washington, dc

The Democratic Strategist

Political Strategy for a Permanent Democratic Majority

Month: January 2011

A Budgetary-Bait-and-Switch: But Which?

House Republican spending-cut talk has been all over the lot during the last year. Remember Paul Ryan’s 2010 “Road-Map” document, designed to shut up critics who said GOPers were unwilling to commit to any specifics? Republicans soon backed away from the Road-Map because it included major structural changes in Social Security and a “voucherization” of Medicare. GOP interest in “entitlement reform” was also undercut by the failure of the Bowles-Simpson commission to draw much support from either party for a entitlement-cuts-for-tax-increases deal.
A focus on discretionary spending as opposed to entitlements was also encouraged by the emergence of current-year appropriations as the flashpoint of the deficit debate. And even before that, Republicans incautiously threw out a $100 billion figure for immediate appropriations cuts in their campaign-stretch-run “Pledge to America.” John Boehner eventually backed off that number, arguing that it was measured from Obama appropriations requests rather than actual spending. And then, this week, the hyper-conservative and very influential House Republican Study Committee released a proposal for very, very large permanent cuts in non-defense discretionary spending that would accompish both the $100 billion first-year target and a supposed ten-year harvest of $2.5 trillion (with lots of magic asterisks thrown in for TBD across-the-board reductions); the numbers suggest a 40% reduction over what would be necessary to continue current services. Maybe this is just a mine canary to test the willingness of Republicans to support cuts far beyond anything ever seriously proposed in the past, but House Majority Leader Eric Cantor immediately made positive noises about the package.
With me so far? The next cookie on the plate was the announcement that Paul Ryan would provide the official GOP response to the State of the Union Address.
So where are Republicans headed on spending? One thing that’s clear is that none of their proposals include defense or homeland security spending. A second thing that’s clear is that it’s entirely possible to promote discretionary cuts in the short-term and entitlement cuts later on (indeed, the Road-Map backloads entitlement cuts by “grandfathering” current beneficiaries). And a third thing that’s clear is that Republican squeamishness on big domestic appropriations cuts is a product of the popularity of most of the programs they would cut, not some concern about the impact on the economy. Republicans appear to have fully and universally drunk the kool-aid of 1930s-era belief that cutting public employment or public benefits somehow can’t damage the economy via reduced consumer demand.
On this last point, the most telling recent quote was from RSC member Tom McClintock (R-CA):

Presidents like Hoover and Roosevelt and Bush … and now Obama, who have increased government spending relative to GDP all produced or prolonged or deepened periods of economic hardship and malaise.

So don’t expect Republicans to embrace the pump-priming Keynsian theories of that notorious socialist Herbert Hoover.
The Democratic response to this mania will obviously depend on which budgetary strategy the GOP decides to pursue. It’s clear some sort of bait-and-switch from Tea Party “cut it all” rhetoric will occur, but whether Republicans will lurch in the direction of shutting down whole major federal functions or going after Social Security and Medicare is very much in the air.


TDS Co-Editor William Galston: Why I Miss President Eisenhower

This item by TDS Co-Editor William Galston is cross-posted from The New Republic.
As preparation for President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union address, I’ve reread two noted presidential speeches delivered days apart, half a century ago. I need not dwell on JFK’s inaugural; many of us know its stirring cadences by heart. Its cardinal virtue is courage; its mood, audacity; its ambition, not just global but galactic. It is a young man’s speech, self-consciously so.
Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell address is the surprise. It is remembered, of course, for its warning against the “acquisition of unwarranted influence … by the military-industrial complex.” But the real point of the speech is moral. Eisenhower cautions against “any failure traceable to arrogance.” He highlights the perennial temptation to believe that “some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties.” Meeting the challenge of a hostile ideology calls for, “not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle.”
We are required, Eisenhower insists, to think not just of ourselves, but of posterity. In words even more relevant today than 50 years ago, he declares that “we–you and I, and our government–must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.”
The foundation stone of Eisenhower’s farewell address is the necessity of preserving balance in all things–“balance between the public and private economy; balance between cost and hoped for advantage; balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the moment. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.”
Consistent with this theme is Eisenhower’s celebration of bipartisanship. “Our people,” he says, “expect their president and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the nation.” Fortunately, he continues, their expectations have not been disappointed: In his eight presidential years, “the Congress and the administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the nation should go forward.”
The tone of Eisenhower’s speech is pacific throughout. Rather than a summons to greatness, it is a warning against hubris. If the cardinal virtue of JFK’s speech is courage, that of Eisenhower’s is prudence. Courage finds its natural home in war; prudence is a virtue for all seasons. In many ways we are a better country than we were 50 years ago. Nonetheless, I cannot help wondering whether, in the process of becoming better, we have lost, first our balance, then our way. In a moment of exasperation, the president I served once complained that we’re all Eisenhower Republicans now. We could do worse.


Decision Time

This item is cross-posted from The New Republic.
The Republican Party–and indeed much of the media establishment–is living in a fantasy world when it comes to 2012. To hear most of the pundits and soothsayers tell it, the presidential nominating contest is still a long way off. The GOP heavies we’ve been talking about since 2008, such as Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, Newt Gingrich, Sarah Palin, and Tim Pawlenty, are all terribly flawed: Mitt’s got his RomneyCare; Newt has been a national pariah; Huck has money problems; Palin is toxic outside her base; and T-Paw induces narcolepsy. But the entire presidential field will change, we are told, when a white knight (possibly handsome, possibly not), comes riding in to save the day. Everything will be different when Mitch Daniels enters the race, the argument goes. You’ll stop scoffing when Mike Pence gets here!
To which I say, look at the calendar. The truth is that if the Republicans’ Galahad is going to save the day, he needs to announce before midnight, and midnight is fast approaching. As Dave Weigel recently pointed out, at this point four years ago, 15 would-be presidents (eight Republicans, seven Democrats) had launched exploratory committees or announced candidacies. And eight years ago, by this time, five Democrats–all of the major candidates other than Wesley Clark–had at least formed exploratory committees, and two had formally announced. Today, in contrast, only the radio talk-show host Herman Cain has launched an exploratory committee. All of the other potential candidacies remain notional and virtual, built around leadership PACs, buzz-generating book tours, and flashy travel announcements.
The simple fact is that, for a white-knight candidate to actually win the nomination, this kind of virtual campaign is not enough. Consider the hurdles that a real, substantive presidential bid must surmount. The first contest of the election takes place on March 11, when the Iowa branch of Ralph Reed’s Faith and Freedom Coalition holds a candidate “forum,” which is another word for “debate.” And the first major event in the 2012 cycle–the Ames, Iowa, Republican Straw Poll–is scheduled for August 13, 2011, less than eight months from now. It is not what you’d rightly call an optional event for anyone who wants to win or place in the 2012 Iowa Caucuses. The straw poll is this election cycle’s major fundraiser for the Iowa GOP, and its sponsors are making it abundantly clear that anyone who skips Ames might as well skip the Caucuses. This event requires either a big operation that will bus eager Republicans to Ames, or the kind of passionate team support that Mike Huckabee had in Iowa in 2008. It cannot be dialed in.
Right now, only four putative candidates can afford to ignore this ticking clock: Romney, Huckabee, Gingrich, and Palin. Each has enough name ID, or prior experience on the presidential campaign trail, that they won’t be hurt by waiting until just prior to the straw poll, or even later, before going official. And there are currently two others, Tim Pawlenty and Rick Santorum, who are already spending enough time in Iowa to prepare for the first contest. (Another possible candidate, Minnesota’s Michele Bachmann, will soon dip her toes into the Iowa waters, buoyed by a personal connection to Iowa’s own fire-breather, Representative Steve King. Particularly if Palin takes a pass on 2012, Bachmann could be quite formidable.) For everyone else, time is a-wasting. It’s hard to imagine any of the potential white knights–John Thune, Mitch Daniels, Mike Pence, Haley Barbour–becoming credible, much less formidable, unless they take the plunge very soon.
It’s not just about Iowa: New Hampshire, where Mitt Romney has a big early lead in polls; and South Carolina, where two of the big dogs of Tea Party-era conservatism, Jim DeMint and Nikki Haley, could have a big impact via endorsements, require early attention too. Despite all the changes the Republican Party has undergone, its nomination contest remains a state-by-state slog in which a few key victories are dispositive. Just ask Rudy Giuliani, whose failed 2008 candidacy vividly demonstrated once again how futile it is to pretend you can ignore the early states altogether, or ask Fred Thompson, a powerful on-paper candidate who couldn’t overcome his own unwillingness to campaign like a wolverine in heat.
Barbour, Daniels, Thune, and Pence may walk tall in Washington, and they can raise money quickly, but they are not particularly well known to the rank-and-file outside their own states. Barbour has to spend time overcoming the poor impression made by his recent clumsy defense of civil-rights-era Mississippi. Daniels has infuriated social conservatives–who dominate the Iowa Caucuses, and who are obsessed with overturning the state’s gay marriage law–by calling for a “truce in the culture wars.” If he is to have any chance at all, he needs to decamp to Des Moines immediately and spend the next several months begging them for forgiveness. Thune has to work to show he’s something other than handsome and inoffensive. And Pence may or may not be running for governor of Indiana. If any of them wants to score a win on the ground in Iowa, New Hampshire, or South Carolina, he will have to confront these p.r. problems and begin campaigning seriously more or less now. Otherwise, we should all admit that the field of legitimate contenders for the Republican nomination looks like this: Romney, Huckabee, Gingrich, Palin (or Bachmann in her absence), and Pawlenty. Talk about anyone else is just a sign of denial.


POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ABSTRACTS – JANUARY 2011

From American Journal of Political ScienceThe Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification
David E. Campbell, John C. Green, Geoffrey . Layman
We argue that the factors shaping the impact of partisanship on vote choice–“partisan voting”–depend on the nature of party identification. Because party identification is partly based on images of the social group characteristics of the parties, the social profiles of political candidates should affect levels of partisan voting. A candidate’s religious affiliation enables a test of this hypothesis. Using survey experiments which vary a hypothetical candidate’s religious affiliation, we find strong evidence that candidates’ religions can affect partisan voting. Identifying a candidate as an evangelical (a group viewed as Republican) increases Republican support for, and Democratic opposition to, the candidate, while identifying the candidate as a Catholic (a group lacking a clear partisan profile) has no bearing on partisan voting. Importantly, the conditional effect of candidate religion on partisan voting requires the group to have a salient partisan image and holds with controls for respondents’ own religious affiliations and ideologies.
Gendered Perceptions and Political Candidacies: A Central Barrier to Women’s Equality in Electoral Politics
Richard L. Fox, Jennifer L. Lawless
Based on the second wave of the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study, we provide the first thorough analysis of how gender affects women and men’s efficacy to run for office. Our findings reveal that, despite comparable credentials, backgrounds, and experiences, accomplished women are substantially less likely than similarly situated men to perceive themselves as qualified to seek office. Importantly, women and men rely on the same factors when evaluating themselves as candidates, but women are less likely than men to believe they meet these criteria. Not only are women more likely than men to doubt that they have skills and traits necessary for electoral politics, but they are also more likely to doubt their abilities to engage in campaign mechanics. These findings are critical because the perceptual differences we uncover account for much of the gender gap in potential candidates’ self-efficacy and ultimately hinder women’s prospects for political equality.
How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court
Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns, Patrick C. Wohlfarth
Although scholars increasingly acknowledge a contemporaneous relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions, debate continues as to why this relationship exists. Does public opinion directly influence decisions or do justices simply respond to the same social forces that simultaneously shape the public mood? To answer this question, we first develop a strategy to control for the justices’ attitudinal change that stems from the social forces that influence public opinion. We then propose a theoretical argument that predicts strategic justices should be mindful of public opinion even in cases when the public is unlikely to be aware of the Court’s activities. The results suggest that the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions is real, substantively important, and most pronounced in nonsalient cases.
From British Journal of Political Science
Research Article
Downs, Stokes and the Dynamics of Electoral Choice
David Sanders, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley
January 2011
ABSTRACT
six-wave 2005-09 national panel survey conducted in conjunction with the British Election Study provided data for an investigation of sources of stability and change in voters’ party preferences. The authors test competing spatial and valence theories of party choice and investigate the hypothesis that spatial calculations provide cues for making valence judgements. Analyses reveal that valence mechanisms – heuristics based on party leader images, party performance evaluations and mutable partisan attachments – outperform a spatial model in terms of strength of direct effects on party choice. However, spatial effects still have sizeable indirect effects on the vote via their influence on valence judgements. The results of exogeneity tests bolster claims about the flow of influence from spatial calculations to valence judgments to electoral choice.
‘The Arithmetic of Compassion’: Rethinking the Politics of Photography
James Johnson
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Compassion, theorists from Arendt to Nussbaum suggest, carries an ineluctable pressure to identify with individual suffering. The very idea of a politics of compassion verges on incoherence. Politics typically demands attention to the aggregate and it is just there that compassion falters. This is a problem for critics addressing the politics of photography, who typically presume that the point of photographs must be to elicit compassion among viewers. But a proper understanding of compassion makes this presumption highly problematic. The role of compassion in exemplary writings on the politics of photography reflects a fixation with ’emblematic’ individual subjects in ‘classic’ American documentary practice, which prevents critics from properly grasping the best of contemporary documentary. The conclusion is that promoting solidarity provides a more plausible, if elusive, aim for the politics of photography.
National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern about Immigration in Britain and the United States
Daniel J. Hopkins
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Theories of inter-group threat hold that local concentrations of immigrants produce resource competition and anti-immigrant attitudes. Variants of these theories are commonly applied to Britain and the United States. Yet the empirical tests have been inconsistent. This paper analyses geo-coded surveys from both countries to identify when residents’ attitudes are influenced by living near immigrant communities. Pew surveys from the United States and the 2005 British Election Study illustrate how local contextual effects hinge on national politics. Contextual effects appear primarily when immigration is a nationally salient issue, which explains why past research has not always found a threat. Seemingly local disputes have national catalysts. The paper also demonstrates how panel data can reduce selection biases that plague research on local contextual effects
From Electoral Studies
Uncovering the Micro-foundations of Turnout and Electoral Systems
Tse-hsin Chen
January 2011
ABSTRACT
This paper tackles the micro-foundations of voting and addresses why proportional representation systems (PR) are associated with higher turnout than majoritarian systems (SMD). I argue that individual evaluations of the differential benefit in the calculus of voting are affected by spatial party competition framed by electoral institutions. Unlike PR, SMD constrains the number of parties and creates large centripetal forces for party competition, which reduces the perceived benefits of voting. A citizen’s voting propensity is related to the distance between her preferred policy position and those of her most- and least-favored parties. I use multilevel modeling to analyze individual voting decisions structured by aggregate variables across 64 elections. The empirical findings confirm the argument and the mechanism holds both in established and non-established democracies.
From The Journal of Politics
When Candidates Value Good Character: A Spatial Model with Applications to Congressional Elections
James Adams, Samuel Merrill III, Elizabeth N. Simas and Walter J. Stone
January 2011
ABSTRACT
We add to the literature that examines the relationship between candidate valence and policy strategies by arguing that candidates intrinsically value both the policies and the personal character of the winning candidate. In making this argument, we distinguish between two dimensions of candidate valence: strategic valence refers to factors such as name recognition, fundraising ability, and campaigning skills, while character valence is composed of qualities that voters and candidates intrinsically value in office holders, including integrity, competence, and diligence. Our model considers challengers who value both the policies and the character-based valence of the incumbent and assumes that the incumbent’s policy position is fixed by prior commitments. Under these conditions, we show that challengers who are superior to the incumbent in their character-based valence have incentives to moderate their policy positions. We report empirical tests of this good-government result of our model, using data on the 2006 congressional elections.
The Role of Candidate Traits in Campaigns
Kim L. Fridkin and Patrick J. Kenney
January 2011
ABSTRACT
We examine how candidates shape citizens’ impressions of their personal traits during U.S. Senate campaigns. We look at the personality traits emphasized by candidates in their controlled communications and in news coverage of their campaigns. We couple information about campaign messages with a unique survey dataset allowing us to examine voters’ understanding and evaluations of the candidates’ personalities. We find that messages from the news media influence people’s willingness to rate the candidates on trait dimensions. In addition, negative trait messages emanating from challengers and the press shape citizens’ impressions of incumbents. In contrast, voters’ evaluations of challengers are unmoved by campaign messages, irrespective of the source or tone of the communications. Finally, we find citizens rely heavily on traits when evaluating competing candidates in U.S. Senate campaigns, even controlling for voters’ party, ideological, and issue preferences.
Do Women and Men Know Different Things? Measuring Gender Differences in Political Knowledge
Kathleen Dolan
January 2010
ABSTRACT
That women exhibit lower levels of political knowledge than men is a common and consistent finding in political science research. Recently, scholars have begun examining whether the content and structure of political knowledge measures contribute to women’s perceived knowledge deficit. In an attempt to enter the debate on the explanations for gender differences in knowledge, I create and test a number of measures of gender-relevant political knowledge to determine whether broadening our definitions of what constitutes “knowledge” may help us more clearly understand the apparent gender gap in political knowledge in the United States. The results indicate that expected gender differences disappear when respondents are asked about the levels of women’s representation in the national government.
The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Based Approach
Alan S. Gerber, Daniel P. Kessler and Marc Meredith
January 2011
ABSTRACT
During the contest for Kansas attorney general in 2006, an organization sent out six pieces of mail criticizing the incumbent’s conduct in office. We exploit a discontinuity in the rule used to select which households received the mailings to identify the causal effect of mail on vote choice and voter turnout. We find these mailings had a politically significant effect on the challenger’s vote share, which is statistically significant in most, but not all, of our specifications. Our point estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the amount of mail sent to a precinct increased the challenger’s vote share by 1.5 to 3.5 percentage points. Furthermore, our results suggest that these mailings had little mobilizing effect, suggesting that the mechanism for this increase was persuasion.
Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation
Nicholas A. Valentino, Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz and
Vincent L. Hutchings
January 2011
ABSTRACT
A large literature has established a persistent association between the skills and resources citizens possess and their likelihood of participating in politics. However, the short-term motivational forces that cause citizens to employ those skills and expend resources in one election but not the next have only recently received attention. Findings in political psychology suggest specific emotions may play an important role in mobilization, but the question of “which emotions play what role?” remains an important area of debate. Drawing on cognitive appraisal theory and the Affective Intelligence model, we predict that anger, more than anxiety or enthusiasm, will mobilize. We find evidence for the distinctive influence of anger in a randomized experiment, a national survey of the 2008 electorate, and in pooled American National Election Studies from 1980 to 2004.
The Long-Term Dynamics of Partisanship and Issue Orientations
Benjamin Highton and Cindy D. Kam
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Partisanship and issue orientations are among the foundational concepts for behavioral researchers. We seek to understand their causal relationship. One view suggests that party identification, as a central and long-standing affective orientation, influences citizens’ issue positions. Another view claims that issue orientations influence party identification. We take both theories into account in this article and argue that the direction of causality may depend upon the political context. Using the Political Socialization Panel Study, we analyze the long-term dynamic relationship between partisanship and issue orientations. The results from our cross-lagged structural equation models are inconsistent with a single, time-invariant, unidirectional causal story. The causal relationship between partisanship and issue orientations appears to depend upon the larger political context. In the early period from 1973 to 1982, partisanship causes issue orientations. In the later period, from 1982 to 1997, the causal arrow is reversed, and issue orientations significantly shape partisanship.
A Genome-Wide Analysis of Liberal and Conservative Political Attitudes
Peter K. Hatemi, Nathan A. Gillespie, Lindon J. Eaves, Brion S. Maher, Bradley T. Webb, Andrew C. Heath, Sarah E. Medland, David C. Smyth, Harry N. Beeby, Scott D. Gordon, Grant W. Montgomery, Ghu Zhu, Enda M. Byrne and Nicholas G. Martin
January 2011
ABSTRACT
The assumption that the transmission of social behaviors and political preferences is purely cultural has been challenged repeatedly over the last 40 years by the combined evidence of large studies of adult twins and their relatives, adoption studies, and twins reared apart. Variance components and path modeling analyses using data from extended families quantified the overall genetic influence on political attitudes, but few studies have attempted to localize the parts of the genome which accounted for the heritability estimates found for political preferences. Here, we present the first genome-wide analysis of Conservative-Liberal attitudes from a sample of 13,000 respondents whose DNA was collected in conjunction with a 50-item sociopolitical attitude questionnaire. Several significant linkage peaks were identified and potential candidate genes discussed.
From PS: Political Science & Politics
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: The Predicted Midterm Landslide
James E. Campbell
January 2011
ABSTRACT
The “Seats in Trouble” forecasting model predicted in mid-August that Republicans would gain a landslide number of seats in the 2010 elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, and that this number would be sufficiently large to restore their majority control of the House, which was lost in the 2006 midterms. Republicans were predicted to gain approximately 51 or 52 seats, about the magnitude of their 1994 midterm victory and the largest seat change since the Truman-Dewey election of 1948. As predicted, on Election Day, Republicans won a landslide number of seats, enough to give them a substantial House majority.
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: Forecasting House Seats from Generic Congressional Polls: A Post-Mortem
Joseph Bafumi, Robert S. Erikson and Christopher Wlezien
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Based on information available in July, we predicted that the Republicans would receive 52.9% of the total House vote and end up holding 229 seats, gaining control from the Democrats in the process (Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien 2010b). Our national vote forecast proved to be nearly correct, undershooting the actual Republican share (53.8%) by slightly less than one percentage point. Our seat forecast was a little less accurate. Although we did foresee the House changing hands, we did not predict such a large Republican windfall in seats–we forecast a “mere” swing of 50 seats, which was short of the actual outcome by about 13 seats. The Republican seat total of 242, however, was well within the 95% confidence interval (199 to 259).
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: Congressional Forecasts: Theory Versus Tracking in 2010
Michael S. Lewis-Becka1 and Charles Tien
January 2011
ABSTRACT
In our recent article forecasting the 2010 U.S. congressional elections, we argue for a model based on theory rather than tracking (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2010). A sound theoretical explanation of vote choice in House races should, ceteris paribus, predict better than a simple dependence on variables that proxy the vote, such as the generic ballot question. We posited a simple but classical explanation of the 2010 House vote–the referendum model–in which voters punish or reward the party in power according to its performance in office and the time available for that performance. In words, the model reads: House Seat Change = f(Economy, Popularity, Midterm). A measurement of these variables, at lags appropriate for forecasting, yields the estimates (OLS) of model 1, shown in column 1 of table 1. Model 1 gives a forecast of −22 seats for the Democrats in 2010, when, in fact, they scored about −60 seats. The model 1 forecast appears “wrong” in two senses. First, substantively, it fails to predict the Republican takeover of the House. Second, scientifically, it is off by over two standard errors of estimate (i.e., 38/17 > 2.0). Why did the model get it wrong this time, when the forecast was off by only one seat in the last midterm in 2006? To answer this question, the specifications of the model need consideration. Such consideration signals the scientific value of the forecasting exercise in providing a systematic trial-and-error method for model improvement.
Postmortems of the 2010 Midterm Election Forecasts: Assessing The 2010 State Legislative Election Forecasting Models
Carl Klarner
January 2011
ABSTRACT
This brief note reports the accuracy of my two forecasts for the 2010 state legislative elections, one made on July 22 and reported in the October 2010 issue of this journal (the “PS model”; Klarner 2010a), and the other made on September 18 and reported in the October issue of Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics (i.e., the “Forum model”; Klarner 2010b). Both models used presidential approval, the state of the economy, and midterm loss as national-level predictor variables, while the later forecast also used Gallup’s generic ballot question asking respondents which party they would vote for in the upcoming U.S. House election. The PS model predicted the Republicans would pick up 11 chambers, while the Forum model forecast a 15-chamber pickup. In actuality, the Republicans picked up 21 chambers, in contrast to the average 3.2-net chamber shift in party control toward one party or the other from 1962 to 2008. While both forecasts understated the extent of the Republican wave, the July forecast especially did. Overall, the Forum forecast did a good job of predicting the Republican wave, calling about three-fourths of its magnitude.
Partisan Vision Biases Determination of Voter Intent
Peter A. Ubel and Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher
January 2011
ABSTRACT
In close, disputed elections, outcomes can depend on determinations of voter intent for ballots that have been filled out improperly. We surveyed 899 adult Minnesotans during a time when the state’s U.S. Senate election was still disputed and presented them with ambiguous ballots similar to ballots under dispute in the same election. We randomized participants to three experimental groups, across which we varied the names on the ballot. We found that participants’ judgments of voter intent were strongly biased by their voting preferences (p < .002 in all four ballots). From Political Behavior
Mobilizing Collective Identity: Frames & Rational Individuals
Christy Aroopala
January 2011
ABSTRACT
Mobilization of collective identities is a common tool in election campaigns and policy debates. Frames that target group identity can mobilize groups; however it is unclear when these group frames are likely to be successful. This project explores whether moderators, or factors that limit framing effects, can help predict whether individuals will respond to group mobilization attempts. Drawing on the rational choice approach, I assess whether the presence of thresholds (i.e. rules that determines how far the group is from attaining its goal) works as a moderator of framing effects. Using a voting game laboratory experiment, I analyze the impact of group frames when distance from a fixed threshold varies and when we account for differences in group identity strength. The findings indicate that the interaction of group identity strength, group frames, and moderators of frames has an important impact on participation, suggesting that environmental factors play a significant role in group mobilization.


POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ABSTRACTS – DECEMBER 2010

From The American Political Science Review
Dynamic Public Opinion: Communication Effects over Time
DENNIS CHONG and JAMES N. DRUCKMAN
December 2010
ABSTRACT
We develop an approach to studying public opinion that accounts for how people process competing messages received over the course of a political campaign or policy debate. Instead of focusing on the fixed impact of a message, we emphasize that a message can have variable effects depending on when it is received within a competitive context and how it is evaluated. We test hypotheses about the effect of information processing using data from two experiments that measure changes in public opinion in response to alternative sequences of information. As in past research, we find that competing messages received at the same time neutralize one another. However, when competing messages are separated by days or weeks, most individuals give disproportionate weight to the most recent communication because previous effects decay over time. There are exceptions, though, as people who engage in deliberate processing of information display attitude stability and give disproportionate weight to previous messages. These results show that people typically form significantly different opinions when they receive competing messages over time than when they receive the same messages simultaneously. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for understanding the power of communications in contemporary politics.
Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment
ALAN S. GERBER, GREGORY A. HUBER and EBONYA WASHINGTON
December 2010
Abstract
Partisanship is strongly correlated with attitudes and behavior, but it is unclear from this pattern whether partisan identity has a causal effect on political behavior and attitudes. We report the results of a field experiment that investigates the causal effect of party identification. Prior to the February 2008 Connecticut presidential primary, researchers sent a mailing to a random sample of unaffiliated registered voters who, in a pretreatment survey, leaned toward a political party. The mailing informed the subjects that only voters registered with a party were able to participate in the upcoming presidential primary. Subjects were surveyed again in June 2008. Comparing posttreatment survey responses to subjects’ baseline survey responses, we find that those reminded of the need to register with a party were more likely to identify with a party and showed stronger partisanship. Further, we find that the treatment group also demonstrated greater concordance than the control group between their pretreatment latent partisanship and their posttreatment reported voting behavior and intentions and evaluations of partisan figures. Thus, our treatment, which appears to have caused a strengthening of partisan identity, also appears to have caused a shift in subjects’ candidate preferences and evaluations of salient political figures. This finding is consistent with the claim that partisanship is an active force changing how citizens behave in and perceive the political world.
Competition between Specialized Candidates
STEFAN KRASA and MATTIAS POLBORN
December 2010
Abstract
Opposing candidates for a political office often differ in their professional backgrounds and previous political experience, leading to both real and perceived differences in political capabilities. We analyze a formal model in which candidates with different productivities in two policy areas compete for voters by choosing how much money or effort they would allocate to each area if elected. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median voter model. Although candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. From a welfare perspective, candidates are “excessively moderate”: almost certainly, a majority of voters would prefer that the winning candidate focus more on his or her strength.
Political Consequences of the Carceral State
VESLA M. WEAVER and AMY E. LERMAN
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Contact with the criminal justice system is greater today than at any time in our history. In this article, we argue that interactions with criminal justice are an important source of political socialization, in which the lessons that are imprinted are antagonistic to democratic participation and inspire negative orientations toward government. To test this argument, we conduct the first systematic empirical exploration of how criminal justice involvement shapes the citizenship and political voice of a growing swath of Americans. We find that custodial involvement carries with it a substantial civic penalty that is not explained by criminal propensity or socioeconomic differences alone. Given that the carceral state has become a routine site of interaction between government and citizens, institutions of criminal justice have emerged as an important force in defining citizen participation and understandings, with potentially dire consequences for democratic ideals.
From British Journal of Political Science
Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting
Samuel Abrams, Torben Iversen and David Soskice
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their own survey data, the authors argue that the ISN model can explain individually rational non-altruistic turnout. If group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically.
From Electoral Studies
Measuring party positions and issue salience from media coverage: Discussing and cross-validating new indicators
Marc Helbling and Anke Tresch
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Recent studies have started to use media data to measure party positions and issue salience. The aim of this article is to compare and cross-validate this alternative approach with the more commonly used party manifestos, expert judgments and mass surveys. To this purpose, we present two methods to generate indicators of party positions and issue salience from media coverage: the core sentence approach and political claims analysis. Our cross-validation shows that with regard to party positions, indicators derived from the media converge with traditionally used measurements from party manifestos, mass surveys and expert judgments, but that salience indicators measure different underlying constructs. We conclude with a discussion of specific research questions for which media data offer potential advantages over more established methods.
Do voters affect or elect policies? A new perspective, with evidence from the U.S. Senate
David Albouy
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Using quasi-experimental evidence from close elections, Lee et al. (2004) – henceforth LMB – argue competition for voters in U.S. House elections does not affect policy positions, as incumbent Senate candidates do not vote more extremely if elected than non-incumbents. Despite stronger electoral competition and greater legislative independence, similar results, shown here, hold for the Senate. Yet, the hypothesis that voters do not affect policies conflicts with how Senators moderate their positions prior to their next election. LMB-style estimates appear to be biased downwards as junior members of Congress prefer to vote more extremely than senior members, independently of their electoral strength. Corrected estimates are more favorable to the hypothesis that candidates moderate their policy choices in response to electoral competition.
The dynamic political economy of support for Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential election campaign
Thomas J. Scotto, Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg, Jason Reifler, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, Paul Whiteley
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In recent years, students of voting behavior have become increasingly interested in valence politics models of electoral choice. These models share the core assumption that key issues in electoral politicds typically are ones upon which there is a widespread public consensus on the goals of public policy. The present paper uses latent curve modeling procedures and data from a six-wave national panel survey of the American electorate to investigate the dynamic effects of voters’ concerns with the worsening economy–a valence issue par excellence–in the skein of causal forces at work in the 2008 presidential election campaign. As the campaign developed, the economy became the dominant issue. Although the massively negative public reaction to increasingly perilous economic conditions was not the only factor at work in 2008, dynamic multivariate analyses show that mounting worries about the economy played an important role in fueling Barack Obama’s successful run for the presidency.
Policy attitudes, ideology and voting behavior in the 2008 Election
William G. Jacoby
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This article examines the impact of policy attitudes and ideology on voting behavior in the 2010 U.S. presidential election. The analysis uses data from the 2008 American National Election Study. The empirical results indicate that the 2008 election should not be regarded as a simple referendum on the George W. Bush presidency. At the same time, voting behavior was not particularly aligned along stark policy divisions; the direct effects of issue attitudes were confined largely to the most sophisticated stratum of the electorate. Finally, liberal-conservative orientations did affect citizens’ political attitudes and candidate choices in ways that are fairly unique, compared to other recent elections.
The dynamics of candidate evaluations and vote choice in 2008: looking to the past or future?
Roy Elis, D. Sunshine Hillygus, Norman Nie
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we leverage a 10-wave election panel to examine the relative and dynamic effects of voter evaluations of Bush, Palin, Biden, McCain, and Obama in the 2008 presidential election. We show that the effects of these political figures on vote choice evolves through the campaign, with the predictive effects of President Bush declining after the nominees are known, and the effects of the candidates (and Palin), increasing towards Election Day. In evaluating the relative effects of these political figures on individual-level changes in vote choice during the fall campaign, we also find that evaluations of the candidates and Sarah Palin dwarf that of President Bush. Our results suggest a Bayesian model of voter decision making in which retrospective evaluations of the previous administration might provide a starting point for assessing the candidates, but prospective evaluations based on information learned during the campaign helps voters to update their candidate preference. Finally, we estimate the “Palin effect,” based on individual-level changes in favorability towards the vice-presidential nominee, and conclude that her campaign performance cost McCain just under 2% of the final vote share.
Transformation and polarization: The 2008 presidential election and the new American electorate
Alan I. Abramowitz
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Along with the unpopularity of President Bush and the dire condition of the U.S. economy, changes in the composition of the American electorate played a major role in Barack Obama’s decisive victory in the 2008 presidential election. The doubling of the nonwhite share of the electorate between 1992 and 2008 was critical to Obama’s election as African-American and other nonwhite voters provided him with a large enough margin to overcome a substantial deficit among white voters. In addition, voters under the age of 30 preferred Obama by a better than 2-1 margin, accounting for more than 80 percent of his popular vote margin. Despite the overall Democratic trend, the results revealed an increasingly polarized electorate. Over the past three decades the coalitions supporting the two major parties have become much more distinctive geographically, racially, and ideologically. The growth of the nonwhite electorate along with the increasing liberalism and Democratic identification of younger voters suggest that a successful Obama presidency could put the Democratic Party in a position to dominate American politics for many years. However, these trends appear to be provoking an intense reaction from some opponents of the President. The frustration and anger displayed at “tea party” demonstrations and town hall meetings may reflect not just discomfort with Barack Obama’s race but the perceived threat that Obama and his supporters represent to the social status and power of those on the opposing side.
The personal vote and voter turnout
Joseph W. Robbins
December 2010
ABSTRACT
The level of electoral turnout is arguably the most widely monitored form of electoral participation. Consequently, electoral systems have often been cited as having a significant effect on turnout levels even though scholars do not agree on the effects of these complex institutions. Since most previous studies have relied on categorical or dichotomous electoral system indicators, this study utilizes Carey and Shugart’s personal vote index to gain theoretical leverage on other electoral system components. In short, I find that where electoral competition is predicated on party, rather than candidates’, reputations, turnout levels rise. The results of a time-series cross-sectional analysis reveal that the personal vote index significantly influences turnout levels even when controlling for a host of other factors.
From Political Research Quarterly
Beyond Supply and Demand: A Feminist-institutionalist Theory of Candidate Selection
Mona Lena Krook
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Dynamics of candidate selection are central to political representation. The dominant model used to study the case of women focuses on the supply of and demand for female aspirants. This article develops a critique of this approach, by drawing on two sets of theoretical tools: institutionalism and feminism. It subsequently elaborates an alternative perspective on candidate selection based on configurations of three kinds of gendered institutions: systemic, practical, and normative. The utility of this approach is then explored through three paired comparisons of cases in which quota policies have been introduced, disrupting some but not necessarily all aspects of gendered institutional configurations.
Campaign Effects on the Accessibility of Party Identification
J. Tobin Grant, Stephen T. Mockabee and J. Quin Monson
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This study uses response latency, the time required for a survey respondent to formulate an answer upon hearing a question, to examine the accessibility of partisan self identifications over the course of a political campaign season. Although the aggregate distribution of partisanship remains fairly stable during the campaign, party identifications become more accessible to individuals with weaker party identifications as the election approaches. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the authors find that partisan orientations are more useful in forming political judgments when those orientations are more accessible to the voter. The effect of partisanship on vote choice is a third greater for voters with highly accessible party identifications than for those with less accessible party identifications.
Candidate Gender and Voter Choice: Analysis from a Multimember Preferential Voting System
Gail McElroy and Michael Marsh
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Women are greatly underrepresented in elected office. A large literature on the subject has considerably advanced our understanding of this phenomenon, but many questions remain unanswered. Using original aggregate and individual-level data, the authors explore the interplay of candidate gender, partisanship, incumbency, and campaign spending in a multimember preferential voting system. This setting allows unparalleled exploration of the heterogeneous nature of voter decision making. The authors find little evidence for an independent effect of candidate gender on voter choice. Voters do not discriminate against women even in an electoral environment that affords them this opportunity without any cost to their partisan preferences.
Serving Two Masters: Redistricting and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Michael H. Crespin
December 2010
Abstract
This article explores the consequences for representation after a redistricting by reexamining the finding that members of Congress will alter their voting behavior to fit their new district. Specifically, it applies partisan theories of congressional organization to test if members are changing their behavior on all or just some votes. The results indicate that representatives adjust their roll call behavior to fit their new districts on votes that are visible to their constituents. However, when it comes to votes that are important to the party for controlling the agenda (i.e., procedural votes), members do not respond to changes in the district.
Obama and the White Vote
Todd Donovan
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This article draws on the racial threat thesis to test if white voters who lived in areas with larger African American populations were less receptive to Barack Obama in 2008. Racial context is found to structure white voters’ evaluations of Obama and, thus, affect where the Democrats gained presidential vote share over 2004. The overall Democratic swing was lower in states where a white Democrat (Hillary Clinton) had more appeal to white voters than Obama. Obama increased the Democrats’ share of the white vote, but gains were associated with positive evaluations of Obama among white voters in places with smaller African American populations. The likelihood that a white voter supported Obama also decreased as the African American population of the respondent’s congressional district increased. The results are relevant to discussions of the future of the Voting Rights Act and to conceptions of a “postracial” America.
Voters, Emotions, and Race in 2008: Obama as the First Black President
David P. Redlawsk, Caroline J. Tolbert and William Franko
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Social desirability effects make it difficult to learn voters’ racial attitudes. List experiments can tap sensitive issues without directly asking respondents to express overt opinions. The authors report on such an experiment about Barack Obama as the first black president, finding that 30 percent of white Americans were “troubled” by the prospect of Obama as the first black president. The authors examine policy and emotional underpinnings of these responses, finding that expressed emotions of anxiety and enthusiasm condition latent racial attitudes and racial policy beliefs especially for those exhibiting a social desirability bias. The results suggest that Obama’s victory despite this level of concern about race was at least in part a result of intense enthusiasm his campaign generated. This enthusiasm for Obama may have allowed some white voters to overcome latent concerns about his race. The research suggests emotions are critical in understanding racial attitudes.
Race and Turnout: Does Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures Increase Minority Voting?
Rene R. Rocha, Caroline J. Tolbert, Daniel C. Bowen and Christopher J. Clark
December 2010
ABSTRACT
The 2008 election marked an end to the longstanding gap in the level of black and white voter turnout, offering further evidence that minority empowerment affects voter turnout. In this article, the authors move beyond a dyadic conceptualization of empowerment and argue that the level of descriptive representation within the legislative body as a whole is crucial to understanding how context affects voter turnout. They find African Americans and Latinos are more likely to vote when residing in states with increased descriptive representation in the state legislature measured by the percentage of black or Latino lawmakers.
A New Measure of Group Influence in Presidential Elections: Assessing Latino Influence in 2008
Matt A. Barreto, Loren Collingwood, Sylvia Manzano
December 2010
ABSTRACT
The importance of the Latino electorate has been the subject of both academic inquiry and media discourses. The question of Latino influence is frequently limited by an approach that focuses on single variable considerations (e.g., voter turnout or ethnic-targeted campaign spending) that are often contest-specific idiosyncrasies. Relying on theoretically appropriate concepts, the authors measure Latino political influence as a function of three factors: in-group population traits, electoral volatility, and mobilization. Using the 2008 presidential election, the authors demonstrate the utility of incorporating a multifaceted measure that accounts for the contemporary complexity within the electoral environment. Because this framework is rooted in theoretical concepts, as opposed to discrete group or contest characteristics, it may be applied to any “influence group” in different electoral settings. Data are culled from several publicly available outlets, making it possible for scholars to replicate these measures and further investigate questions associated with group influence in American politics.
From Political Behavior
The Electoral Consequences of Skin Color: The “Hidden” Side of Race in Politics
Vesla M. Weaver
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Despite the significant role that skin color plays in material well-being and social perceptions, scholars know little if anything about whether skin color and afrocentric features influence political cognition and behavior and specifically, if intraracial variation in addition to categorical difference affects the choices of voters. Do more phenotypically black minorities suffer an electoral penalty as they do in most aspects of life? This study investigates the impact of color and phenotypically black facial features on candidate evaluation, using a nationally representative survey experiment of over 2000 whites. Subjects were randomly assigned to campaign literature of two opposing candidates, in which the race, skin color and features, and issue stance of candidates was varied. I find that afrocentric phenotype is an important, albeit hidden, form of bias in racial attitudes and that the importance of race on candidate evaluation depends largely on skin color and afrocentric features. However, like other racial cues, color and black phenotype don’t influence voters’ evaluations uniformly but vary in magnitude and direction across the gender and partisan makeup of the electorate in theoretically explicable ways. Ultimately, I argue, scholars of race politics, implicit racial bias, and minority candidates are missing an important aspect of racial bias.
From Political Psychology
The Minimal Cue Hypothesis: How Black Candidates Cue Race to Increase White Voting Participation
Gregory A. Petrow
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Racial group interests can compete in politics. One way competition may occur is when Black candidates cue racial thinking among Whites, leading to rivalry at the ballot box. I address this hypothesis with theories of identity, affect, and racial cognition. I argue that Black Congressional candidates cue these factors among Whites, leading the factors of White racial prejudice and White race liberalism to impact Whites’ voting participation. I employ logistic regression analysis of data from the American National Election Study in 1988, 1992, and 2000. The effects of racial prejudice on the predicted probability of voting occur among all Whites, as well as White Republicans, White Democrats, and White conservatives. The effects of White race liberalism occur among all Whites, as well as White Democrats and White liberals. The effects are strongest when Whites are in elections with Black candidates that are either challengers or in open seats.
From Politics and Society
Xenophobia and Left Voting
Kåre Vernby and Henning Finseraas
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In this article, the authors set out to evaluate two competing mechanisms that may account for the negative relationship between xenophobia and left voting. Xenophobia may reduce left voting because parties of the right are more conservative on issues relating to immigration and ethnic relations (the policy-bundling effect), or it may reduce left voting because many potential left voters lack sympathy with the groups to whom redistribution is thought to be directed (the anti-solidarity effect). These two mechanisms imply radically different scenarios for political competition. Using a multilevel modeling approach, the authors analyze the data compiled in fifteen different surveys carried out in ten Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries between 1990 and 2000. This study is the first to draw out the implications of these mechanisms for left voting and to subject them to empirical scrutiny in a large-scale comparative study. The results are consistent with the existence of a relatively strong policy-bundling effect; by contrast, the anti-solidarity effect is trivial in most of the surveys analyzed.
From Public Opinion Quarterly
Explaining Politics, Not Polls: Reexamining Macropartisanship with Recalibrated NES Data
James E. Campbell
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Like all surveys, the American National Election Studies (NES) imperfectly reflects population characteristics. There are well-known differences between actual and NES-reported turnout rates and between actual and NES-reported presidential vote divisions. This research seeks to determine whether the aggregate misrepresentation of turnout and vote choice affects the aggregate measurement of party identification: macropartisanship. After NES data are reweighted to correct for turnout and vote choice errors, macropartisanship is found to be more stable, to be less sensitive to short-term political conditions, and to have shifted more in the Republican direction in the early 1980s. The strength of partisanship also declined a bit more in the 1970s and rebounded a bit less in recent years than the uncorrected NES data indicate.
Generational Conflict Or Methodological Artifact? Reconsidering the Relationship between Age and Policy Attitudes in the U.S., 1984-2008
Andrew S. Fullerton and Jeffrey C. Dixon
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In light of claims of a generational conflict over age-specific policies and the current fiscal troubles of related governmental programs, this article examines Americans’ attitudes toward education, health, and Social Security spending through the use of a new methodology designed to uncover asymmetries in public opinion and disentangle age, period, and cohort effects. Based on generalized ordered logit models within a cross-classified fixed-effects framework using General Social Survey data between 1984 and 2008, we find little evidence consistent with gray peril and self-interest hypotheses suggesting that older people support spending for health care and Social Security but not education. The divide in attitudes toward education spending is the result of cohort–not age–effects. Yet these cohort effects extend to other attitudes and are asymmetrical: The so-called greatest generation (born around 1930 or earlier) is ambivalent about government spending and especially likely to say that we spend the “right amount” on health care. As people approach retirement age, they also become more likely to say that we spend the “right amount” on Social Security. The nuanced ways in which American public opinion is divided by age and cohort are uncovered only through the use of a new methodology that does not conceive of public support and opposition as symmetrical. Historical reasons for these divides, along with their contemporary implications, are discussed.
From The Forum
Advertising Trends in 2010
Erika Franklin Fowler and Travis N. Ridout
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Political advertising offers an important window on American campaigns and elections. We analyze a comprehensive database of political ads aired during the 2010 midterms to shed light on campaign strategies in this history-making election. We find that with the increase in competitive races in 2010, the volume of advertising rose too, as did its negativity. Moreover, we track the issues mentioned by each party, finding that while the parties agreed that employment was the top issue, there was also much divergence in issue priorities, with Republicans taking up some unlikely themes such as health care and “change.” The high volume of advertising in 2010 suggests a greater potential for voter learning, but the high levels of ad negativity could have had both positive and negative consequences on the electorate.
The Citizens United Election? Or Same As It Ever Was?
Michael M. Franz
December 2010
ABSTRACT
In January 2010, the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC overturned long-standing regulations governing the role of unions and corporations in sponsoring pro-candidate advocacy. Many predicted a deleterious effect on the electoral process. In the aftermath of the midterm elections, a number of questions deserve consideration. Was the observed level of outside spending abnormally high in 2010? What can we say about the potential effect of outside spending on the outcomes of House and Senate races? Moreover, what has the decision done to the power of parties and, most especially, their ability to compete with special interests in backing federal candidates? This paper investigates these questions using data from the Wesleyan Media Project, which tracked political ads in 2010. The initial evidence suggests that while interest groups were aggressive players in the air war, their impact may not have been as negative or as large as initially predicted.
Voter Turnout in the 2010 Midterm Election
Michael P. McDonald
December 2010
ABSTRACT
I place national turnout rates in historical perspective and investigate what state turnout rates may tell us about what factors are related to higher levels of voter participation. In midterm elections compared to presidential election, voter turnout is lower among all groups, but more so for young people. I discuss the implications of younger citizens’ disengagement in midterm elections in light of an increasing gap in support for the political parties’ candidates among the young and the old.
The Dynamics of Voter Preferences in the 2010 Congressional Midterm Elections
Costas Panagopoulos
December 2010
ABSTRACT
This article examines campaign dynamics and the evolution of voter preferences for congressional candidates during the 2010 midterm election cycle. Using national pre-election polls of registered voters, I show that there was meaningful change in voter preferences over the course of the campaign and that support for Democratic contenders declined considerably between early March and Election Day. The evidence I present also reveals growing support for Republican contenders was linked to developments during the campaign period. Specifically, the erosion in Obama approval, deterioration in national economic conditions and the passage of the health reform legislation appeared to fuel the Democratic downturn.
The 2010 Elections: Party Pursuits, Voter Perceptions, and the Chancy Game of Politics
Jeffrey M. Stonecash
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Forming party strategy is never easy because of the uncertainty of how the electorate will react. In 2009 and 2010, Democrats sought to address two major problems – the economy and health insurance – and hoped they would get credit for responding effectively. Quite the opposite occurred. Forming party strategy remains an art.


Lieberman’s Retirement

Sen. Joe Lieberman, one of the most unusual figures in American political history, made it official today, announcing he would not run for a fifth term in 2012. Most observers noted accurately that he did not have any feasible path to victory, with both Democrats and Republicans lining up to challenge him (his independent win in 2006 was heavily attributable to a virtually non-existent Republican candidacy).
It was an appropriate if bitter end to Lieberman’s electoral career. I’ll have more to say about this at a later date, but Lieberman’s trajectory since his appearance on the Democratic ticket in 2000 has been in the steady direction of representing traditions he’s misinterpreted, and constituencies that no longer exist. It was fitting that when he crossed every line of political propriety and endorsed the Republican ticket in 2008, he embraced his friend John McCain precisely when McCain was reinventing his own political identity at the behest of the conservative movement, which in turn vetoed Lieberman as a possible running-mate.
My personal interaction with Lieberman was well back in the day, when he was an exceptionally sunny personality who was perhaps the Senate’s most reliable advocate of the Clintonian tendency in Democratic politics. I never saw up-close the reportedly bitter man who never got over his failed presidential campaign in 2004 and his lost primary challenge in 2006, blaming Democrats for turning their backs on him and on the “JFK tradition” in the party (which he cited once again in his retirement announcement). He never seemed to reflect much on the fact that others had legitimate claims to represent that tradition, making his own isolation largely self-imposed.
In any event, those Democrats who remember his earlier days in politics are rightly pleased that he managed one fine moment before announcing his retirement. In championing repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” he did stand for the vindication of both justice and the popular will against the depredations of partisan politics. That, along with his mistakes, will be part of his complicated legacy.


Judis on the Origins of Today’s GOP

The ever-estimable John Judis has written a must-read piece for The New Republic that casts a great deal of light on the antecedants of the contemporary Republican Party, showing its roots in the anti-New Deal “conservative coalition” of the 1930s. Here’s a key nugget:

If the conservative coalition’s aims and tactics sound awfully familiar to us now, that’s because the conservative coalition of the 1930s was the Republican Party of today. Like the contemporary GOP, it described the threat from liberalism in alien terms–as the product of communism or fascism that had been imported from Europe; it was obsessed with strict fealty to an anachronistic reading of the Constitution; it wielded Congress’s investigatory power in order to frustrate the administration; it simultaneously advocated balanced budgets and tax cuts (then, as now, a maddeningly illogical position); and it used an economic downturn to argue against government spending, even though that downturn was caused by Roosevelt’s decision to cut spending, not his New Deal programs.
But there was one crucial difference between the conservative coalition and contemporary Republicans: The former was not a political party, and this imposed limits on what it could do.

It’s now part of the CW that the two parties became vastly more ideological from the 1960s on, and that the GOP is the more ideological of the two parties. But what becomes apparent from Judis’ piece is how literally the conservative GOP is aping the policies and attitudes of the bipartisan conservatives of a bygone era–with the added dynamic of the ability to use party discipline to impose ideological conformity and block progressive legislation.
Democrats have often accused Republicans of wanting to repeal the New Deal. In many cases, this has represented little more than partisan hyperbole. Not any more. The most powerful voices in the conservative movement today are taking up the battle against FDR that their forebears fought and ultimately lost–at least for three-quarters of a century. And thanks to party unity, their media tribunes, and enhanced tools of obstruction, they are stronger than ever.


Enhancing “civility” in politics is too broad a goal to be enforceable by public pressure and “eliminating threats of violence” is too narrow to stop extremist rhetoric. Here’s a proposal for what opponents of extremist political oratory should demand.

President Obama’s memorial speech in Tucson has established a solid foundation for the creation of new social norms to reduce the role of violent extremist political rhetoric in American public life. But our politics will quickly revert to its previous state if political commentators and politicians cannot define a clear and reasonably unambiguous “line in the sand” between what should be considered acceptable in political discourse and what should be viewed as unacceptable.
One social norm that is already emerging is that specific threats of violence are simply no longer acceptable. It is unlikely that we will hear overtly threatening remarks again anytime soon about “meeting census surveyors at the door with shotguns”, or “watering the tree of liberty with blood” in mainstream political discourse. Nor are we likely to see men appearing at political rallies with assault weapons strapped to their backs without there being serious and strenuous outcry. Among elected officials there will for some time probably even be a self-imposed ban on “humorous” remarks about “my close friends Smith and Wesson” or coy references to “second amendment remedies” that imply the threat of using guns and violence to achieve political goals.
This in itself will certainly be healthy, but it will not prevent the gradual (or not so gradual) return of the kind of rhetoric that portrays politics as a desperate, life or death struggle between literally evil and subversive, “un-American opponents of freedom and liberty” on the one hand and “heroic patriots” standing against them on the other (in the comparable left-wing rhetorical framework the dichotomy is between embattled “defenders of traditional democratic values” and “racist, right-wing crypto-fascists”). Simply creating a norm against clear threats of violence will not by itself reverse the broader “climate of hate” or “lack of civility” in politics.
Yet neither a “climate of hate” nor a “lack of civility” are sufficiently precise to create a clear new social norm. In fact, because of this imprecision, they are already being subject to criticism and even ridicule on the grounds that “politics is necessarily passionate” and “metaphors don’t kill people, people kill people.” A number of conservative commentators have dismissed the notions as typical nanny-state political correctness run amok.
As a result, we need a standard that reasonable people can consistently apply and insist upon — one that distinguishes what is acceptable from what is not acceptable.
Politics as Warfare, Political Opponents as “Enemies”
For some time TDS has been arguing that there are two key concepts that lie at the root of both political extremism and the climate of violence: The notions of politics as warfare and political opponents as enemies. This is how a TDS Strategy Memo put it last year:

For most Americans, the most critical — and in fact the defining — characteristic of “political extremism” – whether left or right – is the approval of violence as a means to achieve political goals. Opinions on issues, no matter how “extreme” or irrational they may be do not by themselves necessarily make a person a dangerous “extremist.” Whether opinions are crackpot (e.g. abolish all paper money) or repulsive (e.g. non-whites should be treated as sub-humans) extreme political opinions are not in and of themselves incitements to or justifications for violence.
As a result, there is actually one very clear and unambiguous way to define a genuinely “extremist” political ideology — it is any ideology that justifies or incites violence.
Underlying all extremist political ideologies are two central ideas – the vision of “politics as warfare” and “political opponents as enemies.” While these notions are widely used as metaphors, political extremists mean them in an entirely concrete and operational way. It is a view that is codified in the belief that political opponents are literally “enemies” who must be crushed rather than fellow Americans with different opinions with whom negotiated political compromises must be sought.


Here We Go Again With the Fairness Doctrine “Threat”

When I heard in the wake of the Tucson shootings that Jim Clyburn had said something about bringing back the “Fairness Doctrine” (the long-lapsed FCC regulation requiring that broadcasters offer “equal time” to controversial political content), I literally groaned aloud. “Oh God,” I thought, “that’s all it will take to keep that conspiracy theory alive for another year or two.”
Sure enough, Rush Limbaugh and company were off to the races, as reported by Politico‘s Keach Hagey:

When some liberals called for reining in harsh political rhetoric after the Arizona shootings, Rep. Jim Clyburn (D-S.C.) took it one step further. He called for bringing back the Fairness Doctrine, in what was widely considered an attempt to clamp down on talk radio.
A week later, those calls have abated, and no one is seriously pursuing the idea of returning to the long-defunct policy, which required media on the public airwaves to present both sides of controversial political issues. Not Clyburn, not another Democrat who echoed his call for regulatory remedies, Rep. Louise Slaughter (N.Y.), and not the Federal Communications Commission, whose chairman opposes reinstating the policy.
But you wouldn’t know it from listening to conservative talk radio.
Conservative talkers like Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck and Sean Hannity are rallying their listeners with a very old — and very successful — battle cry, accusing the left of trying to curb their free speech.
“So believe me, I wouldn’t be surprised, folks, if somebody in the Obama regime or some FCC bureaucrat or some Democrat congressperson has already written up legislation to stifle and eliminate conservative speech, and that legislation is sitting in a desk drawer someplace just waiting for the right event to clamp down because that’s what all this is,” Limbaugh said Monday, in his first show since the shooting. “And every time an event like this happens, they get into a trial run in hopes that this is the one that they can succeed in shutting us all down.”
This theme remained a constant on talk radio, conservative blogs and Fox News throughout the week….

Never mind that the “threat” is totally not-happening. Never mind that even if the Fairness Doctrine were brought back, it would involve “equal time,” not the suppression or elimination of conservative gabbing. Never mind that even in that remote contingency, it would only apply to the increasingly less-dominant broadcast media, not to “speech.” And never mind that when the Fairness Doctrine was in effect, there was plenty of conservative advocacy abroad in the land.
Rush’s lurid suggestion that the Obama administration was looking for “the right event to clamp down” and that Clyburn was cleverly and with vast secret backing conducting a “trial run” by bringing the subject up represented a bit more than the now-habitual effort to make purveyors of extremist rhetoric the victims of the Tucson tragedy. He was stopping just short of the analogy which you can see in comment threads all over the right-wing blogosphere: that “the Left” is looking for a “Reichstag Fire” with which to justify a totalitarian takeover of the country, just like you-know-who did back in 1933.
No informed and sane conservative believes this crap, even for a moment. But Rush and Glenn and Sean–not to mention the authors of countless viral emails shrieking about the Fairness Doctrine for at least two years now–play with fears of imminent totalitarianism regularly, and it’s about time folks on the Right called them on it. Aside from unnecessarily scaring the folks who hear and trust this stuff, it must be noted that such fearmongering has the collatoral effect of stimulating the sort of insurrectionary sentiments that genuine totalitarian threats might legitimately raise. And it’s an especially bad time to be doing that.


Why the Right Should Be Reading MLK

It’s noteworthy that the annual holiday set aside to commemorate the life and work of Dr. Martin Luther King has come this year immediately after a horrific act of violence in Arizona, and at the end of a brief and not very edifying debate over the relationship between violent political rhetoric and actual violence.
Unfortunately, most conservative activists probably aren’t much in the habit of reflecting on the teachings of MLK. Some appear to think that “color-blindness” was his enduring legacy; others, that he is simply a historical figure who contributed to the dismantlement of Jim Crow, and is not terribly relevant today. I vividly recall seeing posters around Denver during the 2008 Democratic Convention (erroneously) claiming MLK as a Republican. Above all, many conservatives–along with millions of liberals, moderates, and non-political folk–probably think of MLK Day as simply an ethnic holiday for African-Americans.
You might imagine that some of MLK’s writings that were addressed to the conservatives of his day–say, Letter from a Birmingham Jail, or Paul’s Letter to American Christians, would be useful reading right now. But contemporary conservatives are not at all in the same psychological space as their forebears in the 1950s and 1960s, who were defensively protecting an unjust status quo on grounds that it represented a lesser of evils or a condition best left to fade away slowly. No, for the most part today’s American Right is in a counterrevolutionary mood, viewing the status quo as representing the intolerable consequences of liberal policies and political victories.
But for that very reason, ironically enough, King’s many injunctions to the progressives of his day to strictly eschew violence, stand for the universalist principles of America’s civic and religious traditions, and seek reconciliation rather than self-righteous vengence, seem more appropriate reading material for the Right than for the Left (though the latter need constant reminders as well).
Now it’s true that most conservatives have never embraced violence as a means to the changes they seek in public policies, and that many are careful to avoid demonization of opponents or appeals to “higher laws” that sometimes are used to justify violence or other extraordinary measures. While they may sincerely believe that lower taxes on “job-producers” or a scaling-back of the New Deal and Great Society safety net or war with Iran and North Korea are essential to America’s future, they don’t necessarily view those who disagree with them as un-American or illegitimate.
But there’s simply no denying that there has been a significant rise on the Right in just the last few years in the numbers of those who may not openly advocate domestic violence, but defend the recourse to violence as a trump card in the defense of what they view as immutable principles of governance, economics and national security; that’s the unavoidable meaning of talk about “second Amendment remedies” and secession, or of liberals as “a Terrorist Fifth Column” or as “looters.” And that’s in addition to those conservatives who believe legalized abortion is an ongoing “Holocaust” defended by the latter-day equivalents of the Nazis, or that separation of church and state represents persecution of Christians and an attack on civilization itself.
To those on the Right who are flirting with violence and hatred even if they cannot justly be accused of abetting hate crimes, a good immersion in King’s writings would be a very good idea. And a good place to start might be what King had to say on the power of nonviolence:

[T]he nonviolent resister does not seek to humiliate or defeat the opponent but to win his friendship and understanding.

Nonviolence doesn’t always “work” to achieve immediate social or political objectives. But it does always provide a safeguard against the blindness and bitterness that hatred sows when civic conflict becomes war and opponents become enemies.