 12 points).

There’s been some talk that Harris might help Democrats with base constituencies that are sour about Biden. There’s not much publicly available evidence testing that hypothesis, though the crosstabs in the latest CNN poll do show Harris doing modestly better than Biden among people of color, voters under the age of 35, and women.

The bottom line is that one element of the “Kamala Harris conundrum” needs to be reconsidered. There should be no real drop-off in support if Biden (against current expectations) steps aside in favor of his vice-president (the only really feasible “replacement” scenario at this point). She probably has a higher ceiling of support than Biden as well, but in any event, she would have a fresh opportunity to make a strong first or second impression on many Americans who otherwise know little about her.


If Biden “Steps Aside” and Harris Steps Up, There Should Be No Falloff in Support

At New York I discussed and tried to resolve one source of anxiety about a potential alternative ticket:

One very central dynamic in the recent saga of Democratic anxiety over Joe Biden’s chances against Donald Trump, given the weaknesses he displayed in his first 2024 debate, has been the role of his understudy, Vice-President Kamala Harris. My colleague Gabriel Debenedetti explained the problem nearly two years ago as the “Kamala Harris conundrum”:

“Top party donors have privately worried to close Obama allies that they’re skeptical of Harris’s prospects as a presidential candidate, citing the implosion of her 2020 campaign and her struggles as VP. Jockeying from other potential competitors, like frenemy Gavin Newsom, suggests that few would defer to her if Biden retired. Yet Harris’s strength among the party’s most influential voters nonetheless puts her in clear pole position.”

The perception that Harris is too unpopular to pick up the party banner if Biden dropped it, but too well-positioned to be pushed aside without huge collateral damage, was a major part of the mindset of political observers when evaluating Democratic options after the debate. But now fresher evidence of Harris’s public standing shows she’s just as viable as many of the candidates floated in fantasy scenarios about an “open convention,” “mini-primary,” or smoke-filled room that would sweep away both parts of the Biden-Harris ticket.

For a good while now, Harris’s job-approval numbers have been converging with Biden’s after trailing them initially. These indicate dismal popularity among voters generally, but not in a way that makes her an unacceptable replacement candidate should she be pressed into service in an emergency. As of now, her job-approval ratio in the FiveThirtyEight averages is 37.1 percent approve to 51.2 percent disapprove. Biden’s is 37.4 percent approve to 56.8 percent disapprove. In the favorability ratios tracked by RealClearPolitics, Harris is at 38.3 favorable to 54.6 percent unfavorable, while Biden is at 39.4 percent favorable to 56.9 percent unfavorable. There’s just not a great deal of difference other than slightly lower disapproval/unfavorable numbers for the veep.

On the crucial measurement of viability as a general-election candidate against Trump, there wasn’t much credible polling prior to the post-debate crisis. An Emerson survey in February 2024 showed Harris trailing Trump by 3 percent (43 percent to 46 percent), which was a better showing than Gavin Newsom (down ten points, 36 percent to 46 percent) or Gretchen Whitmer (down 12 points, 33 percent to 45 percent).

After the debate, though, there was a sudden cascade of polling matching Democratic alternatives against Trump, and while Harris’s strength varied, she consistently did as well as or better than the fantasy alternatives. The first cookie on the plate was a one-day June 28 survey from Data for Progress, which showed virtually indistinguishable polling against Trump by Biden, Harris, Cory BookerPete ButtigiegAmy KlobucharGavin NewsomJ.B. PritzkerJosh Shapiro, and Gretchen Whitmer. All of them trailed Trump by 2 to 3 percent among likely voters.

Then two national polls released on July 2 showed Harris doing better than other feasible Biden alternatives. Reuters/Ipsos (which showed Biden and Trump tied) had Harris within a point of Trump, while Newsom trailed by three points, Andy Beshear by four, Whitmer by five, and Pritzker by six points. Similarly, CNN showed Harris trailing Trump by just two points; Pete Buttigieg trailing by four points; and Gavin Newsom and Gretchen Whitmer trailing him by five points.

Emerson came back with a new poll on July 9 that wasn’t as sunny as some for Democrats generally (every tested name trailed Trump, with Biden down by three points). But again, Harris (down by six points) did better than Newsom (down eight points); Buttigieg and Whitmer (down ten points); and Shapiro (down 12 points).

There’s been some talk that Harris might help Democrats with base constituencies that are sour about Biden. There’s not much publicly available evidence testing that hypothesis, though the crosstabs in the latest CNN poll do show Harris doing modestly better than Biden among people of color, voters under the age of 35, and women.

The bottom line is that one element of the “Kamala Harris conundrum” needs to be reconsidered. There should be no real drop-off in support if Biden (against current expectations) steps aside in favor of his vice-president (the only really feasible “replacement” scenario at this point). She probably has a higher ceiling of support than Biden as well, but in any event, she would have a fresh opportunity to make a strong first or second impression on many Americans who otherwise know little about her.