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The Democratic Strategist

Political Strategy for a Permanent Democratic Majority

Month: September 2006

GOP Bets Big On Negative Attack Ads

Republican campaigns are expected to set a new standard for negative attack ads in the weeks ahead, according to Jim VandeHei and Chris Cillizza’s Sunday WaPo article “In a Pivotal Year, GOP Plans to Get Personal: Millions to Go to Digging Up Dirt on Democrats.” According to the authors,

The National Republican Congressional Committee, which this year dispatched a half-dozen operatives to comb through tax, court and other records looking for damaging information on Democratic candidates, plans to spend more than 90 percent of its $50 million-plus advertising budget on what officials described as negative ads.
The hope is that a vigorous effort to “define” opponents, in the parlance of GOP operatives, can help Republicans shift the midterm debate away from Iraq and limit losses this fall.

Some ads are already running, and Cilliza and VandeHei cite examples, including an attack on a Democratic House candidate’s medical practice for suing 80 patients for non-payment of bills and Ohio Democratic Senate candidate Sherrod Brown’s votes on border protection and illegal immigration.
How dirty will it get? Expect the worst, suggests MyDD’s Matt Stoller, who comments on the track record of RNC oppo research director Terry Nelson:

In 2002, he was deputy Chief of Staff at the RNC, where he became wrapped up in Tom Delay’s TRMPAC money laundering scandal as a key point of contact between the RNC and Delay’s Texas PAC. He also testified in the trial of convicted GOP operative James Tobin for illegal phone jamming in New Hampshire, because he was Tobin’s supervisor when Tobin illegally spammed Democratic phone banks on election day.

None of this comes as much of a surprise. But Democratic campaign strategists should prepare their candidates for the most intense negative ad campaigns ever and to respond aggressively. Reading the aforementioned articles is a good start.


New Democracy Corps Survey on Nat. Security

New Democracy Corps Survey on Nat. Security
by Scott Winship
Democracy Corps — part of boss Stan Greenberg’s vast polling empire — released a strategy memo yesterday based on a new national security survey they conducted last month. You’ll be hearing more about this survey this fall, but for now you can check out the memo and some top-line survey findings.
The Republicans are basically in no better shape now than they were on Memorial Day. In the aggregate, Democrats hold a narrow lead when respondents are asked which of the named candidates they will vote for in Congressional elections. Over 6 in 10 likely voters think the country is headed in the wrong direction, basically unchanged from recent months (the steady increase since 9/11 having plateaued). Fifty-five percent of likely voters disapprove of Bush’s performance. The number who approve — 41 percent — is smaller than the number who strongly disapprove (45 percent). In the fifty most-competitive districts, the number who strongly disapprove rose from 36 percent to 47 percent. In these districts, Democrats’ aggregate lead is growing and has reached a majority of likely voters.
The GOP has tried to use gay marriage and immigration as issues to fire up their base and flip swing voters, but “illegal immigration” comes in 7th on a list of most important issues, and “moral values” comes in 9th. Iraq and terrorism are basically tied for most important. Want to guess which of these the Administration will try to exploit this fall?
Many Democratic critiques of the Bush Administration’s Iraq policies resonate with the public, including charges of mismanagement of the war, the assertion that it has no plan moving forward, and the accusation that Iraq has taken away from the effectiveness of the war on terrorism.
But there are a few reasons for worry. Half of the Democracy Corps sample was asked whether they felt warm or cool toward “the Republican Congress” and half about “the Congress”. While just 26 percent were warm toward “the Congress”, 38 percent were warm toward “the Republican Congress”. This is the opposite of what we’d expect to see if voters were mainly fed up with the GOP. And corruption ranked dead last among ten issues when respondents were asked which were most important to their vote.
Furthermore, the number of voters indicating that terrorism was one of their top two concerns jumped 9 percentage points since the spring. And even though their advantage has declined, Republicans are still trusted more on this fundamental issue, 48 to 33 percent. The DCorps memo emphasizes that Democrats narrow these gaps after respondents are given security questions that contrast the Democratic and Republican messages, especially among Independents and in swing districts. But even then Republicans lead Democrats on terrorism and national security (nationally and among Independents) or are tied with them (in swing districts). Democrats are given the edge in terms of who would do a better job in Iraq only by a two-point margin (not statistically different from a tie).
The memo recommends an emphasis on changing the course in Iraq, implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, working toward energy independence, rebuilding international ties, and demanding accountability for Republicans failure to prioritize keeping America safe.
I think that if the election were held today, I’d feel pretty good about our chances. But I do worry that the Administration can create political traps — such as the one in the making regarding the move of al Qaida leaders to Guantanamo and the Administration’s demand for military tribunals. I also worry that the real-world competition between Democratic and Republican messages is poorly captured by the poll-testing of head-to-head position statements. The Democrats’ position on Iraq matches the public, but the public doesn’t give either party the edge on future plans there, and it trusts the GOP more on terrorism. Haven’t I seen this movie before? I don’t remember that it has a happy ending. Hope the sequel is better….


New Democracy Corps Survey on Nat. Security

by Scott Winship
Democracy Corps — part of boss Stan Greenberg’s vast polling empire — released a strategy memo yesterday based on a new national security survey they conducted last month. You’ll be hearing more about this survey this fall, but for now you can check out the memo and some top-line survey findings.
The Republicans are basically in no better shape now than they were on Memorial Day. In the aggregate, Democrats hold a narrow lead when respondents are asked which of the named candidates they will vote for in Congressional elections. Over 6 in 10 likely voters think the country is headed in the wrong direction, basically unchanged from recent months (the steady increase since 9/11 having plateaued). Fifty-five percent of likely voters disapprove of Bush’s performance. The number who approve — 41 percent — is smaller than the number who strongly disapprove (45 percent). In the fifty most-competitive districts, the number who strongly disapprove rose from 36 percent to 47 percent. In these districts, Democrats’ aggregate lead is growing and has reached a majority of likely voters.
The GOP has tried to use gay marriage and immigration as issues to fire up their base and flip swing voters, but “illegal immigration” comes in 7th on a list of most important issues, and “moral values” comes in 9th. Iraq and terrorism are basically tied for most important. Want to guess which of these the Administration will try to exploit this fall?
Many Democratic critiques of the Bush Administration’s Iraq policies resonate with the public, including charges of mismanagement of the war, the assertion that it has no plan moving forward, and the accusation that Iraq has taken away from the effectiveness of the war on terrorism.
But there are a few reasons for worry. Half of the Democracy Corps sample was asked whether they felt warm or cool toward “the Republican Congress” and half about “the Congress”. While just 26 percent were warm toward “the Congress”, 38 percent were warm toward “the Republican Congress”. This is the opposite of what we’d expect to see if voters were mainly fed up with the GOP. And corruption ranked dead last among ten issues when respondents were asked which were most important to their vote.
Furthermore, the number of voters indicating that terrorism was one of their top two concerns jumped 9 percentage points since the spring. And even though their advantage has declined, Republicans are still trusted more on this fundamental issue, 48 to 33 percent. The DCorps memo emphasizes that Democrats narrow these gaps after respondents are given security questions that contrast the Democratic and Republican messages, especially among Independents and in swing districts. But even then Republicans lead Democrats on terrorism and national security (nationally and among Independents) or are tied with them (in swing districts). Democrats are given the edge in terms of who would do a better job in Iraq only by a two-point margin (not statistically different from a tie).
The memo recommends an emphasis on changing the course in Iraq, implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, working toward energy independence, rebuilding international ties, and demanding accountability for Republicans failure to prioritize keeping America safe.
I think that if the election were held today, I’d feel pretty good about our chances. But I do worry that the Administration can create political traps — such as the one in the making regarding the move of al Qaida leaders to Guantanamo and the Administration’s demand for military tribunals. I also worry that the real-world competition between Democratic and Republican messages is poorly captured by the poll-testing of head-to-head position statements. The Democrats’ position on Iraq matches the public, but the public doesn’t give either party the edge on future plans there, and it trusts the GOP more on terrorism. Haven’t I seen this movie before? I don’t remember that it has a happy ending. Hope the sequel is better….


Ding Ding Ding…End of Round 1

by Scott Winship
With TDS editor Ruy Teixeira’s entry, the first round of our middle-class roundtable is complete. Look for a response from the authors of the original discussion piece in the next few days, as well as some additional reaction here and from around the web.


Clear ‘Identity’ Key to Dems’ Success

Gadflyer Paul Waldman has an op-ed in the Boston GlobeElections aren’t about issues,” arguing the primacy of identity as the key to future Democratic victories. As Waldman explains in the nut graph:

If there’s one thing Republicans have understood and Democrats haven’t, it is that politics is not about issues. Politics is about identity. The candidates and parties that win are not those aligning their positions most precisely with a majority of the electorate. The winners are those who form a positive image in the public mind of who they are (and a negative image of who their opponents are). Issues are a vehicle to create that identity, one that combines with symbolism and narrative to shape what the public thinks about when they think about Democrats and Republicans.

Waldman, author of Being Right Is Not Enough: What Progressives Must Learn From Conservative Success, makes a compelling case in clear, blunt language and his insights about strengthening Democratic campaigns deserve more attention.


Will the Real Middle Class Please Stand Up?

By Ruy Teixeira
Let me begin on a note of agreement with Kim, Solomon and Kessler (KSK): the Democrats have a very large problem with middle-class voters, particularly white middle-class voters. And crafting a potent economic message is key to reaching these voters. A better national security message and/or reassuring these voters on values issue will not be enough to enlist a critical mass of these voters in the Democratic camp.
They are also right that getting pummeled among white middle-class voters is a problem of large magnitude. As they correctly note, white middle-class (defined as those with between $30,000 and $75,000 in household income) voters are about a third (35 percent) of voters, according to the 2004 NEP exit poll. Note, however, that if we restrict our attention to “prime-age” voters (aged 25-59) or prime-age married voters in the white middle class, as they seem to urge us to do at one point in their analysis, the magnitude of the problem is reduced substantially (to 24 percent and 16 percent of the voters, respectively). Perhaps they need to decide which white middle-class voters they are really concerned with. A majority of white middle-class voters (54 percent) are either outside of the prime-age range or are not married. Does that make them not “real” white middle-class voters?
A further note: their statistics about the relatively high median incomes of prime-age households, prime-age married households and prime-age married households with two earners are obviously about all the households with such characteristics, not just those that fit their definition of middle class ($30,000-$75,000 in income). Citing these data in the context of a discussion about the middle class is therefore not strictly pertinent and actually somewhat misleading.
But these are relatively minor objections to their analysis. I am much more concerned with the following three questions about their argument.

  1. Do KSK correctly characterize the economic views of the white middle class?
  2. Do KSK correctly formulate an economic message that will resonate with these voters?
  3. Do KSK offer a set of policy prescriptions that make sense in light of the economic views of the white middle class and the economic message that is needed to reach them?

Do KSK Correctly Characterize the Economic Views of the White Middle Class?
KSK argue that the economic outlook of the white middle class is optimistic, not pessimistic. To support this claim, they cite some data showing that Americans, when it comes to their personal economic situation and future prospects, have an optimistic outlook.
I might quibble with some of the data they selected to bolster their case. But the point is nevertheless a reasonable one. In fact, I make the same point, along with my co-authors, Larry Mishel and David Kusnet, in our forthcoming Economic Policy Institute report, “Americans Discuss Economics: Bridging the Gap Between What Elites Say and What Everyday Americans Believe”. The report reviews public opinion data from the last decade and a half, including our own survey in the spring of 2006 specifically on the public’s economic views (the survey was sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation’s Economic Resiliency Group and will henceforth be referred to as the ERG survey). These data generally support what KSK say: the public does tend to view their own economic situation optimistically.
I might also quibble that the data they cite are not really about the white middle class but rather about the public in general. But that is less of a problem than it might seem. The views of white middle-class Americans typically do not deviate much from the views of the American public as a whole, so lacking crosstabular data, using the overall survey figure is a reasonable approximation. In fact, I will use the same strategy below, citing overall survey figures when I don’t have specific figures for the white middle class.
So my quarrel is not with the claim that the white middle class harbors considerable optimism about their personal economic situation. They do tend to see themselves getting by fairly well, given the economic circumstances they have to contend with, and do believe they will be able to better their economic situation over time.
But what of the economic circumstances they do have to contend with? Here is where my quarrel lies. It seems willfully obtuse of KSK to ignore the abundant evidence that Americans are quite pessimistic about the economic circumstances they have to deal with and how these circumstances make their struggle to get ahead a great deal harder, and their progress slower, than they would like.
Consider just a few recent examples (many earlier examples may be found in my forthcoming EPI report, referenced above). In the ERG survey, we asked respondents to choose between two statements characterizing today’s economy:

  1. Most people today face increasing uncertainty about employment, with stagnant incomes, paying more for health care, taxes, and retirement, while those at the top have booming incomes and lower taxes.
  2. Our economy faces ups and downs, but most people can expect to better themselves, see rising incomes, find good jobs and provide economic security for their families. The American dream is very much alive.

By 2:1 (64-32), respondents selected the first statement about increasing uncertainty as coming closer to their views. And among white middle class respondents, these pessimistic sentiments were actually slightly stronger (68-30).
Part of what drives these pessimistic sentiments is the sense that the social contract that used to underlie the U.S. economy has broken down, making it harder to attain a stable, economically secure middle-class life. For example, a June, 2006 Penn Schoen Berland poll for the Aspen Institute found 90 percent agreeing that “25 years ago, if you worked hard and played by the rules, you would be able to have a solid middle class life”, compared to only 49 percent who agreed this characterization was true today. Ninety percent also agreed that retirement today is far less secure than it used to be, because you need to fund retirement yourself, through IRAs and 401(k)s. In contrast, 82 percent agreed that “25 years ago you could retire in dignity and comfort because most people had company pensions”. And perhaps most startling, 80 percent agreed that “Today, with the costs of housing, healthcare, education and self-financed retirement, a middle class life has become unaffordable for most people”.
Similar findings come from an August, 2006 Pew Research Center survey, released this Labor Day. In that survey, they asked respondents to compare how the average working person was faring today as opposed to 20 or 30 years ago in a number of categories. On job security, 62 percent said there was less security, compared to 11 percent who said there was more and 24 percent who thought it was about the same. On how hard one has to work to earn a decent living, 59 percent said harder, 13 percent said not as hard and 26 percent said about as hard. Concerning on-the-job stress, the analogous figures were 69 more/6 less/22 same; concerning employer loyalty to employees, the figures were 56 less/6 more/33 same; concerning retirement benefits, the figures were 51 worse/16 better/27 same; and concerning employee benefits such as health insurance and vacations, the figures were 44 worse/24 better/26 same.
Clearly, there are widely-shared pessimistic sentiments about how well the economy is working for the typical American. Indeed, there is a sense that important aspects of our economy that used to serve the middle class well are now broken. It would be as silly for Democrats to ignore these data as it would be for them to ignore the data about Americans’ personal optimism. And it would be even goofier to argue that somehow only the optimistic data are “real” data and the pessimistic data are artifacts of question wording, survey timing and so on (or vice-versa).
No, I am afraid we shall have to accept the fact that Americans, including white middle-class Americans, are optimistic and pessimistic at the same time. That is, they are optimistic about their personal economic situation and believe they will be able to get ahead, even as they pessimistically recognize that the workings of today’s economy make their struggle, and that of people like them, much more difficult than it should be. The dual nature of this economic viewpoint may be summarized as follows.

  1. When it comes to their own individual and family situations, most people say that they are succeeding (and expect their kids to succeed), thanks to their hard work and personal sacrifice in the face of great obstacles. This allows them to tell a story where they and their families are the heroes and where their difficulties redound to their credit.
  2. But, when they talk about how the economy is actually performing for “people like me” or for the entire nation or for the next generation as a whole, people are more forthright and forthcoming about the challenges that they themselves face. Now, they are not pitying themselves; they are expressing concern for their children, their friends, their neighbors, their co-workers, and their fellow citizens.

This dual viewpoint is nicely illustrated by the relationship between two questions asked on the ERG survey. The first was given above: when respondents were asked whether a pessimistic or optimistic statement about how the economy was working was closer to their view; they chose the pessimistic statement by 64-32. The other asked whether respondents thought they would attain the American Dream within their lifetime or had already attained it; 69 percent optimistically said they would attain the Dream or had already attained. But this group that thought they had reached, or would reach, the Dream, nevertheless endorsed the pessimistic statement (“Most people today face increasing uncertainty about employment, with stagnant incomes, paying more for health care, taxes, and retirement, while those at the top have booming incomes and lower taxes.”) about today’s economy by 59-38!
What explains this seeming paradox? Part of the answer surely lies in the optimistic, aspirational nature of Americans as a people, who see themselves as being able to move ahead even when overall economic circumstances are difficult. But another part of the answer lies in the fact that most people, in fact, tend to gain more income as they get older and climb the “age-earnings profile”, even when the economy as a whole is performing poorly (see Larry Mishel’s contribution over at the The American Prospect version of this debate for a lucid discussion of this phenomenon). In other words, even though workers now “start lower and go up slower” than they did in the past (part of what colors people’s jaundiced view of today’s economy), they nevertheless do go up over time and this reality helps explain why they evaluate their personal trend line positively.
So it’s not “either-or”, it’s “both-and”. On to the next question.
Do KSK Correctly Formulate an Economic Message That Will Resonate With These Voters?
Stripped down to its essentials, KSK are clearly recommending that Democrats stop blathering so much about economic security and focus instead on economic opportunity. Arguments like this contribute to my occasional sense that Democrats can’t walk down the street and chew gum at the same time.
In light of the data reviewed above, it seems much more sensible to argue that Democrats should do both. Americans clearly want both more opportunity and more security–so why talk about just one of these? As KSK correctly point out, an economic message that boils down to “your life sucks, and here’s how we’re going to cushion your fall” is a loser, precisely because Americans do not see themselves that way and believe in their ability to get ahead. But equally a message that ignores the many ways in which Americans believe today’s economy promotes insecurity and constrains their ability to get ahead and that simply says “here are some tax breaks-go get ’em tiger!” will also seem out of touch.
In fact, Democrats should not only talk about both economic opportunity and security, they should link them together. The phrase Jacob Hacker and I use in a forthcoming American Prospect article is “providing security to expand opportunity”. Here’s a summary of our approach:

Add on top of the big causes of long-term insecurity your typical family’s struggle to cover steadily rising health care costs, get or safeguard health insurance coverage, pay for decent childcare while both parents are working and simultaneously put away enough savings in their 401(k) plans (if a family has one) for a comfortable retirement and you have a recipe for running in place, rather than moving ahead. Change becomes a foe, rather than a friend, despite the typical American’s strong belief in upward mobility.
Democrats’ job is to offer the struggling but hard-working and optimistic American family a way out. The general problem of economic security can be addressed by some sort of universal insurance program that, in exchange for a small premium, protects families against catastrophic declines in their economic situation (whether that be from suddenly-falling income or rising expenses). There is probably also a role here for personal accounts that would help families manage their expenses before they reached meltdown levels. Such accounts would be less regressive than those proposed by Bush and would include small annual (and on the birth of a child) progressive contributions from the government.
The details of a universal insurance approach, of course, can be complicated and one of the present authors has provided some. But for purposes of thinking about the Democrats’ message, the details are far less important than the general approach.
That is also true of the rest of the Democrats’ economic agenda. Efforts to increase health coverage (perhaps by expanding Medicare, which most Americans know and like) and contain health care costs (including prescription drugs), to improve the quality and availability of childcare, to defend (Social Security) and extend (a universal 401(k)) existing retirement benefits, and to make college and specialized training available to all are the subjects of countless and competing policy prescriptions. But the important thing is that these policies-whatever the details-should be put in the context of helping Americans get ahead. These are measures to allow the typical American family to raise its head from the day-to-day struggle to get by and concentrate on its most heartfelt wish: to better oneself, to move up in the world, to even become wealthy.

Sounds like a winner to me.
Do KSK Offer a Set of Policy Prescriptions That Make Sense in Light of the Economic Views of These Voters and the Economic Message That Is Needed to Reach Them?
Obviously, I am skeptical. There is certainly a place for some of the targeted tax breaks they advocate, and they are correct that if you want to reach the white middle class, you must, logically, advocate policies that would benefit them. Defending transfer payments and other programs that directly assist the poor, whatever their considerable virtues, will not be enough to convince middle-class voters that Democrats embrace their economic interests and are concerned about their struggle to get ahead.
But the targeted tax breaks they advocate do not seem particularly responsive to the magnitude of the structural economic problems middle-class families currently have to negotiate–problems which don’t just exist in the minds of progressive economists but are clearly recognized by these families themselves. These tax breaks would likely be underwhelming both in practice and in the perceptions of the very constituency they are designed to reach.
A better approach is the kind of universal programs suggested above. Universal programs have succeeded in the past in both substantially improving the country for everyone and convincing white middle-class voters that their economic aspirations are well-served by identifying with the Democratic Party. And, as John Halpin and I argue in our paper, “The Politics of Definition“, this approach would help build up a “common good” identity for the party that would be congenial to both white middle-class voters and the minority/labor/low-income/professional base of the Party.
In conclusion, I commend KSK for forcefully raising the importance of optimism and economic opportunity to the Democratic economic message. But their approach is too one-sided. Time for Democrats, including KSK, to give the lie to the idea they can’t walk down the street and chew gum at the same time. Walking and chewing: try it, you’ll like it!


Clear ‘Identity’ Key to Dems’ Success

Gadflyer Paul Waldman has an op-ed in the Boston GlobeElections aren’t about issues,” arguing the primacy of identity as the key to future Democratic victories. As Waldman explains in the nut graph:

If there’s one thing Republicans have understood and Democrats haven’t, it is that politics is not about issues. Politics is about identity. The candidates and parties that win are not those aligning their positions most precisely with a majority of the electorate. The winners are those who form a positive image in the public mind of who they are (and a negative image of who their opponents are). Issues are a vehicle to create that identity, one that combines with symbolism and narrative to shape what the public thinks about when they think about Democrats and Republicans.

Waldman, author of Being Right Is Not Enough: What Progressives Must Learn From Conservative Success, makes a compelling case in clear, blunt language and his insights about strengthening Democratic campaigns deserve more attention.


More Trouble With Comment Threads

A good while back I made a resolution not to blog about blogging more than once in a blue moon, and I’ve kept the resolution well enough that I literally can’t find my last post on the subject, after googling and scanning the site for about an hour. I do recall that this long-lost post explained why I don’t provide comment threads–which some folks consider essential for any legitimate progressive blog–mainly because I literally don’t have the time to read, much less manage, a significant number of comments. But at present, there’s quite a bit of buzz about comment threads in the blogosphere. Much of it is devoted to the recent incident over at The New Republic, which shut down a “culture blog” written by Lee Siegel after he got caught pseudonymously doing self-hagiographical posts in his own comment threads. And there’s continuing discussion (most recently by my colleague The Moose) about anti-semitic comments on progressive blog sites and whether their managers are sufficiently policing them. Siegel’s stunt struck me as reflecting more of a psychological disorder than some sort of massive violation of blogospheric ethics; you have to wonder how many other bloggers have succumbed to the temptation to stuff their own ballot box with self-praise. But it does raise obvious questions about the function of comment threads. Their ostensible purpose is to allow readers to “comment” on primary posts. But as anyone knows who slogs through comment threads, particularly at high-traffic sites, threads typically drift into collateral and then non-collateral topics. And there is clearly a hardy band of frequent commenters who drift from site to site; who know each other’s views; and who often conduct long-running debates that have little or nothing to do with the posts on which they are “commenting.” I have no inherent objection to this practice, but would observe that comment threads in many cases simply offer a way for non-bloggers to blog without the muss and fuss of running a site or creating diaries on the sites that offer them. The topic of objectionable content on comment threads is more important and troublesome. I agree with Kevin Drum that it’s fundamentally unfair to tar whole sites, much less whole categories of bloggers, with occasional disgusting views as expressed in comment threads. The Moose is making the somewhat different claim that blog proprietors aren’t doing enough to rid their sites of anti-semitic comments. I dunno about that. Most of the big progressive sites have an elaborate (and to me largely incomprehensible) machinery of policies and technological tools to police comments threads, and do regularly “ban” posters who violate the policies chronically. But they don’t, and probably can’t, instantly expunge comments that express objectionable prejudices, in part because it’s not always easy to draw the line between, say, objections to the U.S. alliance with Israel, and genuine anti-semitic utterances, even though they may often overlap.As it happens, I once (successfully) urged Josh Marshall to ban a guy from comments at TPMCafe who was constantly popping up (not just there, but all over the blogosphere) to claim that anyone he disagreed with on virtually any topic was, in fact, acting as an agent of AIPAC, a.k.a. “the Israel Lobby.” I contacted Josh after about the fifth time this jerk breezily announced that the DLC existed purely and simply as an AIPAC front. My objection was not exactly that he was expressing anti-semitic opinions, though he likely holds them; it was that his comments weren’t expressions of opinion at all, but completely unsupported statements of “fact” that were actually lies, and had to be either conscious lies or products of a deep delusion, since he had no idea what he was talking about. Seems to me this might not be a bad rule of thumb for the general treatment of possibly anti-semitic content on blog sites. After all, the diseased heart of all classic anti-semitism is the stubborn claim that Jews exercise shadowy and disproportionate influence by way of a conspiracy that has ensnared or corrupted the gentiles who ostensibly are in charge of governments and opinion-leading media. If, God forbid, I were in charge of a comment thread, I wouldn’t have a beef with people who wanted to argue that America’s alliance with Israel is not in our national interest. But there are dozens of reasons for the strong pro-Israeli tradition in U.S. foreign policy–reasons that range from coldly rational analysis to all sorts of ideological and cultural affinities. It would exist if there were no AIPAC, and no high-profile Jews writing about the Middle East. So I’d bounce anybody from a comment thread that resorted to the “Jewish cabal” kind of argument. It’s a short distance from there to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. And quite frankly, that point of view has been aired more than enough over the centuries, with horrific consequences.


Ideology, Foreign Policy, and Yellow Submarines

by Scott Winship
Let me take you down, ’cause I’m going to….review a paper by one Paul T. McCartney. (Hey Jude, I never claimed to be the Daily Humorist.)
For real though. Let’s talk about a paper presented at last weekend’s annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Not just any ol’ paper, but Sir Paul’s “Partisan Worldviews and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era.” The paper tackles the question of whether there really is such a thing as an ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans on foreign policy. That is, can it be said in the post-Cold War period that Democrats and Republicans consistently prioritize different values that lead them to embrace different foreign policies? Is there something about the Administration’s foreign policy that is “conservative”, or does it simply reflect the particular views of the Administration itself? Is Democratic electoral weakness on foreign policy due to framing or past decisions by Democratic leaders, or is it a consequence of the Party’s basic ideology in foreign affairs? Different answers to these questions imply different political strategies.
McCartney’s review of the more general “culture war” literature and literatures oriented toward national security positions leads him to identify two worldviews that govern foreign policy preferences. The Inclusive Pluralist worldview is analogous to George Lakoff’s Nuturant Parent worldview; both emphasize cooperation and empathy and reject blind authoritarianism and moral absolutism. Lakoff’s Strict Father worldview mirrors McCartney’s Nationalist-Darwinist worldview. In both cases, the emphasis is on strength, competition, self-interest, submission to authority, and respect for tradition.
McCartney took all of the Key Votes related to foreign policy — as chosen by Congressional Quarterly editors — between 1989 and 2004 and coded them to indicate which position was Inclusive Pluralist and which was Nationalist-Darwinist. He then examined how the votes mapped onto legislators’ parties. Each year, between 60 and 92 percent of Democrats voted the IP position, while just 8 to 64 percent of Republicans did. The gap between Democratic and Republican legislators ranged from 9 to 64 percentage points, with the average across years being 37 points.
There was one exception to these results — in 2001 Republicans were actually more likely than Democrats to vote the IP position. That’s because in the wake of 9/11, most Democrats voted for N-D policies (i.e., related to the Patriot Act) while Republicans were more likely to vote the IP position on Fast-Track Trade Authority (i.e., pro-free trade). McCartney classifies the pro-free trade position as IP because it indicates support for a cooperative arrangement that benefits poor countries. In this case, the domestic Nurturant Parent/Strict Father worldviews conflict with and win out over the foreign policy IP/N-D worldviews. The same is true for one immigration vote in 1998.
I would go a step further than McCartney and argue that there are three fundamental value dimensions underlying the domestic and foreign policy worldviews (and therefore all policy preferences): altruism vs. self-interest (How much do I care about others versus myself?), idealism vs. realism (How practical is it for me to pursue these priorities?), and classical liberalism vs. traditionalism (Is it legitimate for me to pursue these priorities?). Inclusive Pluralism and economic liberalism at home combine altruism and idealism, while cultural liberalism rests on classical liberalism. The foreign policy preferences of establishment Republicans as well as economic conservatism can be seen as reflecting self-interest and realism. Nationalist conservatives like Pat Buchanan add a dose of traditionalism. Cultural conservatives value traditionalism above all. Domestic neoconservatives of the ’60s and ’70s can be viewed as altruistic realists who wanted to believe in social programs but could not. They eventually also embraced traditionalism. Finally, the foreign policy neoconservatives of recent decades blend self-interest and idealism.
Analyses like McCartney’s help explain why Democrats have electoral problems related to their cultural liberalism and their national security views. Fairly or not, the Party is perceived to put too much of a priority on the rights and interests of other nations rather than advocating a strong self-interested foreign policy. And their stance on key “values issues” challenges the traditionalism of many voters. Because of the basic values underlying each party’s worldview and the policies the parties have supported over time, voters have become sorted into two camps, one of which embodies both traditionalism and self-interest and one of which values classical liberalism and altruism.
One final thought — like cultural polarization, foreign-policy polarization is a recent phenomenon. The ’60s marked the arrival of the culturally-loaded controversies that would reshape the parties in subsequent decades as well as the breakdown of Cold War liberalism as a unifying foreign policy doctrine. Vietnam activated the altruistism, idealism, and anti-authoritarianism of young liberals and changed American politics. It is interesting to ponder what might have been if early war protestors had been more traditional or if anti-authoritarian youth had entered politics without the backdrop of the war. Perhaps we’d be looking at a gap in only one policy area rather than two.


Ideology, Foreign Policy, and Yellow Submarines

by Scott Winship
Let me take you down, ’cause I’m going to….review a paper by one Paul T. McCartney. (Hey Jude, I never claimed to be the Daily Humorist.)
For real though. Let’s talk about a paper presented at last weekend’s annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Not just any ol’ paper, but Sir Paul’s “Partisan Worldviews and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era.” The paper tackles the question of whether there really is such a thing as an ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans on foreign policy. That is, can it be said in the post-Cold War period that Democrats and Republicans consistently prioritize different values that lead them to embrace different foreign policies? Is there something about the Administration’s foreign policy that is “conservative”, or does it simply reflect the particular views of the Administration itself? Is Democratic electoral weakness on foreign policy due to framing or past decisions by Democratic leaders, or is it a consequence of the Party’s basic ideology in foreign affairs? Different answers to these questions imply different political strategies.
McCartney’s review of the more general “culture war” literature and literatures oriented toward national security positions leads him to identify two worldviews that govern foreign policy preferences. The Inclusive Pluralist worldview is analogous to George Lakoff’s Nuturant Parent worldview; both emphasize cooperation and empathy and reject blind authoritarianism and moral absolutism. Lakoff’s Strict Father worldview mirrors McCartney’s Nationalist-Darwinist worldview. In both cases, the emphasis is on strength, competition, self-interest, submission to authority, and respect for tradition.
McCartney took all of the Key Votes related to foreign policy — as chosen by Congressional Quarterly editors — between 1989 and 2004 and coded them to indicate which position was Inclusive Pluralist and which was Nationalist-Darwinist. He then examined how the votes mapped onto legislators’ parties. Each year, between 60 and 92 percent of Democrats voted the IP position, while just 8 to 64 percent of Republicans did. The gap between Democratic and Republican legislators ranged from 9 to 64 percentage points, with the average across years being 37 points.
There was one exception to these results — in 2001 Republicans were actually more likely than Democrats to vote the IP position. That’s because in the wake of 9/11, most Democrats voted for N-D policies (i.e., related to the Patriot Act) while Republicans were more likely to vote the IP position on Fast-Track Trade Authority (i.e., pro-free trade). McCartney classifies the pro-free trade position as IP because it indicates support for a cooperative arrangement that benefits poor countries. In this case, the domestic Nurturant Parent/Strict Father worldviews conflict with and win out over the foreign policy IP/N-D worldviews. The same is true for one immigration vote in 1998.
I would go a step further than McCartney and argue that there are three fundamental value dimensions underlying the domestic and foreign policy worldviews (and therefore all policy preferences): altruism vs. self-interest (How much do I care about others versus myself?), idealism vs. realism (How practical is it for me to pursue these priorities?), and classical liberalism vs. traditionalism (Is it legitimate for me to pursue these priorities?). Inclusive Pluralism and economic liberalism at home combine altruism and idealism, while cultural liberalism rests on classical liberalism. The foreign policy preferences of establishment Republicans as well as economic conservatism can be seen as reflecting self-interest and realism. Nationalist conservatives like Pat Buchanan add a dose of traditionalism. Cultural conservatives value traditionalism above all. Domestic neoconservatives of the ’60s and ’70s can be viewed as altruistic realists who wanted to believe in social programs but could not. They eventually also embraced traditionalism. Finally, the foreign policy neoconservatives of recent decades blend self-interest and idealism.
Analyses like McCartney’s help explain why Democrats have electoral problems related to their cultural liberalism and their national security views. Fairly or not, the Party is perceived to put too much of a priority on the rights and interests of other nations rather than advocating a strong self-interested foreign policy. And their stance on key “values issues” challenges the traditionalism of many voters. Because of the basic values underlying each party’s worldview and the policies the parties have supported over time, voters have become sorted into two camps, one of which embodies both traditionalism and self-interest and one of which values classical liberalism and altruism.
One final thought — like cultural polarization, foreign-policy polarization is a recent phenomenon. The ’60s marked the arrival of the culturally-loaded controversies that would reshape the parties in subsequent decades as well as the breakdown of Cold War liberalism as a unifying foreign policy doctrine. Vietnam activated the altruistism, idealism, and anti-authoritarianism of young liberals and changed American politics. It is interesting to ponder what might have been if early war protestors had been more traditional or if anti-authoritarian youth had entered politics without the backdrop of the war. Perhaps we’d be looking at a gap in only one policy area rather than two.