It’s traditional in American politics to fret about “October surprises,” the unanticipated events that throw off years of plans and calculations. October has barely begun, but Hurricane Helene with its terrible destruction already has people wondering, so I wrote some preliminary thoughts about how to assess it at New York:

The upcoming presidential election is so close that it could easily be swayed by external developments. Perhaps a widening war in the Middle East will turn heads in one direction or the other, or possibly a dockworkers strike will shake the steadily improving economy and help Republicans. But the major event we already know about is Hurricane Helene, which took a horrific toll on a swath of coastal and inland communities stretching from Florida to Virginia. Confirmed deaths from the storm have already reached 175, with more likely as rescue crews sift through the wreckage and reach remote areas. Damage is expected to reach as much as $160 billion, making the storm one of the deadliest and costliest in U.S. history.

While the human tragedy of Helene remains front and center, it’s impossible to forget entirely that the nightmare storm hit late in a very close and highly consequential presidential election, and two battleground states (Georgia and North Carolina) were very much affected. Here’s what we know about the possible political fallout.

Will damage from the storm impact turnout?

A lot of what we know about the impact of a major destructive storm on the willingness and ability of citizens to vote comes from Hurricane Sandy, which hammered parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York in October 2012 during the run-up to a reasonably competitive presidential election. Sandy, to be clear, was much more proximate to Election Day (hitting the United States on October 29, eight days before the election) than Helene. On the other hand, early voting has become more significant since 2012, and mail ballots were going out in North Carolina when Helene roared across the area. The major study on the electoral impact of Sandy concluded that the famous “superstorm” did not have a significant impact on voter turnout in 2012.

There’s some talk in North Carolina of flooded polling places that may not be usable any time soon and fears of extended disruption of mail service. However, in all but a few isolated places, there should be plenty of time for recovery in the month before Election Day. Individuals, of course, may experience dislocations and psychological effects that might interfere with all kinds of civic participation, but it will be hard to anticipate the magnitude of such collateral damage.

If Helene does affect voting, will there be a disparate impact on candidates?

The Washington Post took a look at the communities experiencing the most death and destruction from Helene and quickly concluded Trump country was most affected:

“As of writing, the federal government has issued disaster declarations in 66 mostly rural counties across four states: 17 in Florida, 11 in Georgia, 25 in North Carolina, and 13 in South Carolina. The declarations follow Helene’s path, from the section of Florida where the state bends along the Gulf of Mexico, through eastern Georgia and into the western Carolinas …

“Overall, counties in those four states that weren’t declared disaster areas voted for Joe Biden by a slight margin. Counties that were declared disaster areas backed Trump by a nearly 16-point margin. In all four states, counties that were included in the federal government’s disaster declarations were more supportive of Trump than were counties that didn’t receive that designation. In Georgia and North Carolina, non-disaster counties gave more votes to Biden.”

The disparate impact is most notable in North Carolina, a red-hot battleground state and the one where Helene’s impact was most heavily concentrated:

“Trump won North Carolina by a bit over one percentage point in 2020. If no one in the counties currently undergoing a Helene-related disaster had voted, Biden would have won by more than three points. If those counties are unable to vote at the same level as they did four years ago by the time Election Day arrives, that could spell trouble for the former president.”

But again, it’s a long time until Election Day.

Will government relief and recovery efforts affect voter preferences?

People who have lost homes or other possessions to high winds and (especially) flooding and/or who lack power or other essentials for an extended period of time are especially dependent on emergency assistance and may be grateful if it arrives expeditiously. Beyond for those immediately affected, the perceived competence and compassion of government entities dealing with disaster relief and recovery efforts can affect how voters assess those in office, particularly in a high-profile situation like that created by Helene.

An American Enterprise Institute study of Sandy suggested that the Obama administration’s response to the storm was a major factor in the incumbent’s ability to win late deciders in 2012, topped by this finding: “Fully 15 percent of the electorate rated Obama’s hurricane response as the most important factor in their vote.”

At the other end of the spectrum, the George W. Bush administration’s tardy, confused, and seemingly indifferent response to the calamity of Hurricane Katrina in August and September of 2005 had an enduringly negative effect on perceptions of his presidency, even though it occurred nowhere close to a national election, as Reid Wilson explained:

“Voters, already turning skeptical over the mismanaged war in Iraq, blamed Bush for the unfolding disaster in New Orleans. Bush’s approval rating hit 45 percent in Gallup surveys the month after Katrina; they never again reached that high. The number of Americans who said the country was headed off on the wrong track rose north of 60 percent and stayed even higher for the rest of Bush’s presidency.”

While FEMA and HUD are typically the federal agencies most involved in disaster response and recovery, presidential leadership in a disaster always gets attention, too, and the risk of negative publicity or graphic displays of unmet needs won’t go away immediately. Bureaucratic backlogs in distributing funds and approving applications for assistance could cause voter unhappiness long after the initial damage is addressed.

Barring unexpected developments or a major series of screwups in the federal response, Hurricane Helene is likely to mark a big moment in the lives of people in and near the areas of devastation but probably won’t much affect their voting behavior. Obviously the campaigns and their allies will need to adjust their get-out-the-vote operations and show some sensitivity to the suffering of people whose lives were turned upside down. We can only hope the election itself and its aftermath don’t add violence and trauma to the damage done.

Lately I’ve noticed a tendency in some parts of the pro-Democratic commentariat to scorn anyone who isn’t confidently predicting a Kamala Harris landslide in November. So I wrote a warning about this self-delusion at New York:

It’s the nature of the political game that some fans perpetually insist their team is on the brink of a landslide victory. Maybe it’s just a device for maintaining their own enthusiasm, or maybe they truly believe that hype and spin add votes to their candidate’s columns. I usually associate this tendency with conservatives, but in this tense 2024 presidential contest, the landslide-predictors aren’t all in the MAGA camp. There are assorted voices pouring buckets of cold water on the data suggesting the contest between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris is a dead heat, insisting Harris is on the brink of a big victory.

Personally, I try to keep it all in the road by looking at the broadest array of public polling data available, by sticking with averages rather than enthusing or panicking over isolated poll findings, and by using history and common sense to discern trends and avoid overreaction to every survey that comes down the pike. But there’s just so much science you can muster on these matters given the relatively small sample size we have for presidential elections, which occur only every four years. So there’s plenty of grounds for legitimate nitpicking about polls and the experts who interpret them. It can get pretty wonky, as with Nate Silver’s criticism of the presidential-election model being used by his successors at FiveThirtyEight. But it probably affects only the numbers — and the expectations — at the margins.

Another entirely legitimate form of carping about polls and predictions emanates from those who dispute interpretations based on poor analysis of the timing, mix, and provenance of public polls. My old colleague Simon Rosenberg became somewhat famous doing that ahead of the 2022 midterms, when he denied he saw any “red wave” in the data (there ultimately wasn’t one despite an insistent media narrative) and pointed to the skewing of polling averages by strategically released state polls from conservative outlets and firms. He was largely right, though all in all, 2022 polling was very accurate, even if the predictions weren’t. This cycle, Rosenberg is again more optimistic about Democratic prospects in 2024 than your average pundit, but he remains firmly anchored in the world of data and objective reality and admits it’s a close race.

Then you have pro-Harris critics of the polls and pundits who rely on quite different talking points. The distinguished political scholar Michael A. Cohen uses data to support his supposition that Harris is actually in command of the race but ultimately relies on more fundamental arguments that are impervious to numbers:

“I have a few well-argued beliefs about this campaign (and they predate Biden’s departure from the race). Donald Trump is a high-floor, low-ceiling candidate who voters, by and large, don’t like — and they have made up their minds about him. Trump is incapable of and unwilling to change his political messaging to appeal to voters outside of his MAGA base. Democrats have a growing edge with women and college-educated voters, as evident in multiple elections since 2018, which gives them a significant advantage in crucial swing states like PA, WI, MI, GA, and AZ. Democrats have the easier path to 270 electoral votes.

“In key regards, this election is playing out in much the way I expected — even when Biden was on the ticket. With Biden out and his age and mental acuity no longer an issue, it’s that much harder for Republicans to win.”

Maybe Cohen is right. I’ll believe it when I see it empirically. But it turns out my attitude is exactly the kind of thing that veteran progressive media critic Dan Froomkin considers a sign of terrible bias:

“What if Kamala Harris — after a spectacular entry into the race, a stunningly unified convention, and a devastating debate — is basically running away with it, leaving Trump in the dust, while the national media — still mortified by its failure in 2016 to see the extent of Trump’s support — stubbornly sticks to the safer narrative that it’s a horserace going down to the wire?

“But wait, the polls aren’t showing Harris way ahead, you say. At most, they’re showing her with a narrow lead. Well, polls are garbage these days. And the pollsters, whose arbitrary weightings make a mockery of science, travel in packs. They, more than anyone, are terrified of underestimating Trump support again. So maybe this time they’re overestimating it? (Which they sure did in 2022.)

“You could, by contrast, make a solid vibes-and-momentum argument that Harris is winning handily.”

There’s a lot to unpack here. The argument that “polls are garbage these days” isn’t supported by the 2022 record, and to the extent that polls have been garbage lately, they have indeed underestimated Trump’s support. The “arbitrary weightings” of pollsters may or may not be precise, but they are not “arbitrary”; they reflect what we know about the shape of the electorate. And just tossing out all data in favor of a “vibes-and-momentum” take that is 100 percent subjective hardly empties analysis of bias.

Froomkin tips his hand by quoting SFGate columnist Drew Magary, who angrily argues that Harris is “destroying Trump, because Trump is a deranged old s—tbag” and that anyone who doesn’t see that is an Establishment hack.

Maybe all these critics are right and, for various reasons, pollsters and pundits are afraid to admit Harris is romping to victory. I don’t think there’s much question that a lot of the people being accused of overestimating Trump would be ecstatic if Harris wins. But being careful about it, given what we actually know about this election and the electorate, is not just prudent but mandatory.

Trying to separate the wheat of legitimate concern about how the presidential election is going from the chaff of mere fear-mongering, I wrote a piece at New York assessing Trump’s electoral college advantage, such as it is:

With under six weeks left until Election Day, there are three major sources of anxiety besetting those who devoutly hope for a Kamala Harris victory over Donald Trump. One may not go away until January: the high probability that the 45th president would again try to overturn a defeat via legal action or perhaps even violence. The other two concerns are less distinct, if still alarming. One is that pollsters will once again crucially underestimate the Trump vote, either in the battleground states (as they did in 2016) or in both the national totals as well as the battleground states (as occurred in 2020). Pollsters keep assuring us they are making every effort to correct past problems and reach a truly representative sample of voters, and it’s worth remembering that there was very little polling error in 2022. But to many Harris supporters, no lead is going to feel safe.

A final source of concern is that any Harris lead in national polls, even if they are totally accurate, won’t be enough because Trump has an Electoral College advantage. This means he can significantly undershoot a national-popular-vote plurality and win anyway, as he did in 2016 (when Hillary Clinton beat him by 2.1 percent in the popular vote) and nearly did in 2020 (when Joe Biden beat him by a pretty big 4.5 percent in the popular vote, but Trump still came within 44,000 votes in Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin of gaining a tie in the Electoral College). So even if Harris leads Trump by two or three or four points in the national polls, and those polls do turn out to be correct, she could lose anyway — in theory, at least.

The source of this Electoral College advantage (which did not exist as recently as 2012) can be explained in two ways. The first is that the handful of key battleground states are simply more Republican than America as a whole, which means they’re winnable with a smaller vote than the average vote share nationally. In 2016 and 2020, the so-called tipping-point state that gave one candidate or the other the 270th electoral vote necessary for victory was Wisconsin, which in both cases was nearly dead even. This year, the tipping-point state might be Georgia or Pennsylvania, and for the most part, polls have shown both as closer than the national vote spread between Harris and Trump. But probably the simpler way to explain any popular-vote/electoral-vote discrepancy is that candidates can and will “waste” votes in states they either can’t lose or can’t win. In 2020, for example, Biden got a huge number of votes beyond what he needed to carry the large states of California, New York, and Illinois, while Trump’s vote was more efficiently distributed among the states he needed to win.

Interestingly enough, in a deep dive on this subject, the New York Times’ Nate Cohn suggests that Trump’s Electoral College advantage could fade significantly this year because he’s making gains over his past performance in both the Deep South states that are in the bag for him and states like New York and California, which are sure to go for Harris but perhaps by diminished margins.

The bottom line is that maybe Harris does not need to beat Trump nationally by 5 percent to win, but what she does need won’t be clear until the votes are counted. The even more basic point to remember, however, is that national polls are simply an estimate of the national popular vote, and, unfortunately, the national popular vote just doesn’t matter in presidential elections beyond conferring bragging rights. If it did, we’d be remembering the presidencies of Al Gore and Hillary Clinton.

This does not mean national polls are useless by any means. Their typically larger samples make them essential for understanding both trend lines and the performance of candidates among different groups of voters. And unlike state polls, they are both frequent and diverse, making averages more reliable. In some states, polling is dominated by pollsters with dubious methodologies and records, making the averages suspect as well. And it bears remembering that the national-popular-vote winner has indeed won the presidency in 23 of the past 25 elections spanning a century.

But until the dust has settled, it will be difficult for highly informed Harris backers to forget the fact that in 2020 the final national polling averages at FiveThirtyEight showed Biden leading Trump by 8.4 percent and it still wound up being a nail-biter. So while you should definitely read national polls, it would be a good idea not to believe they necessarily predict the winner.

 

It’s a very close presidential election, so unsurprisingly Team Trump is looking for an illicit edge, as I explained at New York:

With the major-party presidential candidates in close battles in a sparse landscape of battleground states, every electoral vote matters. There are scenarios where either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump wins 269 or 270 electoral votes. Part of the underlying picture is that each of them has been expected to snag a single Electoral College vote from one of the two states (Maine and Nebraska) that allocate them by congressional district. Biden won the Omaha-based Second Congressional District of Nebraska in 2020, when Trump won the largely rural Second Congressional District of Maine. Polls are showing the same outcome is likely this year.

So the two campaigns have hungrily looked at a potential gain or loss of an electoral vote if either state adopted a winner-take-all system. But only Nebraska, pushed aggressively by Team Trump, has seriously moved toward taking that step in 2024. It hasn’t happened yet, in part because of internal Nebraska Republican dissension and in part because Maine Democrats have threatened to retaliate and make the whole exercise pointless. But now, at the very last minute, the heist may be back on, as the Nebraska Examiner reports:

“The national Republican push to help former President Donald Trump win all five of Nebraska’s Electoral College votes is ramping up again, and this time it might work.

“Nebraska Gov. Jim Pillen on Wednesday hosted two dozen state senators at the Governor’s Mansion, along with Secretary of State Bob Evnen, the state’s chief election official.

“Several who attended the meeting said some senators who had wavered earlier showed more support now for changing Nebraska to the winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes this year.”

Pillen has talked off and on in recent weeks about calling a special session of the legislature (the state’s second this year) to give Trump this very special gift if he could secure the votes to overcome a likely Democratic-led filibuster. Now he’s bringing in some outside help:

“State senators at Wednesday’s meeting at the Governor’s Mansion heard from Trump ally U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., about the national security and economic stakes if voters don’t return Trump to the White House.

“A national GOP spokeswoman said Graham’s visit shows how seriously Republicans are treating the need for Trump to win Nebraska’s 2nd District. Some have argued it could break a 269-269 Electoral College tie.”

One Republican legislator involved in this skullduggery dismissed complaints about such a last-minute change by citing the substitution of Harris for Biden on the Democratic side. Apparently, rules of fair play no longer matter, if they ever did, to Trump’s backers.

So why didn’t Pillen (and Lindsey Graham, and Trump’s other operatives) put on a full-court press earlier? This explanation from Politico Playbook is persuasive:

“Back in April, when the Nebraska idea was first gaining steam, Maine’s Democratic House Majority Leader Maureen Terry issued a statement indicating that if Nebraska made such a move, she would push for a like-for-like move in her state, which delivered one electoral vote to Trump in 2016 and 2020.

“[Democratic] Gov. Janet Mills would be required to call a special session of the legislature. But the stickier wicket is in the timing: A bill only becomes law in Maine 90 days after it’s passed, unless the bill receives a two-thirds vote in each chamber (Democrats currently have majorities, but not supermajorities). We’re 46 days away from Nov. 5, and 87 days from Dec. 16, when electoral votes are set to be cast.”

More than likely, the electoral-vote robbers chose to postpone their gambit until it was too late for Democrats to neutralize the theft in Maine.

It appears the effort to nail down the votes needed to pull off the Nebraska heist will come down to a very small handful of state senators. All sorts of horse-trading could ensue. But there are good odds Republicans will “rig” the Electoral College by one vote, and unless a creative lawsuit is in the offing, no one will be able to do anything about it.

 

One of the many variables affecting the 2024 election is the plethora of ballot measures to protect abortion rights on state ballots, which I wrote about at New York.

After many months of signature-gathering on petitions and lots of maneuvering in state courts, ballot measures to expand or protect abortion rights have been certified for general-election ballots in ten states: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, and South Dakota. Two (in Maryland and New York) were referred by legislators and confirm rights already protected by statutes, while eight were citizen referred. This is more impressive than you may think: Only 17 states allow citizen-referred constitutional amendments, and after this year, fully 14 states whose legislatures enacted abortion bans will have voted on abortion ballot measures seeking to overturn them. Pro-choice advocates have won all seven ballot fights (four in the deep-red states of Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, and Ohio and another in the battleground state of Michigan) since the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Roe v. Wade; there is a significant chance the winning streak could expand to 17 in November, in an astonishing confirmation of the breadth and depth of support for abortion rights.

We don’t have significant public polling in some states, but everywhere (including in the deep-red states of Missouri and South Dakota), advocates for expanding or defending abortion rights seem to have an advantage. It’s telling that one of the few signs of hope for the anti-abortion cause is in Florida, and that’s only because the state has a 60 percent supermajority requirement for constitutional ballot initiatives. Meanwhile, an abortion-rights victory is all but assured in Arizona, Colorado, Maryland, and Nevada. In Montana, it’s worth noting that voters rejected a 2022 ballot measure to restrict abortions.

There are some complications to this generally bright picture for abortion rights. In Nebraska, anti-abortion voters succeeded in certifying for the ballot a competing initiative that would constitutionally ban abortion after the first trimester; the standard is technically less draconian than the state’s current 12-week ban but would set back abortion rights and is clearly designed to confuse voters. If that initiative and the primary measure restoring the Roe viability standard both pass, the one that gathers the most votes will be implemented. In South Dakota, a legal effort failed to keep the abortion-rights initiative off the ballot, but courts are allowing a trial over the anti-abortion movement’s complaints, which could in theory make an enacted amendment unenforceable.

In New York, the decision to nestle abortion-rights protections into a broader equal-rights constitutional amendment could be backfiring, as Politico explains:

“An issue that should have been as easy a win in New York as it has been for Democrats across the nation is now at risk of backfiring because of how they chose to craft the amendment.

“The pushback from the right has relied heavily on anti-trans rhetoric, a line of attack that internal polling shows has proven persuasive to voters in battleground House districts, three people who have reviewed the data told POLITICO. They were granted anonymity to discuss the inside information.

“Without a well-funded campaign to defend and bolster the equality amendment, deep blue New York could reject a referendum in support of abortion rights — with dire national political implications for Democrats.”

It’s still hard to imagine New York voting against an equal-rights amendment, but it may be more difficult than expected.

If all ten pro-choice ballot initiatives succeed, there will be 18 states in which constitutions (either by explicit provision or state supreme court interpretations) prevent legislatures from banning abortion and another seven blue states where passage of a ban is extremely unlikely. That’s half the states, which leaves a lot of work to be done to reverse the damage wrought by the U.S. Supreme Court but a lot of work accomplished as well.