You know, it’s hard to become the least accurate pollster of gubernatorial and Senate races in the most pro-Republican election year in decades because you exhibit a pro-Republican bias. But that’s what Rasmussen Reports managed to accomplish in 2010. Nate Silver has the damning facts:

The 105 polls released in Senate and gubernatorial races by Rasmussen Reports and its subsidiary, Pulse Opinion Research, missed the final margin between the candidates by 5.8 points, a considerably higher figure than that achieved by most other pollsters. Some 13 of its polls missed by 10 or more points, including one in the Hawaii Senate race that missed the final margin between the candidates by 40 points, the largest error ever recorded in a general election in FiveThirtyEight’s database, which includes all polls conducted since 1998.
Moreover, Rasmussen’s polls were quite biased, overestimating the standing of the Republican candidate by almost 4 points on average. In just 12 cases, Rasmussen’s polls overestimated the margin for the Democrat by 3 or more points. But it did so for the Republican candidate in 55 cases — that is, in more than half of the polls that it issued.
Rasmussen’s polls have come under heavy criticism throughout this election cycle, including from FiveThirtyEight. We have critiqued the firm for its cavalier attitude toward polling convention. Rasmussen, for instance, generally conducts all of its interviews during a single, 4-hour window; speaks with the first person it reaches on the phone rather than using a random selection process; does not call cellphones; does not call back respondents whom it misses initially; and uses a computer script rather than live interviewers to conduct its surveys. These are cost-saving measures which contribute to very low response rates and may lead to biased samples.
Rasmussen also weights their surveys based on preordained assumptions about the party identification of voters in each state, a relatively unusual practice that many polling firms consider dubious since party identification (unlike characteristics like age and gender) is often quite fluid.

FWIW, Quinnipiac and Survey USA had the best record of accuracy in Nate’s analysis. But the ubiquity of Rasmussen polls, particularly if you include surveys done by its subsidiary for Fox, was a regular feature in the ebb and flow of the 2010 cycle. The firm certainly hasn’t done itself any favors in terms of its future credibility.

Earlier this year I complained about the tendency of pundits to take some poll of likely voter in an upcoming election and use it to complain that “the American people” want this or that or have decided this or that. This is done, of course, to depict any politician (say, Barack Obama) or political party (say, the Democratic Party) that is out of step with a select subset of the population as defiantly opposing the Popular Will, and perhaps representing alien influences–as opposed, of course, to the Courage of Conviction and Conservative Principles that other politicians are credited with when they swing against the tide of published polls.
But the same issue comes up after elections, which, while infinitely more authoritative than polls and bearing vast real-life consequences, should not be confused with some sort of universal plebiscite on this or that issue, or even on how the next election will go.
Hendrik Hertzberg of The New Yorker made the crucial distinction amidst the expansive spin of the post-election chattering classes:

With the votes tallied, the spin began: a procession of confident assertions about what “the American people”–meaning, in practical terms, the slice of the scaled-down midterm electorate that went one way in 2008 and the other in 2010–were “trying to say.”…
As for “the American people” themselves, it seems clear enough that their rejection of the Democrats was, above all, an expression of angry anxiety about the ongoing economic firestorm. Though ignited and fanned by an out-of-control financial industry and its (mostly) conservative political and intellectual enablers, the fire has burned hottest since the 2008 Democratic sweep. By the time the flames reached their height, the arsonists had slunk off, and only the firemen were left for people to take out their ire on. The result is a kind of political cognitive dissonance. Frightened by joblessness, “the American people” rewarded the party that not only opposed the stimulus but also blocked the extension of unemployment benefits. Alarmed by a ballooning national debt, they rewarded the party that not only transformed budget surpluses into budget deficits but also proposes to inflate the debt by hundreds of billions with a permanent tax cut for the least needy two per cent. Frustrated by what they see as inaction, they rewarded the party that not only fought every effort to mitigate the crisis but also forced the watering down of whatever it couldn’t block.

Hertzberg’s interpretation of the muddled intent of the midterm electorate (which acted as authorized agents for “the American people,” but are not the same thing) is his own version of events and their background, which doesn’t spring automatically from the results. But the same is true of the confident Republican argument that their party has some sort of mandate to do things that weren’t made manifest by any exit polls or any clear-cut point of debate in campaigns across the country. So next time you hear somewhat pontificate about what “the American people” are demanding–and particularly if elements of those purported demands, such as more tax cuts for the wealthy or big changes in Social Security and Medicare, are items the public clearly hasn’t supported up until now–then it’s time to challenge the spin and mock the spinner.
Republicans have won their midterm victory, but overstating it into a precise mandate, given the circumstances, is very curious, all the more since Republicans can’t seem to make up their own minds whether “deficits don’t matter” as the most recent Republican vice president famously said, or have instead instantly become the most important thing of all.

In monographs for the Brookings Institution and the Center for American Progress, and in separate articles for The New Republic, TDS Co-Editors William Galston and Ruy Teixeira offer distinctive takes on what happened on November 2, with equally distinctive suggestion about what Democrats need to do to regain the electoral strength they displayed in 2006 and 2008.
In explaining the decline in Democratic fortunes for Brookings, Galston places great emphasis on the conflict between the public-sector activism that Democrats pursued–partly to implement their longstanding agenda, partly to deal with the economic emergency–and profound public mistrust in the institutions of government, which was only made worse by the economic situation and how the White House and congressional leaders dealt with it. And this, says Galston, exposed a fundamental ambiguity about perceptions of the President himself which was one a political strength, but then became a weakness:

Some expected him to be a liberal stalwart, leading the charge for single-payer health insurance and the fight against big corporations; others assumed that his evident desire to transcend the red-blue divide pointed to a post-partisan presidential agenda implemented through bipartisan congressional cooperation. It would have been difficult to satisfy both wings of his coalition, and he didn’t. As he tacked back and forth during the first two years of his presidency, he ended up disappointing both.
There was a further difficulty. While Obama’s agenda required a significant expansion of the scope, power, and cost of the federal government, public trust in that government stood near a record low throughout his campaign, a reality his election did nothing to alter. A majority of the people chose to place their confidence in Obama the man but not in the institutions through which he would have to enact and implement his agenda. Although he was warned just days after his victory that the public’s mistrust of government would limit its tolerance for bold initiatives, he refused to trim his sails, in effect assuming that his personal credibility would outweigh the public’s doubts about the competence and integrity of the government he led.[iii] As events proved, that was a significant misjudgment.

Obama’s efforts to negotiate these difficult straits, says Galston, only made matters worse, as key elements of the electorate came to accept Republican complaints about various administration initiatives:

Once elected, Obama in fact had not one but two agendas–the agenda of choice on which he had run for president and the agenda of necessity that the economic and financial collapse had forced upon him. The issue he then faced was whether the latter would require him to trim or delay the former, a question he answered in the negative. Denying any conflict between these agendas, he opted to pursue both simultaneously. A major health care initiative was piled on top of the financial rescue plan and the stimulus package, exacerbating the public’s sticker shock. And initiatives such as climate change legislation and comprehensive immigration reform remained in play long after it should have been clear that they stood no serious chance of enactment while pervasive economic distress dominated the political landscape.

In his TNR piece, Galston looks at the political mechanics of how the House was lost, and suggests that a strong rightward shift in ideology among independents since 2006, and a general decline in the percentage of Americans who perceive themselves as moderate, are not just factors that explain 2010 but represent a fundamental challenge to the Democratic Party:

According to the Pew Research Center, conservatives as a share of total Independents rose from 29 percent in 2006 to 36 percent in 2010. Gallup finds exactly the same thing: The conservative share rose from 28 percent to 36 percent while moderates declined from 46 percent to 41 percent.
This shift is part of a broader trend: Over the past two decades, moderates have trended down as share of the total electorate while conservatives have gone up. … Unless the long-term decline of moderates and rise of conservatives is reversed during the next two years, the ideological balance of the electorate in 2012 could look a lot like it did this year.

With his CAP colleague John Halpin, Teixeira has developed a take that focuses more on the structural background of the 2010 elections than on a narrative of what Obama and congressional Democrats did right or wrong over the last two years. As they succinctly put it in their TNR piece:

Why did the Democrats decisively lose this election? It’s not really a mystery. The 2010 midterms were shaped by three fundamental factors: the poor state of the economy, the abnormally conservative composition of the midterm electorate, and the large number of vulnerable seats in conservative-leaning areas.

Laying it out in greater detail for CAP, Teixeira and Halpin put it this way:

Independent voters, white working-class voters, seniors, and men broke heavily against the Democrats due to the economy. Turnout levels were also unusually low among young and minority voters and unusually high among seniors, whites, and conservatives, thus contributing to a massively skewed midterm electorate. The Democrats therefore faced a predictable, and arguably unavoidable, convergence of forces. Incumbent Democrats suffered a genuine backlash of voter discontent due to a weak economy with considerable concerns about job creation, deep skepticism among independents, poor turnout among key base groups, and strong enthusiasm among energized conservatives.

They go through these factors in some detail, and have this to say about the many conflicting theories circulating among the chattering classes:

Political commentators are notoriously prone to overinterpreting election results and extrapolating singular causes for victories and losses from a multitude of possible factors. These interpretations usually underlie some desire to influence ideological debates and power struggles or to shape media stories about the election. And 2010 is no different….
Years of political science research show fairly conclusively that structural issues explain most of the variance in election results. Context, candidates, and politics matter, of course. But progressives should examine the basics if they want to understand why 2010 happened as it did: the poor condition of the economy; a conservative-leaning midterm electorate; and a Democratic Party with many marginal seats to lose. Strategic and policy decisions certainly made some difference in the magnitude of losses, but in a horrible economy it’s difficult to escape the reality that Democrats were poised to lose a significant number of seats no matter what they did.

Given their widely varying takes on the election, it’s not surprising that Galston and Teixeira have different advice for Democrats going forward, with Galston expressing optimism about a more limited and less partisan agenda along the lines of President Clinton’s approach after 1994, while Teixeira and Halpin suggest a reengagement with those elements of the electorate that stayed home in 2010 but tend to vote in presidential elections. But they agree completely that positive action and positive results on the economy are a must.

In the next several weeks two things are certain to occur:

• Dems will engage in a robust and often bitter debate about the strategic lessons of the elections
• The mainstream media will build this into a “Dems in disarray” narrative that will have major negative consequences for Democratic morale, mobilization and public image.

The problem is particularly acute this year because Democrats are now facing a Republican Party even more extreme and radicalized than the one that emerged after the mid-term elections of 1994. The conservative advances in this election will encourage conservatives and Republicans to immediately launch a broad and intense attack, not only on the administration, but also on the network of individuals, groups and institutions that support Democratic officeholders, candidates and causes. Unions, environmental groups, think-tanks, social cause organizations and foundations will all find themselves directly in the cross-hairs.
During this critical period, the “Dems in disarray” narrative and perception will significantly weaken Democrats ability to resist this assault. As a result, it is urgent that Democrats seriously try to agree upon certain basic understandings about how to maintain the maximum degree of unity and cohesion as a political coalition and community while still engaging in a robust internal debate about the meaning and lessons of the election.
On the one hand, long Democratic tradition and culture insures that advocates for the major strategic perspectives within the Democratic Party will all energetically argue for their interpretation of the election results. In the coming weeks several hundred articles and several thousand web commentaries, comments, posts and discussion threads will debate these assertions in intense detail.
On the central issue of Obama’s performance, the vast majority of these analyses will fall into one of the following six categories:

1. Obama is basically doing as well as is realistically possible in the circumstances – his unpopularity is an inevitable side-effect of his trying to pass controversial legislation in an adverse economic environment.
2. Obama has made substantial mistakes on various issues, but overall he still deserves support.
3. Obama adopted too radical an agenda. He should have embraced more moderate, centrist positions then those he chose.
4. Obama allowed himself to be caricatured as more radical than he and his programs actually are. He needs to substantially revise his rhetoric and behavior.
5. Obama was too cautious and timid in embracing a coherent progressive program. He needed to take a significantly more forceful and indeed radical stance in a number of different areas, the economy in particular.
6. Obama allowed himself to be dragged down into Washington’s permanent culture of corruption, a culture that embraces not only the White House but all of Congress and the political system. Democrats cannot achieve meaningful change without fundamentally reforming the entire system.

Whatever their choice among the six views above, analysts will also argue that five other specific issues also profoundly affected the election outcome (1) “structural” factors like the normal, more conservative demographic slant of off-year election voters and the unusual number of Democrats who were running for re-election from basically Republican districts (2) the bad economy (3) the exceptional “inside” view voters had of the “sausage making” for the health Care bill (4) the huge and unprecedented partisan role of Fox and the right-wing media (5) the massive surge of secret campaign contributions .
Yet, despite the inevitable outpouring of articles and commentaries on all these subjects, few Democrats will really expect any serious shifts in thinking to occur. Realistically, there are always enough ambiguities in election results to provide some support for any of the major points of view within the Democratic coalition and, as a result, the major intra-Democratic strategic perspectives have all been stable and enduring features of the Democratic Party’s ideological landscape for the last half-century. The truth is that all Democrats know perfectly well that in the next three or four months none of the six major viewpoints noted above is going to suddenly and magically disappear as a result of any new data or analysis that emerges from the intra-Democratic debate about this election.
As a result, there are two basic points of agreement on which Dems from all the major intra-party factions ought to be able to agree:

1. All of the major perspectives within the Democratic Party have a legitimate place and role in today’s Democratic coalition. While various elements of both the centrist and progressive wings of the party may sincerely believe that in the long run a smaller but more ideologically united party would ultimately be preferable, the present moment categorically demands a basic level of Democratic unity from every element of the coalition.
2. To successfully defend the Democratic Party and its allied institutions against the very powerful conservative offensive that will come after the election, advocates of all major perspectives must proudly and explicitly assert that there are basic values and core areas of agreement unite them with all other Democrats and that they are prepared to present a solid and united front against the external threat posed by Republican extremism.

This can be asserted — to the mainstream media and the country as a whole — as follows:
Disagreements among Democrats are arguments within a coalition and a community. We are all powerfully united by our profound opposition and deep sense of outrage at the socially irresponsible and politically extremist agenda that has been adopted by the Republican Party and we proudly stand together against it. We are united by our deep and profound belief that — As James Carville so eloquently expressed it in 1996 — “We’re right, you’re wrong”.
Do not mistake our diversity for disunity. Do not mistake our debates for division. Whatever our internal disagreements, they pale beside our common rejection of the extremist world-view that has permeated the Republican Party. We Democrats have a wide range of views within our coalition, but we stand together as one united political party in our dreams for a better future and our readiness to join together as one to confront and withstand conservative attack.
This should be a common ground for all Democrats. Dems from all sectors of the party and points of view should consistently express it, particularly when dealing with the mainstream media. Dems cannot stop the mainstream media from pushing the Dems in disarray” narrative but they can all energetically and forcefully push back against it at every opportunity.
Ed Kilgore
James Vega
J.P. Green

Last night’s returns contained a few surprises, but for the most part, were only surprising to people who hadn’t been paying much attention, and to those conservative commentators who had been predicting a Republican takeover of the Senate and House gains in the neighborhood of 80-100 seats. It was indeed a Republican “wave” election, but not what you’d rightly call a tsunami.
When it’s all said and done (projections of outstanding votes are very favorable to Michael Bennet of CO and Patty Murray of WA), it’s likely that Democrats will retain a 53-47 margin in the Senate, which means Republicans will not be in a position to tempt Ben Nelson or Joe Lieberman to “flip” and give them control. Had things gone a little differently in the very close Senate races in PA or IL, the margin could have gone even higher, but Democrats aren’t complaining.
It appears Republican gains in the House will wind up at around 64 or 65 seats. Looking quickly at the casualties, it appears the vast majority were either veterans in heavily Republican territory or Class of 2006-2008 “Democratic wave” members. Six wins were in southern open districts that were all but conceded months ago. There were virtually no out-of-the-blue upsets; as Nate Silver put it early this morning, it was a very “orderly wave.”
But Republicans did seem to enjoy some luck at the margins. They won the national House popular vote by between 6% and 7% (which means the final Gallup generic poll, predicting a 15-point margin, was indeed an outlier, along with Rasmussen, which predicted a 12-point margin). This margin would in theory normally produce a gain of about 55 seats. The excess peformance will be attributed to superior Republican vote “efficiency,” which is another way of saying that the advantage they obtained during the last round of redistricting endured to the end.
Speaking of redistricting, the worst news of the night for Democrats was in state legislative races. Republicans appear to have gained control of 15 state legislative chambers. In conjunction with gubernatorial wins, they obtained control of the redistricting process in several big states which will lose House seats (alway an opportunity for gerrymandering mischief), including Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania.
Overall, governorships went about as expected (though several have yet to be resolved, including CT, which had a lot of polling place irregularites), with Republicans likely to control 29 or 30. If Rick Scott’s lead in Florida holds up, that will be a bitter defeat fr Democrats, though the impact might be mitigated somewhat by the simultaneous passage of a initiative creating an independent redistricting commission. Democrats were hit hard in the Rust Belt, where several long-serving term-limited Democratic incumbents had become so unpopular that the entire ticket suffered (i.e., PA, MI and WI). The national wave almost certainly extinguished several well-fought Democratic gubernatorial candidacies, including those of Ted Strickland in OH and Vincent Sheheen in SC.
Finally, something must be said about the electorate that produced these results. According to national exit polls, 2010 voters broke almost evenly in terms of their 2008 presidential votes; indeed, given the normal tendency of voters to “misremember” past ballots as being in favor of the winner, this may have been an electorate that would have made John McCain president by a significant margin. Voters under 30 dropped from 18% of the electorate to 11%; African-Americans from 13% to 10%, and Hispanics from 9% to 8%. Meanwhile, voters over 65, the one age category carried by John McCain, increased from 16% of the electorate to 23%.
These are all normal midterm numbers. But because of the unusual alignment of voters by age and race in 2008, they produced a very different outcome, independently of any changes in public opinion. Indeed, sorting out the “structural” from the “discretionary” factors in 2008-2010 trends will be one of the most important tasks of post-election analysis, since the 2012 electorate will be much closer to that of 2008. That’s also true of the factor we will hear most about in post-election talk: the “swing” of independents from favoring Obama decisively in 2008 to favoring Republicans decisively this year. Are these the same people (short answer: not as much as you’d think), or a significantly different group of voters who happened to self-identify as independents and turned out to vote?
We’ll also hear far, far more than is useful about the radical changes the White House needs to make in order to put the president in position to be re-elected in 2012. An even more pertinent question is how Republicans will deal with their electoral windfall, particularly given the realities of the much less favorable electorate they will face in 2012. When given the rather limited choice of supporting, as the “highest priority” for Congress, either “cutting taxes, reducing the budget deficit, or spending to create jobs,” exit polls show 18% wanting to cut taxes and 39% wanting to reduce the deficit. The newly empowered GOP, of course, is committed to both courses of action, which are incompatible without deeply unpopular spending cuts. And this fiscal problem is completely independent of the other furies unleashed by conservatives over the last two years, including a determination to deregulate corporations, turn back the clock on abortion and GLBT rights, and demonize the president (a demand of the “base” they will be in a position to indulge through their new perches in House committees).
Some analysts will make much of the defeat of several Tea Party champions yesterday, notably Christine O’Donnell, Sharron Angle, Ken Buck (if Bennet’s lead holds up) and perhaps, around Thanksgiving time, of Joe Miller. But put aside individuals candidates. Just as the Tea Party Movement represents the radicalization of the GOP’s conservative base, the Tea Party Movement itself has radicalized the Republican Party beyond the point of turning back. No “grownups” are going to rescue that party from the Class of 2010 and the now-invincible belief of conservatives that they won by moving hard right. So we may have to wait until 2012 to understand the true legacy of this election. This wave definitely has an undertow.

This item is cross-posted from The New Republic.
This is your comprehensive hour-by-hour guide to Election Night 2010. It will help you follow all of the bellwether indicators throughout the day and interpret the returns. So what are you waiting for? Print it out and keep it close during every minute of the agonizing countdown.
What to Look for Early on Election Day: There will be lots of anecdotal reports during the early hours of voting about turnout and the expectations* of both parties and many candidates. It’s colorful, but don’t believe any of it. Much of this chatter can be safely ignored as too unsystematic or, worse, as spin designed to suppress or motivate turnout. It’s also good to remain skeptical about charges of “voter fraud,” often peddled by Republicans in order to enrage the base and offset Democratic charges of voter intimidation and polling place chaos.
One distraction that generally won’t be available, at least in the East, is the type of early exit-poll rumor that was common before the 2008 election. The exit poll consortium of media outlets won’t get data until after 5:00 p.m. (all hours in this article are Eastern Daylight Time), and leaks prior to release time are becoming virtually extinct. In addition, exit polling is only being conducted in 26 states, and only of statewide races. So if anyone offers you exit poll data from VA-5 at 3:00 p.m., throw it in the nearest trash can.
Watch the weather. Early indications are that Election Day rain will be centered in the South, and some parts of the Northwest–but if the weather gets bad in other key swing areas, it can generally be assumed to benefit Republicans.
Beyond that, though, most of the day before early evening will be filled with tedium and hearsay.
The Late-Afternoon Rush: The first big hint of what’s to come will be at around 5:45 p.m., when media outlets begin reporting partial exit-poll data about the makeup of the electorate. These news organizations actually receive all the exit-poll data that is available around the country at 5:00 p.m., but they don’t use it to call races until polls close in the relevant states. Yet they are willing to report the non-candidate data from the exits earlier in the evening–and, if you read it right, that information can tell you a lot about who’s going to win. Here’s what to look for:
•Partisan/ideological composition of the electorate: In terms of self-identification by voters, if Republicans outnumber independents, it will be a very good sign for the GOP. If voters are divided into Republicans and Democrats plus “leaners,” any plurality by Republicans will be significant. Similarly, if conservatives outnumber moderates, and/or if conservatives exceed 45 percent of the electorate, look for big GOP gains.
•Age composition of the electorate: This is one of the most critical turnout variables. If 18-29 year-olds represent 10 percent of the electorate, Democrats are definitely going to pull some surprises. If, conversely, voters over 50 represent more than 60 percent of voters, this is probably an electorate that would have elected John McCain president two years ago, which is obviously a good sign for Republicans in close races, even in states carried by Obama.
•Total turnout: Turnout for midterms is typically around 40 percent of eligible voters. Anything higher than that is probably a sign that Democratic turnout was better than expected.
•Issues: Exit polls typically ask voters what issues were most important to voters. If “deficits,” “taxes,” “terrorism,” or “immigration” together amount to over what 20 percent of voters consider “most important,” it’s probably a very good sign for Republicans. “Jobs,” “the economy,” and “health care” are concerns shared by Dems and Republicans. And there’s always one question that asks whether voters would prefer a smaller government with less services or a larger government with more services. The small-government opinion almost always prevails (as it did in 2008), but any small-government number over 60 percent could be significant.
•Right track/wrong track; anti-incumbency: These are data points you should approach with caution, since voters for both parties are likely to express strongly “wrong track” or “anti-incumbent” sentiments.
First Poll Closings, 6:00 p.m.: At this time, polls will close in most of Indiana (it’s by local option) and in Eastern Kentucky. The results will provide the first indication of how Americans are voting–and it will also set the tone for the night’s network coverage. (Networks generally don’t like to “call” statewide races until all polls are closed, but sometimes do if the results are very clear.) For example, the networks will probably call the Indiana Senate race for Republican Dan Coats right away, which would be the first GOP “takeover” of a Senate seat. An early call of the Kentucky Senate race for Republican Rand Paul, who has become a heavy favorite in the last two weeks, would portend something like a double-digit win for Paul, and it would begin the night’s first big batch of hype about the Tea Party movement.
There are three House bellwethers in Indiana and Kentucky that bear close watching: IN-9, a perennially marginal district, where Democrat Blue Dog Baron Hill is a slight underdog to Republican Todd Young; IN-2, where a Class of 2006 Blue Dog Democrat, Joe Donnelly, is in a very close race with Jackie Walorski; and Lexington-based KY-6, where still another Blue Dog Democrat, Ben Chandler, who took the seat away from the GOP in a 2004 special election, is in a tough race with Andy Barr. This contest will say something about whether a candidate who voted for climate-change legislation can survive in a coal-producing state. If the GOP sweeps these bellwether districts, the odds are very high Republicans will control the House and could well exceed the 54 seats won in 1994.

Read more…

While fortifying myself for a long election night, I happened upon a very interesting piece by Jon Chait about the dynamics of election predictions, and particularly the tendency of conservatives to guess very high about Republican gains while progressives tend to be pretty objective. Here’s the key passage:

I think there’s a strange sociology at work here. Obviously, there has been a strong Republican undertow in Washington over the last year or more. The primary effect of this undertow has of course been to improve the GOP’s prospects. But the secondary effect has been to make conservatives giddy and liberals depressed. On the right, a can-you-top-this sensibility is at work in predicting the November bounty. And while there are many conservatives making outlandishly hopeful electoral predictions, and very few liberals doing the same. Nate Silver is, properly, the lodestar of liberal electoral analysis, and his prediction is admirably down-the-line. Not even partisans like Markos Moulitsas are challenging his median prediction of a 53-seat House loss.
And so, in a lopsided environment like this, it seems like all the social pressure is pushing pundits toward Republican-friendly positions. That’s why you see them making nonsensical guesses where they throw out a reasonable number (like 60-some seats in the House) along with a caveat that the number could be vastly higher. What does this show? It shows they’re afraid of guessing low but not afraid of guessing high. Nobody wants to be on the wrong side of this wave. Nobody wants to be the mainstream reporter who is ridiculed by Republicans for not getting it.

There’s an amusing example of this phenomenon in the Weekly Standard this morning, where Jay Cost, a very smart guy who knows how to run numbers, ties himself into knots trying to justify a prediction of very large GOP gains. He even suggests that he’s bravely breaking away from the “herd” that is aiming lower, when (whether he’s right or wrong) he’s pretty clearly following his conservative buddies who are treating this election as an Epoch-Defining Event instead of a bad-economy midterm dominated by Rebublican-trending older white voters who are in part just lopping off the low-hanging fruit grown by previous Democratic landslides. In his enthusiasm, Jay winds up predicting things that don’t look that credible from available evidence, like a very competitive California Senate race and (I really hope he’s wrong about this) a gubernatorial win for Tom Tancredo.
Now some progressives look at this phenomenon, which extends far beyond election predictions into all forms of political expression, and argue that Democrats are giving up something valuable by trying to be objective, instead of countering conservative exaggerations and spin with their own. I understand the argument, but don’t buy it. For every advantage conservatives gain by hype, they lose something intangible but important in the long run: the ability to resist believing in their hype.
I think it’s very likely we’ll see this downside of “enthusiasm” in abundance after this election, when Republicans convince themselves they’ve won a mandate to undo all of the Obama administration’s policies and set the country on a rightward course that would have alarmed Ronald Reagan. Indeed, many Republicans are visibly buying into the ancient, threadbare conservative argument that the path to future electoral victories, in 2012 and beyond, is to move as far to the right as the hard-core party base (known lately as the Tea Party Movement) wants it to. So when they emerge from their victory parties fired up to repeal even the popular elements of ObamaCare, or to champion more high-end tax cuts, or to gut regulation of Wall Street, or to abolish the Departments of Education and Energy, or to immediately balance the federal budget (which means gigantic changes in Social Security and Medicare), they may not realize they’ve over-interpreted this election to their peril. I’d just as soon my party be less enthusiastic, and more in touch with reality.

While there’s no doubt that Republicans are going to make net gains in congressional and gubernatorial contests today (as the “out” party almost always does in the first midterm after a new presidential administration takes office), there is some pretty serious mystery about how big those gains wll be, particularly in the House. That’s mainly because of an unusual degree of disagreement among the major polling outlets about the shape of the midterm electorate and the size of the GOP advantage.
Mark Blumenthal of pollster.com has a nifty write-up this morning of the problem, which includes a chart of final likely-voter generic congressional ballot polls showing a remarkable range of findings, from Marist/McClatchey’s dead even to the “low-turnout”-based Gallup prediction of an astonishing 15 point Republican margin.
Complicating the issue (which would normally dictate just averaging the polls and not worrying about it) is the fact that Gallup has historically been very accurate in its final generic ballot poll. Yet today their findings look like an outlier, off there nearer to the Rasmussen numbers (a 12-point GOP margin) than to such equally well-established and sober outfits like Pew (a 6-point margin) and ABC/WaPo (4 points). TDS contributor and advisory board member Alan Abramowitz of Emory University has been saying for a good while that something’s screwy with Gallup’s methodology this year. One theory is that Gallup is placing too much stock in subjective “enthusiasm” indicators that may over-estimate the marginal tendency of Republicans to vote. With other apparent outlier polls like Rasmussen’s, there is a suspicion that the firm has failed to sufficiently adjust for its inability to reach cell-phone-only households.
We’ll know the truth soon enough, but it’s comforting to know that the poll-assessment industry seems to be growing as fast as the public polling industry itself. Certainly Democrats hope that Gallup is making a mistake this year that rivals its famous prediction in 1948 that Dewey would crush Truman.

This item is cross-posted from The New Republic.
The inevitable loss-induced “struggle for the soul of the Democratic Party” has already begun. In a New York Times op-ed, The Nation’s Ari Berman has written that liberals should “Boot the Blue Dogs,” suggesting a smaller but more ideologically homogeneous Democratic congressional caucus would be happier, more effective, and more progressive [see J.P. Green’s earlier analysis of the essay].
I disagree with Berman’s argument on substantive grounds–particularly the CliffsNotes version that the Times’ word limit imposed on him–but in addition, isn’t this a really weird time to be talking about a purge of Democratic moderates? After all, Republicans are poised to do the job themselves, seizing so many seats that they’ll drastically shrink the size of the Congressional Blue Dog Caucus.
How many of these moderates will actually be left after November 2? Currently, there are 54 members of the Blue Dog Coalition in the House. Four of them are retiring, and two others–Brad Ellsworth of Indiana and Charlie Melancon of Lousiana–are running for the Senate. All six of these open seats are very likely to flip to the GOP.
Looking at Nate Silver’s very precise projections of House races, there are 47 incumbent Democrats that he rates as having a better-than-even chance of losing. Of those, 21 are Blue Dogs. If you assume they all do lose, then add in the six open seats, and acknowledge there are likely to be no reinforcements from the tiny Democratic class of 2010, this leaves you with a Blue Dog Coalition of 27 members, exactly half the current number.
With some luck, the numbers could be higher, but they could be a lot lower, too; four more Blue Dogs are rated by Silver as having a 40 to 50 percent chance of losing, and three more make his list of those with a 30 to 40 percent probability of getting booted.
Silver’s entire projection estimates a net loss of 53 seats by Democrats, leaving a House Democratic Caucus of 203 members. In that scenario, a Blue Dog Coalition of 27 members would represent 13 percent of the caucus, as compared to 21 percent today.
In other words, progressives won’t have much purging to do. It’s hard to assess the influence that this far-smaller group of Blue Dogs would have on the Democratic minority, particularly in a House of Representatives controlled by the most ideologically coherent Republican caucus in history. But it is worth noting that talk about “booting the Blue Dogs” seems beside the point–and it might only aid the Republicans who may soon be attempting to lure Ben Nelson or Joe Lieberman across the line to gain control of the Senate.

At pollster.com, Margie Omero takes a fascinating look at the gender gaps in polls involving female candidates in some major races. There’s a lot going on in her charts, and thanks to the variable availability of crosstabs, she has to rely on polling data of variable reliability.
It’s clear, however, that by and large, all those “Mama Grizzly” Republican candidates aren’t exactly pulling women across the line. The two races with the largest gender gaps actually involve women running on both tickets, the OK and NM gubernatorial contests (unfortunately, dreadful performance among men has kept both Democrats from being competitive, though NM is much closer than OK). But there are also sizeable gender gaps in two races involving Democratic men and Republican women (the Senate races in NH and CT).
The female Republican candidates who do seem to be seriously appealing to women in a race against a man, creating an unusually small or even non-existent advantage for Democrats among women, are, surprisingly, Sharron Angle and Christine O’Donnell. Keeping in mind that this is a Rasmussen poll we are talking about, O’Donnell is actually running slightly better among women than among men, though she’s losing the former by 11 points and the latter by 12. The only Republican women in Omero’s analysis who are actually leading among women are Oklahoma’s Mary Fallin (who’s going to win very big because she’s leading among men by 50 points), and SC’s Nikki Haley (a favorite to win, but not by a lot), both by four point margins.
All in all, there’s not much evidence that the much-noted emergence of conservative women is having a big impact on women’s votes, though it is helping the GOP achieve some desperately needed diversity in the ranks of its candidates.