This item is cross-posted from The New Republic.
Now that Mitt Romney is officially the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, and we have some distance from the primaries that decided it all, it’s time to consider the lessons. Otherwise, poor memories, shaky analysis and self-serving spin will combine to congeal a conventional “wisdom” that is anything but.
As someone who obsessively chronicled every twist and turn of this very odd nomination contest for TNR, here are my five top takeaways:
1.Mitt Romney is a very lucky man. The Republican Party’s dominant conservative wing resisted his nomination as long and as hard as it could, but in the end, had no better options. Herman Cain was not ever going to win the nomination. Nor, likely, was the immensely vulnerable, highly unpopular Newt Gingrich or the extremist Michele Bachmann, both of whom were an oppo researcher’s dream. The two potentially viable rivals were Tim Pawlenty, who gambled everything and lost on the fool’s gold of the Ames Straw Poll in Iowa last summer, and Rick Perry, who ran one of those rare, amazingly inept presidential campaigns that are a constant reminder of the importance of minimal competence in politics. It’s a sign of Romney’s vulnerability that Rick Santorum–whose 2006 Senate defeat told you everything you needed to know about how well he wore on voters, and how much ammunition his record provided his opponents–came within a few thousand votes in Michigan of sending Mitt’s campaign into a potential death spiral and the national GOP into a panic. Anyone who tells you Romney’s nomination was pre-ordained by some iron law of succession or some shadowy “Establishment” was obviously not paying much attention to how the deal actually went down.
2. Conservatives reasserted their control of the GOP. You’ll also hear that Romney’s nomination was a victory for Republican “moderates” over “movement conservatives” or their latest grassroots incarnation, the Tea Party. Don’t believe it. Yes, hard-core conservatives would have preferred a different nominee–for the most part, someone who wasn’t running, like Jim DeMint or Mike Pence or Marco Rubio–but they had issues with virtually everyone in the actual field, and more importantly, they got what they needed from Romney, who was, as everyone seems to have forgotten, their own preferred candidate in 2008. He’s atoned for his health care heresy by promising about ten thousand times to repeal ObamaCare root and branch. He’s on board with the twin pillars of the Small Government counter-revolution, the Cut, Cap and Balance Pledge, and the Ryan Budget. He’s foresworn increased taxes as any part of any budget deal, however large. He’s met all the basic social-issues litmus tests of the Christian Right. He was by most measures the hawkiest of all the candidates on foreign policy issues. And for good measure, he tacked hard right on immigration policy in order to croak Rick Perry. Thanks to his “flip-flop” problem and conservative hyper-vigilance, there will be no back-tracking by Romney between now and November, or most probably, between now and the end of time. Mitt’s no stubbornly independent cuss like John McCain. He’ll stay bought.
3. 2012 is not just “about” the economy. The primaries did not notably feature debates among Republican candidates about how, exactly, to bring the U.S. economy back. In part that’s because they were in total agreement on the big points: both fiscal and monetary stimulus of the economy are terrible ideas; excessive federal spending and extension of housing credit to irresponsible poor and minority folk caused the Great Recession; and a systematic agenda of universal deregulation, public-sector austerity, health-care rationing to reduce costs, restriction of collective bargaining rights, and high-end (including corporate) tax cuts are the prescription for recovery. That this is the conservative movement’s permanent non-cultural agenda for good times and bad is the tip-off that even the GOP’s “economic” plans are about an ideological commitment to smaller government–extending very nearly these days to a complete overturning of the New Deal and Great Society legacy–rather than any shrewd macroeconomic strategy. Beyond that, there is no question the primaries reflected an abiding preoccupation with cultural issues, whatever the candidates professed, viz. the endless angels-dancing-on-pins distinctions on whether to ban “abortifacient” contraceptives as well as clinical abortions, the war on Planned Parenthood, and the final plunge of the GOP (and for that matter, the Catholic Bishops) into full harness with the Christian Right’s long-standing position that church-state separation represents a “war on religion.” It’s hard to imagine much of anything about the subject-matter of the primary contest that would have changed had the economy been booming.
4. Super-PACs have changed politics. Whether it’s simply a matter of the drift towards uncontrolled campaign financing accelerated by Citizens United, or the hyper-mobilization of an unprecedented group of politically active billionaires, there’s no question the Super-PACs played a big role in the nomination contest. Newt Gingrich’s Palinesque media-bashing debate performances had a lot to do with his candidacy coming back from the grave twice, but he would have remained a novelty candidate like past debate phenoms had not it been for Sheldon Adelson’s decision to give him the resources to run an actual campaign. It was Romney’s Super-PAC that destroyed Perry in Iowa, Gingrich in Florida, and later on, Santorum in the Midwest. And when the losing candidates’ own sugar daddies (Adelson and Santorum’s friend Foster Friess) closed the checkbooks, it was all over. The same forces (and many of the very same people) may be about to save Scott Walker’s bacon in Wisconsin, and are in the process of challenging the assumption that the sheer power of paid media can’t win a presidential general election.
5. The crazy nomination process is here for another four years. The dog that didn’t bark in 2012 was the usual chorus of complaints about the crazy-quilt nominating process itself–the disproportionate power of the early states, and the buyer’s remorse of voters and elites stuck with a nominee they didn’t want. The stretched-out nature of the primary calendar–which kept Romney from formally claiming the nomination until late May–was part of that non-event. So, too, was the rapid consolidation of support behind Romney once he essentially clinched the nomination in Wisconsin if not earlier. There will be some grumbling about the procedural glitches that allowed Ron Paul’s minions to dominate delegate selection events long after the deal had gone down, but for the most part, minor adjustments should suffice. We’ll be stuck with the same crazy system in 2016.

So in a brief update of strategic analysis from Political Animal:
* It’s increasingly obvious that Romney’s economic messaging (most recently focused on attacking stimulus projects) is chum in the water to distract attention from the fact that his own “plan” is deregulation plus the Ryan Budget.
* The latest “sting” operation by anti-choice forces shows them (and their allies in the House Republican Caucus) nimbly moving from abortion-is-genocide-against-African-Americans to abortion-is-genocide-against-unborn-girls.
* The intra-Republican game of expressing interest in maintaining the popular provisions of ObamaCare takes a predictable turn as conservative activist groups push back.

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from the New Republic.
Europe’s Greek tragedy has now entered its final act, with potentially fateful consequences for the global economy–and for Barack Obama, whose reelection may hinge on the decisions of Germany in the coming weeks. The 2012 election will pivot on the public’s evaluation of the president’s economic stewardship, and a perceptible decline in the U.S. growth rate–which a badly handled Greek exit from the Eurozone would cause–could easily spell the difference between victory and defeat. Obama’s fate, then, may well lie in Angela Merkel’s hands. That doesn’t mean, though, that there’s nothing he can do about it.
What are the economic stakes? Mark Cliffe, ING’s head of Financial Markets Research, has conducted the most detailed analysis that I know of. He examines two scenarios–a Greek exit from a Eurozone that remains intact, and an exit that triggers a complete collapse of the European monetary union. The consequences of the latter would be catastrophic. In the first year alone, Eurozone GDP would fall by 9 percent. Inflation in the “peripheral economies” such as Spain and Portugal would head toward double digits, while the Eurozone core–especially Germany–would suffer a “deflationary shock.” Because the dollar would surge in relation to whatever national currencies might emerge, the United States would undergo that shock as well, and the exchange-rate jolt to U.S. competitiveness would reduce the odds of a sustained recovery in U.S. exports–a cornerstone of Obama’s growth strategy.
The consequences of a Greek exit considered in isolation would be less serious, of course. Even so, they are not pretty. Cliffe projects that the Eurozone would undergo a major recession and experience significantly higher levels of unemployment. In the United States, GDP growth would slow to only 1.3 percent in 2012 and 1.7 percent in 2013. Unemployment would stop falling and stagnate at current levels for the remainder of this year. These developments would make it harder for Obama to argue that we’re heading in the right direction, and–based on my analysis of recent elections involving incumbents–I suspect that economic growth at these depressed levels would mean victory for Mitt Romney.
From the American standpoint, the best outcome is concerted European action to keep Greece within the fold, while the second best outcome is a strategy that delays the inevitable until Europe can strengthen its defenses against contagion.
But there’s a problem: Many key European officials and observers have concluded that a Greek exit is both inevitable and manageable. A lengthy article in Der Spiegel makes this case, going so far as to argue that the consequences of doing what would be necessary to keep Greece in the monetary union would be worse than allowing it to leave. And Germany’s powerful Bundesbank agrees. Its most recent monthly report states: “A significant dilution of existing agreements [concerning Greece] would damage confidence in all euro area agreements and treaties and strongly weaken incentives for national reform.” Crucially, Germany’s central bank has concluded that Europe could successful deal with a Greek exit: “The challenges this would create for the euro area and for Germany would be considerable but manageable given prudent crisis management.”
To be sure, many other leaders–especially in France and Italy–are far more concerned about Europe’s ability to contain the consequences of Greece’s departure. France’s new president, Francois Hollande, is pushing the European Central Bank to provide further liquidity and intervene in sovereign debt markets. But the stark fact is that right now these leaders’ views don’t matter all that much. Angela Merkel, Germany’s new iron chancellor, holds the veto, and she appears unyielding. And (it must be said) German opinion from top to bottom seems driven by the tale of the ant and the grasshopper. Germany’s success in no accident, Germans believe. A thrifty, disciplined people bit the bullet and made the painful structural adjustments that long-term prosperity requires. Now it’s time for others to follow suit.
Until now, the ability of the United States to influence Eurozone policy has been modest, and many of our efforts to do so have produced resentment. So what is President Obama to do? If he believes, as I think he should, that the global economy, U.S. economy, and his own electoral prospects all hang in the balance, then he should call Merkel and propose a quick summit between the two leaders and their respective economic teams. He should come armed with a menu of concrete steps that the United States and major international institutions would be willing to take if Germany were to change course. He should appeal to Germany’s self-interest as the major beneficiary of the expanded export market the Eurozone has created. He should remind Merkel of the sacrifices that the United States made over many decades to help build a Europe that is free, whole, and united. And he should make it clear in private, and announce in public, that from the American standpoint, what touches all concerns all: Chancellor Merkel is not free to proceed as though the current crisis affects only Germany (or Europe) and the rest of the world has no legitimate say in the outcome.
Granted, this would be a bold and risky step. There’s no guarantee of success, and it would surely strain ties between the United States and one of its most important allies. Obama could return empty-handed, resulting in a diplomatic catastrophe. But the alternative is worse–to stand by while the dominant European country allows short-term politics, nationalist myopia, and misplaced moralism to substitute for far-sighted statesmanship that promotes a broader good.

This item is cross-posted from The New Republic.
In the two months since Eric Fehrnstrom’s “etch-a-sketch” gaffe, many political observers have waited for the iconic moment when Romney would move to the center or distance himself from the toxic conservative ideological battles of the primary season. But without much notice, that etch-a-sketch moment has already happened.
No, Romney has not shifted positions. Nor has he disrespected the conservative activists whose votes and trust he sought so relentlessly since 2007. What his campaign has done, however, is radically narrow its focus to a single message, one particularly attractive to swing voters: that this election is purely and simply a referendum on Obama’s economy. This focus comes at the expense of the philosophical, social, and cultural topics that dominated the primary season from beginning to end. There’s one problem though: His party’s conservative base may not let him get away with it.
Barely an hour goes by these days without a Romney surrogate staring into a camera and intoning like an incantation that the election is about nothing other than Obama’s responsibility for a poor economy. As Jonathan Chait recently noted, even the much-asked question on Romney’s poor standing with Hispanic voters is routinely answered by citing the economic sufferings of Hispanics and the certainty that they, too, will ignore every other factor and vote for Mr. Fix-It.
The narrow focus of Romney’s campaign makes it easier for him to deal with right-wing efforts to drag the campaign discourse into dangerous areas. This was evident in last week’s brouhaha over reports that billionaire Joe Ricketts and star GOP consultant Fred Davis were discussing a $10 million super PAC ad campaign resurrecting the president’s relationship with Reverend Jeremiah Wright. Romney’s campaign quickly repudiated the proposed ad, but just as quickly, RNC chairman Reince Priebus brought things back on message, accusing the Obama campaign of using criticism of the proposed ads to distract from the only issue that matters: Obama’s responsibility for a poor economy.
So long as his campaign doesn’t look like it’s on the verge of losing–as McCain looked in the fall of 2008 when conservatives began openly protesting his reluctance to bring up Jeremiah Wright–Romney can probably avoid visible conservative criticism for failing to raise a broader, cultural critique of Obama as a secular-socialist elitist whose association with Wright and Bill Ayers shows he hates America.
But there are other, less controversial, issues important to conservative voters that don’t nicely fit into a monomaniacal focus on the unemployment rate or monthly job figures. Romney is fortunate that Republicans agree that debts, deficits, and the size of government are all highly germane to the case for “firing” Obama on purely economic grounds. But many conservatives are concerned about these themes not because they affect the country’s short-term economic prospects, but for more ideological reasons: because they are morally offended by federal programs that “redistribute” wealth, or by the very idea of progressive taxation, or by the religious implications of environmentalism.
And unsurprisingly, many conservatives want their ideological motivations to be reflected in the Romney campaign’s rhetoric. As a result, Romney has been all but forced to endorse Paul Ryan’s budget, which makes explicit the conservative desire to abandon the Great Society safety net and to reverse any public-sector policies that alter the “natural” market-based distribution of wealth. In that way, the Romney campaign has the economic themes of a “centrist” campaign, but, in order to placate the concerns of his base, the details of speeches and other communications sometimes often veer into fringe territory. It is an open question how long the candidate can finesse this tension.
Beyond the cluster of economic-fiscal issues, there are a host of cultural issues which Romney’s campaign is trying to avoid, but which both conservative activists and the Obama campaign may insist he discuss. One of these is “religious liberty”–defined as the right for conservative religious organizations to discriminate against gays and lesbians or against reproductive rights for women. Another is same-sex marriage, an increasingly unavoidable campaign issue that pulls the campaign away from its focus on the economy. Conservative activists will also be eager to campaign against Obamacare, particularly if the Supreme Court forces the issue directly into the center of the presidential contest.
And even if conservative activists–and the Obama campaign–don’t succeed in broadening Romney’s economic focus, another factor may intervene: The economy could improve. more than is currently projected between now and November. Chait’s article on the Romney campaign’s economic monomania suggests it will shift to a “Plan B” argument that the economy is just not improving enough. But instead, they may be forced to refocus on all those broader ideological issues–religious liberty, same-sex marriage, and health care, and perhaps more–that they’re currently trying to avoid. If that happens, then both conservative activists and their enemies in the Obama campaign will get something they want, and the etch-a-sketch will shake up the message yet again.

This item is cross-posted from the New Republic.
Plenty of liberals and other Americans of good conscience no doubt breathed a sigh of relief when AmeriTrade founder and Chicago Cubs co-owner Joe Ricketts distanced himself yesterday from the $10 million racially-tinged Jeremiah Wright ad blitz that the New York Times had reported he was considering buying. But it would be a mistake to consider that any sort of significant victory against the disproportionate power wielded by super PACs. Indeed, even if big donors decide not to corrode the atmosphere of the presidential campaign, they have already demonstrated–Ricketts did so earlier this week, in fact–their commitment to influencing state and local elections. And it’s precisely in those elections–elections that many of us won’t be paying attention to–that their power over national politics will prove most decisive.
Take Tuesday’s Republican Senate primary in Nebraska, for example. From a national point of view, this was a relatively obscure affair: For many pundits, the only thing they knew about surprise winner Deb Fischer is that she was endorsed by Sarah Palin. Indeed, there was an initial tendency to push the Nebraska contest into the familiar template set a week earlier by the Mourdock/Lugar primary in Indiana: Conservative insurgent beats moderate. This had the advantage of pleasing the otherwise embarrassed conservative activists who had poured much time and treasure into the campaign of third-place finisher Don Stenberg. Democrats also had an interest in reinforcing that interpretation; the more Fischer looked like 2010 wacko Senate candidates Sharron Angle and Christine O’Donnell, the better the fundraising environment for Democratic candidate Bob Kerrey.
But this early conventional wisdom was wrong: A closer look shows that Fischer is a fairly conventional Republican politician, and ideology played little role in the primary’s outcome. (In part because all three major candidates constantly claimed to be true conservatives battling the ever-traitorous RINOs of the national party). A Public Policy Polling survey on the eve of the primary (which pretty much nailed the results) showed that so-called establishment candidate Joe Bruning’s shaky favorable ratings were actually highest among self-identified “very conservative” voters, while moderates felt most fondly towards Fischer.
But even if Fischer never makes it to Washington, this week’s election may have been one for the history books. That’s because what happened in Nebraska is the clearest example yet of what a post-Citizens United landscape is like, and an object lesson in the power of super PAC donors.
What this primary was about wasn’t ideology, but money. One prominent conservative gabber, the Washington Post blogger Jennifer Rubin, pointed to Bruning’s large advantage in funding over Fischer, and suggested her victory showed that “money is overrated.” Others (including PPP’s Tom Jensen and yours truly) looked at the large quantity of “independent” money–particularly from the Club for Growth and Jim DeMint’s Senate Conservative Fund–that was spent attacking Bruning and boosting the hapless Stenberg. Seen in this light, the contest was a money-driven murder-suicide affair, where the two better-financed candidates destroyed each other and left Fischer unscathed to pick up the pieces.
But on the ground in Nebraska, it was Ricketts’ last-minute brace of ads that was actually much more decisive. The ads–one boosting Fischer, one blasting Bruning–represented the kind of strategic, last-minute super PAC ad blitz funded by a single donor that Citizens United encouraged . To be sure, compared to huge individual super PAC investors like Sheldon Adelson (who single-handedly bankrolled Newt Gingrich’s Winning Our Future PAC) or huge super PACs with multiple investors (like Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS, which has just launched a $25 million anti-Obama ad blitz in battleground states), Ricketts made a relatively modest investment of $200,000. But he made it in exactly the right place at exactly the right time.
TNR contributor Jonathan Bernstein best captured the lesson learned from Ricketts’ intervention in the Nebraska race:
Outside money matters more in Congressional races than presidential, and more in primaries than general elections. … And as we’ve just discovered, a single donor can be responsible for the election of a general election Senate candidate — or even, if Fischer wins, a Senator.
Why is that so? Paid media ads matter most in contests with three factors. First, where candidates are not as well known–this is true in down-ballot races, rather than presidential elections, since the public’s perceptions of Romney and Obama are already largely fixed. Second, where factors like party affiliation are less dominant–this points to primaries where candidate allegiance is far more fluid than in general elections. And third, where the cost and scope of advertising provides the greatest bang for the buck–this points to states like Nebraska and many others where you can get your message in front of a large percentage of voters for just $200,000.
This week’s primary contest in Nebraska had all three of these factors, but so will many other contests in the future. Political pros advising politically ambitious tycoons in the months and years ahead will likely use Ricketts’ intervention in Nebraska as an example of exactly the right way to make a big mark in an unregulated system of campaign finance.
Does this mean that big donors don’t have an impact on presidential elections? Not exactly. Yesterday’s furor over Ricketts’ potential Jeremiah Wright ad proved another important point about the impact of rich individual donors in a post-Citizens United world: They don’t have to write a check to have a big impact, even on a presidential general election contest. They just have to clear their throats.
But ultimately, it’s Ricketts’ more quiet intervention in the Nebraska primary that may prove more effective and instructive. After all, it may have provided us with a new United States Senator. And it may have confirmed the most indulgent vanities of the very rich: That they’re invited not only to have a say in our political process, but the final word.