This item was cross-posted at The New Republic.
Tim Pawlenty made a much-anticipated speech to the Republican National Committee yesterday in an apparent first step towards a 2012 presidential bid. It wasn’t exactly greeted as a trumpet blast; a nice familiar tune from a kazoo might be a more apt metaphor. But after what’s happened in the last few weeks to putative 2012 GOP candidates John Ensign, Mark Sanford, and Sarah Palin, maybe he’s a “fresh face” in the sense of one that does not sport large blemishes.
The full text of his speech isn’t readily available yet. But from descriptions, it sounds like he performed the same dance that has been perfected by other Republican leaders such as party chairman Michael Steele: Republicans need to stand up to Obama, get back to their conservative principles, stop apologizing for their past, and oh, by the way, attract whole new categories of voters. It doesn’t say a lot for GOP outreach efforts that they think just throwing open the door and not being aggressively hostile to converts will do the trick, absent some change in message or policy. But the “not conservative enough” diagnosis of George W. Bush continues to exert an iron grip on GOP options for the future.
It does appear that Pawlenty talked a lot about “market-based health reform,” but it’s not clear yet whether he meant the kind of relentless return to the pre-insurance 1950s that John McCain’s 2008 campaign plan implicitly called for, in which Americans will be “empowered” to buy individual health care policies, or something a bit less antediluvian. But if Pawlenty came up with anything new, it clearly escaped his listeners.
One account of his speech said he received “mild applause” and a “polite standing ovation.” So it doesn’t appear he’s become Demosthenes overnight. This is a consistent problem for the Minnesotan. An upcoming book on the 2008 campaign (I’ve gotten a sneak peek) by Dan Balz and Haynes Johnson confirms that Pawlenty, not Romney or Lieberman or Ridge, was actually the co-finalist for the 2008 Veep nomination alongside Sarah Palin. McCain’s wizards settled on Palin after concluding that Pawlenty, while “safe,” didn’t add much to the ticket’s electoral appeal.
And that’s Pawlenty’s problem today. If it turns out that 2012 is one of those years when any credible Republican who is acceptable to the party’s dominant conservative wing can win, then someone who’s a right-to-life evangelical with an attractively middle-class background who has non-disastrously governed a Blue State might make a lot of sense. But unfortunately for Pawlenty, such a promising landscape would undoubtedly tempt the Republican Right to get behind a True Believer who breathes fire and doesn’t hide it with vanilla mints. After four years of shrieking at Barack Obama as some sort of Leninist agent, will a party whose members apparently doubt the President was born in this country really want a candidate like Tim Pawlenty? Probably not, unless the other viable options continue to drop like flies.

To hear most of the talk the last couple weeks, you’d think the drive for health care reform–and with it, perhaps, the Obama administration’s overall agenda–is running into a buzzsaw of adverse public opinion.
But accurately assessing public opinon on health reform requires a more careful look at polling data, and the recognition that thanks to the vagaries of congressional procedure, the “Obama plan” hasn’t yet congealed into a specific plan with a clear and consistent rationale.
Andrew Baumann of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner has a very helpful item up at Huffington Post that covers much of this ground. Here are his conclusions (see his full post for examples of each point from specific polling data):
* The public knows the status quo is unsustainable and they want fundamental change now.
* Voters don’t trust the Republicans on the issue at all and trust Obama and the Democrats far more.
* Most important, when voters get more information about the likely elements of the final plan, they like it.
But all these fundamentals of public opinion are at present being obscured by the complex maneuverings in Congress:

[A]ll voters are hearing are stories about how much the plan will cost (on top of the stimulus, budget and bailouts), that it will be paid for with high taxes and that Democrats are bickering and divided. Meanwhile, the attacks on reform coming from Republicans and their allies are much simpler and easier for votes to digest, especially when Republicans can train their fire on unpopular specifics that will not likely be in the actual bill.
All of this suggests that when Democrats can finally coalesce around a single plan and Obama can go out and forcefully sell it, support is likely to increase significantly and Obama and supporters of reform will be able to get more traction in their arguments.

Similarly, Mark Blumenthal of Pollster.com has an article out that examines the polling data on health reform in detail, and notes there is a significant “gap” between support for the principles Obama and Democrats have advocated, and the “health reform plans” as they are perceived by the public. His conclusion:

The case against health care reform is getting through; the case in favor is not.

In other words, there’s a lot of room for improvement in support for what Obama and congressional Democratic leaders are trying to do, if, and only if, perception of their “plan” begin to converge with the principles of reform that a majority of Americans already embrace.

This is a cross-post from The New Republic.
Has Barack Obama shifted to the left since his election as president? The question would seem absurd to most progressives, many of whom believe that Barack Obama has abandoned progressive policy commitments made during the campaign on issues ranging from GLBT and abortion rights to terrorist suspect treatment.
But the “Obama has abandoned the center” narrative is a staple of conservative and some “centrist” criticism of Obama, particularly on the current hot topics of health care reform and climate change legislation. David Brooks made the case most luridly in a July 20 New York Times column entitled “The Liberal Suicide March.” Clive Crook of The Atlantic followed up with a piece claiming that by “splitting with moderates,” Obama was “repudiating one of the most brilliant campaigns ever seen.” And pointing to the difficulties the administration is having with the Blue Dogs, Republican speechwriter Troy Senick of RealClearPolitics attributes all the blame to Obama, suggesting he is “perilously close to breaking the coalition that was built for him.”
It’s important to understand that this sort of repositioning of Obama by his critics, while possibly sincere, is also one of the oldest political tricks in the book. Back when I was policy director for the famously “centrist” Democratic Leadership Council, we used to say there were two ways to “seize the center”: the first was to occupy political high ground with policies and messages that resonated with a strong majority of the electorate, without abandoning any core principles; but the second, to put it crudely, was simply to push the other side out by labeling them as “extremists” or “ideologues.” Doing both (as, say, Bill Clinton did in 1995-96) is naturally the most effective approach, but repositioning your opponents rhetorically has always been wildly popular among people in both parties who don’t particularly want to change their own policies to accord with public opinion, and hope that tarring the other side as extremist will indirectly position themselves as closer to “the center.”
This is largely what we are seeing from Republicans who don’t particularly want to admit that they have in fact moved to a more rigorously ideological position on issues like health care (abandoning even their own prior reform proposals), climate change (where denying the very existence of climate change has made a huge comeback during the last few months), and the budget (where supply-siders, who until very recently derided budget deficits as meaningless, have suddenly returned to a neo-Hooverite public austerity posture).
Now you can make the argument that this whole question of positioning is irrelevant, and there are certainly a lot of Democrats and Republicans who despise the very idea of “the center,” as a place where principles are sacrificed and deals with devils are cut. But like it or not, there is political value in “the center” in a country where “moderate” remains the strongly preferred ideological self-identification, and on complex issues like health care reform and climate change where voters feel better if proposals have broad support and can claim to be “pragmatic.”
If “the center” does matter, then it should be clear that Obama’s critics shouldn’t have plenary rights to define it as they wish. In this respect, the problem is the same as with the closely associated conservative charge that Obama has “abandoned bipartisanship.” Those who refuse to cooperate with Obama and then blame him for “partisanship” or excessive liberalism should not be allowed to have it both ways.
The best measure of whether Barack Obama has “shifted” in any particular direction since taking office remains what he promised to do as a candidate. His positioning on health care reform hasn’t shifted in any significant way, and to the extent that it has at all, it has been a move in the direction of his critics on the right. The same is true of climate change legislation, and, given what he was saying on the campaign trail after the financial sector collapse, on the budget and on economic stimulus legislation.
The real problem here, which is evident from the comments of Brooks, Crook and Senick, is that Obama’s critics from the right seem to have been under the impression that candidate Obama didn’t mean it when he advanced positions deemed as “liberal,” and won strictly because of his talk about bipartisanship and pragmatism, which they define as a willingness to sacrifice his actual platform to their own point of view, contradictions be damned. This is a counterpart to the disappointment of some progressives who seem to believe that candidate Obama cynically took “centrist” positions out of a political expediency that is no longer necessary or tolerable now that Democrats control the White House and have healthy margins in both houses of Congress.
The best evidence is that Barack Obama is, for the most part, and subject to later verification, largely governing as he campaigned, and particularly so on health care reform and climate change. For all the efforts from left and right to “reposition” him, what we saw in 2008 is what we are getting in 2009. Let his critics spend some time explaining their own positions.

Since you’d get the general idea from news coverage that Democrats are at each other’s throats, and are gravely dissatisfied with President Obama, it’s always interesting to look at those few public opinion polls that supply breakouts not only by partisan self-identification but by sub-category or faction.
The headline on the latest national survey by Pew is the alarming “Obama’s Ratings Slide Across the Board.” What that actually means is that the President’s job approval ratio has dropped from 61/30 in June to 54/34 today, hardly the stuff of apocalypse since Obama was elected by a margin of 53-46, which was considered a semi-landslide at the time.
But with all the talk of Democratic unhappiness, particularly among “moderates” and “Blue Dogs,” with Obama’s agenda, here’s where rank-and-file Democrats stand on the President’s job performance during the summer of their deep discontent:
Democrats as a whole–85/8 (down from 88/8 in June).
Conservative/Moderate Democrats–82/10 (down from 85/10 in June).
Liberal Democrats–95/5 (up from 93/4 in June).
Not exactly a collapse in support, eh?
Meanwhile, Gallup’s tracking poll on Obama’s job approval, which also shows a general decline in July, has him at 56% as of July 20-26. Among Democrats, his approval rating plunged all the way from 92% during the week of July 13-19, to 88% July 20-26.
And here are the ideological breakdowns:
Conservative Democrats–77% (down from 80% the previous week)
Moderate Democrats–86% (down from 91%)
Liberal Democrats–92% (down from 95%)
Keep in mind that we are in a period when pundits are saying that Barack Obama is “splitting with moderates” and “threatens to break the Democratic coalition.” With 86% of self-identified moderate Democrats and 77% of self-identified conservative Democrats thinking that Obama’s doing a good job, I’d say the reports of Democratic discontent and disunity are more than a bit exaggerated.

This item was cross-posted at The New Republic.
While Jon Chait is definitely right that much of the difficulty with House Blue Dog Democrats on health reform (like climate change) has had to do with the legislative timing, there is still a residual question about their generally reluctant position with respect to much of the Obama agenda. And the oversimplistic answer to this oversimplistic question has often been that Blue Dogs tend to represent marginal districts they could lose by toeing the party line.
So now comes the ever-insightful Mike Tomasky with an analysis of exactly how vulnerable those Blue Dogs really are. He keeps this analysis clean by limiting himself to those Members from districts carried last year by John McCain—i.e., those where fears of a voter backlash are most reasonable. And his conclusion is that the vast majority of Blue Dogs seem to have little to worry about based on their 2008 performance.
His conclusion:

Yes, some Democrats have to be very careful and not be seen as casting a liberal vote. But they’re a comparatively small number. A very clear majority of these people have won by large enough margins that it sure seems to me they could survive one controversial vote if they [put] some backbone into it.
But many of these folks manage to sell this story line to Washington reporters who’ve never been to these exurban and rural districts and can be made to believe the worst caricatures. I say many of these Democrats are safer than they contend. People need to start challenging them on this.

Mike’s post is very valuable in dealing with broad-brush stereotypes of the Blue Dogs and of Democratic “centrists” generally. He doesn’t, of course, deal with alternative explanations, including the diametrically opposed possibilities that they believe what they say they believe on policy issues as a matter of principle, or that they are deeply beholden to interests (whether home-grown or national) who oppose Obama’s agenda.
But let’s stick with electoral calculations. Mike plausibly assumes that any Democrat in a “red” district whose 2008 margin of victory exceeded McCain’s might be in a pretty strong position to take a bullet for the donkey team. Here, however, are three provisos to this argument:
1) Risking serious GOP competition” is not as compelling a motive as “risking defeat,” but anyone familiar with how Members of Congress think would understand that the former is treated as a personal disaster by anyone ill-accustomed to heavy fundraising and campaigning. This is hardly a Blue Dog exclusive: some may remember the disputes over racial gerrymandering during the early 1990s, in which some members of the Congressional Black Caucus stoutly defended the “packing” of their districts with African-Americans, at the arguable expense of overall Democratic prospects, on grounds that they deserved a safe, not just a winnable, seat. (To their credit, many CBC members volunteered for less safe seats during the next round of redistricting). And in all fairness, it should be remembered that many of the “loyal” Democrats who fulminate about Blue Dog treachery haven’t had a competitive race since their first elections. Avoiding actual accountability to voters is hardly an honorable motive, but it’s real.
2) It’s generally assumed by many analysts that 2010 is likely to be a pro-Republican year, particularly in districts carried by McCain in 2008. So 2008 performance levels aren’t necessarily dispositive of 2010 prospects. But equally important, more than a few Blue Dogs are from states where Republicans are likely to control redistricting after 2010. Invincible Members tend to be treated kindly in opposition-party redistricting; potentially vulnerable Members could wind up with much more difficult districts than they represent today. This may seem to be a remote worry, but again, it’s real.
3) Most Blue Dogs, whatever you think of their principles, loyalty, or ethics, are not stupid people. They understand that association with “liberal” Obama initiatives may be a problem, but that the value of the “D” next to their name on the ballot also depends on Obama’s success as a president. So like any politician, they undertake a personal cost-benefit of their positions on legislation and the overall effect on Obama, the party, and political dynamics generally. This, as much as concerns over “timing,” helps create the Kabuki Theater atmospherics of Blue Dog rhetoric. Most Blue Dogs want Barack Obama to succeed, but many would prefer that he do so without their own votes.
This last factor helps explain why, in addition to the important timing concessions, the Blue Dogs have reached an agreement with Henry Waxman that will allow health care reform to emerge from the House, but probably with only enough Blue Dog votes to avoid disaster. It remains to be seen how many of the conceded and ultimately insignificant “no” votes from Democrats can be sorted into the principled, the suborned, or the politically endangered. In any event, the Blue Dog bark may be worse than its bite.

Amid reports that the Senate Finance Committee’s version of health care reform does not include a “public option” for insurance, and after many weeks of line-drawing by various progressive organizations making the inclusion of a public option a sine qua non, Ezra Klein has an important post challenging the whole premise that this issue is central:

The public option, as it exists in any bill moving through Congress, is not the core of reform, nor anything near it. It is, for one thing, limited to the Americans who buy into the Health Insurance Exchanges, and the exchanges are in turn limited to the unemployed, the self-employed and small businesses. In the House bill — which is the strongest of the bills — the Congressional Budget Office estimates that 27 million Americans would be in the exchanges by 2019. That’s not nothing, but it’s not much. Imagine half choose the public option (CBO estimates many fewer than that). You now have 13.5 million Americans in a public insurer with no substantive advantages over private insurance. That’s not a gamechanger, it’s a tweak.

Even if you dispute some aspects of Ezra’s analysis of the substantive importance of the public option, it’s worth listening to his broader, historical argument: progressives have in the past supported a variety of health reform proposals that did not include a public option:

The public option is not now, and has not ever, been the core of the argument for heath-care reform. It is the core of the fight in Washington, D.C. It is an important policy experiment. But it was not in Howard Dean or John Kerry or Dick Gephardt’s plans, and reformers supported those. It was not in Bill Clinton’s proposal, and most lament the death of that. It is not what politicians were using in their speeches five years ago. It is a recent addition to the debate, and a good one. But it is not the reason were are having this debate.

But I would observe that Ezra doesn’t mention one of the reasons for the current focus on the public option: a significant element of health care reformers didn’t really support the Dean or Kerry or Gephardt plans, or the Clinton plan as it was eventually shaped, other than as a compromise with an unacceptable status quo. They supported, and still support, a single-payer system, and now either (a) hope, just as reform opponents claim, that a public option is simply a way-station to single-payer, or (b) want to maintain the priniciple of a public insurance provider as the only way to curb the abuses associated with private health insurance.
So while some progressives view the public option as merely a means to an end that is perhaps less important than several other aspects of health reform, others do indeed view it as “the core of reform.” It’s not clear at this point whether they are willing, this time, to take a dive on health care reform if the eventual legislation lacks a public option, but there’s no particular reason to doubt their sincerity or its origins.
I don’t happen to share the reflexive enthusiasm for single-payer of many progressives, but I do understand why its advocates feel frustrated. There was a moment a few years ago when single-payer seemed finally to be sweeping the progressive world; it was endorsed by Al Gore way back in 2002, and by the Editors of The New Republic, and by most if not all progressive health wonks. But in the 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns, all of the Democratic candidates other than Dennis Kucinich rejected the single-payer approach.
Moreover, single-payer fans may rightly note that for the second time in fifteen years, a health reform proposal by a Democratic president is being imperiled by its complexity. Single-payer is nothing if not easy to understand, and while a public option in a competitive system isn’t that simple, comparisons to Medicare make it somewhat more comprehensible than, say, health insurance exchanges.
Still, Ezra is issuing the right challenge to those who make the public option non-negotiable out of a displaced preference for another approach to health reform altogether: is failure acceptable, given how rarely the opportunity for health care reform comes around?
Maybe progressives won’t ultimately have to make the choice between a bill without a public option and no bill at all. But I wouldn’t bet the farm, or health reform, on it.

One of this week’s “must-reads” is an eloquent, angry piece by Hendrik Hertzberg for The New Yorker that explains and laments America’s “health care exceptionalism,” and attributes it largely to our constitutional system. An extended quote is in order:

In other free countries, legislation, social and otherwise, gets made in a fairly straightforward manner. There is an election, in which the voters, having paid attention to the issues for six weeks or so, choose a government. The governing party or coalition then enacts its program, and the voters get a chance to render a verdict on it the next time they go to the polls. Through one or another variation of this process, the people of every other wealthy democracy on earth have obtained for themselves some form of guaranteed health insurance or universal health care.
The way we do it is, shall we say, more exciting. For us, an election is only the opening broadside in a series of protracted political battles of heavy artillery and hand-to-hand fighting. A President may fancy that he has a mandate (and, morally, he may well have one), but the two separately elected, differently constituted, independent legislatures whose acquiescence he needs are under no compulsion to agree. Within those legislatures, a system of overlapping committees dominated by powerful chairmen creates a plethora of veto points where well-organized special interests can smother or distort a bill meant to benefit a large but amorphous public. In the smaller of the two legislatures—which is even more heavily weighted toward conservative rural interests than is the larger one, and where one member may represent as little as one-seventieth as many people as the member in the next seat—an arcane and patently unconstitutional rule, the filibuster, allows a minority of members to block almost any action. The process that results is less like the Roman Senate than like the Roman Games: a sanguinary legislative Colosseum where at any moment some two-bit emperor is apt to signal the thumbs-down.

He’s right, of course; America does differ fundamentally from countries with parliamentary systems where parties run on manifestos that are almost immediately implemented; intraparty dissent may well exist, but not on such basic issues as health care. Hertzberg could have gone further in his analysis of American exceptionalism: here party identity among candidates for Congress is largely self-selected, with primary voters offering the only (and rarely exercised) curb. Currently, 49 Democratic House members represent districts won by John McCain in 2008; ten Democratic senators represent states carried by McCain. There’s a strong presumption that the switch from total control of the federal government by Republicans prior to 2006 to total Democratic control today will create a natural backlash against Democrats in 2010 and perhaps beyond, especially given the dire economic situation. This is one of many factors in our system and our traditions that militate against big legislative reform efforts, particularly when, as is the case today, the “out” party decides to operate as an obstructionist force.
Add in the chronic mistrust of the federal government and particularly Congress among Americans from both parties and no party, and the power and money deployed by a threatened private-sector health care industry, and the extraordinary difficulty facing the Obama administration and its congressional allies in enacting meaningful health care reform is no big surprise.
So let’s continue to cut Barack Obama some slack in how he’s handled health care reform. He could have postponed action for a year, pleading the economic emergency; had he done so, he would have earned standing ovations from many pundits of the center and center-right. He could have “gone incremental” right away, and lowered expectations to a manageable level. Instead, for all the tactical manuevering going on right now, he’s still pushing pretty much the same ideas for reform that he campaigned on. But make no mistake: reforms of similar magnitude in the past required either gigantic majorities beyond anything Democratic currently hold (the New Deal, Medicare and Medicaid), or significant support from Republicans (the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts). Hertzberg is right in finding many aspects of our system frustratingly reactionary. But if we wait for, say, a parliamentary system to save us, we’ll be like premillienialist Christians waiting for the Rapture: standing in place, looking beyond the skies for redemption.

The California budget crisis has gotten a lot of deserved attention over the last few weeks, leading to all sorts of theories, some bordering on collective psychotherapy, about the Golden State’s fiscal dysfunction.
But it doesn’t seem to have quite penetrated the consciousness of the chattering classes that California’s only an extreme example of a fiscal meltdown that’s occurring all over the country, and probably isn’t getting any better any time soon.
New figures published last week by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities paint the full bleak picture. For fiscal year 2010 (which began on July 1), states faced cumulative shortfalls during their budgeting processes of $162 billion, which amounts to 29.3 percent of state budgets. That’s significantly more than the $111 billion in shortfalls the states had in FY 2009, when the financial crisis hit.
But if current trends hold, states are expected to encounter an even higher level of shortfalls–$180 billion–in Fiscal Year 2011, for which they are just beginning to make plans. They are far past the ability to borrow from reserve funds, cancel major new investments, or cut out “waste.” We’re talking serious cuts in services and employment, and the kind of tax increases that no one likes and that could combine with spending cuts to further depress state and even national economies. And it would all be a lot, lot worse if funding for the states (albeit primarily just for Medicaid) hadn’t been included in the economic stimulus package.
So mock California all you want: as is often the case, they really have been a trend-setter in the advent of unmanageable fiscal problems.