The following article, “The Democrats’ Class Gap Problem” by Ruy Teixeira, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of major works of political analysis, is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:
It’s not exactly news that Democrats have a yawning working-class hole in their coalition. Over time, they have shed both white and nonwhite working-class (noncollege) voters, while improving among college-educated voters—though it has varied by election which sector of the working class has contributed the most to Democratic losses. In 2024, it was nonwhite working-class voters. Given the policies and rhetoric of the Trump administration might it be possible that the pointer this election moves back to the white working class, leaving the Democrats’ class gap in support as large or larger than ever?
It might! In the latest New York Times/Siena poll, white college voters say they’ll vote Democratic in 2026 by 16 points (two-party vote), while white working-class voters favor the Republicans by 34 points. That makes for a 50-point class gap among whites, about doubling the analogous class gaps from 2024 and 2022 Congressional voting (28 and 24 points, respectively). The NYT/Siena poll shows a similarly-sized class gap in net Trump approval (approval minus disapproval) among whites—white college graduates lopsidedly disapprove of Trump, while the white working class lopsidedly approve.
Other data from the poll underscore this gap. On specific issues, white working-class voters approve of Trump’s handling of the economy by 25 points (compared to net 20 points disapproval among white college grads); on handling immigration, it’s net 27 points approval vs. net 24 points disapproval; on managing the federal government, it’s 28 points net approval vs. 24 points net disapproval; and on crime, it’s a whopping 33 points net approval among the white working class vs. 13 points net disapproval among white college voters.
Views on recent high profile policy issues are consistent with these ratings. By 40 points (69-29 percent), white working-class voters support “deporting immigrants living in the United States illegally back to their home countries”, while white college grads are split evenly. A similar gap can be seen on “the deployment of National Guard troops in Washington, D.C.” White working-class voters support the move by 21 points (55-34 percent), while white college voters are opposed by 23 points (60-37 percent).
And white college grads are highly likely to think the Trump has “gone too far” in these and similar areas: 58 percent think his immigration enforcement actions have gone too far, 59 percent feel the same about sending National Guard troops into big cities and 57 think pressuring colleges and universities has gone too far. In contrast, just 34 percent, 37 percent and 28 percent of the white working class, respectively, think the president has gone too far in these areas (the rest think what he’s done is about right or, more commonly, that he hasn’t gone far enough).
Finally, here’s a result from the poll that crystallizes this chasm in attitudes between white working-class and college voters. Voters were given a choice between these two statements about Trump’s time in office so far: “Donald Trump is cleaning up chaos and disorder,” or “Donald Trump is creating chaos and disorder.” By 25 points (61-36 percent), white working-class voters think he’s getting rid of chaos and disorder, while white college-grad voters are almost exactly the reverse; by 27 points (63-36 percent) they think Trump is creating chaos and disorder. Interesting!
When you think about it, this pattern of results makes a great deal of sense. Since Trump’s election, Democrats have spent their limited political capital on resisting Trump’s every move and denouncing them in the most histrionic terms—with the clear implication that anyone with mixed feelings or (worse) qualified support for some of his moves is enabling the destruction of democracy and the unleashing of evil upon the land. This is catnip for white college-grad voters, the one demographic among whom Democrats have made progress since the Obama years. But among white working-class voters, the Democrats’ perennial problem demographic, who strongly distrust the Democrats and feel that it’s about time someone did something about the problems Trump is addressing, this approach plays far less well.
Of course, Democrats since the election have been talking nonstop about the need to reach working-class voters. They’re not unaware their party is increasingly a vehicle for educated professionals, whose priorities are quite different and frequently opposed to those of vast sectors of the working class. They’re just not willing to do much about it except proclaim their deep affection for the working class and assure them they are on their side and are really, really concerned about the cost of living. Efforts to materially change the image of the party on difficult cultural issues have been assiduously avoided, save the occasional and tentative suggestion that perhaps those with unorthodox (or, heaven forfend, conservative) views should not be immediately drummed out of the party.
This is not adequate for closing the class gap and convincing working-class voters that they and the Democratic Party are on the same page. Not even close. A NYT/Ipsos poll found this disjuncture between Democratic priorities and personal priorities back in January:
A new poll from the Searchlight Institute shows little has changed since the NYT/Ipsos January poll. Three of the top four Democratic issue priorities are still seen as climate change, LGBTQ+ issues, and abortion (though climate change is now at the top, not abortion) and immigration and crime are at the bottom of the priority list.
Plus ça change plus c’est la même chose. The Democrats’ implicit white college-grad play might well work in the 2026 House elections, where their odds of taking enough seats to shift control look good. But it’s a lot less likely to work for the Senate, where Democrats need to pick up four seats and successfully defend all their incumbents including in Michigan (52 percent white working class among eligible voters according to States of Change estimates) and New Hampshire (55 percent). The Democrats’ target seats include must-have Maine (61 percent white working class), almost-certainly-needed Ohio (55 percent) and if-they-can’t-get-Texas Iowa (61 percent). Daunting!
Getting the love from white college voters may not be enough to scale this mountain. Or succeed in 2028 for that matter. The clock is ticking.
A clear test case on whether centrism can solve this problem has emerged across the Atlantic. Keir Starmer’s Labour government in the UK has made immigration harder and cut disability benefits. Still trailing Brexit king Nigel Farage’s Reform Party by a double digit average. The reason lies in what the decline of moderate politicians of both parties has told us over the last generation: The soft partisans who they have historically relied on have vanished as polarization has set in. Yes, I am saying that Bill Clinton could not hope to have half the same Southern strength today.
Your premises are questionable. Your description of the similarities between UK and US politics are misportrayals and oversimplifications.
Centrists in the US (aka as corporate Democrats -which includes a lot of Hispanic congressmembers eg Espaillat-) mostly support higher levels of (legal and illegal) immigration. Do you think this is not the case?
Yes, many leftists (eg AOC) also support increased immigration (they represent high illegal immigration districts after all).
But actual economics focused leftists have always opposed unrestricted immigration (eg Bernie Sanders -who was escoriated by neoliberals like Hillary for that reason-).
A few centrist analysts and advocates (eg Teixeira) have supported stricter immigration but have been systematically ignored. Only once Biden panicked did he change strategy. Nowadays Democrats (ie Schumer and Jeffries) are back to their illegal immigration backing (under the guise of humanitarianism) and give illegal immigrations welfare benefits stance.
So restricting immigration in the context of US politics has not really been based on “centrism”.
Yes Obama was deporter in chief but he also illegally implemented DACA. And his immigration grand bargain included increased indentured servant H1-B visas that most Democrats love.
Post-Brexit UK had some very high levels of immigration. Which is why the Conservatives have become so unpopular.
Labour tinkered with the rules but has actually barely done anything regarding immigration or anything else.
The main problem with your premise is that Labour is unpopular because even though it has 400 seats in the 650 House of Commons, it is still doing very few things.
So Labour is unpopular because it is seen as weak just like American Democrats, except American Democrats can point at institutional problems for not being able to govern.
Two problems Labour does have is first it exists in a context of incredible change in the British parliamentary system and second structural economic problems that the US actually doesn’t face.
Receiving only one third of votes and yet gaining 3/5 of seats creates a crisis of legitimacy that is even more difficult than the problems in the US. There are potential successors to Labour waiting in the sidelines that are already organized and have already crossed the governing threshold in the past. The wholesale collapse of the political system seems to have been accepted by the vast majority of the population (ie also the collapse of the Conservative party).
The UK is facing fiscal and competitiveness problems that are more difficult to manage for it than the US. The UK pound is nowhere near as important as the US dollar. The UK market is smaller. Deficits and debt are actual problems for the UK because it is a much smaller economy and has a lot trade vulnerabilities than the US.
Moving back to the US, yes centrists like Obama have in the past proposed grand bargains regarding some entitlements in the contexts of deficits.
But I don’t recall any Democrats proposing cuts to SSD. Certainly not in the past few years, during which if anything Democrats have moved in the direction of proposing expansions of Social Security.
Even neoliberal Democrats have not talked about cuts to the welfare state, even though in practice yes the party has gone along with not reversing the 1990’s GOP welfare reforms.
Currently the Democratic party is united against Medicaid cuts and opposed to work requirements (at least rhetorically).
Even Republicans have historically balked at SSD cuts. Even now Trump is only proposing minor tinkering.
The UK and US safety nets are designed very differently.
The UK actually adopted a much more strict welfare reform during the 90s (under Blair) than the US.
In the UK NHS is universal and sacrosanct and has crossparty support.
In the US Medicare mostly serves the old is also sacrosanct and has crossparty support. But Medicaid, CHIP and ACA, which together cover more populations don’t have GOP support (although they do have some popular support from the right). Then you have the whole issue with employer provided healthcare (supported by unions but opposed by many leftists and liberals) and healthcare savings accounts (etc) which complicated any analysis.
So how can these distinct situations be regarded as a test case that is similar enough to be in any way predictive?
It is never clear from what your write what you think Democrats should actually do.
On immigration should it move to defend de facto open borders? (Which is the only non-centrist non-moderate position.)
On welfare should it support getting rid of the 1990’s reforms and expand benefits? (Which again is the only non-centrist non-moderate position.)
First, I am less than receptive to attempts to point out the differences between U.S. and UK politics considering that didn’t hold anti-progressives back a centimeter when Jeremy Corbyn went down in flames. And considering the Brexit debate of the late 2010’s, not to mention how big an issue immigration is the UK (some say it’s the first, last, and only reason why Reform looks set to replace the Conservatives as the party of the British right), I would argue that the politics of these countries are more similar than in 2019, not less.
Considering that Rishi Sunak and now Keir Starmer have tightened immigration and not cut it, it’s time to admit that maybe, just maybe those who say that there’s almost no way to do it, meaning that a Prime Minister Farage would be destined to be deposed by his own party in short order (you can do that in the UK, you know).
I am rather surprised to see first past the post being used as a criticism of Labour considering the Conservative governments of the past were never hurt by that, despite left of center parties generally combining for popular vote majorities back then.
Your claim that moderate Dems generally support more immigration is flawed considering the Blue Dogs tended to support fairly conservative immigration policy. Also, the 2007 immigration compromise was defeated in an up-or-down vote in a Democratic Senate. So there goes that excuse for the centrist collapse.
Besides, what’s the explanation for the same thing having happened to moderate Republicans, who were bullseyed in the blue waves of 2006 and 2008? Only one I can think of is that moving to the center in pursuit of votes doesn’t work like it used to.
What big budget cuts did Obama support? He supported Social Security cuts as part of grand bargains in 2011 and 2013 that would have been overwhelmingly cuts. Wasn’t good enough for the Republicans, though they did just fine. See how that works?
All this is a long way of saying that just about every attempt that has been made to establish more to the demise of the center than meets the eye falls apart under scrutiny. And that’s not the half of it. To believe centrism hasn’t been tested fairly, you have to assume that, without exaggerating a bit, the past quarter-century of American history is a fluke. That is so far-fetched that it suggests that survival instincts on the part of moderates are trumping reason.
Plus, let’s say Jon Tester, Joe Manchin, and Kyrstin Sinema had been re-elected to the Senate last year, but the Republicans had still won a majority because Larry Hogan prevailed in Maryland. Under what circumstances would the likes of Texeira, Chait and Yglesias have not made them a favorite talking point of theirs? The answer or perhaps non-answer to that question matters.
The (proportionally) few supposedly Democrat and Republican centrists who have been defeated these past decades have not been moderates.
All of them have defended amnesty and legalization, including Blue Dogs and “moderate” Republicans. That makes them culturally far left. They were also economically far right, by defending increased levels of immigration in the context of “immigration reforms”. Do you disagree?
Portraying this mix of liberalism and libertarianism as somehow moderate is the trick of centrist neoliberals want to play on the working class. People don’t buy it.
Corbin did both better and worse than regular Labour, same as Bernie. They did better when focusing on economics and worse when pandering to the cultural left.
The US has been absolutely able to reduce levels of immigration at the border recently, including under Biden. This is a very well known fact. Do you deny this?
Primaries, gerrymandering and polarization all contribute to the removal of politicians who are not aligned with the core of their parties. Nobody is denying this.
You refuse to make any comments on the way forward. Why?
So I’ll ask again…
It is never clear from what your write what you think Democrats should actually do.
On immigration should it move to defend de facto open borders? (Which is the only non-centrist non-moderate position.)
On welfare should it support getting rid of the 1990’s reforms and expand benefits? (Which again is the only non-centrist non-moderate position.)
Can you point at Teixeira (or any other Democrat for the matter) advocating cutting disability benefits with a quote and a source?
First, you asked for me to cite an example of Democrats proposing changes to the safety net. I brought up Obama putting Social Security on the table. I met your condition. Don’t be nitpicking that now.
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1101/vote_110_1_00235.htm
As you can see in that link, the big immigration deal of 2007 that would have traded additional border security for a path to citizenship lost in a Democratic Senate with many Dems voting against it. So, no, immigration isn’t this unique issue in which just about all Democrats lean left. When moderates were significant, they were as prone to wavering on it as any other. Therefore, it’s no excuse for the fall of moderate Democrats.
Few moderate politicians lost their seats? If you just count 2024, that’s true, but it’s been the same story almost every election cycle of the 21st century. And they add up. Primaries account for like 30% of their decline, and some of those would have lost general elections. After all, the end of moderate Republicans’ significance just happened to coincidence with the blue tsunamis that closed out the Bush era.
As for what I think Dems should do? They probably should avoid saying stupid things like “gas the Jews” that too many critics of Israel in the streets did in 2023 and 2024. But it shouldn’t overlook polarization and how it has killed moderates.
But I must admit that I tend to subscribe to political science’s belief that elections are largely decided on how well the country is running. Contrary to popular narratives, you would expect what COVID inflation did to prices to oust the Dems in 2024. And so it did.
You gave me my own example of Obama’s Social Security grand bargain, but I asked you to provide a recent example, not one from 18 years ago. It is not nitpicking if you can’t provide a recent one. Avoidance.
You completely avoided my point that there has never been an immigration reform bill that completely ruled out amnesty and legalization. Avoidance.
My point about few moderate politicians losing their seats is that I want you to talk about the recent past (not more than 2 decades ago). Avoidance.
Your example of what Democrats should do is weird given how much public opinion is turning against Israel (which I actually disagree with -as I fundamentally agree with your argument but art the same time believe it is basically a hyperbolic straw man argument-). Avoidance.
If “elections are largely decided on how well the country is running” (which I don’t dispute, but would qualify), then why didn’t Covid oust several right wing governments worldwide or at least reduce their popularity?
And once again, why do you avoid my key questions on what to do regarding immigration and welfare reform?
Actually, there has been an immigration compromise that more or less did it the Republicans way. Just last year. The Republicans turned it down but still won. I know. It was supposedly too little too late. With moderates having been in electoral decline for a college student’s age, it’s far later for excuses. You may not want to talk about two decades ago, but that’s how long moderates have been getting voted out of office. The fate of Manchin, Tester, and Sinema prove that it’s not even close to being over. Relevant.
The reason COVID didn’t get governments voted out was because it created a “rally around the flag” panic atmosphere that actually tended to boost the popularity of governments everywhere. The approval ratings of Prime Ministers Justin Trudeau and Boris Johnson went up during COVID, for examples.
OK, 2011 and 2013 was a long time ago. But Obama’s approval rating tanked to 38% right after his proposed cuts in 2011 (although dropping unemployment did save him) and the election cycle after he did it again in 2013 was a red wave.
And you will still not answer about your own personal thoughts about what to do now…
Immigration? Welfare?
You still refuse to clearly answer what to do regarding immigration and welfare reform…
Democrats are willing to break with precedent to placate the college educated voters that have pushed for a shutdown without even convincing the rest of the party.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-news-poll-shutdown-trump-democrats-republicans/
Basically because the groups dictate so to a weakened Schumer.
https://www.slowboring.com/p/the-groups-have-learned-nothing?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=159185&post_id=175102971&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=ecbqk&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
But are totally unwilling to listen to what potential swing voters actually are saying.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/young-trump-voters-frustration-economy-immigration-focus-group-rcna234493?fbclid=IwY2xjawNQ4k1leHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFUUVRGZ2tCZWpZU2lLSG9UAR7v8qRaYQfKrvONPpQX36U7qIl5takskwU5XQMRR-3MvVsBuvvcN53bLqT6iw_aem_G3yimEN_hYTUDqRceXtSow
“Among the nine participants who disapproved of Trump’s job performance, just one said they would have voted for Harris over Trump if given the opportunity to redo their vote.
Apart from that look backward, these voters had several choice words to describe the Democratic Party right now, almost all of them negative, including “hateful,” “crybabies,” “selfish,” “lazy,” “ignorant,” “spiteful,” “opportunistic,” “trivial” and “divisive.”
They did offer some advice for Democrats looking to win them over, advice that largely reflected a view the party is too influenced by its left flank or hate of Republicans.”