In a continuing effort to outline what the 2024 election returns did and did not mean, I offered some objections at New York to some of the triumphalist talk from MAGA-land.

While claiming victory on Election Night (this time credibly), Donald Trump was unrestrained in his interpretation of what it all means: “We had everybody, and it was beautiful. It was a historic realignment, uniting citizens of all backgrounds around a common core of common sense.”

As Lee Corso likes to say on College GameDay when one of his colleagues makes a confident prediction about how a football game will turn out, “Not so fast.”

The more you look at the election returns — which are still evolving as millions of votes are counted in California — Trump’s accomplishment remains impressive considering his chronic unpopularity and the long comeback he pursued after his 2020 defeat. But historic realignment isn’t the right term for a victory that could have been undone had Kamala Harris won a relatively small number of additional votes in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Trump’s steadily declining national popular-vote margin will wind up, according to Nate Silver’s estimate, at around 1.4 percent (lower than Hillary Clinton’s 2.1 percent in 2016), with his total votes at less than a majority and 3 percent more than he won in 2020. Again, that’s good for someone with Trump’s spotty record but pretty clearly attributable to his being the “change” candidate when the electorate was in an especially sour mood and angry about short-term trends in the economy and immigration.

Trump’s much-ballyhooed gains among Democratic “base” groups are significant but no better than those posted by George W. Bush 20 years ago before his party lost control of Congress and four years before Democrats reclaimed the White House in a near landslide. So perhaps the best way to characterize the situation is that Trump will have the opportunity to build a durable GOP advantage in a country that has been closely divided between the two parties for much of this century. But there are serious questions as to whether he has a plan for pulling it off or the self-restraint to avoid blowing up his coalition altogether.

As John Judis and Ruy Teixeira (who know a lot about premature realignment claims, having made their own in a famous 2002 book called The Emerging Democratic Majority) point out in a New York Times op-ed, Trump’s announced agenda isn’t particularly well designed to keep his 2024 coalition together, much less expand it:

“[T]here are plenty of issues that could fracture this coalition. Even immigration cuts both ways. He might try to carry out his promise of deporting millions of illegal immigrants, a project that could not just wreak havoc among families and in communities but also cause economic chaos.

“Or take tariffs. Mr. Trump’s working-class voters who lament the loss of jobs to China have supported his trade initiatives, including his plan to slap as high as a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods. But Mr. Trump’s first-term tariffs provoked retaliation from China and angered Republican farmers and Senate Republicans. Much higher tariffs could meet with opposition from Mr. Trump’s high-tech backers, who depend on the Chinese market, and from his financial donors, who still have investments in China. Unlike most Republican initiatives, tariffs, if successful, work by imposing short-term costs in prices in order to achieve long-term gains in jobs from otherwise endangered industries. It’s the short-term costs — another round of inflation, this time imposed by Mr. Trump — that might endanger the Republican coalition.”

Trump faces other obvious pitfalls, such as his “concept of a plan” to replace Obamacare with some health-care system that will likely shrink coverage and impose vast new costs on vulnerable people. As Judis and Teixeira note, Trump’s allies want to do a host of unpopular things — from RFK Jr.’s desire to ban vaccines to the anti-abortion movement’s hopes for banning abortion pills. Trump’s own promises to demolish federal aid to education and gut civil-service protections for millions of federal employees may please his MAGA “base” but not so much the new voters he temporarily attracted this year. And above all, there’s the question of whether the 45th and 47th president, who has run his last campaign, really cares enough about the long-term strength of the Republican Party to rein in his and his closest supporters’ more politically reckless tendencies. Judis and Teixeira discuss that factor as well:

“The final obstacle to a strong realignment is Mr. Trump himself, who is consumed with the quest for power and self-aggrandizement and appears eager to seek revenge against his detractors. Many of his difficulties during his first term stemmed from his own misbehavior, and he continues to revel in division and divisiveness.”

The challenge is hardly unique to Trump. Any electoral winner has to decide whether to expend the political capital victory brings on achieving goals regardless of the potential backlash or instead move cautiously to consolidate power. Nothing about Trump and his early steps (a Fox News gabber to run the Pentagon? Elon Musk acting as de facto vice-president?) suggests caution or a willingness to delay gratification; they in fact look strongly like overreach or, to use the classical term, hubris. Twenty years ago a triumphantly reelected Bush announced he would use some of his evident political capital to launch legislation to partially privatize Social Security. It backfired spectacularly and began the process whereby Bush squandered his election victory and blew up the many predictions of a permanent political realignment in his party’s favor. Trump and the GOP could avoid the same fate, but not if they think the incredibly hard work of breaking America’s partisan gridlock has already been done in a single election.