The following article, “What Democrats Can Learn From Morena,” by Juan David Rojas, is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:
On June 2, 2024, Claudia Sheinbaum was elected Mexico’s first female and Jewish president. Her party, the ruling National Regeneration Movement (Morena), secured landslides at virtually all levels of government. Just five months later across the Rio Grande, former Vice President Kamala Harris and the Democratic Party lost to Donald Trump and the GOP. Democrats’ 2024 loss culminated a post-pandemic backlash against incumbents—with the left-wing Morena representing a notable exception. The party, moreover, has bucked the trend of Brahminization among left-of-center parties that cater to college-educated professionals at the expense of a bygone working-class constituency.
Founded in 2014 by the political juggernaut Andrés Manuel López Obrador—known popularly as AMLO—Morena would become wildly popular in the ensuing decade. In 2015 following congressional midterms, the party held just 35 of 500 seats in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. By 2018, Lopez Obrador became the first self-described leftist to win the presidency in almost five decades, securing 55 percent of the vote. President Sheinbaum—AMLO’s successor and protege—won by a margin of 33 points, representing 61 percent of votes cast. A Gallup poll found that AMLO ended his term with an 80 percent approval rating while Sheinbaum has enjoyed even higher marks of 85 percent. Morena and its allies now control 24 of 32 state governorships, 530 of 1113 state legislative seats, and two-thirds of both houses of congress.
What explains the appeal of the most popular political movement in the Americas? Ask legacy media and you’ll find extended diatribes on Mexico’s purported “democratic backsliding” under Morena. Ask apologists of leftist tyrants—such as Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega—and they will explain that Morena’s success is the obvious result of its righteous anti-imperialism. In reality, the party maintains a meticulous commitment tofiscal responsibility, democratic governance, and material populism. In the same vein, AMLO’s 2018 victory was the culmination of decades of coalition building as well as the cumulative failings of his predecessors.
After 2000, the end of one-party rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) spawned a competitive multiparty system centered around the centrist PRI, conservative National Action Party (PAN), and leftist Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD). Until AMLO’s election in 2018, no party won more than a plurality for either the presidency or congress. In 2000, AMLO was elected PRD Mayor of Mexico City, where Sheinbaum served as his environment secretary. He received widespread recognitionfor reducing poverty, expanding infrastructure and improving public security.
Lopez Obrador later ran for president in 2006 and 2012 in a coalition with the hard-left Labor Party (PT) and progressive Citizen’s Movement (MC). In 2006, AMLO lost with 36.06 percent of the vote to PAN-candidate Felipe Calderon’s 36.69 percent in an election marked by irregularities. In 2012, he secured 32.4 percent, losing to the PRI’s 39.2 percent under Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN).
Peña Nieto went on to reform welfare, education, and energy policy in a unity coalition with the PRI, PAN and PRD. The notorious 2013 energy reform allowed private firms to compete with the state oil and electricity giants Pemex and CFE. The nationalist wing of the PRD—including AMLO and Sheinbaum—denounced the betrayal by the party’s congressional leadership and founded Morena. For context, the Mexican left has championed state control of the country’s energy sector since its 1938 nationalization by President Lázaro Cárdenas—an idol within the governing coalition.
Having lost two consecutive elections to both the PAN and the PRI, Lopez Obrador cultivated a big-tent coalition in support of Morena, one that would promote ideological diversity on cultural issues while maintaining a shared, populist vision on material concerns. Lopez Obrador himself was widely regarded as traditionalist-to-conservative on moral and social matters. Ahead of congressional midterms in 2015, he stated that issues such as abortion and gay marriage were “not very important” to the newly formed Morena.
The party joined a coalition with the PT and the conservative Evangelical Social Encounter Party (PES); the rump PRD and progressive MC subsequently allied with the PAN in a comparable big-tent coalition. An indefatigable populist in the spirit of William Jennings Bryan, AMLO visited all 2,477 of Mexico’s municipalities ahead of the 2018 election where he promised to usher a “Fourth Transformation,” a reference to the preceding Mexican Revolution, Reforms of Benito Juarez, and War of Independence. The 4T—itself a shorthand for the governing coalition—would overturn 40 years of neoliberalism augured by the PRI and PAN.
Between 1976 and 1994, the minimum wage lost 75 percent of its inflation-adjusted value before stagnating until 2018. In the eyes of policymakers, low wages and weak labor rights would maintain Mexico’s comparative advantage under NAFTA and prevent a repeat of the spiraling debt and inflation of the 1980s. Morena rejected these paradigms and hiked the minimum wage from $2,650 pesos a month in 2018 to $8,400 (about $500 USD) in 2025—in real terms, a 150 percent increase. The administration also passed reforms promoting unionization and banning subcontracting, itself a convenient method for employers to avoid paying workers bonuses and other benefits.
The result was that real wages in Mexico rose 40 percent by the start of Sheinbaum’s term. Inflation, moreover, returned to pre-pandemic levels of 4 percent by 2023, with unemployment falling to a record low of 2.5 percent since 2024. All the more remarkable is the fact that GDP growth in Mexico has been mediocre, averaging less than two percent a year since 2018. And yet, wages under the PRI and PAN were so low that hikes have also benefited businesses large and small due to the subsequent boom in the country’s internal market. Unsurprisingly, both AMLO and Sheinbaumhave received high marks for their management of the Mexican economy.
A master in branding, Lopez Obrador also slashed government bureaucracy under the moniker of “Republican Austerity.” Unlike the oxymoronic Department of Government Efficiency, which has pursued destructive cuts for their own sake, Republican Austerity served the discrete purpose of streamlining redistributive efforts. Middlemen, including foreign NGOs, were axed from the distribution of means-tested cash transfers, which were reformed into universal programs such as an old-age stipend for seniors 68 and older.
The administration also executed a mass building spree, often using the military to circumvent red tape. Megaprojects such as the Maya Train, Tehuantepec Interoceanic Corridor, and Olmeca oil refinery were deliberately situated in poor southern states to attract jobs, tourism, and investment. Consequently, Mexico’s south has grown at a faster rate than other regions for the first time in decades.
None of this has compromised the country’s finances. Despite the pandemic, Mexico’s debt-to-GDP under Morena has remained stable at 50 percent, with the country’s cumulative budget deficit averaging just 3.5 percent. Refusing to also raise taxes, Morena enforced an aggressive crackdown on corporate tax evasion, with revenues from large firms doubling since EPN’s term. In contrast to the endless boom and bust of its Latin American peers, low but stable growth under the penny-pinching Morena has delivered lasting results. A 2024 report from the World Bank found that 10 millionleft poverty during AMLO’s term.
To tout these achievements, Lopez Obrador continued a tradition from his time as mayor: daily press conferences known as mañaneras. An avid admirer of the New Deal, the mañaneras served a similar function as FDR’s fireside chats, allowing AMLO to lash out at a mostly hostile media and set the government’s agenda. The three-hour affairs consisted of everything from history lectures to screeds against the corrupting influence of ‘el nintendo’ on Mexican youth.
While left-wing and materially populist in substance, much of the bible-quotingpresident’s rhetoric was moralistic and conservative in form. In his telling, privatizations and financial deregulation were part and parcel of rule by a cosmopolitan, technocratic elite that disdained workers’ traditional values. “[Mexican] cultural, moral, and spiritual values come from the people and the family, not from academia or the media—and especially not from politics or economic elites. It comes from the people,” he said during a 2021 mañanera.
In Mexico, opposition toward the former president came almost exclusively from middle- and upper-class professionals. An idiosyncratic friend of Donald Trump, AMLO was also universally hated by American centrists and progressives for policies deemed “problematic.” On energy, his government rejected the twin evils of market and climate fundamentalism. Under the PRI and PAN, market reforms and insufficient investment in state refineries led oil production to decline from four million barrels per day in 2004 to two million by 2013, ballooning Pemex’s debt and leading to a greater reliance on U.S. oil imports.
The subsequent privatization of Mexico’s energy market in 2014 led to an even greater fall in production, as the inefficient Pemex failed to adequately compete with foreign multinationals. As in California after the 1990s, the imposition of competition within CFE’s natural monopoly led electricity prices to jump 35 percent by 2017. AMLO subsequently rescued Pemex, increased oil production, and began construction of the aforementioned Olmeca refinery, though the latter has been plagued with delays and accidents.



