One of the central concerns of The Democratic Strategist has been to explore ways that Democrats can regain the support of a healthy majority of working-class voters, including white working-class voters, a group which accounts for about half of the electorate. Toward that end, Andrew Levison has a new TDS Strategy Memo entitled “Democratic Political Strategy is Developed by College-Educated Political Analysts Sitting in Front of Computers on College Campuses or Think Tank Offices . That’s Why the Strategies Don’t Work.” Levison, author of influential works of political analysis, including “The White Working Class Today: Who They Are, How They Think and How Progressives Can Regain Their Support,” argues that nearly all of the previous political analysis of white working-class voters “is profoundly and painfully superficial” because “It essentially visualizes working people as if they were isolated individuals sitting in their living rooms watching TV or reading a newspaper and thoughtfully evaluating the political messages and policy proposals that they see presented.” Further, Levison writes: “What is entirely ignored in this way of conceptualizing how workers make political choices is the massive effect of social and community life, of neighborhood and community institutions and a voter’s personal history and experience on their political perspective – on how daily interaction with friends, neighbors, co-workers and others in a workers’ neighborhood, workplace and community shape that person’s political attitudes.”
This is a very different perspective than the common wisdom embraced and regurgitated by many political analysts. As Levison notes further, “At first glance these articles appear to offer a vast range of distinct suggestions but when examined more closely can be seen to fall into three basic categories:
- Revise Democratic economic programs/policies: proposals range from suggesting that Democrats should support even more ambitious progressive economic proposals than those passed by the Biden Administration versus arguing that Democrats should adopt more business friendly policies and fiscal moderation.
- Revise Democratic positions on social policies: proposals range from insisting that there should be absolutely no retreat whatsoever from current progressive racial, gender, environmental and other positions versus recommendations that Democrats adopt instead various degrees of moderation
- Improve Democratic Messaging: proposals range from recommending that Democrats simply learn to express greater empathy and concern for working class voters to insisting that they recruit more candidates with working class backgrounds.
Quite literally 95% of the solutions proposed in the vast array of articles that have appeared since the election are based on suggesting some combination of positions in these three areas….In contrast, only one or two even mention the need to rebuild grass roots organizations and local Democratic parties in working class areas and not one discusses a strategy for achieving these goals in any detail….The major empirical arguments offered in support of one or another of these recommendations are invariably based on the analyses of statistical data that is produced by college educated political strategists and commentators who work sitting in front of computers on college campuses or think tank offices.”
Levison adds, “This is the result of the fact that the strategic recommendations are all based on three main sources of quantitative data — opinion polls, economic/ demographic data about different geographic areas and variations in election results between different electoral districts—this year either above or below Kamela Harris’s totals….In contrast, in the dozens of articles that have appeared since the 2024 elections, there are barely any political strategies that are based on extended sociological and ethnographic “in the field” research….This is a major weakness in Democratic thinking. It leads to the notion that Democratic “strategy” is essentially limited to three areas: (1) the design of social and economic policies (2) the crafting of political messages and (3) candidate selection….The vast majority of strategic analyses suggest that it is some mixture of these three that will produce a “secret sauce” of electoral success.” Unfortunately, notes Levison, “For professional political campaign managers this limitation seems entirely logical because for the most part they only work for 1 or 2 years on any one specific campaign and as a practical matter the three areas above are the only ones that they can effectively influence. But this limited approach also filters up through every level of strategic discussion about broad, long-term political strategy and the future of the Democratic Party….The problem with this can be stated simply: it is profoundly and painfully superficial.”
In addition, as Levison writes: “What is entirely ignored in this way of conceptualizing how workers make political choices is the massive effect of social and community life, of neighborhood and community institutions and a voter’s personal history and experience on their political perspective – on how daily interaction with friends, neighbors, co-workers and others in a workers’ neighborhood, workplace and community shape that person’s political attitudes.” Levison cites the exceptional scholarship that probes these critical factors by Theda Skocpol, Lainey Newman and Stephanie Ternullo, and he notes other ground-breaking sociological studies by Arlie Russell Hochschild and Jennifer Sylva, and he writes “There is one fundamental strategic conclusion that flows from this analysis – a conclusion that profoundly challenges basic Democratic assumptions about the way Democratic politics should be conducted today….It can be stated simply. A Democratic political strategy that is entirely based on promoting Democratic programs, policies and messages can only have an extremely small impact on working class attitudes….Advertisements on TV or social media and speeches by candidates cannot deeply influence working class attitudes unless they are supported and reinforced by a working person’s circle of friends, neighbors, co-workers and other members of the local community….Without the social support of local institutions such as unions or progressive churches that in the past reassured a voter that a Democratic candidate or the Democratic party could be trusted because it was “on their side” few individuals will embrace a view just because it initially seems plausible when presented to them in a speech or TV ad….The result is that in modern politics variations in the specific policies and messages in a Democratic candidate’s platform can only make a significant difference in extremely close elections. In the vast number of red state districts across America today, on the other hand, the massive weight of community opinion makes most voters “follow the crowd.”….Many Democratic strategists will resist the conclusion that Democratic programs and policies can play only a very limited role. They deeply believe in the power and importance of policies and messages and will insist that the “right” policies and messages can somehow successfully break through the partisan divide and win workers’ support. For political commentators andcampaign managers this belief is central to their careers and professional lives….The alternative is deeply daunting – so much so that many Democrats will dismiss it as impossible. It is that Democrats need to gradually and systematically rebuild locally based community institutions that can win workers’ trust and act as a counterweight to the conservative/MAGA perspective that now dominates much of working class America.” Further, “The rebuilding of local Democratic organizations and grass roots community institutions in working class areas is inescapably a long, slow process that cannot be completed in a single election cycle. It will require years of patient effort before even very modest results can be seen….Democrats can either commit themselves to the long and hard struggle to rebuild an enduring progressive and Democratic presence in working class communities or accept that there will be no progressive change at all.” Read Levison’s whole memo right here.
Quite right: the party needs a stronger community-based presence. But who will decide and implement that? Who’s in charge of rebuilding? Everyone looks to insiders—the DNC or aspiring presidential candidates—for the answer. But I suggest the party should form a broadly diverse advisory board of non-insiders, and also, the idea of putting ideas and personalities to a daily test through a UK-style Shadow Cabinet (or “People’s Cabinet,” https://www.change.org/p/democrats-form-a-people-s-cabinet) has a lot of merit.
So, if a great deal of the problem is staffing, what changes are recommended regarding the role of staff in policy making?
Any recommendations on how to make changes to recruitment policies? At the DNC, the congressional/legislative campaign committees, etc?
And why are staff behaving this way? What are the incentives at colleges, internships, NGOs, etc that make them be so out of touch?
Even staff from working class backgrounds seem to cave to the woke “groups”.
If politicians made a more concerted effort to recruit staff for staff ideology instead of staff credentials, they would end up with a better mix.
Recruiting almost exclusively from elite colleges (even local ones) can lead to problems because these colleges have developed a very out of touch culture.