I wrote this insta-reaction to Trump’s victory at New York in the wee hours of the morning, after many hours of staring at numbers and trying to understand them. It’s probably as good an analysis as I can manage days later:
We will be debating the contours of Donald Trump’s comeback presidential victory over Kamala Harris for a good while. Certainly among Democrats, this close but conclusive defeat will be interpreted as flowing from a host of party weaknesses and candidate and campaign mistakes. And Republicans, as winners do, will likely over-interpret their success as representing a watershed victory that will turn into governing coalition that will last for decades.
The simplest explanation, though, may be the most compelling: This was a classic “change” election in which the “out” party had an advantage that the governing party could not overcome. Yes, the outcome was in doubt because Democrats managed to replace a very unpopular incumbent with an interesting if untested successor, and also because the GOP chose a nominee whose constant demonstration of his own unpopular traits threatened to take over the whole contest. In the end Trump normalized his crude and erratic character by endless repetition; reduced scrutiny of his lawless misconduct by denouncing critics and prosecutors alike as politically motivated; and convinced an awful lot of unhappy voters that he hated the same people and institutions they did.
Nobody for a moment doubted that Trump would bring change. And indeed, his signature Make America Great Again slogan and message came to have a double meaning. Yes, for some it meant (as it did in 2016) a return to the allegedly all-American culture of the 20th century, with its traditional hierarchies; moral certainties and (for some) white male leadership. But for others MAGA meant very specifically referred to the perceived peace and prosperity of the pre-pandemic economy and society presided over, however turbulently, Trump. When Republicans gleefully asked swing voters if they were better off before Joe Biden became president, a veritable coalition of voters with recent and long-standing grievances over conditions in the country had as simple an answer as they did when Ronald Reagan used it to depose Jimmy Carter more than a half-century ago.
Just as Democrats will wonder whether a candidate different from Harris would have won this election, Republicans ought to wonder whether anyone other than Trump would have won more easily without the collateral damage to their principles, their sensibilities, and their long-term prospects. It’s true that their craven surrender to Trump made it possible for his campaign to present a unified front that took him far along to road to victory in a polarized electorate, despite all sorts of private grumbling over his countless conspiracy theories and insults to opponents. But it’s not clear at all Trump can bring the kind of change he came to represent to his voters. Indeed, the millions of people for whom inflation became not only an economic handicap but a symbol of government fecklessness could easily and quickly become disillusioned with Trump’s strange mix of protectionism and tax cuts if, as economists warn, it will rekindle inflation and spark global economic warfare. It’s a particularly troubling sign for the GOP that so many potential Trump hirelings and allies have wildly conflicting expectations of what he will actually do.
But for now, Trump’s unlikely comeback coincided almost entirely with an election in which voters wanted change enough to ignore or embrace the dark side of his legacy and agenda. It’s his luck and probably this country’s misfortune, but there’s nothing for it but to move ahead with fear and trembling.
I don’t see a path forward for Democrats on a “continue doing the same thing” basis.
Societal Trends
Even if inflation turns out to be a transitory issue, other trends point against Democrats. The most discussed in the media are:
1. Gender polarization;
2. Racial and Age depolarization (leading to the completion of multiracial working class realignment against Democrats);
3. Falling standards of living (specially due to housing costs);
4. Democratic cities switching from their support for immigration (due to Republican busing);
5. Skepticism about free trade (nearly total opposition to free trade among Republicans and general skepticism among Democrats);
6. Climate change never becoming a pressing concern (except among a small sliver of the electorate).
But there are additional ones that deserve more attention:
7. Blue states are losing population (meaning loses of House districts and less weight in the Electoral College);
8. Work from home has allowed people to move out of cities, further compounding #7;
9. College enrollment is down in general (increasing the weight of the working class and age/class depolarization);
10. College enrollment of males is much lower (compouding gender polarization);
11. Abortion restrictions are being lifted via referendums in the states (making the issue less important and allowing ticket splitting);
12. Gay marriage is no longer as dividing an issue, but transgender issues are becoming even more divisive (even among liberals) as they concern not general questions of equality but specific ones about certain very complex (and very rare) contexts (sports, prisons) and the whole issue of the rights of minors versus parents versus government;
13. Voters in red states have been using referendums to deal with economic questions (specially minimum wage and sickness and parental leaves), so they don’t need to vote for Democrats in order to get these things.
The Texas referendum on wealth taxes shows they would not be easy to implement.
Voters got rid of open primaries and ranked choice voting in Alaska and rejected it in several other places. The National Popular Vote Compact is stuck and moving it forward would also require referendums.
In this cycle Democrats have lost the last 3 Senate seats that were “borrowed” from red states: Ohio, Montana and West Virginia. There is only one borrowed seat from blue states: Maine. The path forward for Democrats in the Senate depends exclusively on persuasion and either very strong left candidates or very weak right ones.
To govern effectively Democrats need to win the presidency via the Electoral College, the House of Representatives, 60 senators (or 50 senators willing to get rid of the filibuster) and have a majority of the Supreme Court. (Taking back the Senate and Supreme Court require wins in consecutive terms or a total rout of the GOP.)
Looking Back
Democrats have only had this sort of win in contemporary history one time: after the Great Recession and the failures of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (and with a male Black candidate).
Before that Bill Clinton won because Ross Perot (standing against NAFTA) took away a lot of Republican votes. (Before Clinton was elected in 1992 the last Democratic President was elected in 1976.)
Clinton was reelected because of the economy and Obama was reelected despite it (because Romney embodied Wall Street).
Biden was elected because voters, even the ones that vote for Trump, think there are serious character and governance issues with Trumpism.
Looking Forward
Trump explains economic problems with free trade. He has settled on tariffs and deportation (anti-globalization) as the main policy.
Democrats don’t have a coherent explanation for economic problems. That means their internal unity on any economic issue is also lacking.
Fear of deficit driven inflation will now further taint any discussions about expanding government programs. Centrist elites will demand that they be paid for.
If taxes on the very rich are taken off the table, then the only path forward is for rich Democrats to tax themselves. Election results on this question aren’t very promising either.
A lot of congressional Democrats hid behind Manchin and Sinema, but we would soon find out that there are several additional Manchins/Sinemas in the Senate and House even if Democrats won again.