The following article, “Forecast for Democratic Party Renewal: Cloudy with a chance of rain” by Ruy Teixeira, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of major works of political analysis, is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:
There seems to be general agreement that Democrats need to radically transform their party image. The second election of Donald Trump and the subsequent failure of the party to gain favor in voters’ eyes even as many of Trump’s actions are notably unpopular suggests that Democrats have a “yuck” factor that just isn’t going away.
Can the Democrats accomplish such a renewal of their party’s brand? On the plus side there are a number of Democratic-aligned organizations focusing on the party change imperative and promulgating useful analyses and suggestions. These include the new Searchlight Institute, the new Majority Democrats group of Democratic officeholders, the Welcome Party (whose terrific new data-driven report, “Deciding to Win,” is cited below) and the more venerable Progressive Policy Institute and Third Way. Their ideas are not without support in significant sectors of the Democratic party, including House moderates, some Senators, and some who appear to be intent on contending for the 2028 Democratic presidential nomination.
This is promising, but of course the pushback has been fierce from those in the party who believe the party’s image merely needs a few strategic tweaks to become enticing to voters. This includes a huge contingent of Democrats who are not really interested in anything that distracts from the party line that Trump-is-a-fascist-and-everything-he-does-is-wrong. And there are those who, astoundingly, believe the solution lies in the Democrats becoming even more progressive! It’s just a fact that energy in the Democratic Party seems to be coming preponderantly from these quarters, not from the reformers.
Moreover, it’s not even clear that the reformers are offering stern enough medicine to cure what ails the party or, even if they were, that sympathetic politicians would actually be willing to push for truly decisive breaks with party orthodoxy. This can be illustrated by referring to recent work that demonstrates just how steep a hill Democrats have to climb and how, therefore, half-measures will likely be inadequate.
1. The Democrats’ image isn’t as bad as you think—it’s worse! The treasure trove of data in the new “Deciding to Win” report clarifies just how bad things are. Here’s a chart on what voters think Democrats do prioritize versus what voters think they should prioritize. At the top are issues Democrats vastly underprioritize (securing the border, lowering everyday costs, lowering the rate of crime, creating jobs and economic growth); at the bottom are issue Democrats vastly overprioritize (protecting the rights of undocumented immigrants, protecting the rights of LGBT+ Americans, raising taxes to increase spending on social programs, promoting DEI). Ouch.
Further illustrating this problem, take a look at this chart of unpopular Democratic policies. Some have not had really serious support within the party but quite a few have—indeed, some have become closely associated with what it means today to be a Democrat.
Read more here.
If Ruy Teixeira insists on urging Democrats substantially to the right, the least he can do is offer an explanation for why the 21st century has been almost invariably lethal to moderates. And no, this does not mean horribly exaggerating the role primary challenges have played in this. I notice this is a popular cope of centrists, but half of the moderate Republican decline and nearly all the moderate Democratic decline was in general elections instead.
Because absent a convincing argument that we’ve seen a quarter-century (!) of accidents, the following thesis is both logical and a vindication of those Teixeira has been ridiculing:
A. Trump supporters have nowhere near the respect for the moderate alternative as Reagan supporters did. And make no mistake, that is primarily what has happened to the center. Whether this is polarization or a more partisan punditry (including online influencers) is up for debate.
B. As a result of A, the base mobilization strategy is a lot sounder than it used to be because the moderate path makes so little of a difference. I know some have tried to say this is a myth out of a refusal to show weakness, but the two presidential elections with Bill Clinton in the White House just happened to rank among the lowest turnouts ever. Also, urban turnout was down big time in 2024, and moderate Republicans John McCain and Mitt Romney had a base enthusiasm disadvantage against Barack Obama. This can’t all be a coincidence.
C. A and B apply to Republicans as well. I know many progressives will also not want to read this for their own reasons, but the Dwight Eisenhower model depends on the support of people who will never vote for them significantly outnumbering the MAGAs who would stay home over that.
In order to argue for base mobilization one needs to explain why key elements of the base have endorsed Trump. Is it purely because of economics?
That’s easy. There were always culturally conservative elements of the black, Asian, and Latino communities, they just voted Democratic for anti-racist reasons. This is why during the Republicans’ generation of irrelevance in California, that state has had a more mixed record on ballot measures. Polarization is terminating this contradiction.
It should be noted that although Kamala Harris was the second Democrat since 1988 to lose the popular vote, she did better with whites and seniors than John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, even Barack Obama the second time. And the same with whites and better with seniors than Joe Biden. So, this isn’t a one-way street.
You may quibble with all this but if centrism could win cultural conservatives of color over, Krystin Sinema would still be a Senator. Instead, she retired in the face of polling giving her no chance.
Post-Trump 2024 polarization is driving a permanent surge of support for Democrats?
How about Post-Trump 2016 or Post-Trump 2020? When will we ever see the Post-Trump dividend leftists and liberals promise us?
Or Democrats need to keep a permanent surge in polarization to win elections? How? On which issues?
How does your insistence on base mobilization deal with actual facts like declining party identification and the existence of actual swing voters who actually determine elections?
Low information/participation voters are now more likely to be Republican. Highly polarized elections no longer automatically favour Democrats. Does your strategy take this into account? How?
Your constant refusal to talk specific issues is a huge red flag.
Your choice of Sinema is instructive as she was an identity politics centrist (on sexual orientation) that refused to do something as minimal as voting for an increase of the federal minimum wage. She was not known for being particularly culturally conservative. She went along with a lot of Biden’s cultural policies.
First, last night was not “A permanent surge in support for Democrats,” nor could it be. Inflation is up, job creation is down, and the tariffs and Big, Beautiful Bill poll badly. Knowing these things, you’d expect Democrats to do well.
As for your talk of dropping party ID…
https://news.gallup.com/poll/692978/democrats-regain-advantage-party-affiliation.aspx
And even if that isn’t so, a quarter-century of centrist decline. It’s too late for excuses. You say Sinema was “An identity politics centrist?” As I’ve said before, moderate Republicans (what few there are) have *not* been exempt. That would suggest that this is a much more fundamental thing than you like to think.
Party affiliation has become fluid. How is this consistent with the permanent effects of polarization you talk about?
Now this is an analysis based on facts, not confirmation bias which is Ruy’s go-to. And since when was there a Democratic policy of “abolishing the police and prisons”? Just a ridiculous analysis.